JUDGMENT Per V.K. Sharma, J. The State is in appeal against acquittal of the respondent (accused) for the offences, under Sections 302, 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’), vide judgment dated 29.9.2006, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi (H.P.) in Sessions Trial No. 21/2004 / 78/2005, State of Himachal Pradesh versus Manohar Lal. 2.The gravamen of charge against the accused was that after his marriage with Reena Devi (deceased) in the year 2001, he subjected her to cruelty, in connection with unlawful demands for dowry and ultimately committed her murder/ dowry death on 5.4.2004, at about 6.15 p.m., by sprinkling kerosene oil on her and burning her to death in the matrimonial home. 3. Briefly stated, facts of the prosecution case are that on 5.4.2004, at about 6 p.m., the deceased suffered extensive burn injuries in the matrimonial home, where the accused was also present. She was taken to Community Health Centre (CHC), Baldwara in District Mandi and then to District Hospital, Bilaspur on the same day. On receipt of information from the hospital at Bilaspur, PW-9 HC Hari Ram, No. 60 of Police Post (PP) City, Bilaspur went to the hospital and moved application, Ex.PW-9/A for medical examination of the deceased and seeking opinion, whether she was fit to make statement or not. Consequently, after certifying that the “Patient Reena Devi is medically fit to give oral statement”, PW-6 Dr. S.K.Patial carried out her medical examination vide certificate, Ex. PW-6/A, recording the following history and observations:“History Given H/O having suffered burns as a result of stove bursting into flames and clothes catching fire today. Case first seen by doctor at CHC Baldwara. Observations Skin of face, neck, upper arms, lower arms, chest, abdomen, ears, hands burnt and swollen limbs of upper extremity. Blisters having burnt and exposing white skin underneath. Cloths wet from burnt blisters. Hair of the head are charred and curled up.Approximate burnt surface = 65%Pulse 75 /ml BP 80 mm hg systic. Pt was admitted in this hospital, but on the advice of the surgeon, she has been referred to a better institute for management, to either IGMC Shimla or PGI, CHD.” 4. In the opinion of PW-6 Dr. S.K.Patial, nature of injuries was “Fire Burns”, caused within probable duration of “within six hours”. 5. Thereafter, statement of the deceased, Ex. Pt was admitted in this hospital, but on the advice of the surgeon, she has been referred to a better institute for management, to either IGMC Shimla or PGI, CHD.” 4. In the opinion of PW-6 Dr. S.K.Patial, nature of injuries was “Fire Burns”, caused within probable duration of “within six hours”. 5. Thereafter, statement of the deceased, Ex. D-1 was recorded by PW-9 HC Hari Ram, at 10.40 p.m. on 5.4.2006, which was also attested by PW-6 Dr. S.K.Patial. It is in Hindi and its translation in English is as follows: Stated that I am resident of the above address (mentioned in the beginning of the statement). I am a housewife. I have studied upto 10th standard. My marriage had taken place about three years back. My husband Manohar Lal is a private driver. I have one daughter, who is aged about 1 1/2 year. Today, that is 5.4.2004, at about 7 p.m., I was preparing tea for myself and my husband on a stove. In the meantime, the iron stove on which I was preparing tea, got burst. Owing to bursting of the stove, my face, hands, arms, chest, abdomen and rest of the entire body got burnt. This accident has occurred due to sudden bursting of the stove, for which no one is at fault. I and my husband live separately. We three are the only members of the family. My mother-in-law Ratni @ Raksha also lives separately from us. No family member harasses me. In this no one is at fault. The stove has burst all of a sudden, on its own. This is my statement, which is correct.Sd/Reena in Hindi, twice. 6. On having been referred, the deceased was taken to IGMC, Shimla and admitted there. On 7.4.2004, PW-11 HC Balak Ram, No. 37 of P.P., Hatli, P.S. Sarkaghat, within whose jurisdiction the place of occurrence is situate, moved application, Ex.PW-11/A to the Medical Officer, IGMC, Shimla seeking opinion whether she was in a fit condition to make statement or not, on which PW-1 5 Dr. Ankush Sood certified vide endorsement, Ex.PW-1 5/A dated 8.4.2004, that “she is fit for statement”. Accordingly, statement of the deceased was recorded by PW-11 HC Balak Ram, under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) on 8.4.2004 at 10.15 a.m., which was also attested by PW-1 5 Dr. Ankush Sood certified vide endorsement, Ex.PW-1 5/A dated 8.4.2004, that “she is fit for statement”. Accordingly, statement of the deceased was recorded by PW-11 HC Balak Ram, under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) on 8.4.2004 at 10.15 a.m., which was also attested by PW-1 5 Dr. Ankush Sood vide endorsement, Ex.PW-1 5/B, to the effect that “Statement given in my presence”. The statement is in Hindi and when translated into English, is as under: Stated that I am resident of the above address (mentioned in the beginning of the statement) and am a housewife. My marriage had taken place about three years back and I am having one daughter, aged 1 1/2 year. We live separately from my mother-in-law and Jeth. On 3.4.2004, I alongwith my husband Manohar Lal and daughter Amisha, had gone to my parental village Phatoh Sanwahani. On 5.4.2004, my father asked me to return to the matrimonial home after ‘Basoa’ (Baisakhi), but my husband said that “AAJ HI CHALNA PAREGA, NA HIN TO DEKH LENA” (You will have to go today, otherwise will have to face the consequences). Accordingly, I alongwith my husband came back to the matrimonial home on 5.4.2004 itself. We reached home at about 6.15 p.m. On reaching home, my husband started giving beatings to me and gave a fist blow on the eye and said “RAND BADMASH HAI. AAJ JALA DOONGA”. (You are a woman of easy virtue. Today I will burn you) and set me on fire with kerosene oil. My infant daughter was present there, who cried bitterly. I could not know as to what I had stated in the statement made by me in District Hospital, Bilaspur, as at that time I was under immense pain and was also feeling giddy. This statement has been made by me before my father and Taya (uncle) Gorakh Ram and doctor. Both my hands are burnt and bandaged. I cannot sign and put my thumb impression. However, I can put thumb impression of my foot. This is my statement, which is correct. Legal action may be taken against my husband.Right foot thumb mpression of Reena Devi. 7. Both my hands are burnt and bandaged. I cannot sign and put my thumb impression. However, I can put thumb impression of my foot. This is my statement, which is correct. Legal action may be taken against my husband.Right foot thumb mpression of Reena Devi. 7. On the basis of statement, Ex.PW-11/B, formal FIR, Ex.PW-8/A was recorded under Sections 498-A, 307 and 323 IPC, which on the death of the deceased at IGMC, Shimla on 13.4.2004, at 4.50 p.m., was converted into Sections 498-A, 302 and 304-B IPC. The accused had already been arrested on 9.4.2004. 8.The police prepared inquest papers, Ex.PZ and sent the dead body of the deceased for autopsy and obtained Post Mortem Report (PMR) Ex.PW­13/A, containing the following observations and opinion, submitted by PW-13 Dr. Rakesh Kumar: “EXTERNAL APPEARANCE; A dead body of a young female around 20 years of age and length 5 feet 2" Moderately built. The body was covered by bandage all over. Rigor Mortis present in all the big joints. Hypostasis was present on the back and posterior aspect of legs purplish blue in colour and fixed. Body was cooled to room temperature externally and internally. No putrefactive changes seen but foul smell present. No external injury other than burn injury seen. LIST OF ANTEMORTEM EXTEND BURN INJURIES; 1.No smell of kerosene in scalp hair/body. 2.No blackening seen on the body. 3.Burning of scalp hair present, burn injury over eye lashes present. 4. Burning of eye brows present more on right side eye. 5. Front of chest-dermo-epidermal burns (First degree according to wilson classification). 6. Abdomen-dermo-epidermal burns with spairing of Lower area (First degree according to wilson classification). 7.Both legs-front-dermo-epidermal burns on front of thigh (First decree according to wilson classification).8.Left leg back-dermo-epidermal burns on left leg on thigh posteriorly (First decree according to wilson classification).9.Neck-dermo-epidermal burns partially healed.10.Face-Dermo-epidermal burns. 11.Right upper limb front and back-Dermo-epidermal burns with spairing of elbow partially healed. 12.Left upper limb: Dermo-epidermal burns in front of back and spairing of forearm anteriorly. 7.Both legs-front-dermo-epidermal burns on front of thigh (First decree according to wilson classification).8.Left leg back-dermo-epidermal burns on left leg on thigh posteriorly (First decree according to wilson classification).9.Neck-dermo-epidermal burns partially healed.10.Face-Dermo-epidermal burns. 11.Right upper limb front and back-Dermo-epidermal burns with spairing of elbow partially healed. 12.Left upper limb: Dermo-epidermal burns in front of back and spairing of forearm anteriorly. 13.Back: Dermo-epidermal burns on upper part of back.14.Red line of demarcation seen at junction of burnt and un­burnt area.15.Pus point present in neck, front of chest and left forearm.16.Photographs were taken during post mortem examination (nine in number).CRANIUM AND SPINAL CORD Scalp: Burn injury over scalp hair present.Skull and Vertebrae: Normal.Nembranes- Brain: N.A.D.Spinal Cord: Not opened.THORAX; 1.Walls, ribs and cartilages: Burn injury as already described on Page 2.2.Pleurae: 150 CC of transparent fluid present(transudate)3.Larynx and Trachea: N.A.D.4.Right Lung)( A whitish froth on cut 5.Left Lung)(section and showing multiple septic foci.6.Pericardium)( 7.Heart)(Normal.i.Large Vessels etc. )(ABDOMEN: 1.Walls: Burn injury already described in Page-2.2.Peritoneum: Approximately 100 CC of transparent fluid in peritoneal cavity(transudate).3.Mouth, Pharynx and Oesophagus:Normal 4.Stomach and its contents Approximately 20 Ml. of greish fluid present. No peculiar smell. No congestion of Mucus Membranes.5.Small intestines and their contents: Gases of decomposition.6.Large intestines and their contents: Gases of decomposition.7.Liver)(8.Spleen )(Pale and Multiple septic foci present.9.Kidneys)(10.Bladder:Empty.11.Organs of generation External genitalia normal.External and Internal:Uterus normal and empty.MUSCLES, BONES, JOINTS: Burn injury already described on Page 2.CERTIFICATE OF CAUSE OF DEATH In our opinion the death took place due to Septicaemic shock as a result of ante mortem burn injury.”9.The accused was also got medically examined by the police at R.H., Sarkaghat vide certificate, Ex.PW-7/A, issued by PW-7 Dr. Keshav Koundal, containing the following observations and injuries, which were opined to be simple burn injuries, caused within the probable duration of between 4-5 days:“Person brought for custodial Medical Examination.O/E PR-84/min walking, oriented, talking well.Local Examn. On Rt side 4 fingers burns injury. On posterior aspect from below to upwards with pus formation & oozing. Of Schemer + pus (yellow) Blisters + pus seen on all 4 fingers. 2. Not on palmar side mild Burns on lateral aspect of fingers(+). Lt hand: In palmer aspect small burns injury. On tip of middle finger + pus. On Rt side 4 fingers burns injury. On posterior aspect from below to upwards with pus formation & oozing. Of Schemer + pus (yellow) Blisters + pus seen on all 4 fingers. 2. Not on palmar side mild Burns on lateral aspect of fingers(+). Lt hand: In palmer aspect small burns injury. On tip of middle finger + pus. (3) Superficial skin burns on at root of hand palmar side at color area (Middle).”10.The police also collected clue materials, such as broken pieces of red colour bangles, a kerosene stove, a gallon containing kerosene oil, a burnt gunny bag, burnt clothes (kameej and salvar) of the deceased alongwith burnt pieces of cloths lying scattered on the spot and stuck on the roof of the kitchen and a match box, vide memos Ex. PW-2/A to Ex.PW-2/F from the spot scene / living room of the accused and also got the spot scene photographed, vide photographs, Ex.PW-3/A-1 to Ex.PW-3/A-11, negatives whereof are Ex.PW-3/B (colly). Clothes of the accused (shirt and pant), said to have been worn by him at the time of the occurrence, were also taken into possession by the police vide memo, Ex.PW-4/A. Ex.PW-5/A is extract of the Family Register, in respect of the accused. The spot scene is depicted by site plan Ex.PW-14/A.11.The aforesaid burnt clothes (kameej and salvar) of the deceased and burnt pieces of clothes, lying scattered on the spot and stuck on the roof of the kitchen, were sent for chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Himachal Pradesh, Junga and report, Ex.PW-12/A was obtained, as per which, no traces of kerosene oil or any other inflammable substance were found therein.12.On completion of investigation, the accused was sent up to face trial. On being charged, he did not plead guilty and instead claimed trial. The prosecution evidence followed, which examined as many as 15 witnesses. 13.On close of the prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence and stated as under, in reply to question No. 35 of the statement: “I am innocent. I have not demanded any dowry nor gave any beating. I sustained injury in my hand when I tried to rescue the deceased and burning piece of gunny bag fell on my hands. The stove which is taken into possession is not the same. I have not demanded any dowry nor gave any beating. I sustained injury in my hand when I tried to rescue the deceased and burning piece of gunny bag fell on my hands. The stove which is taken into possession is not the same. The stove bursted when deceased lit the match box and at that time, the deceased caught fire due to bursting of the stove (Bhalaka) and no kerosene oil was sprinkled by me.”14.We have heard the learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State and the learned counsel for the respondents- accused and perused the record.15.There is no denying the fact that the deceased had made two dying declarations, Ex. D-1 and Ex.PW-11/B. Statement Ex.D-1 was made by her in District Hospital, Bilaspur on 5.4.2006, at 10.40 p.m., that is just after 3 hours and 40 minutes after the occurrence, which took place on that very day, that is, 5.4.2004 at about 7 p.m.16.The second dying declaration was made by the deceased in IGMC, Shimla on 8.4.2004, at 10.15 a.m., that is, on the third day of the occurrence.17.Whereas the first dying declaration altogether absolves the accused of any blame for the occurrence and instead, the same is stated to have taken place owing to bursting of the kerosene stove, as per the second dying declaration, the accused is said to have first beaten the deceased and thereafter set her on fire by sprinkling kerosene oil on her, after calling her bad names.18.Against the above backdrop, when the case is mainly based on dying declaration(s), it shall be appropriate to notice the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the appreciation of evidence on the subject. In this regard, both the prosecution and the accused have placed reliance upon Lakhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 514. Paras 9 to 21 of the judgment, being relevant, are extracted below: “9. The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in the legal maxim “Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire”, which means “a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth”. Paras 9 to 21 of the judgment, being relevant, are extracted below: “9. The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in the legal maxim “Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire”, which means “a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth”. The doctrine of Dying Declaration is enshrined in Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called as, “the Evidence Act”) as an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of the Evidence Act, which provides that oral evidence in all cases must be direct i.e. it must be the evidence of a witness, who says he saw it. The dying declaration is, in fact, the statement of a person, who cannot be called as witness and, therefore, cannot be cross- examined. Such statements themselves are relevant facts in certain cases.10.This Court has considered time and again the relevance/probative value of dying declarations recorded under different situations and also in cases where more than one dying declaration has been recorded. The law is that if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and made voluntarily by the deceased, conviction can be based solely on it, without any further corroboration. It is neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be relied upon without corroboration. When a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be relied upon without having corroborative evidence. The court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased must be in a fit state of mind to make the declaration and must identify the assailants. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details of the occurrence, it cannot be rejected and in case there is merely a brief statement, it is more reliable for the reason that the shortness of the statement is itself a guarantee of its veracity. If the dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot alone form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution version differs from the version given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. If the dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot alone form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution version differs from the version given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (Vide Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22; Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P., AIR 1974 SC 332; K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994; State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, 1980 Supp SCC 455; Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 5 SCC 254; Babulal v. State of M.P., (2003) 12 SCC 490; Muthu Kutty v. State, (2005) 9 SCC 113; State of Rajasthan v. Wakteng, (2007) 14 SCC 550; and Sharda v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 2 SCC 85). 11.In Munnawar & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 5 SCC 451, this Court held that a dying declaration can be relied upon if the deceased remained alive for a long period of time after the incident and died after recording of the dying declaration. That may be evidence to show that his condition was not overtly critical or precarious when the dying declaration was recorded. 12.A dying declaration recorded by a competent Magistrate would stand on a much higher footing than the declaration recorded by officer of lower rank, for the reason that the competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person named in the dying declaration of the victim, however, circumstances showing anything to the contrary should not be there in the facts of the case. ( Vide Ravi Chander v. State of Punjab, (1998) 9 SCC 303; Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1999) 6 SCC 545; Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 9 SCC 562; and Vikas & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 2 SCC 516.) 13.In Balak Ram v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165, the question arose as to whether a dying declaration recorded by a higher officer can be discarded in case of multiple dying declarations. The Court held as under:- (SCC p. 235. para 54)“54The circumstances surrounding the dying declaration, though uninspiring, are not strong enough to justify the view that officers as high in the hierarchy as the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the Civil Surgeon and the District Magistrate hatched a conspiracy to bring a false document into existence. The Court held as under:- (SCC p. 235. para 54)“54The circumstances surrounding the dying declaration, though uninspiring, are not strong enough to justify the view that officers as high in the hierarchy as the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the Civil Surgeon and the District Magistrate hatched a conspiracy to bring a false document into existence. The civil services (sic servants) have no platform to controvert allegations, howsoever grave and unfounded. It is therefore, necessary that charges calculated to impair their career and character ought not to be accepted except on the clearest proof. We are not prepared to hold that the dying declaration is a fabrication.” 14.In Sayarabano v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 562, two Dying Declarations had been recorded. As per the first declaration, the deceased had met with an accident. She was hit by the kerosene lamp which fell on her body and caught fire. While recording the second declaration, the Judicial Magistrate asked her why she was changing her statement. The deceased replied that her Mother-in-Law had told her not to give any statement against the family members of her in-laws and that was the reason, why she had not involved any person in the earlier statement. But, in fact, it was her Mother-in-Law who threw the kerosene lamp on her and thus, she was burnt. She also stated that her Mother-in-Law was harassing her. In such a situation, this Court held that the second dying declaration was true and inspired confidence. Ill treatment of the decreased was clearly established and completely proved on the basis of the evidence of other witnesses. 15.In case, there are inconsistent dying declarations, the Court must rely upon any other evidence, if available, as it is not safe to act only on inconsistent dying declarations and convict the accused. (Vide Lella Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P., (2004) 9 SCC 713). 16.In Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2008 SC 1426, a case of bride burning, three dying declarations had been recorded. In the first dying declaration, the decreased had denied the role of the accused persons. (Vide Lella Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P., (2004) 9 SCC 713). 16.In Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2008 SC 1426, a case of bride burning, three dying declarations had been recorded. In the first dying declaration, the decreased had denied the role of the accused persons. In second dying declaration deceased attributed a role to the accused but the said declaration did not contain the Certificate of the Doctor that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make a declaration, however, the Magistrate, who recorded the declaration, certified that the deceased was in a conscious state of mind and was in a position to make the statement to him. The third dying declaration was recorded by a police officer after the Doctor certified that she was in a fit state of mind to give the statement. This Court held that the conviction could be based on the third dying declaration as it was consistent with the second dying declaration and the oral dying declaration made to her uncle, though with some inconsistencies. First declaration was made immediately after she was admitted in the hospital and was under threat and duress by her Mother-in-Law that she would be admitted in hospital only if she would give a statement in favour of the accused persons. 17.In Paras Yadav Vs. State of Bihar (1999) 2 SCC 126, this Court held that a statement of the deceased recorded by a police officer in a routine manner as a complaint and not as a dying declaration can also be treated as dying declaration after the death of the injured and relied upon if the evidence of the prosecution witnesses clearly establishes that the deceased was conscious and was in a fit state of health to make the statement. 18.In Anmol Singh v. State of M.P., (2008) 5 SCC 468, this Court, placing reliance upon the earlier Judgment in Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCC 684, held that it is not the plurality of dying declarations but the reality thereto that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in a fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. If there is more than one dying declaration, they should be consistent. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in a fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. If there is more than one dying declaration, they should be consistent. In case of inconsistencies between two or more dying declarations made by the deceased, the Court has to examine the nature of inconsistencies namely, whether they are material or not and in such a situation, the Court has to examine the multiple dying declarations in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances. 19.In Heeralal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2009) 12 SCC 671, this Court considered the case having two dying declarations, the first recorded by a Magistrate, wherein it was clearly stated that the deceased had tried to set herself ablaze by pouring kerosene on herself. However, the subsequent declaration was recorded by another Magistrate and a contrary statement was made. This Court set aside the conviction after appreciating the evidence and reaching the conclusion that the courts below came to abrupt conclusions on the purported possibility that the relatives of the accused might have compelled the deceased to give a false dying declaration. No material had been brought on record to justify such a conclusion. 20.In State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Khaja Hussain, (2009) 15 SCC 120, this Court set aside the conviction as there was a variation between the two dying declarations about the manner in which the deceased was set on fire and for the reason that there was no other evidence to connect the accused with the crime. 21.In view of the above, the law on the issue of dying declaration can be summarized to the effect that in case, the Court comes to the conclusion that the dying declaration is true and reliable, has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration and it has not been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting; it can be the sole basis for recording conviction. In such an eventuality no corroboration is required. In case, there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, generally, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon, provided that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness. In such an eventuality no corroboration is required. In case, there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, generally, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon, provided that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness. In case, there are circumstances wherein the declaration had been made, not voluntarily and even otherwise, it is not supported by the other evidence, the Court has to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance. “19.The prosecution has further relied upon Sahadevan Alias Sagadevan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, Chennai, (2003) 1 Supreme Court Cases 534, (Head Note C, Para 19) to stress that false explanation/ statement made by the accused can be taken as a circumstance against him.20.The accused has also cited Heeralal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2009 (3) Criminal Court Cases 363 (SC) : (2009) 12 Supreme Court Cases 671, on the point of appreciation of evidence, relating to conflicting dying declarations. Paras 9 and 10 of the judgment, being relevant, are reproduced below: “9. Undisputedly, in the first dying declaration recorded by a Naib Tehsildar, it has been clearly stated that she tried to set herself ablaze by pouring kerosene on herself, but in the subsequent declaration, recorded by another Nayab Tehsildar, a contrary statement was made. It appears that one dying declaration earlier was made before the Doctor. The trial court referred to the evidence of Dr. Chaturvedi who stated that the deceased was admitted on bed No.8, but the father of the deceased stated that her daughter was admitted on some other bed number.10. The trial court and the High Court came to abrupt conclusions on the purported possibility that the relatives of the accused may have compelled the deceased to give a false dying declaration. No material was brought on record to justify such a conclusion. The evidence of the Nayab Tehsildar who recorded Ext. D-4 was examined as PW8. His statement was clear to the effect that nobody else was present when he was recording the statement. That being so, in view of the apparent discrepancies in the two dying declarations it would be unsafe to convict the appellant.” 21. The evidence of the Nayab Tehsildar who recorded Ext. D-4 was examined as PW8. His statement was clear to the effect that nobody else was present when he was recording the statement. That being so, in view of the apparent discrepancies in the two dying declarations it would be unsafe to convict the appellant.” 21. The accused has relied upon another authority, reported as Mohan Lal and Others v. State of Haryana , (2007) 9 Supreme Court Cases 151, wherein it has been held as under, vide para 10 of the judgment: “Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross- examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1992 SC 1817):(i)There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 2 SCR 764).(ii)If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav (AIR 1985 SC 416) and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164).(iii)The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav (AIR 1985 SC 416) and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164).(iii)The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. The Public Prosecutor (AIR 1976 SC 1994).(iv)Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 (4) SCC 264).(v)Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v State of M.P. (AIR 1982 SC 1021).(vi)A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. (1981 (2) SCC 654)(vii)Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu (AIR 1981 SC 617).(viii)Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1505).(ix)Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1988 SC 912).(x)Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (AIR 1989 SC 1519).(xi)Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (AIR 1989 SC 1519).(xi)Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1982 SC 839)” 22.As far as the allegations, regarding demand of dowry by the accused are concerned, it would be seen that no such allegation was levelled by the deceased against him in dying declaration, Ex. PW-1 1/B, on the basis of which FIR, Ex.PW-8/A was registered, under Sections 498-A, 307 and 323 IPC, which after her death at IGMC, Shimla on 13.4.2004, was converted into Sections 498-A, 302 and 304 IPC. Such allegations surfaced only in the statements of father of the deceased, PW-1 Shri Rajinder Kumar and her uncle (Taya), PW-2 Shri Gorkh Ram, recorded by the police, under Section 161 Cr.P.C. However, their statements do not inspire intrinsic confidence and as such, cannot be safely relied upon, for the reasons, stated hereinafter. 23.It is stated by PW-1 Shri Rajinder Kumar, during cross examination, that his statement was recorded once on 7.4.2004. According to him, his statement was not recorded by the police on 8.4.2004 and such statement, if any, has been recorded incorrectly. In case statement of PW-1 Shri Rajinder Kumar, father of the deceased, was recorded on 7/8.4.2004 and the same contained allegations regarding demand of dowry by the accused, it is not understandable as to why and under what circumstances such allegations were not made by the deceased in her dying declaration, Ex. PW-1 1/B, recorded by the police on 8.4.2004. Further more, in the absence of any allegation of demand of dowry in dying declaration, Ex.PW-11/B, leveling of such allegations by PW-2 Gorkh Ram in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded on 9.4.2004, also becomes suspect. It is more-so because, whereas he has stated that the accused had started ill-treating the deceased just after 3-4 months of the marriage and used to demand money and vehicle on account of dowry, PW-1 Shri Rajinder Kumar has nowhere stated that the accused used to demand money and vehicle in dowry. It is more-so because, whereas he has stated that the accused had started ill-treating the deceased just after 3-4 months of the marriage and used to demand money and vehicle on account of dowry, PW-1 Shri Rajinder Kumar has nowhere stated that the accused used to demand money and vehicle in dowry. Further more, though some witnesses from the matrimonial side of the deceased, namely, such as Vidya Rani, Prem Lal and Onkar Shukla, were cited as prosecution witnesses to prove the allegations against the accused that he used to ill-treat and torture the deceased on account of dowry, but all of them were given up by the prosecution, on the assumption that they were won over by the accused, which on the face of it, does not appear to be a plausible explanation. The allegations regarding ill-treatment and torture on account of demand of dowry, were levelled against the accused only after the death of the deceased and prior to that, the same were not reported either to the police or any local authority, such as, Gram Panchayat etc. 24. Now while adverting to the two dying declarations, Ex. D-1 and Ex. PW-1 1/B, made by the deceased, it would be seen that the investigating officer, PW-14 S.I. Anil Verma, has admitted during cross examination that the deceased was taken to the hospital at Bilaspur and IGMC, Shimla by the accused, who had also suffered burn injuries on his hands during the occurrence and was got medically examined by the police, through PW-7 Dr. Keshav Koundal, vide Medico Legal Certificate, Ex.PW-7/A and was found to have suffered burn injuries, as already noticed while stating brief facts of the case, vide para 9 of this judgment. According to PW-7 Dr. Keshav Koundal, such injuries could be caused while pouring kerosene oil, as also while saving the person, who is burning. 25.In the earliest version about the occurrence, stated by the deceased vide dying declaration, Ex.D-1, she had suffered burn injuries owing to bursting of the stove. This statement is also attested by PW-6 Dr.S.K.Patial. There is nothing to suggest that the accused was in any way instrumental in influencing the deceased to have made a statement like this, albeit the fact that she was taken by the accused for treatment to CHC, Baldwara, then to District Hospital, Bilaspur and ultimately to IGMC, Shimla. 26. This statement is also attested by PW-6 Dr.S.K.Patial. There is nothing to suggest that the accused was in any way instrumental in influencing the deceased to have made a statement like this, albeit the fact that she was taken by the accused for treatment to CHC, Baldwara, then to District Hospital, Bilaspur and ultimately to IGMC, Shimla. 26. To the contrary, the subsequent dying declaration, Ex.PW-1 1/B was admittedly recorded in the presence of the father of the deceased, PW-1 Shri Rajinder Kumar and her uncle (Taya) PW-2 Gorkh Ram, who were with her in IGMC, Shimla since 6.4.2004. Both these witnesses have stated during cross examination that at the time of recording her dying declaration, Ex. PW-1 1/B, the deceased had told the police about her ill-treatment at the hands of the accused, on account of demand of dowry. However, as already noticed, no such allegations find mention in statement, Ex.PW-1 1/B. 27.In view of the above, the possibility that the subsequent dying declaration, Ex.PW-1 1/B made by the deceased, was as a result of manipulation and tutoring on the part of her near relations from parental side, such as PW-1 Shri Rajinder Kumar (father) and PW-2 Shri Gorkh Ram (Taya), cannot be altogether ruled out. 28. It was contended on behalf of the prosecution that it is apparent from photograph, Ex.PW-3/A-2 that there was a cooking gas connection in the house of the accused and further that the stove, shown in photograph, Ex.PW­3/A-4, is intact and as such, the version about bursting of the stove as stated in dying declaration, Ex.D-1 and as also set up by the accused, cannot be accepted to be true without a pinch of salt. However, the fact remains that when stove, Ex.P-2 was taken into possession by the police vide memo, Ex.PW-2/B, it was containing some kerosene oil. As per history mentioned in Medico Legal Certificate, Ex.PW-6/A, the deceased had suffered burns as a result of “stove bursting into flames and clothes catching fire”. In dying declaration, Ex.D-1 it is stated that the stove had burst. The accused, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., has stated that the deceased had caught fire “due to bursting of the stove (Bhalaka)”. In dying declaration, Ex.D-1 it is stated that the stove had burst. The accused, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., has stated that the deceased had caught fire “due to bursting of the stove (Bhalaka)”. 29.Against the fore going background, when according to the prosecution, the deceased had suffered burn injuries when the accused had sprinkled kerosene oil on her and set her on fire and to the contrary, the case of the accused is that she had suffered such injuries due to bursting of the stove (Bhalaka), it would be seen that as per FSL report, Ex.PW-12/A, neither any traces of kerosene oil nor any other inflammable substance, were found on the clothes and pieces of clothes, worn by the deceased at the time of occurrence. PW-1 3 Dr. Rakesh Kumar, who had conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased vide PMR, Ex.PW-13/A on 14.4.2004, had not observed any smell of kerosene on the scalp, hair and body of the deceased. There was also no blackening on the body, which are usual characteristics of burns, caused by kerosene oil, as per Modi’s Medical Jurisprodence & Toxicology, 22nd Edition, Page 315. 30. Thus, on the face of the earliest version about the occurrence, as finds place in dying declaration, Ex. D-1, which nowhere implicates the accused for causing death of the deceased by sprinkling kerosene oil on her and setting her on fire, which version according to PW-6 Dr.S.K.Patial, was also mentioned in the history given at CHC, Baldwara, the subsequent dying declaration, Ex.PW­11/B, implicating the accused for setting the deceased on fire, after sprinkling kerosene oil on her, cannot be safely relied upon to return a finding of guilt against the accused, beyond all reasonable doubt. It being so, we do not find any lawful cause or basis to upset the acquittal of the accused vide the impugned judgment and accordingly proceed to dismiss the appeal.