ORDER S.K. Gangele, J. - 1. The petitioners have filed this petition against the demolition of their property. The petitioners further prayed for delivery of possession of the property, which has illegally been demolished and also compensation on account of illegal demolition of their property. 2. The petitioner is a partnership firm registered under the provisions of Indian Partnership Act, 1932. It purchased the property vide five sale-deeds, copies of the same have been filed along with the petition as Annexure P/6 collectively from Ashok Dattarey Joshi, Smt. Anuradha, Dusyant, Devyani Joshi, Avinas Dattarey Joshi, Smt. Smita Avinas Joshi, Ravi Avinas Joshi, Shrikant Avinas Joshi. All the sale-deeds were executed by the aforesaid persons in favour of the petitioner partnership firm on 31/3/2006 in regard to different area and different consideration. In the first sale the consideration is of Rs. 53.00 lac and the area is 75’9'’x 61’2'’=4632 square feet, in the Second sale-deed the consideration is of Rs.35.00 lacs and the area is 75’9'’x 76’11'’ and 21’x 6’10'’=3057 square feet, in the third sale deed the consideration is of Rs.53.00 lacs and the area is 33’2'’x 129' and 12’9'’x 26'=4609 square feet. Similarly in the other two sale-deeds the consideration are of Rs.32.40 lacs and Rs.44.50 lacs and the area are 25’x82’9’’=2068 square feet and 25’x155'= 3875 square feet. The sale-deeds are dated 31st March, 2006. After purchase of the property, the name of the petitioner firm was mutated in the record of Municipal Corporation. The petitioners also constructed some shops after dismantling the old construction. However, major portion of the construction which was at the time of purchase remained as it is. The property is situate at Jayendraganj, Lashkar, Gwalior at Survey No.635. The total area of the survey number No. 635 is 2.163 hectares. 3. In the Municipal records of Municipality Gwalior for the Samvat 1968, the name of the owner of the land of the property was recorded as Ramchandra s/o Gangadhar Joshi, since then, the entry had been continued. The property tax was also paid by the family members of Joshi family to the Municipal Corporation. The competent authority registered a case vide case no.29/79-80/ under Section 20B of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called as ‘the Urban Land Ceiling Act’) against Mr.Dattarey Joshi and family members. The property tax was also paid by the family members of Joshi family to the Municipal Corporation. The competent authority registered a case vide case no.29/79-80/ under Section 20B of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called as ‘the Urban Land Ceiling Act’) against Mr.Dattarey Joshi and family members. Before the competent authority, Joshi family pleaded that they were owners of the house and property, it was received by them as an ancestral property, it was registered in the name of Dattarey Ramchandra Joshi and subsequently the family members; Ashok and Avinas, who were sons of Dattarey Joshi and his wife Smt. Sushila and daughters Sheela, Nilima, Kumari Swati inherited the property. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the competent authority held that all the family members were owners of the property and it was less than 460.072 square meter in the name of each family member, hence, it is within the ceiling limit. Consequently, the Urban Land Ceiling proceedings were dropped vide order dated 21/01/1980, copy of the order has been filed as Annexure P/3 along with the petition. 4. After purchase of the property by the petitioner firm, the Collector stamps initiated proceedings against the petitioners firm in regard to under valuation of the property at the time of registration. The Collector, Stamps held that the petitioners did not value the property properly and deficit stamps duty was paid and ordered payment of certain stamp duty against the petitioners. An appeal was filed against the aforesaid order before the Commissioner, that was dismissed subsequently. The Board of Revenue remanded the matter back. 5. The authorities without giving any notice to the petitioners demolished the property of the petitioners and also took over possession on 16/2/2011. It is pleaded by the respondents in the return that the property is a part and parcel of Survey No.635 and it has been recorded in the revenue record as Government land. It has further been submitted that in Samvat 1997 Survey No.635 was recorded as Ahatmam Talim (Education department, Mahakma Talim). The aforesaid khasra entry continued subsequently. Because, the petitioners and other persons made encroachments over the land, hence, the Tahsildar, Nazul initiated proceedings under Section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). It has further been submitted that in Samvat 1997 Survey No.635 was recorded as Ahatmam Talim (Education department, Mahakma Talim). The aforesaid khasra entry continued subsequently. Because, the petitioners and other persons made encroachments over the land, hence, the Tahsildar, Nazul initiated proceedings under Section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). Thereafter, an order of removal of encroachment was passed and the encroachment had been removed over the land and possession has also been taken over. It has further been submitted that the Collector Gwalior vide order dated 01st March, 2011 reserved the land for multi level parking and lawyer chambers. 6. The petitioners filed a rejoinder in reply to the return and pleaded that no enquiry was conducted by the Tahsildar, Nazul before passing the order under Section 248 of the Code. The petitioners further pleaded that their names were mutated in the revenue records and no notice was served to them by the Tahsildar, Nazul. It has further been submitted that the land in Samvat 1997 was mentioned as Abadi and the petitioners purchased the land from the valid owners, hence, it cannot be said the petitioners made encroachment over the land. 7. The respondents/State filed an additional return to the rejoinder and pleaded that notices were served to the persons, who were found in possession over the land. It has further been submitted that no right accrued in favour of the petitioners or earlier Mr. Joshi Family on account of proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. It has further been submitted that the petition of the petitioners is not maintainable, because disputed questions of facts are involved for determination. 8. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has contended that the proceedings initiated under Section 248 of the Code are without power and authority. He further contended that no proceedings against the petitioners were initiated under Section 248 of the Code, neither any notice was issued by the Tahsildar, Nazul to the petitioners in regard to initiation of proceedings under Section 248 of the Code or taking over possession of the land before demolition of the property. He further submitted that the property was recorded in the name of Mr. Dattarey Joshi in Samvat 1968 in the municipal record of Municipality Gwalior and the entry was continued subsequently. He further submitted that the property was recorded in the name of Mr. Dattarey Joshi in Samvat 1968 in the municipal record of Municipality Gwalior and the entry was continued subsequently. The competent authority initiated proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and it was held that the Joshi family was the owner of the property and those proceedings were dropped subsequently. Thereafter, the petitioners purchased the property vide registered sale deeds and their names were also mutated in the municipal records, they have also paid the property tax. Even though, the competent authority initiated proceedings for payment of deficit stamp duty while executing the sale-deeds against the petitioners, this shows that the petitioners are the owners of the property and only on the basis of entry in the khasra of survey No. 635, it cannot be said that it is a government land, because the survey no. 635 comprise of total 2.163 hectares and over the aforesaid land there are other properties also and those properties have not been removed by the respondents. Hence, the action of the respondents is arbitrary and illegal. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied on the following judgments:- (i) M/s Hindustan Steel Limited, Rourkela vs. Smt. Kalyani Banerjee and others, AIR 1973 SC 408 ; (ii) S.R. Ejaz vs. T.N. Handloom Weavers’ Cooperative Society Ltd., (2002) 3 SCC 137 ; (iii) Narain Prasad Aggarwal (Dead) By Lrs. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007 RN 361 = (2007) 11 SCC 736 ; (iv) Faqruddin (dead) Through Lrs. vs. Tajuddin (dead) Through Lrs., (2008) 8 SCC 12; (v) Meghmala and others vs. G. Narasimha Reddy and others, (2010) 8 SCC 383 ; (vi) Sawarni (Smt.) vs. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223 ; (vii) Smt. Naseem Bano vs. State of U.P. And others, AIR 1993 SC 2592 ; (viii) Ramesh Dutt and others vs. State of Punjab and others, (2009) 15 SCC 429 ; and (ix) State of West Bengal and others vs. Somdeb Bandyopadhayay and others, (2009) 2 SCC 694 ; 9. Contrary to this, learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted that the Survey No. 635 in Samvat 1997 has been recorded as Ahatmam Talim (Education Department, Mahakma Talim) and it is a Government land and since then the entry has been continued. Hence, the authorities have rightly removed the constructions and has also been taken possession. Contrary to this, learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted that the Survey No. 635 in Samvat 1997 has been recorded as Ahatmam Talim (Education Department, Mahakma Talim) and it is a Government land and since then the entry has been continued. Hence, the authorities have rightly removed the constructions and has also been taken possession. He further submitted that those persons who were found in possession over the land were served notices and proceedings under Section 248 of the Code were initiated against them. Hence, action of the authorities is in accordance with law. He further submitted that the disputed questions of facts are involved for determination in this petition in regard to right of ownership, hence, the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied on the following judgments: (i) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority vs. Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti, (2006) 9 SCC 524 ; (ii) Food Corporation of India and another vs. Pala Ram and others, (2008) 14 SCC 32; (iii) Antonio S.C. Pereira vs. Ricardina Noronha (dead) by Lrs., (2006) 7 SCC 740 ; (iv) Sawarni (Smt.) vs. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223 ; (v) Thakur Panchamsingh vs. Mahant Ramkishandas and others, 1971 JLJ 588 = 1971 MPLJ 745 ; (vi) Ramesh Dutt and others vs. State of Punjab and others, (2009) 15 SCC 429 ; and (vii) State of M.P. And another vs. Sind Mahajan Exchange Ltd., 1999 RN 328 (viii) Mahendra Kumar Gupta vs. State of M.P. And others, 1993 RN 253 (ix) Rajinder Krishan Khanna and others vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1999 SC 463 and; (x) State of Orissa & another vs. Mamata Mohanty, AIR 2011 SCW 1332. 10. The question for determination before this Court in this petition is that whether the petitioners were encroachers over the property and whether any proceedings under Section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 were initiated by the Tahsildar, Nazul against the petitioners? 11. Undisputed facts of the case are that the property in question was recorded in the name of Ramchandra s/o Gangadhar Joshi in the record of Municipality Gwalior in Samvat 1968. The aforesaid entry was renewed in Samvat 1991 and it had been continued subsequently. Mr. Ramchandra s/o Gangadhar Joshi paid the property tax to the Municipality. 11. Undisputed facts of the case are that the property in question was recorded in the name of Ramchandra s/o Gangadhar Joshi in the record of Municipality Gwalior in Samvat 1968. The aforesaid entry was renewed in Samvat 1991 and it had been continued subsequently. Mr. Ramchandra s/o Gangadhar Joshi paid the property tax to the Municipality. The entries of the municipal records in this regard have been filed along with the petition as Annexure P/1. Subsequently, family members of Ramchandra Joshi paid the property tax, copy of the documents of property tax have been filed as Annexure P/2. The competent authority under the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act initiated ceiling proceedings against Dattarey Joshi of the same property in regard to declaring the property an excess of urban land ceiling. In the aforesaid proceedings on 21/01/1980, the competent authority passed the order and held that each family members of Joshi family had less than 460.072 square meter of the land and there were other land including the house and other constructed area. Subsequently, the Urban Land Ceiling Proceedings were dropped. Thereafter, the petitioners purchased the some portion of the property vide five sale-deeds from the family members of Joshi family on different dates. Thereafter, the names of the petitioners were mutated in the record of Municipal Council. Subsequently, the petitioners also made some constructions of shops and all those shops were rented out to number of persons. Joshi family sold the some portion of the property to other persons also. 12. It is also an admitted fact that in the Khasra entry of Samvat 1997, which has been filed along with the reply as Annexure R/2 against survey No.635 in column No.3, the name of the owner has been mentioned as Ahatmam Talim (Education Department, Mahakma Talim). In the column of description ‘Abadi’ has been mentioned. The total area of land survey No.635 is 2.163 hectares. Subsequently, on 01/01/2011 the land has been mentioned as nazul government land against the Khasra no. 635. The order was passed by the Collector without giving opportunity of hearing to anyone. The respondents in its return pleaded that the land of Khasra No.635 is located at Jayendraganj, Lashkar Gwalior. The buildings of New District Court, Rajput Hostel, Maratha Boarding are part and parcel of Survey No.635. 635. The order was passed by the Collector without giving opportunity of hearing to anyone. The respondents in its return pleaded that the land of Khasra No.635 is located at Jayendraganj, Lashkar Gwalior. The buildings of New District Court, Rajput Hostel, Maratha Boarding are part and parcel of Survey No.635. It is an admitted fact that no action has been taken by the respondents to remove the construction of Rajput Hostel and Maratha Boarding and District Court building, it was erstwhile Victoria College. 13. Section 2 (l) of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 defines “to hold”. The relevant definition is as under: “(l) “to hold” with its grammatical variations, in relation to any vacant land, means- (i) to own such land; or (ii) to possess such land as owner or as tenant or as mortgagee or under an irrevocable power of attorney or under a hire-purchase agreement or partly in one of the said capacities and partly in any other of the said capacity or capacities.” From the aforesaid definition, it is clear that “to hold” means to own such land or to possess such land as owner. The competent authority issued notice to Joshi Family under the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act and a case was registered under the aforesaid Act. Hence, the Government itself accepted that Joshi Family had own the land or possess the land as owner. 14. The petitioners specifically pleaded in the rejoinder that no notice under Section 248 of the Code had been issued to them before demolition of the property and in reply to the aforesaid pleadings, the respondents pleaded that the notices were issued to the persons who were in possession over the land. Learned Deputy Advocate General produced the revenue records of 14 cases in regard to proceedings initiated by the Tahsildar Nazul under Section 248 of the Code. The following cases have been registered under Section 248 of the Code by the Tahsildar Nazul in regard to encroachment over the land of Survey No.635: (i) Case No. 35/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Falke Sahab. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 25’x40' feet of land in Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (ii) Case No.33/A68/2010-11 was registered against one Mr. Vijay Gupta. Falke Sahab. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 25’x40' feet of land in Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (ii) Case No.33/A68/2010-11 was registered against one Mr. Vijay Gupta. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 19’x13' feet of land in Survey No.635 by constructing two shops. (iii) Case No. 34/A-68/2010-11 was registered against one Mr. Hafiz Noor Bhaksh. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 19’x25' feet of land in Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (iv) Case No. 44/2010-11/A-68 was registered against one Mr. Ravi Patankar. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 11’3'’x10’6'’ and 18’x3' feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (v) Case No. 36/2010-11/A-68 was registered against one Mr.Omprakash Pal. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 19’x13' feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (vi) Case No. 37/A-68/2010-11 was registered against one Mr. Narayan Das Choudhary. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 5’10'’x8’7'’ feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (vii) Case No. 38/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Vishal Khanduja. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 5’10'’x8’7'’ feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (viii) Case No. 39/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Mohammad Jakariya. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 17’6'’x25' feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (ix) Case No. 40/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Abdul Raoof alias Vakar Quereshi. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 19’x25' feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (x) Case No. 41/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Ramesh Khanduja. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 19’x13' feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (xi) Case No. 42/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Hariom Garg. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 5’10'’x8’7'’ feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (xii) Case No. 43/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Radheshayam Garg. (xi) Case No. 42/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Hariom Garg. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 5’10'’x8’7'’ feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (xii) Case No. 43/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Radheshayam Garg. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 7’x8' feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. (xiii) Case No. 45/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Sunil Khanduja. It is mentioned that he had been made encroachment over the area 18’6'’x13’6'’ feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop; and (xiv) Case No. 32/2010-11/A68 was registered against one Mr. Vijay Goyal. It is mentioned that he had made encroachment over the area 10’6'’x21' and 6’x10' feet of land of Survey No.635 by constructing a shop. From the proceedings of the cases, it is clear that only a case No. 32/2010-11/A-68 was registered against Mr. Vijay Goyal in regard to an area 10’6'’x21' and 6’x10' feet of two shops. No case was registered against Mr. Ramesh Chandra Agrawal. The petitioners purchased the property vide five registered sale-deeds in the name of Maa Kaila Devi Enterprises, a partnership firm. Against Mr. Vijay Goyal only a case No.32/2010-11/A-68 was registered for encroachment over the area of 10’6'’x21' and 6’x10' feet, hence, it is clear that no case under Section 248 of the Code was registered in regard to rest of the land. 15. We have perused the proceedings of all the cases. In the proceedings, it is mentioned that all the proceedings were initiated on 10/1/2011. It is written in the ordersheet dated 10/1/2011 that Nazul Inspector reported certain encroachments over the land and notice be issued to the encroachers. Next date was fixed as 17/1/2011. It is written in the odersheet that nobody appeared on behalf of the encroachers and they were proceeded ex-parte. Then the case was listed on 25/1/2011 on which date, the statements of Nazul Inspector Mr.Chandramohan Sharma was recorded. Thereafter, the cases were listed on 31/1/2011, 07/2/2011 and 11/02/2011. On 11/2/2011 an order was passed mentioning the fact that some persons made encroachment over the land and in spite of notices, they were absent. Hence, the Nazul Officer was directed to dispossess the persons. All the orders are on computer sheet. Thereafter, the cases were listed on 31/1/2011, 07/2/2011 and 11/02/2011. On 11/2/2011 an order was passed mentioning the fact that some persons made encroachment over the land and in spite of notices, they were absent. Hence, the Nazul Officer was directed to dispossess the persons. All the orders are on computer sheet. Only, the date of the orders and names of the particular persons and description of the area have been mentioned in ink. All the orders are same and dates are also same. Copy of the notice dated 10/1/2011 is on record. It is written on the back side of the notice that Chandrakant and Deeraj Kumar went on the spot but the persons refused to take notice, hence, the notice was affixed. The same fact has been mentioned in another notice dated 11/2/2011 by Rajkumar Kushwah, which was a notice for removal of encroachment. In all the cases, it is said that the persons refused to take notice and the notice was said to be affixed on 12/2/2011 and thereafter the construction was removed on 16/2/2011. A Panchnama was prepared at the time of removal of encroachment by Nazul Officer Gwalior, Tahsildar Nazul, S.L.R. Nazul, Additional Commissioner Municipal Corporation Gwalior, Madakhalat Officer Revenue, Police personnels, who were present. From the aforesaid facts of the case, it is clear that the affected persons were not at all heard before passing the order, even against the petitioner Mr. Vijay Goyal a case was registered, which is in regard to some portion of the land. 16. Section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 prescribes penalty for unauthorizedly taking possession of land. The aforesaid Section also gives powers to the Tahsildar for summery ejection. The relevant provisions are as under: “[248. Vijay Goyal a case was registered, which is in regard to some portion of the land. 16. Section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 prescribes penalty for unauthorizedly taking possession of land. The aforesaid Section also gives powers to the Tahsildar for summery ejection. The relevant provisions are as under: “[248. Penalty for unauthorisedly taking possession of land.- (1) Any person who unauthorisedly takes or remains in possession of any unoccupied land, abadi, service land or any other which has been set apart for any special purpose under Section 237 [ or upon any land which is the property of Government, or any authority, body corporate, or institution constituted or established under any State enactment,] may be summarily ejected by order of the Tahsildar and any crop which may be standing on the land and any building or other work which he may have constituted thereon, if not removed by him within such time as the Tahsildar may fix shall be liable to forfeiture. Any property so forfeited shall be disposed of as the Tahsildar may direct and the cost of removal of any crop, building or other work and of all works necessary, to restore the land to its original condition shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue from him. Such person shall also be liable at the discretion of the Tahsildar to pay the rent of the land for the period of unauthorised occupation at twice the rate admissible for such land in locality and to a fine which may extend to [five thousand] rupees and to a further fine which may extend to twenty rupees for every day on which such unauthorised occupation or possession continues after the date of first ejectment. The Tahsildar may apply the whole or any part of the fine to compensate persons, who may in his opinion have suffered loss or injury from the encroachment : Provided that the Tahsildar shall not exercise the powers conferred by this sub-section in regard to encroachment made by building or works constructed- (i) in the Mahakoshal region- (a) in areas other than the merged States before the first day of September, 1917; (b) in the merged States, before the third day of April, 1950; (ii) in the Madhya Bharat region, before the fifteenth day of August, 1950; (iii) in the Vindhya Pradesh region, the first day of April, 1955; (iv) in the Bhopal region, before the eighth day of November, 1933; (v) in the Sironj region, before the first day of July, 1958. Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section “Merged States” shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Madhya Pradesh Merged States Laws (State) Act, 1950 (XII of 1950).” The proviso of Section 248 of the Code clearly prescribes that the Tahsildar shall not exercise the powers conferred by this sub-section in regard to encroachment made by buildings or works constructed in the Madhya Bharat region before the fifteenth day of August, 1950. As per the entry of Samvat 1968 in the Municipal Corporation, a huge house was there alongwith open land and it had been continued subsequently. The petitioners purchased the open land of the property including construction. The procedure prescribed under Section 248 of the Code in regard to ejectment is summery in nature and this power has to be exercised by the Tahsildar. 17. In the present case, the respondents have contended that the petitioners made encroachments over the land against the Survey No.635, which comprises the total area of 2.163 hectare. It has been mentioned that the land was of the Ahatmam Talim (Education Department, Mahakma Talim) and subsequently, in the year 2011 it was recorded as government land. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Hindustan Steel Limited, Rourkela vs. Smt. Kalyani Banerjee and others reported in AIR 1973 SC 408 has held as under in regard to effect of a revenue entry as proof of proprietary title:- “13. The learned Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the appellant countered this plea of the petitioners by saying that entries in Register ‘D’ can never be conclusive as to title. The learned Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the appellant countered this plea of the petitioners by saying that entries in Register ‘D’ can never be conclusive as to title. Our attention was drawn to Section 4 of the Land Registration Act 1876 which though a Bengal Act (18 of 1876) is the Act applicable to Bihar. Section 4 of that Act describes the various registers which the Collector of every district has to prepare and maintain. Register ‘D’ is described in that Section as an intermediate register of changes affecting entries in the general and mouzawar register. The Land Registration Act mentions the purposes as well as the contents of the four registers mentioned in Section 4. The intermediate register called Register ‘D’, it appears, is kept for the purpose of recording all changes effected in the entries which stand in the other three registers, namely Register ‘A’ of revenue-paying lands, Register ‘B’ of revenue-free lands as well as the Mouzawar Register ‘C’ of all lands, revenue-paying and revenue-free, so that by a reference to Register ‘D’ correct uptodate information as to Registers ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ on all points recorded therein may be obtained at any time. The names and addresses of the properties of every estate which comprises lands situate in a district are to be found in Register ‘A’. It is clear therefore that Register ‘D’ will ordinarily show changes in the names of proprietors which are to be posted in Register ‘A’ as a result of mutation proceedings. Ordinarily, a proprietor will take good care to have his name registered under the Land Registration Act in the Collector’s registers for, otherwise, he cannot be entitled to claim rent from his tenants since, under Section 78 of the Land Registration Act no one is bound to pay rent to any person claiming such rent as proprietor or manager of an estate unless his name is registered under the Act. All the same, even when a name is posted in a register as proprietor as a result of a mutation proceeding, the person whose name is posted cannot claim that he automatically establishes his title as proprietor of the estate concerned. All the same, even when a name is posted in a register as proprietor as a result of a mutation proceeding, the person whose name is posted cannot claim that he automatically establishes his title as proprietor of the estate concerned. In Nirman Singh v. Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh, 53 Ind App 220 = (AIR 1926 PC 100) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that proceedings for the mutation of names are not judicial proceedings in which title to and proprietary rights in immovable property can be determined. The Privy Council further held that mutation proceedings are in the nature of fiscal enquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of several claimants for the occupation of certain denomination of immovable property may be put into occupation of it with greater confidence that the revenue for it will be paid. The Privy Council clearly held that revenue authorities have no jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of claims of title so that orders in mutation proceedings cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of proprietary title. The learned Solicitor General relied also on a decision of this Court in Sri Murudeswarar Temple v. Dhanalakshmi Ammal, Civil Appeal No. 236 of 1961, D/- 10-1-1963 (SC) where this Court held that a certified copy of the revenue extract showing a land as entered in the name of the particular temple is not conclusive of the right of the temple to the land, for a revenue record merely shows that the Government regards the person in whose name the land is entered as responsible for payment of revenue. “Such an entry may, prima facie, be good evidence of possession and even of the right to hold the land, but in law it is not conclusive.” 14. On the strength of these authorities the learned Solicitor-General contended that the entries in the Register ‘D’ on which the petitioners rely cannot be taken as conclusive evidence as to the title of Kumar Amardeyal Singh. In our opinion there is considerable substance in this contention of the learned Solicitor-General. It is true that the extracts from Register ‘D’ are strong prima facie evidence in support of the petitioners’ claim that Kumar Amardeyal Singh was a proprietor of Ladi Estate but it is not possible to treat his evidence as conclusive on the point.” 19. In our opinion there is considerable substance in this contention of the learned Solicitor-General. It is true that the extracts from Register ‘D’ are strong prima facie evidence in support of the petitioners’ claim that Kumar Amardeyal Singh was a proprietor of Ladi Estate but it is not possible to treat his evidence as conclusive on the point.” 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in subsequent judgment in the case of Faqruddin (Dead) through Lrs. vs. Tajuddin (dead) Through Lrs. reported in (2008) 8 SCC 12 held as under: “45. Revenue authorities of the State are concerned with revenue. Mutation takes place only for certain purposes. The statutory rules must be held to be operating in a limited sense. The provisions of Rule 13 of the Matmi Rules laying down a rule of primogeniture will have no application in relation to the offices of Sajjadanashin and Mutawalli, which are offices of different nature. They are stricto sensu not hereditary in nature. It is well-settled that an entry in the revenue records is not a document of title. Revenue authorities cannot decide a question of title. 46. Inheritance or succession to a property is governed by statutory law. Inheritance of an office may not be governed by law of inheritance; but, the office of Sajjadnashin is not ordinary office. A person must possess the requisite qualifications to hold the said office. 47. In Suraj Bhan and others v. Financial Commissioner and others [ (2007) 6 SCC 186 ], this Court held : “...It is well settled that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. It is settled law that entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose” i.e. payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. So far as title to the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court (vide Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh)...” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case of Narain Prasad Aggarwal (dead) by Lrs. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2007 RN 361 = (2007) 11 SCC 736 has held as under: “19. Record of right is not a document of title. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case of Narain Prasad Aggarwal (dead) by Lrs. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2007 RN 361 = (2007) 11 SCC 736 has held as under: “19. Record of right is not a document of title. Entries made therein in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act although are admissible as a relevant piece of evidence and although the same may also carry a presumption of correctness, but it is beyond any doubt or dispute that such a presumption is rebuttable. Exhibit P-4 and Exhibit P-6, whereupon reliance has been placed by the learned trial Judge to hold that the State had title over the property in question, were documents of year 1920-21, but failed to notice that the documents must have been taken into consideration and/ or would be presumed to have been taken into consideration by the Settlement Commissioner when the aforementioned order dated 30.10.1922 (Exhibit P-3) was passed wherein it had categorically been held that no deed of lease having been executed in respect of the land in question, the title of the said Putri Sethani should be deemed to be a permanent lessee. 20. Although title in respect of an immovable property may have different concepts, it is fundamental that title of the same nature cannot be found to be existing in two different persons where their claims thereover are opposite. It was possible for the Court to hold in a situation of this nature that the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 2 being a permanent lessee under the State were bound to pay rent to the State by way of land revenue or otherwise but the same would not mean that despite the plaintiff being the holder of title, the State had in it a right of reversion or for that matter the character of the land was Nazul land. It is, therefore, difficult to agree with the findings of the learned trial Judge as affirmed by the High Court. 21. The existence of a lease deed must be proved. The same must also answer the legal requirements contained in sections 105 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relationship of lessor and lessee and the terms and conditions of a lease would depend upon the contract between the parties. 21. The existence of a lease deed must be proved. The same must also answer the legal requirements contained in sections 105 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relationship of lessor and lessee and the terms and conditions of a lease would depend upon the contract between the parties. It is not and cannot be the case of the State that an oral lease was granted in favour of Putri Sethani. In a case involving the State and particularly when the nature of the land is said to be Nazul land, it was imperative on the part of the State to execute a deed of lease. As execution of such a document has not been proved, the learned trial Judge, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in solely relying upon the entries made in the revenue record of rights despite noting the order of the Commissioner of Settlement dated 30.10.1922. Entries made in the revenue record of rights, it would bear repetition to state, cannot defeat the lawful title acquired by an auction purchaser, particularly, in view of the fact that Putri Sethani had questioned the order passed by the Collector of the District before the Commissioner of Settlement which ended in her favour. It is well-settled that payment or non-payment of rent does not create or extinguish title.” 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Dutt and others vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (2009) 15 SCC 429 had held as under: “14. Title in or over an immovable property has many facets. Possession is one of them. Unless there exits a statutory interdict, a person in possession may transfer his right, title and interest in favour of a third party.” 22. From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the entry in revenue record is not a conclusive proof about the title and ownership. It can only raise a presumption about the possession and ownership, however, that presumption can be reverted on certain other factors. In the present case, the name of Joshi family was recorded as owner of the property in the municipal council record of Samvat 1968. The Joshi family had paid property tax also. Subsequently, the ceiling proceedings were initiated against the Joshi family and those proceedings were dropped. In the present case, the name of Joshi family was recorded as owner of the property in the municipal council record of Samvat 1968. The Joshi family had paid property tax also. Subsequently, the ceiling proceedings were initiated against the Joshi family and those proceedings were dropped. It was held that the Joshi family had property within the ceiling limit. The ceiling proceedings were initiated because the government itself accepted the fact that the Joshi family was the owner of the property. Subsequently, the petitioners purchased the property and their names were also recorded in the municipal council record after mutation. Even the Tahsildar Nazul did not issue the notices to the firm Maa Kailadevi, neither any case was registered against the firm through its partners under section 248 of the Code, nor any notice was issued to the partners in regard to the property. Only one case was registered against Mr. Vijay Goyal one of the partner for a small portion of two shops of the land. It is alleged that he made encroachment by making constructions of two shops. 23. Section 14 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 prescribes procedure as under in regard to property of the firm:- “14. The property of the firm: - Subject to contract between the partners, the property of the firm includes all property and rights and interests in property originally brought into the stock of the firm, or acquired, by purchase or otherwise, by or for the firm, or for the purposes and in the course of business of the firm, and includes also the goodwill of the business. Unless the contrary intention appears, property and rights and interests in property acquired with money belonging to the firm are deemed to have been acquired for the firm.” From the Section, it is clear that firm is the owner of the property acquired by it. Admittedly, the property was purchased by the petitioner firm, hence, it was mandatory to register case under section 248 of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 against the firm. 24. As per the proviso of section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, a Tahsildar has no power and authority to initiate proceedings in regard to removal of encroachment made by building or works construction in the Madhya Bharat Region before 15th August, 1950. 24. As per the proviso of section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, a Tahsildar has no power and authority to initiate proceedings in regard to removal of encroachment made by building or works construction in the Madhya Bharat Region before 15th August, 1950. As per the record of the then Municipal Council Gwalior of Samvat 1968, the property was in the name of Joshi Family and it consisted a house. Some portion of the house was purchased by the petitioner firm. Hence, the Tahsildar had no power and authority to initiate proceedings under section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. 25. After perusal of the whole records of encroachment proceedings, in our opinion, the revenue authorities and Tahsildar Nazul had acted arbitrarily and in utter disregard to the provisions of section 248 of the Code. Prima facie, we are of the opinion that no notice was issued to the affected persons and in order to complete the formalities, the notices were said to be affixed on the spot. Subsequently, it has been mentioned that the persons refused to take notices. The Rules have been framed in regard to procedure of revenue officers and revenue courts for issuance of notices under section 41 of the Code in Schedule I. Rules 4 to 9 prescribes mode of service of notices, which are as under: “4. (a) The process-fee shall be paid in court-fee stamps which shall be affixed either to the application by which the Revenue Officer is moved to issue the process, or to a memorandum to be written on a sheet of paper and filed before the Revenue Officer : Provided that- (1) Process-fee on process issued for the recovery of land revenue or of any other sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue under section 155 shall be recovered in cash and credited into the treasury. (2) Process fees my not be recovered in Advance- (i) From a duly appointed liquidator of a co-operative society in a case I which any sum is to be recovered as arrears of land revenue under a certificate issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies; and (ii) From a Co-operative Society in a case in which any sum is to be recovered as arrears of land revenue under a certificate issued by the said registrar. They shall, however, be deducted from the total amount realised from members against whom the processed are issued, whether jointly or severally. If the total amount realised is less than the process fees or no amount is realised, the balance or the whole of the process fees, as the case may be, shall be recovered in cash from the liquidator or the society; (3) When processes in either class of cases referred to in the preceding clause are issued by a liquidator or an auditor of the Co-operative Department invested with the powers of a Tahsildar and served by peons employed by him at the cost of a Co-operative Society, the process-fees recovered shall be credited to the society concerned. (b) If an application, and not a memorandum, is filed, it must in addition to the requisite stamps for the process-fees, bear such stamps, if any, as are needed for its own validity. (c) Such application or memorandum, as the case may be, shall state in designation of the Revenue Officer, the number and description of the case, appeal or proceedings, the value of the courtfee stamps affixed, and details of the processes to be issued. (5) The mode of issuing a proclamation, prescribed in Rule 17 of the rules in Schedule I of the Code, shall apply to the issue of the prohibitory order. (6) Processes shall be served by peons attached to Tahsil or by the patel or may, in the case of notice, be sent by post. The peon or the patel shall enter the date and particulars of the mode of service on the copy of the process retained by him, and this copy shall be returned to the officer who issued it. Explanation- Where an officer is vested with the powers of a Revenue Officer, for the purpose of proceedings by him in his capacity as a Revenue Officer a peon attached to him shall be deemed to be a peon attached to the Tahsil for the purposes of this rule. 7. Tahsil peons are prohibited from receiving any money on account of Government revenue or process-fee. 8. 7. Tahsil peons are prohibited from receiving any money on account of Government revenue or process-fee. 8. When a Revenue Officer sends a process for service or execution to any Court in India out of the State, the fees shall be levied in stamps in accordance with the rate prescribed in Rule 2, and the Revenue Officer shall certify on the process that the proper fee has been levied. 9. A process issued by any Court in any other State in India shall be served and executed free of charge by any Revenue Officer to whom it may be sent, if it is certified on the process that the proper fee has been levied. When no such certificate has been given or the amount of process-fee has been specifically mentioned in the Revenue recovery certificate, the officer effecting recovery of the arrears will realise the fees due on the processes actually issued minus the amount shown in the revenue recovery certificate to have been recovered in advance.” From the perusal of the aforesaid Rules, it is clear that no notice was served in accordance with the aforesaid Rules, neither these Rules have been followed. The authority has also not decided the fact that whether there was any encroachment over the land or not. It appears that the authority had made up his mind to remove the persons and for that purpose only formalities have been completed. 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R. Ejaz vs. T.N. Handloom Weavers’ Cooperative Society Ltd., (2002) 3 SCC 137 has observed as under in regard to exercise of powers by the authority: “8. In our view, if such actions by the mighty or powerful are condoned in a democratic country, nobody would be safe nor can the citizens protect their properties. Law frowns upon such conduct. The court accords legitimacy and legality only to possession taken in due course of law. If such actions are condoned, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India or the legal rights would be given a go-by either by the authority or by rich and influential persons or by musclemen. Law of jungle will prevail and “might would be right” instead of “right being might”. If such actions are condoned, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India or the legal rights would be given a go-by either by the authority or by rich and influential persons or by musclemen. Law of jungle will prevail and “might would be right” instead of “right being might”. This Court in State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh dealt with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and observed that a lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extrajudicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry of earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited. The Court also held that there is no question of the Government withdrawing or appropriating to it an extrajudicial right of re-entry and the possession of the property can be resumed by the Government only in a manner known to or recognized by law.” 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Meghmala and others vs. G. Narasimha Reddy and others, (2010) 8 SCC 383 has observed as under: “48. Even the State authorities cannot dispossess a person by an executive order. The authorities cannot become the law unto themselves. It would be in violation of the rule of law. The Government can resume possession only in a manner known to or recognised by law and not otherwise.” 28. From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that authority cannot become the law unto themselves. It would be in violation of rule of law and the Government can resume possession only in a manner known or recognised by law. In the present case, the authorities have acted in such a manner that they became the law unto themselves. The possession of the property of the petitioners has been taken in most arbitrarily manner without following the due procedure of law. 29. In the present case, the authorities have acted in such a manner that they became the law unto themselves. The possession of the property of the petitioners has been taken in most arbitrarily manner without following the due procedure of law. 29. The contentions of the learned Deputy Advocate General that the petition is not maintainable as the disputed questions of facts are involved, could not be accepted, because from the perusal of the proceedings, it is clear that no proceedings was initiated against the petitioners under section 248 of the Code and only in regard to small portion of the land a case was registered against one partner Mr. Vijay Goyal. Earlier, the property was in the name of Joshi family and thereafter the proceedings under the Urban Land and Ceiling Act were initiated and in those proceedings, it was held that Joshi family had right to own the property, in our opinion, the respondents have committed an error of law in holding that the Government has right of ownership of the property. Hence, the proceedings initiated under section 248 of the Code are without any power and jurisdiction. It was obligatory on the part of the State authorities to institute a suit for declaration of title and possession over the property, however, in order to bye-pass the procedure established by law, the authorities have taken the law in their own hands. 30. In the democratic society the Rule of law is an important feature of governance and it is obligatory on the part of the State authorities to place the correct facts and correct documents before the Court so that the Court can pronounce the correct judgment. If the administrative authorities place doctored documents before the Court then it would be very difficult to pronounce the proper judgment. In the present case, prima facie, the respondents placed the doctored documents in regard to service of notice or summon on the affected persons. In our opinion, an inquiry is necessary to this aspect. If the administrative authorities place doctored documents before the Court then it would be very difficult to pronounce the proper judgment. In the present case, prima facie, the respondents placed the doctored documents in regard to service of notice or summon on the affected persons. In our opinion, an inquiry is necessary to this aspect. Hence, we direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior to conduct an inquiry in regard to service of summons in all the nazul cases registered by the Nazul Tahsildar under section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code in regard to Survey No. 635 mentioned earlier in the order after taking evidence, calling the record and giving opportunity of hearing to the affected specifically the persons, on whom it is said that the notices were served. The Chief Judicial Magistrate shall submit his findings before this Court so this Court can take appropriate action. 31. We may also take note of the facts from other two writ petition i.e. W.P. No.1171/2011 (Avi Smriti Patankar Pathology Laboratory vs. The State of M.P. And others) and W.P. No.1172/2011 (Smt. Urmila Phalke and another vs. The State of M.P. And others) to the effect that this Court granted an order to maintain status quo on 17/2/2011. It is pleaded by the petitioners that the aforesaid order was passed in the presence of learned Additional Advocate General. However, in spite of that in the afternoon, the property was demolished and possession had been taken over. We will deal with the aforesaid question separately in deciding the aforesaid two writ petitions. 32. Consequently, the petition of the petitioners is allowed. The action of the respondents in regard to initiation of proceedings under section 248 of the Code and recovery of possession are hereby quashed. Now the area is an open land because construction has been demolished, hence, possession of the petitioners over the land is restored. The order dated 01st March, 2011 passed by the Collector Gwalior is hereby quashed. 33. The petitioners have also made a prayer for grant of compensation. However, looking to the facts of the case, in our opinion, under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court cannot quantify the damages or compensation. For the aforesaid purpose, the petitioners are at liberty to institute a proper suit. 33. The petitioners have also made a prayer for grant of compensation. However, looking to the facts of the case, in our opinion, under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court cannot quantify the damages or compensation. For the aforesaid purpose, the petitioners are at liberty to institute a proper suit. The respondents State authorities are also at liberty to file a proper suit in regard to their claim of ownership of the property. No order as to costs.