Judgment :- 1. Animadverting upon the return of the petition in unnumbered E.A.No.........of 2012 in E.P.No.42 of 2010 in O.S.No.1334 of 1990 and the order dated 3.2.2007 passed by the Principal Sub Judge, Coimbatore, in I.A.No.917 of 2006 in I.A.No.212 of 2006 in O.S.No.1334 of 1990, respectively, these civil revision petitions are filed. 2. The parties, for the sake of convenience are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. A thumbnail sketch of the germane facts in a few broad strokes can be encapsulated thus: (i) M.C.Swaminathan Chettiar-the first respondent herein filed the suit O.S.No.1334 of 1990 for partition seeking the following relief: "To pass a decree a) Directing that the suit property be divided into 8 equal shares by metes and bounds and the plaintiff be allotted and delivered possession of one such; b) Directing the 2nd defendant to render accounts regarding the future income derived from the property and pay plaintiff's share of property; c) Directing the defendants to pay costs of the suit;" (extracted as such) as against the defendants. (ii) The matter was contested by Murugananthan-the second defendant and some other defendants. Whereupon a preliminary decree was passed, as against which, the plaintiff preferred the appeal A.S.No.96 of 2002 and in that also, the original defendant No.2-Murugananthan and some others contested the appeal. (iii) Indubitably and indisputably during the pendency of the said appeal A.S.No.96 of 2002, the said Muruganantham-the original defendant No.2, who was R2 in the appeal, sold the property in favour of the revision petitioners herein, namely, S.P.N.Sathyamoorthy and S.P.N.Krishnamoorthy (iv) Subsequently, the plaintiff-Swaminathan Chettiar filed the application for obtaining final decree. (v) Pending final decree proceedings, the revision petitioners herein filed the I.A.No.917 of 2006 under Order 1 Rule 3 of C.P.C. read with Section 101 of C.P.C. with the following prayer: "For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, the petitioners most humbly pray that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass an order directing the first respondent who is the petitioner in the final decree petitioner and who is the plaintiff in the suit to implead or add the petitioners as parties to the final decree proceedings and to grant such other ...." (extracted as such) (vi) The matter was contested by the plaintiff, namely, Swaminathan Chettiar. 4. 4. The lower Court dismissed the said application, as against which, these revision petitions have been filed on various grounds, including the ones that the lower Court ought not have dismissed the application but should have given due opportunity to the third party purchasers-the revision petitioners herein to contest the matter and prove their case in equity, but such opportunity was deprived to them, warranting interference in revisions. 5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners herein would put forth and set forth his arguments, reiterating the grounds of revisions to the effect that the revision petitioners did not belong to the place where the suit property is situated, but they belonged to a different place; without knowing about the then pending litigation, simply they purchased the property and for no fault of them they should not be penalised. 6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners also by inviting the attention of this Court to the order of this Court dated 9.5.2007, would submit that initially stay was granted for six weeks staying the proceedings in the final decree petition; however ignoring the said stay order of this Court final decree was passed and as such, such a final decree has to be ignored. 7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguements as put forth and set forth on the side of the revision petitioners, the learned counsel for R1-Swaminathan Chettiar/plaintiff would advance his arguments, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: (i) The Pendente lite purchasers cannot try to establish before the Court anything over and above what their vendor could place before the Court. They are having no independent right to contend that their vendor was having more share than what was allotted to him. They are simply bound by the finality in the proceedings. They cannot try to reopen the proceedings also. (ii) The order dated 9.5.2007 passed by this Court in M.P.No.1 of 2007 in C.R.P.No.1506 of 2007 stipulated that the stay would be for six weeks only; whereas, thereafter there was no extension of stay. In fact, the final decree was passed on 1.4.2007 long after the expiry of six weeks as per the said order of stay of this Court. (iii) There is absolutely nothing to indicate that there was allegedly collusion among the co-sharers including the vendors of the revision petitioners herein. In fact, the final decree was passed on 1.4.2007 long after the expiry of six weeks as per the said order of stay of this Court. (iii) There is absolutely nothing to indicate that there was allegedly collusion among the co-sharers including the vendors of the revision petitioners herein. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the first respondent-Swaminathan Chettiar would pray for the dismissal of the CRPs. 8. The learned counsel for R2-Sarojini, R4-Visalakshi and R6-Rajendra Prasad would in fact adopt the arguements as put forth on the side of Swaminathan Chettiar-R1 herein. 9. The points for consideration are as under: (i) Whether the third party purchasers-the revision petitioners herein could simply pray the Court to mandate the plaintiff to take steps to implead them, as prayed by them in I.A.No.917 of 2006; and over and above that, whether they could prove anything which their vendor himself had not placed before the Court. (ii) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the order passed by the lower Court. 10. Both these points are taken together for discussion as they are interwoven and interlinked, interconnected and entwined with each other. 11. At the out set itself I would like to point out that the very prayer in the I.A.No.917 of 2006 invoking Order 1 Rule 3 of C.P.C., is a farfetched one. If at all the third party purchasers wanted to get themselves impleaded they should have straight away sought for such permission, even while the appeal A.S.No.96 of 2002 was pending, because they purchased the property pending such appeal. But they had not chosen to do so. 12. The advocates appearing on the respondents' side herein without fear of contradiction would point out that even though the sale executed by Murugananthan in favour of the revision petitioners herein took place as early as on 18.3.2003, yet the appeal was disposed of only on 23.7.2003 and that too, the revision petitioners' vendor Murugananthan was contesting the appeal filed by the plaintiff's vendor Swaminathan. The revision petitisoners mere plea of ignorance about the litigation is neither here nor there. 13. In this connection, I would like to cite the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC) [ T.G.Ashok Kumar vs. Govindammal and another]. Certain excerpts from it would run thus: "9. ................ The revision petitisoners mere plea of ignorance about the litigation is neither here nor there. 13. In this connection, I would like to cite the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC) [ T.G.Ashok Kumar vs. Govindammal and another]. Certain excerpts from it would run thus: "9. ................ In Jayaram Mudaliar vs. Ayyasami AIR 1973 569 this Court held that the purpose of Section 52 of the Act is not to defeat any just and equitable claim, but only to subject them to the authority of the Court which is dealing with the property to which claims are put forward. This Court in Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh (2007) 2 SCC 404 : (2007) 3 MLJ 44 held that Section 52 of the Act does not declare a pendente lite transfer by a party to the suit as void or illegal, but only makes the pendente lite purchaser bound by the decision in the pending litigation. 10. The principle underlying Section 52 is clear. If during the pendency of any suit in a Court of competent jurisdiction which is not collusive, in which any right of an immovable property is directly and specifically in question, such property cannot be transferred by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights of any other party to the suit under any decree that may be made in such suit. If ultimately the title of the pendente lite transferor is upheld in regard to the transferred property, the transferee's title will not be affected. On the other hand, if the title of the pendente lite transferor is recognized or accepted only in regard to a part of the transferred property, then the transferee's title will be saved only in regard to that extent and the transfer in regard to the remaining portion of the transferred property to which the transferor is found not entitle, will be invalid and the transferee will not get any right, title or interest in that portion. If the property transferred pendente lite, is allotted in entirely to some other party or parties or if the transferor is held to have no right or title in that property, the transferee will not have any title to the property. If the property transferred pendente lite, is allotted in entirely to some other party or parties or if the transferor is held to have no right or title in that property, the transferee will not have any title to the property. Where a co-owner alienates a property or a portion of a property representing to be the absolute owner, equities can no doubt be adjusted while making the division during the final decree proceedings, if feasible and practical (that is without causing loss or hardship or inconvenience to other parties) by allotting the property or portion of the property transferred pendente lite, to the share of the transferor, so that the bona fide transferee's right and title are saved fully or partially. 11. In this case, a suit for partition filed by the first respondent against the second respondent in the year 1985 which included the suit property, was pending in a court of competent jurisdiction as on the date of sale (11.4.1990) by the second respondent in favour of the appellant. The partition suit was not collusive. Having regard to Section 52 of the Act, the sale by the second respondent in favour of the appellant did not in any way affect the right of the first respondent (plaintiff in the partition suit) or the decree made in her favour in the said partition suit. It is thus evident that the sale by second respondent in favour of the appellant though not void, did not bind the first respondent who was the plaintiff in the partition suit. On the other hand, the sale in favour of appellant was subject to the right declared or recognized in favour of the first respondent-plaintiff under the decree passed in the pending partition suit. The sale pendente lite would therefore be subject to the decree in the partition suit. In the final decree passed in the partition suit, the major portion of the suit property shown by the letters, B,C, D,E,F,G,H, I, B in the Commissioner's sketch (Exhibit C-5) was allotted to the share of the first respondent and to that extent, the sale in favour of the appellant would be ineffective. In the final decree passed in the partition suit, the major portion of the suit property shown by the letters, B,C, D,E,F,G,H, I, B in the Commissioner's sketch (Exhibit C-5) was allotted to the share of the first respondent and to that extent, the sale in favour of the appellant would be ineffective. But, in regard to the remaining portion of the suit property namely the portion shown by the letters A, B,I, H, A in the Commissioner's sketch (Exhibit C-) which stood allotted to the share of the second respondent in the final decree in the partition suit, the sale by the second respondent in favour of the appellant is effective, valid and binding on the second respondent and to that extent, the appellant is entitled to a declaration of title and consequential injunction. 12. We are therefore, of the view that the suit ought not to have been dismissed in entirety even if the sale by the second respondent in favour of the appellant on 11.4.1990 was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The second respondent cannot avoid the sale made by her on the ground that she was held to be not the exclusive owner, in the pending partition suit. Therefore, the courts below ought to have decreed the appellant's suit in part, in regard to the portion of the suit property that fell to the share of second respondent instead of dismissing the suit." 14. A plain reading of the said decision would amply make the point clear that a pendente lite purchaser cannot plead before the Court that he purchased the property without knowing the pending litigation. As such, the law is absolute in its term that it imputes knowledge on the third party purchaser, who cannot try to wriggle out of the consequences of his purchase by pleading ignorance of the pending litigation. As such, the lower Court correctly rejected the plea of ignorance of the pending litigation as pleaded by the revision petitioners herein. 15. The Courts powers are enormous to permit even a third party purchaser to get himself impladed so as to work out his equities and nothing more, in the eventuality of such purchaser, pendente lite, willing to participate in the proceedings. Independently he cannot take any plea. He is only bound by the ultimate result in the proceedings. 16. 15. The Courts powers are enormous to permit even a third party purchaser to get himself impladed so as to work out his equities and nothing more, in the eventuality of such purchaser, pendente lite, willing to participate in the proceedings. Independently he cannot take any plea. He is only bound by the ultimate result in the proceedings. 16. Palpably and glaringly clear, it is that after the appeal, the final decree itself emerged, wherein the revision petitioners' vendor Muruganandhan was allotted 1/7th share by metes and bounds, at a particular spot specified in the commissioner's report, which became part and parcel of the final decree. There is no scintilla or pint of any plausible factual suggestion at least to shed light as on what basis the third party purchasers, at the final decree stage could get anything better than what their vendor R3 herein was allotted finally in the final decree. As such, the revision petitioners could only work out their remedies by paying necessary Court fee before the lower Court and get a final decree in their favour in respect of that portion, which was already ear marked in favour of his vendor and the said vendor Muruganandhan-respondent No.3 herein is not in any way objecting to it, as he remained ex-parte in the present revision. 17. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners would submit that the grievance of his clients, namely, the revision petitioners, who happened to be the 3rd party purchasers is that the plaintiffs cannot get 1/7th share in the said house. 18. I would like to make it clear by reiteration and pleonasm, that the third party purchaser cannot independently set up any case by disputing or disagreeing with the ultimate result arrived at in the suit. 19. In the preliminary decree itself, the shares were finalised. Whereupon the appeal was filed. In the appeal it was modified and as such finality achieved with regard to the shares are concerned to the effect that the 7 sharers are entitled to one share each and as a sequela in the final decree proceedings also the revision petitioners' vendor, namely, Murugananthan was allotted 1/7th share in the specific portion marked for him in the final decree plan itself. In such a case, the revision petitioners/third party purchasers could only take steps to get that portion belonged to his vendor Murugananthan. 20. In such a case, the revision petitioners/third party purchasers could only take steps to get that portion belonged to his vendor Murugananthan. 20. The learned counsel for he revision petitioners would submit that since they are in possession of the property they want to protect their possession and with that in mind they filed the application under Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C., which was returned with the following cryptic endorsement by the lower Court. "Returned 1) Provision under Order 21 Rule 97 is applicable only for the holder of decree for possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in a execution of decree. How a third party claimant can invoke Order 21 Rule 97 is to be stated to relevant authorities if any may be quoted. 2) Docket sheet shall be attached." (extracted as such) 21. It is ex facie and prima facie clear that the revision petitioners herein had no such right to invoke Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C., even then the lower Court in very many words did not state so. 22. I would like to refer to the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court fruitfully: (i) (1997)3 SUPREME COSURT CASES 694 – BRAHMDEO CHAUDHARY V. RISHIKESH PRASAD JAISWAL AND ANOTHER. (ii) (1998) 6 SUPREME COURT CASES 200 – GHASI RAM AND OTHERS V. CHAITRAM SAINI AND OTHERS. 23. A plain reading of those decisions would leave no doubt in the mind of this Court that a person, who is claiming right under the judgment debtor, cannot be dignified with the title of an obstructor within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C. If at all the obstructor is having independent right de hors the rights of the judgment debtors, then only the Court is enjoined to have a roving enquiry as it is done in a suit. But on the other hand, if the pleadings would disclose that the so called obstructor is only claiming right under any one of the judgment debtors then he should be treated as the one beyond the purview of Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C.and his obstruction should be ignored. 24. But on the other hand, if the pleadings would disclose that the so called obstructor is only claiming right under any one of the judgment debtors then he should be treated as the one beyond the purview of Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C.and his obstruction should be ignored. 24. A plain running of the eye over those precedents and also order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C. would make the point amply and pellucidly, palpably and plainly clear that only a 3rd party, having independent right, in order to protect his right, can invoke Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C. On the other hand, the persons like the revision petitioners, who claim right under one of the defendants in the litigation cannot holler and invoke Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C. As such, no more elaboration in this regard is required. 25.In the result, this C.R.P.No.1508 of 2007 is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed. 26. C.R.P.No.1941 of 2012 is disposed of with the observation that it is open for the revision petitioners herein to approach the lower Court and take steps to get the share, which was allotted to Murugananthan-R3 herein, allotted in their favour in the final decree, by paying appropriate Court fee as well as non-judicial stamp duty. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.