The defendant No.1, the successor-in-interest of the defendant No.2 and the defendant No.3 have filed this appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 15.05.2003 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Barpeta, in Title Appeal No.41/1986, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff/respondent by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 10.07.1986 (decree drawn on 08.08.1986), passed in Title Suit No.33/1983 by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No.1, (now Munsiff), Barpeta, whereby and whereunder the suit of the plaintiff/respondent was dismissed. During pendency of the present appeal the defendant No.1/appellant No.1 Surya Das died and in his place the names of appellant Nos.1(a) to 1(d) were substituted vide order dated 30.07.2010. The appellant No.2 Balabhadra Das, whose name was substituted in place of deceased defendant No.2 Chidananda having died during pendency of the appeal and there being no application filed for substitution of the names of his legal heirs, this Court vide order dated 26.02.2010 has dismissed the appeal as abated in so far as Balabhadra Das, the appellant No.2. 2. The respondent as plaintiff instituted Title Suit No.33/1983 in the Court of the learned Munsiff praying for declaration of right, title, interest and recovery of khas possession in respect of a plot of land measuring 1 katha 12½ lechas covered by Dag No.148 of K.P. Patta No.71 of Metuakuchi Town, Mouza-Barpeta in the district of Barpeta, contending inter alia that he purchased the said land from Chandra Kanta Das, out of the total land of 1 bigha 2 kathas 10 lechas in the said Dag, by a registered deed of sale dated 31.01.1981 (Ext.-1) for a valuable consideration of Rs.7,500/- and accordingly the possession was delivered. It has further been contended that his name thereafter was mutated in the revenue records in respect of the said land and thereafter on the basis of the application filed, the Sub-Deputy Collector demarcated the boundary on 07.10.1982 in presence of the boundary persons as well as the neighbours of the suit land. The further contention of the plaintiff is that on 08.10.1982 the defendant Nos.1 and 2 forcibly came to possess the said suit land thereby dispossessing the said plaintiff therefrom, which necessitated filing of the suit for declaration of right, title, interest and recovery of khas possession. 3. The further contention of the plaintiff is that on 08.10.1982 the defendant Nos.1 and 2 forcibly came to possess the said suit land thereby dispossessing the said plaintiff therefrom, which necessitated filing of the suit for declaration of right, title, interest and recovery of khas possession. 3. The defendant No.1 Surya Das filed the written statement contending that he has been possessing the suit land since the year 1938 and the plaintiff never possess the suit land as alleged. In the separate written statement filed by the defendant Nos.2 and 3, it has been contended that the defendant No.2 in the year 1975 purchased a plot of land measuring 3 kathas in Dag No.148 from the pattadar Chandra Kanta Das by a registered deed of sale and again purchased 12 lechas of land in the said Dag from the same vendor on 01.06.1977, thereby purchasing 3 kathas 12 lechas of land, pursuant to which possession was delivered and his name has been mutated in the revenue record. It has also been contended that on the basis of the order passed by the Revenue Authority, a new Dag being Dag No.943 and a new patta being patta No.352 have been curved out from the old Dag No.148 of K.P. Patta No.71, in respect of said 3 kathas 12 lechas of land. 4. The Trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues for consideration and decision:- (i) Whether there is any cause of action for this suit? (ii) Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form? (iii) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties as alleged by the defendants? (iv) Whether the suit is barred for want of proper court fees as alleged? (v) Whether the plaintiff has acquired right, title and interest and possession over the suit land as claimed? (vi) Whether the defendants have dispossessed plaintiff from the suit land as alleged? (vii) Whether the defendants have long possession over the suit land since 1938 as alleged? (viii) To what relief, if any, the parties are entitled? 5. The learned Munsiff, on the basis of the evidences adduced by the parties, both oral and documentary, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent vide the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 10.07.1986. (vii) Whether the defendants have long possession over the suit land since 1938 as alleged? (viii) To what relief, if any, the parties are entitled? 5. The learned Munsiff, on the basis of the evidences adduced by the parties, both oral and documentary, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent vide the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 10.07.1986. Being aggrieved the plaintiff/respondent preferred Title Appeal No.41/1986, which was allowed by the First Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 30.06.1988, thereby decreeing the suit of the plaintiff by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. The defendants then preferred Second Appeal No.127/1988 challenging the said judgment and decree dated 30.06.1988 passed by the First Appellate Court. The said second appeal was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 22.07.1996 by remanding the matter to the First Appellate Court to frame an issue relating to identification of the suit land purchased by the plaintiff and to appoint the Amin Commission under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC and to dispose of the said suit accordingly. In the said judgment and order passed in the aforesaid second appeal, it has, however, been concluded that the plaintiff acquired the right, title and interest in respect of the land by right of purchase vide Ext.-1. 6. The First Appellate Court, after remand, framed the additional issue being Issue No.9, which reads as follows:- Whether the plaintiff purchased the suit land as per boundary given in the sale deed? 7. The First Appellate Court accordingly appointed the Amin Commission to identify the suit land, who submitted the report, which was marked as Ext.-Y. The First Appellate Court has also recorded the evidence of Amin Commissioner apart from the evidence of the Latmandal to prove the revenue records as well as the report of the Amin Commissioner. The First Appellate Court having perused the evidences on record by the impugned judgment allowed the appeal by decreeing the suit of the plaintiff by holding that the plaintiff has acquired the right, title and interest over the suit land by virtue of the sale deed dated 31.01.1981 (Ext.-1) and the land mentioned in the said sale deed (Ext.-1) and in the schedule to the plaint is the same land. Hence the present appeal. 8. Hence the present appeal. 8. The appeal was admitted for hearing vide order dated 13.01.2004 on the following substantial question of law:- 1) Whether the learned Court below erred in reversing the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court by misconstruing and misreading the sale deed Ext.-1 and further by relying on the report of the Amin Commissioner with regard to the identity thereof? 9. I have heard Mr. P.P. Baruah, learned counsel for the defendants/appellants and Mr. P. Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent. 10. Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the appellants referring to the substantial question of law formulated vide order dated 13.01.2004 has submitted that since this Court vide judgment and order dated 22.07.1996 passed in Second Appeal No.127/1988 has confirmed the finding of the Court below relating to the title of the respondent/plaintiff by virtue of Ext.-1, the first part of the substantial question of law as formulated does not arise in the appeal. However, it has been contended that since vide aforesaid judgment and order dated 22.07.1996 the Second Appellate Court directed the First Appellate Court to frame the additional issue relating to identity of the land and to decide the same by appointing the Amin Commission, the second part of the substantial question of law formulated on 13.01.2004 still subsist. 11. Mr. Baruah referring to the deposition of the Amin Commissioner as well as the Latmandal, who were examined by the First Appellate Court as well as the Amin Commission’s report (Ext.-Y) submits that it is evident therefrom that there was in fact no field verification conducted before submission of the report by the Amin Commissioner. It has also been submitted that it is apparent from the schedule given in the sale deed as well as the schedule given in the plaint that the boundaries are completely different thereby indicating two different lands. Mr. Baruah, submits that as the plaintiff has not prayed for a decree declaring her right, title and interest in respect of the land which she has purchased but in respect of another land with different boundary, the first appellate Court ought not to have decreed the suit by allowing the appeal. Mr. Baruah, submits that as the plaintiff has not prayed for a decree declaring her right, title and interest in respect of the land which she has purchased but in respect of another land with different boundary, the first appellate Court ought not to have decreed the suit by allowing the appeal. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court needs to be set aside and the matter needs to be remanded to the First Appellate Court for identification of the suit land by appointing a fresh Amin Commission. 12. Mr. Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent, on the other hand, has submitted that the defendants having not disputed the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the land measuring 1 katha 12½ lechas in Dag No.148, cannot raise the plea that the suit land is not identifiable as the defendant No.1 in the written statement except saying that he is possessing the suit land did not claim any right to possess. The learned counsel further submits that the discrepancy in the boundary has been clarified by the subsequent evidence recorded by the First Appellate Court and also by the Amin Commission’s report, even though the suit land is otherwise identifiable without placing much reliance on the boundary given. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the appeal preferred by the appellants/defendants needs to be dismissed. 13. It is apparent from the evidences adduced by the parties including the deposition of the Amin Commissioner and the Latmandal, which was recorded by the First Appellate Court after remand, that out of the total land measuring 1 bigha 3 kathas 10 lechas, the pattadar Chandra Kanta Das sold 3 kathas 12 lechas by two sale deeds in favour of the original defendant No.2 Chidananda and thereafter a new Dag being Dag No.943 and a new patta being Patta No.352 was curved out from Dag No.148 of K.P. Patta No.71, in respect of the aforesaid land measuring 3 kathas 12 lechas purchased by the defendant No.2. It is also evident from the evidences on record that thereafter 1 katha 12½ lechas of land in Dag No.148 was sold by the pattadar Chandra Kanta Das in favour of the plaintiff in the said Dag being Dag No.148 and after such sale 2 kathas 10 lechas of land still remains, which belong to Chandra Kanta Das, the original pattadar. Though there were certain discrepancies relating to boundaries given in the plaint as well as the boundary of the land measuring 1 katha 12½ lechas given in the sale deed, the said discrepancy has been removed by the evidence of the Latmandal as well as the Amin Commissioner. The fact remain that in Dag No.148 of Patta No.71 the defendant No.2 has not claimed any land. The original defendant No.1 i.e. the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellant Nos.1(a) to 1(d) except claiming that he is possessing the suit land in Dag No.148 did not however claim any right to possess and has also not filed any counter claim. As noticed above, the sale of the land measuring 1 katha 12½ lechas by the pattadar Chandra Kanta Das in favour of the plaintiff in Dag No.148 of Patta No.71 is also not in dispute. That being the position, it cannot be said that the land in respect of which the decree has been passed by the First Appellate Court is not identifiable. The Amin Commissioner’s report (Ext.-Y) as well as the evidence of the Latmandal recorded by the First Appellate Court supports such finding recorded by the First Appellate Court. 14. In view of the above, I do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. Hence the appeal stands dismissed. No cost. _____________