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2012 DIGILAW 354 (MAD)

Jayaram Sait v. Thillai Rani

2012-01-24

M.VENUGOPAL

body2012
Judgment :- 1. The Appellant/Plaintiff has filed the present Second Appeal as against the Judgment and Decree dated 19.08.1997 in A.S.No.95 of 1996 passed by the Learned Principal District Judge, Cuddalore in reversing the Judgment and Decree dated 18.09.1996 in O.S.No.410 of 1992 passed by the Learned Additional Sub Judge, Cuddalore. 2. The First Appellate Court viz., the Learned Principal District Judge, Cuddalore, while placing the Judgment in Appeal A.S.No.95 of 1996 on 19.08.1997, in paragraph 14, has, inter alia, observed that in regard to the first claim of Rs.10,000/- [being the balance of advance amount paid by the Respondent/Plaintiff to the Appellant/Defendant on 28.08.1989 on which it is seen that Ex.A.1 that a sum of Rs.20,000/- has been paid to the Defendants] that there is no acknowledgement in Ex.A.3 [Appellant/Defendant's reply lawyer notice addressed to the Respondent/Plaintiff's lawyer] excepting the mention of two admitted facts namely (1) that Rs.10,000/-was paid to the Defendant on 28.8.1989 and the other (2) that Defendant repaid Rs.10,000/-on 13.9.1989. We cannot merely infer that the balance amount would only be due and held that what was contained in Ex.A.3 was only on admission of the pre-existing liability and not a subsisting, liablity, which is vital to prove an acknowledgement and further that there is no acknowledgement of subsisting liability under Ex.A.3 and that the claim is barred. 3. In regard to the second claim of Rs.20,000/- based on Ex.A.4-Pronote dated 05.09.1991, the First Appellate Court has held that the signature of the Appellant/Defendant in the Pronote when specifically was denied, the Plaintiff should prove it by the expert opinion and this was not done and opined that it was unsafe to rely upon the evidence of P.W.2 to come to a proper conclusion and accordingly found that the Ex.A.4 -Pronote was not proved satisfactorily. 4. As regards the third claim viz., a sum of Rs.5,350/- purportedly due under Ex.A.6-Chit dated 28.08.1989 the First Appellate Court has held that the hand chit cannot be safely relied on so as to construe it as a valid instrument and also the signature of the Appellant/Defendant in that chit was disputed, it was not sent to any expert and properly proved and no attestor was also found as per Ex.A.6 and held that the claim was not proved. 5. 5. In so far as the fourth claim, amounting to Rs.6,000/-, reportedly due Ex.A.5-Hand Chit dated 20.09.1990 purportedly to have been executed by the Appellant/Defendant is concerned, the First Appellate Court has come to a consequent conclusion that there was a disputed signature of the Defendant in the chit and that the lower Court has accepted the signature by comparing it with the Appellant/Defendant's signature in Ex.A.1 and also that the Courts cannot take the role of an Expert etc. and as opined that it was highly unsafe to compare a signature in the nacked eye and come to a conclusion and held that the circumstances under which the Respondent/Plaintiff has got Ex.A.1, a security and Ex.A.4 a Pronote in the same year raise about as to how he could advance a sum of Rs.6,000/- and Rs.5,350 towards hand chits and held that Exs.A.4 to A.6 have not been proved factually and that the claim of Ex.A.1 was barred by limitation and allowed the Appeal with costs thereby setting aside the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit with costs. 6. At the time of the Second Appeal, this Court has formulated the following Substantial Questions of Law 1 and 2 for consideration: "1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court is correct in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation on the ground that the reply notice sent by the respondent's lawyer, does not contain the respondent's signature and is hence of no consequence? 2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court is correct in dismissing the suit on the ground it is barred by limitation, without reference to the respondent's admission of her liability in the reply notice?" The Contentions, Discussions and Findings on Substantial Questions of Law Nos.1 and 2: 7. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff submits that the First Appellate Court has committed an error in reversing the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court in the suit. 8. According to the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff, the First Appellate Court has erred in coming to the conclusion that Ex.A.3-Defendant's lawyer notice dated 07.09.1992 addressed to the Plaintiff's lawyer contends no signature of the Respondent/Plaintiff. 9. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff projects a plea that the First Appellate Court is not correct in coming to the conclusion that the claim of the Appellant/Plaintiff is barred by limitation. 9. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff projects a plea that the First Appellate Court is not correct in coming to the conclusion that the claim of the Appellant/Plaintiff is barred by limitation. As a matter of fact, P.W.2, in his evidence, has clearly deposed supporting the case of the Appellant/Defendant. 10. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff submits that the Appellant/Plaintiff and the Respondent/Defendant entered into an agreement to sell for Rs.50,000/-on 28.08.1989 and that the Respondent/Defendant received a sum of Rs.20,000/-as advance on the same day and further, the Respondent/Defendant borrowed Rs.2,000/-on 16.06.1989 by means of Pronote and borrowed another sum of Rs.20,000/-on 05.09.1991 under another pronote. 11. It is the case of the Appellant/Plaintiff that he issued an Ex.A.2-Notice referring the money transactions and mentioning that over and above Rs.55,000/-, the sale amount stated in the agreement, a sum of Rs.6,540/-is still payable by the Respondent/Defendant and prayed for execution of conveyance. Ex.A.3-Reply Notice dated 07.09.1992 of the Respondent/Defendant contained false averments. Inasmuch as the Respondent/Defendant repaid Rs.10,000/-in respect of the sale agreement, a balance of Rs.10,000/- only is repaid by the Respondent/Defendant and that the Appellant/Plaintiff is entitled to recover the same with 12% interest. 12. The Appellant/Plaintiff has restricted his right of recovery of the amount due under the promissory note dated 05.09.1991 for Rs.20,000/-and filed a suit for that claim also. Other than the aforesaid borrowings, the Respondent/Defendant has purchased 15 grams of gold jewellery on 20.09.1990 for Rs.5,000/- and borrowed a sum of Rs.1,000/-and signed in a chit accepting the aforesaid sum of Rs.6,000/-. 13. It is the case of the Appellant/Plaintiff that one Kuppusamy signed as a witness in the Chit. Further, on 19.02.1991 another purchase has been made by the Respondent/Defendant which incurred an liability of Rs.150/-. Further, the Respondent/Defendant purchased other jewels and borrowed money from 28.08.1989 to 09.02.1990. The amounts due from the Respondent/Defendant have been categorically added in the running account on 09.02.1990 when she signed in the hand chit, her admitted liability has come to Rs.5,350/-. In all, an amount of Rs.11,500/-has been due by the Respondent/Defendant under the two hand chits. The Appellant/Plaintiff has laid a suit for recovery of sum of Rs.48,120 with subsequent interest. 14. In all, an amount of Rs.11,500/-has been due by the Respondent/Defendant under the two hand chits. The Appellant/Plaintiff has laid a suit for recovery of sum of Rs.48,120 with subsequent interest. 14. The plea of the Respondent/Defendant is that the sale agreement is true, but the same is not an agreement of sale and identity of sale agreement, she received a sum of Rs.20,000/- from the Appellant/Plaintiff and it has been agreed that interest should be paid at 12% per annum. The sale agreement is only a security for the borrowal. Except the sum of Rs.20,000/-, no other amount has been received by the Respondent/Defendant from the Appellant/Plaintiff and there has been no transaction between the parties. The alleged pronotes are forged one. Further, she has not purchased jewels from the Appellant/Plaintiff and issued receipts. She repaid a sum of Rs.10,000/- on 13.09.1989 in respect of the sale agreement and only a sum of Rs.10,000/- remains due. Moreover, the claim is barred by time. 15. It is to be borne in mind that as per Ex.A.1-Sale Agreement dated 28.08.1989 a sum of Rs.20,000/- has been received in cash by the Respondent/Defendant from the Appellant/Plaintiff. It is not in dispute that on 13.09.1989 the Respondent/Defendant repaid a sum of Rs.10,000/- to the Appellant/Plaintiff. The claim made under Ex.A.1-Sale Agreement to the effect that it is within time has to be proved by the Appellant/Plaintiff to the satisfaction of this Court. 16. At this juncture, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/ Plaintiff very much relies on Ex.A.3-Notice [the Respondent/ Defendant's lawyer's reply notice addressed to the Appellant/Plaintiff's lawyer] dated 07.09.1992 and contends that in the said notice, it is clearly made mention of that 'the Appellant/Plaintiff can receive this amount [viz., Rs.10,000/-] at any time with the agreed interest at the rate of 12% per annum etc.' and this constitutes an acknowledgement of liability of the Respondent/Defendant and as such, the contra view taken by the First Appellate Court that there is no acknowledgement in Ex.A.3-Notice dated 07.09.1992 is factually and legally incorrect one, which needs to be set right by this Court to promote substantial cause of justice. 17. 17. To lend support to the contention that the words 'your client can receive this amount at any time with the agreed interest at the rate of 12% per annum (amounting a sum of Rs.12,000/-), has made mention of in Ex.A.3-Respondent/Defendant's lawyer's notice is an acknowledgement of liability in law which saves limitation so as to enable the Appellant/Plaintiff to file the suit in time, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff cites the decision of this Court in K.M.MuhammedSultan Rowther and another V. K.S.M.Muhamed Nurdin, 1963 (1) MLJ 301 whereby and whereunder it is laid down as follows: "Whether a particular acknowledgement amounts to an acknowledgement of liability in law so as to save limitation within the meaning of section 19 of the Limitation Act is no doubt to be decided in each case by a proper inference from the facts and circumstances and the intention of the debtor. But even in cases of acknowledgements where a claim was for a particular amount but the debtor acknowledged his liability only for a smaller amount such acknowledgement cannot enable the creditor to claim the entire amount. The acknowledgement can be used to save limitation only with respect to the amount acknowledged." 18. A perusal of the Judgment of the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.95 of 1996 indicates that in para 14, the First Appellate Court has opined as follows: "What Ex.A.3 contains is nothing but a reiteration of the repayment of Rs.10,000/-made on 13.9.1991. Any later acknowledgement of a previous partial discharge cannot extend the date of such discharge to the later date of acknowledgement. It will have only the effect that such partial discharge cannot extend the date of such discharge. Further, an acknowledgement should be unequivocal and express. But there is no such acknowledgement in Ex.A.3 excepting the mention of two admitted facts namely (1) that Rs.10,000/- was paid to the defendant on 28.8.1989 and the other (2) that defendant repaid Rs.10,000/- on 13.9.1989. We cannot merely infer that the balance amount would only be due. This is so because it was held in AIR 1922 Madras page 104 and unaccompanied by an allegation of discharge, cannot in all cases be interpreted as an admission of a subsisting liability. Therefore, what was contained in Ex.A.3 was only on admission of the pre-existing liability and not a subsisting, liability, which is vital to prove an acknowledgement. This is so because it was held in AIR 1922 Madras page 104 and unaccompanied by an allegation of discharge, cannot in all cases be interpreted as an admission of a subsisting liability. Therefore, what was contained in Ex.A.3 was only on admission of the pre-existing liability and not a subsisting, liability, which is vital to prove an acknowledgement. Thus I find that there is no acknowledgement of subsisting liability under Ex.A.3. So, the claim is time barred." 19. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff seeks in aid of the decision inBans Gopal V. Mewa Ram AIR 2930 Allahabad 461 at page 462 wherein it is among other things held as follows: "The other argument of Mr.Agarwala was that on 8th December 1924, Bans Gopal in his insolvency petition acknowledged the debt of Mewa Ram. Unfortunately for the creditor, however, a sum of Rs.200 only is mentioned. Acknowledgement of a sum of Rs.200 cannot be taken as an acknowledgement if a sum of Rs.585 as claimed by the decree-holder. It is true that if no definite sum had been mentioned and there had been an acknowledgement in general terms the amount of the debt could have been discovered from the evidence as mentioned in Expln. (1), S. 19, Lim., Act. In the present case, however, there is a definite acknowledgement of Rs.200 and if this to be used to save limitation, it could be done only with respect to the sum acknowledged, and not with respect to acknowledged, and not with respect to any sum that may be proved to be due on that date." 20. He also invites the attention of this Court to the decision in MariappaGoundan V. Palaniappa Goundan and others, AIR 1930 Madras 796 wherein it is held as follows: "In considering whether a particular document amounts to a proper acknowledgement within the meaning of S.19, all that one has to see is whether the document contains an acknowledgement of liability in respect of the debt now sued upon. The circumstance that the acknowledgement was contained in a sale deed executed by the debtor which was not to take effect at all or was executed with an ulterior motive is not a relevant consideration in connexion with the question arising under the Act." 21. The circumstance that the acknowledgement was contained in a sale deed executed by the debtor which was not to take effect at all or was executed with an ulterior motive is not a relevant consideration in connexion with the question arising under the Act." 21. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff relying on the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions submits the words 'Your client can receive this amount at any time with the agreed interest, at the rate of 12% per annum (amounting Rs.10,000/-)' unerringly point out that the Respondent/Defendant has acknowledged a liability to repay the amount mentioned therein and this admission in law is only an acknowledgement of liability of the Respondent/Defendant. But, unfortunately, this factual and legal aspect of the matter have not been adverted to by the First Appellate Court in real and proper perspective, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 22. It is to be noted that the question of onus of proof will not come into operative play when both parties to the litigation/ proceedings have adduced evidence in the case. To put it differently, the burden of proof in that event is irrelevant, as opined by this Court. It cannot be gainsaid that an acknowledgement must be an one of an existing liability. When a debtor makes an acknowledgement of a liability to pay a debt it normally means that he is admitting a subsisting liability to pay. Even the statement on which the plea of acknowledgement is based need not amount to promise and need not include the exact nature of liability as per decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in LakshmiratanCotton Mills Company Limited V. Aluminium Corporation of India Limited, AIR 1971 SC 1482 . It is needless to point out that an acknowledgement must rely to the existing debt in ValliamaV. Shivathanee, AIR 1979 SC 1937 , it is held that mere recital in a document as to the existence of a part liability with a statement of its discharge does not constitute acknowledgement within Section 18. 23. If a Defendant takes a point of limitation and the Plaintiff takes the plea that the Defendant acknowledged the liability and the limitation period has been extended, a Court of Law cannot merely decree the suit without considering the contentions of rival parties. 23. If a Defendant takes a point of limitation and the Plaintiff takes the plea that the Defendant acknowledged the liability and the limitation period has been extended, a Court of Law cannot merely decree the suit without considering the contentions of rival parties. The opening words of Section 18 of the Limitation Act 'Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit of application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed etc., shows that an acknowledgement to be valid must relate to the time when the right is still enforceable. An acknowledgement must be made before the expiration of the period of limitation. A promise to pay a time-barred debt should fall within the purview of Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act. The burden is on the creditor to prove that the acknowledgement has been made within time. An acknowledgement only extends the period of limitation and as a matter of fact, in law, it does not create any new right. 24. This Court worth recalls the decision in National Co-operative Consumer Federation of India Limited V. Union of India, AIR 1995 Orissa 204 wherein it is held that 'mere issuance of short certificate by the railway does not amount to the railway acknowledging the liability for the alleged short delivery for the purpose of extending limitation to file the suit for compensation against the railway.' 25. As far as the present case is concerned, in regard to the first claim, it is to be pointed out that what is mentioned in Ex.A.3-Notice, 'Your client can receive this amount at any time with the agreed interest, at the rate of 12% per annum' only is an admission of pre- existing liability and not a subsisting liability and accordingly, it is held that there is no acknowledgement of subsisting liability in regard to the words 'Your client can receive this amount at any time with the agreed interest, at the rate of 12% per annum' and per contra, it is held that the said words in Ex.A.3 only are held to be of the pre-existing liability and when there is no acknowledgement of subsisting liability as per Ex.A.3-Notice, then, this Court holds that the first claim made by the Appellant/Plaintiff is clearly out of time. 26. As regards the second claim of Rs.20,000/- as per Ex.A.4-Pronote dated 05.09.1991, the Appellant/Plaintiff claims that the same has been executed by the Respondent/Defendant and the said Pronote has been duly attested by the attesting witness, which has been examined as P.W.2 before the trial Court. Surprisingly, the Scribe, who has written Ex.A.4-Pronote dated 05.09.1991, S.Mani, 40, Thomaiyar Nagar, Vadalur has not been examined as a witness, on behalf of the Plaintiff. In the present case on hand, the Respondent/Defendant has denied the signature in Ex.A.4-Pronote. Although P.W.2 has deposed that the Respondent/Defendant has put his signature and that no one has signed as a second witness in Ex.A.4-Pronote and the signature seen on reverse of Ex.A.4 belongs to the Respondent/Defendant, but he does not know the Respondent/Defendant affixing his signature. In this regard, this Court opines that it is not safe for this Court to fall back upon the evidence of P.W.2, since he has feigned ignorance about the signature of the Respondent/Defendant on reverse of Ex.A.4-Pronote dated 05.09.1991. When P.W.2 has deposed that the Respondent/Defendant has put his signature on Ex.A.4-Pronote, then as a man ordinarily prudence, then, he would certainly known the fact that the Respondent/Defendant has affixed his signature on back of Ex.A.4-Pronote. When P.W.2 has deposed that the Respondent/Defendant has put his signature on Ex.A.4-Pronote, then as a man ordinarily prudence, then, he would certainly known the fact that the Respondent/Defendant has affixed his signature on back of Ex.A.4-Pronote. When he has feigned ignorance and also deposed that he does not know about the Respondent/Defendant putting his signature on Ex.A.4, then, certainly, his evidence is one of a simmering doubt and his evidence is not certain and further, one cannot rest upon his evidence to come to a categorical conclusion that the Respondent/ Defendant has executed Ex.A.4-Pronote dated 05.09.1991 for Rs.20,000/-. Also, when the Respondent/Defendant has disputed the signature over the revenue stamp in Ex.A.4-Pronote dated 05.09.1991, then, no endeavour has been made to send the pronote for examination of an Expert to compare the signature of the Respondent/Defendant in the said pronote with that of her admitted signatures. 27. Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, the first part speaks of comparison of signature, writing, finger impressions purporting to have been written or made by a person with others admitted or proved to the satisfaction of this Court to have been written or made by the person. The second part of the Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act empowers a Court of Law to direct any person present in Court to give his specimen writing or finger impression for the purpose of explaining the Court to compare it with others alleged to have been written or made by him. 28. Both the first part and second part of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act are complementary to each other. As a matter of fact, though Section 73 refers to a comparison of signature being made, it is expressly or impliedly silent as to who can compare the disputed signature/handwriting in a document. No doubt, a Court of Law is empowered to compare the signature. But such a comparison through naked eyes is not a safe one. Per contra, it is an hazardous one because of the simple reason a Court of Law is not an Expert and further it cannot take the role of the expert. No doubt, a Court of Law is empowered to compare the signature. But such a comparison through naked eyes is not a safe one. Per contra, it is an hazardous one because of the simple reason a Court of Law is not an Expert and further it cannot take the role of the expert. Therefore, the contra view taken by the trial Court that it has power to compare one's disputed signature with that of the admitted signatures and on such comparison the very conclusion arrived at by it in regard to the execution of the pronotes by the Respondent/Defendant to and in favour of the Appellant/Plaintiff is not sustainable in the eye of law. 29. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Defendant cites the decision of this Court in KaliannaGounder (died) S/o.Komaraswami Gounder and others V. Kalianna Gounder S/o.Appavu Gounder and others, 1986 MLJ (R) 470 wherein it is held that 'when scribe and attestor to the document though available have not been examined, a Court can draw an adverse inference in this regard.' 30. He also relies on the decision in Rama Goundar V. Swamikkannu, 1997 LW 512 at page 513 wherein it is held as follows: "In this case the attestor to the promissory note was not examined by the Plaintiff on account of his feeling that the attestor was the younger brother of the defendant and would not speak in favour of the plaintiff. The scribe was not examined as he was inimically disposed toward plaintiff. This does not stand in the way of the court to shut its eyes and to examine only what is available and produced by either side by way of evidence. S.165 of the Evidence Act as well as O.16, R.14, C.P.C. have to be borne in mind to see that if anything is required as evidence for coming to a proper and correct way of appreciation of evidence and the failure on the part of both sides to produce that evidence, will not in any way obstruct the court from exercising its jurisdiction under S.165 of the Evidence Act and also calling the parties to depose regarding the aspects that are behind the curtain by virtue of exercising the power vested with the court under O.16, R.14, C.P.C." 31. In this connection, it is relevant for this Court to make a significant mention that Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act enjoins that a Judge's power to put questions or order production of documents. The First Appellate Court has exercised the powers enjoins under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act coupled with Order 16 Rule 14 of C.P.C. In a civil suit, it is the duty of a Plaintiff to prove his case to the satisfaction of the Court. The Plaintiff has to stand or fall on his own legs. He cannot fall back upon or lean towards the defence or inconsistent defence of the Defendant in a particular suit. Viewed in that perspective, as discussed already in detail, this Court holds that the Appellant/Plaintiff has not established to the subjective satisfaction of this Court that Ex.A.4-Pronote dated 05.09.1991 for Rs.20,000/-has been executed by the Respondent/Defendant to and in favour of the Appellant/Plaintiff. 32. Dealing with the third claim viz., Ex.A.6-Hand Chit dated 28.08.1989 for Rs.5350/-, it is to be pointed out that it is a sheet of quarter size paper which as three signatures on the front side and one on the reverse side. On going through the said Ex.A.6, there is a reference being made to gold ring of 4 grams and wastage charges, making charges in all amounting to Rs.2,000/- and all the endorsements are made in Tamil and the said signature is reported to be the signature of the Respondent/Defendant, according to the Appellant/Plaintiff. On the whole in Ex.A.6-Chit, there is a total refers to outstanding amount of Rs.5,350/- and the earlier balance is referred to as Rs.4,700/-. How a sum of Rs.5,350/- has been arrived at, there is no proper, sufficient and acceptable evidence before the trial Court on behalf of the Appellant/Plaintiff, as opined by this Court. 33. The First Appellate Court, in paragraph 16 of its Judgment in Appeal, has observed that the Respondent/ Defendant has pleaded in her written statement that she purchased some jewels and borrowed money from 28.08.1989 and 09.02.1990. But, there is no borrowal made on 09.02.1990. The last date of jewel purchased has been on 17.10.1989. Even the date is in different ink. The First Appellate Court has held that Ex.A.6 cannot be safely relied upon so as to construe it as a valid document. But, there is no borrowal made on 09.02.1990. The last date of jewel purchased has been on 17.10.1989. Even the date is in different ink. The First Appellate Court has held that Ex.A.6 cannot be safely relied upon so as to construe it as a valid document. Here again, the same has not been sent to any Handwriting Expert and his opinion has been obtained. Therefore, Ex.A.6-Chit has been held to be not proved. Even in Ex.A.6-Chit, no independent witness either as attestor or otherwise found or seen. As such, this Court unhesitatingly holds that the claim as per Ex.A.6-Chit dated 28.08.1989 for Rs.5,350/- has not been proved on behalf of the Appellant/Plaintiff. 34. In regard to the last claim made as per Ex.A.5-Chit dated 20.09.1990 here also there is some reference to jewel balance of Rs.5,000/- and a sum of Rs.1,000/-has been received in cash and aggregating in all, a sum of Rs.6,000/-is made mention of. According to the Appellant/Plaintiff, the Respondent/Defendant has signed in Ex.A.5-Chit. P.W.3 has been examined to show that he has signed in Ex.A.5-Chit. Who has authored/writing the Ex.A.5-Chit has not come to light before the trial Court. Even in regard to Ex.A.5-Chit, the Respondent/Defendant has denied her signature. The trial Court has accepted the signature of the Respondent/Defendant in Ex.A.5-Chit by comparing the same with the admitted signature of the Respondent/ Defendant in Ex.A.1. As already observed by this Court, that a Court of Law can render its finding in a particular case based on other evidence adduced by the parties coupled with the opinion of Expert. In the instant case on hand, admittedly, pronote/chits have not been sent to an Handwriting Expert to compare by an Expert. Naked eye comparison though a Court of Law is empowered to do the same or to compare the signature with that of disputed signature with a magnifying glass, all these acts of Court will not be a proper and correct substitute for the Expert opinion being rendered in a certain case where the signatures are in dispute/controversy. Naked eye comparison though a Court of Law is empowered to do the same or to compare the signature with that of disputed signature with a magnifying glass, all these acts of Court will not be a proper and correct substitute for the Expert opinion being rendered in a certain case where the signatures are in dispute/controversy. The First Appellate Court has also made an observation in para 17 of its Judgment in Appeal that the circumstances that the Appellant/Plaintiff has got Ex.A.1 a security and Ex.A.4 a Pronote in the same year raise a doubt as to how he could advance a sum of Rs.6,000/- and Rs.5,350/- towards Hand Chits and this makes the case of the Appellant/Plaintiff an implausible or incredible one and has finally held that Exs.A.4 to A.6 have not been factually proved. Inasmuch as Ex.A.5 has not been proved to have been executed by the Respondent/Defendant to the subjective satisfaction of this Court and also taking note of the fact that Ex.A.5-Chit has not been sent for obtaining an Handwriting Expert's opinion etc., this Court holds that Ex.A.5-Chit has not been proved by the Appellant/Plaintiff. Viewed in that perspective, this Court holds that the First Appellate Court is correct in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation. Even though Ex.A.3-Reply Notice sent by the Respondent/Defendant's lawyer does not contain the Respondent/Defendant's signature and further Ex.A.3 cannot be construed to be a document acknowledging the liability of subsisting debt and the so-called admission made by the Respondent/ Defendant in Ex.A.3, in law, is not at all construed to be a case of admission of her liability as per Limitation Act, 1963 and the Substantial Questions of Law 1 and 2 are so answered against the Appellant/ Plaintiff. 35. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court viz., Principal District Judge, Cuddalore dated 19.08.1997 in A.S.No.95 of 1996 are affirmed by this Court for the reasons assigned in this Appeal. The suit O.S.No.410 of 1992 filed by the Appellant/Plaintiff is dismissed.