Judgment :- The plaintiff/respondent, who allegedly lost 3½ years of his service for no fault of him, who wanted confirmation/restoration of his original date of birth as given by him at the time of entering into service, is facing the second appeal, which is filed by the appellants raising the following substantial question of law:- "(i) Whether the claim of the plaintiff for change of date of birth is barred by Rules 49 and 49-A of Tamil Nadu Service Manual? (ii) Whether the lower appellate court is right in placing the burden of proof regarding the alleged fabrication with regard to the date of birth of the plaintiff in the service register under Ex.A-4?" 2. The brief facts:- The date of birth of the plaintiff as per the birth certificate is 31.12.1946. It is shown, as the same, as per the transfer certificate issued by the school where the plaintiff studied. He was appointed as Rural Medical Officer and his service began on and from 19.09.1975. He served in various places under the respective Panchayat Union and finally he was made to retire from service on 31.07.2000. Having regard to his date of birth i.e., 31.12.1946, the plaintiff ought to have retired only on 31.12.2004. This happened because his date of birth in the service register had been surreptitiously altered from 31.12.1946 to 04.07.1942. This came to the knowledge of the plaintiff when he obtained the salary certificate for the purpose of obtaining a bank loan. Immediately, he filed a writ petition before this Court and the said writ petition was dismissed and a writ appeal filed also came to be dismissed with an observation that the plaintiff can approach the civil court. Therefore the suit was filed on 16.04.2001 for a declaration that the fabrication of date of birth made in the service register of the plaintiff was illegal and also for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to restore the date of birth of the plaintiff in the service records as 31.12.1946. The mandatory injunction was also sought for directing the defendants to reinstate the plaintiff in service. 3. The suit was resisted by the defendants on the following contentions:- (i) The date of birth, as 04.07.1942 was entered, as per the particulars given by the plaintiff himself. Therefore, as per rules, he was retired on 31.07.2000. The mandatory injunction was also sought for directing the defendants to reinstate the plaintiff in service. 3. The suit was resisted by the defendants on the following contentions:- (i) The date of birth, as 04.07.1942 was entered, as per the particulars given by the plaintiff himself. Therefore, as per rules, he was retired on 31.07.2000. (ii) The request regarding change of date of birth can be entertained only if it is made within five years of his joining the duty. Therefore, the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit. (iii) The contention that someone has altered the change of date of birth of the plaintiff is incorrect. 4. The Additional District Munsif Court, Mayiladuthurai, tried the suit in O.S.No.162 of 2001 and dismissed the suit. As against the dismissal, an appeal was filed in A.S.No.38 of 2003 on the file of the Additional Sub Court, Mayiladuthurai, and the appellate court has allowed the appeal, setting aside the dismissal of the suit by the lower court. The decree and judgment of the first appellate court is under challenge in the second appeal. 5. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the plaintiff having entered into service on 15.09.1975 ought to have taken steps to get the date of birth altered within a period of five years from the date of entry into service and the relief claimed in the year 2001 by way of filing the suit is not maintainable and therefore the dismissal of the suit by the trial court is proper. The learned counsel for the appellants pointed out the observation made by this court in W.A.No.1806 of 2001 and also the citations reported in 1998 (2) MLJ 551 (Life Insurance Corporation of India v. S.M.Margasahayam and another), (ii) 1993 AIR 1367 : 1993 SCR (1) 862 (Union of India v. Harnam Singh) and (iii) 1993 AIR 2647 (Secy& Commissioner v. R.Kirubakaran). 6. 6. In all the citations, referred to supra, it has been held that request for correction of date of birth is required to be made by the Government servant within five years of his entry into Government Service, according to Tamil Nadu Service Manual, Rules 49 and 49-A, and his date of birth may be corrected if it is established that, a genuine bonafide mistake had occurred while recording his date of birth at the time of his entry into Government service. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants invited the attention of this court to a note of caution sounded in the citation 1993 AIR 2647 (referred to supra) that whenever an application for alteration of date of birth is made on the eve of super-annuation or near about the same, the court concerned should be more cautious because of the growing tendency among the sections of the public servants, to raise such a dispute, without explaining as to why this question was not raised earlier. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the reasons and considerations given by the trial court and supported the contention that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable. It is the case of the appellants that the date of entry as entered in the service register as 04.07.1942 is correct and it was recorded as per the information provided by the plaintiff at the time of his entry into service and only in accordance with the date of birth as furnished by the plaintiff, the date of retirement was finalised. The fact that somebody has altered the date of birth of the plaintiff in the service registered is stoutly denied by the appellants. 9. This raises the following questions:- (i) Whether the date of birth as allegedly given by the plaintiff is whether 31.12.1946 or 04.07.1942? (ii) Whether any fabrication has been made in the service register with regard to the date of birth of the plaintiff? (iii) If so, whether the fabrication has been made by altering the date of birth from 31.12.1946 to 04.07.1942? (iv) If so, what could have been the reason for the fabrication? (v) If so, whose duty and responsibility is to prove that there had been such fabrication? (iii) If so, whether the fabrication has been made by altering the date of birth from 31.12.1946 to 04.07.1942? (iv) If so, what could have been the reason for the fabrication? (v) If so, whose duty and responsibility is to prove that there had been such fabrication? (vi) When the available documentary evidence show that the real date of birth is 31.12.1946, what could have been the motive for the plaintiff to give the date of birth as 04.07.1942 if found true? (vii) Even if there had been fabrication in the date of birth whether the plaintiff is justified in making the grievance in the year 2001? 10. Before answering the issues raised, it is necessary to clarify the important aspect of the matter. The plaintiff is not at all seeking alteration in the date of birth, as has been mistakenly understood by the appellant. The plaintiff is asking for restoration of the original date of birth as entered in the service register as per the documentary evidence available with him. The plaintiff is asking for confirmation of his date of birth and contending that his date of birth has been altered, without his knowledge, and the alteration / fabrication made by somebody has to be undone is the claim of the plaintiff. It is not a case where the correctness of the original date of birth is under challenge. Only in that case the question of seeking alteration within a period of five years of entry into Government service would come into picture. Here is a case where the correctness of the correction of date of birth made by somebody without the knowledge of the plaintiff is under challenge. Therefore, the question of invoking Rules 49 and 49-A of the said Manual does not arise. 11. The time at which the request for setting right the fabrication made itself would raise the eye-brow with regard to the genuineness of the claim. It is the case of the plaintiff that he came to know about the fabrication only when he got the salary certificate from the employer for the purpose of obtaining a bank loan and that certificate is marked as Ex.A-7. It is the case of the plaintiff that he came to know about the fabrication only when he got the salary certificate from the employer for the purpose of obtaining a bank loan and that certificate is marked as Ex.A-7. A perusal of Ex.A-7 reveals that while issuing the pay certificate, the Commissioner of Panchayat Union has mentioned that the plaintiff, T.V. Anabalagan, is to retire on (wrongly mentioned as "retired on") 31.07.2000, probably giving a warning to the bank that the bank need not give a loan to the plaintiff who would be a retiring person shortly, but rightly or wrongly the intention on the part of the official who issued the pay certificate has given a wake up call that his date of birth has been altered by somebody. Only thereafter, it is contended by the plaintiff, that he issued a notice and also filed a writ petition challenging the same. Therefore, the claim made by the plaintiff in the year 2001 cannot be said to be a belated claim or it cannot be branded as a claim made aiming for postponement in the age of retirement. Therefore, the note of caution sounded in the case referred to above will not apply to the facts of the case. 12. It appears, as per the rule, the employer use to take the signature of the employee, once in five years, in the service register. After joining the service in the year 1975 signature of the plaintiff has been obtained only once and not thereafter. Therefore, the plaintiff would not have got any opportunity to know or see the alteration in the date of birth. 13. The most important question is, what is the date of birth of the plaintiff, what is the date of birth as supplied by the plaintiff at the time of entry into service and whether there is really any fabrication in the date of birth of the plaintiff in the service register. 14. In many cases documents will not be available to show the real and exact date of birth, but, in this case, the Birth Certificate-Ex.A-1, issued by Mayiladuthurai Municipality, indicating the date of birth of the plaintiff as 31.12.1946 is available. Ex.A-1 is corroborated by Ex.A-2-Transfer Certificate issued by the school authorities, wherein also the date of birth is mentioned as 31.12.1946. Ex.A-1 is corroborated by Ex.A-2-Transfer Certificate issued by the school authorities, wherein also the date of birth is mentioned as 31.12.1946. Under Ex.A-3-certificate of membership issued by Tamil Nadu Arasu and Panchayat Union, issued on 06.09.1986, shows the date of birth as 31.12.1946. 15. Under such circumstances, whether the plaintiff would have given his date of birth as 04.07.1942 at the time of entering into Government service is the question. Comparing the date of birth with the date of entry into service it is evident that there is no compulsion for him to show a higher age for the purpose of satisfying any minimum requirement with regard to age. No person with common sense and common knowledge, regarding the age of retirement, would prefer giving higher age as to invoke his early retirement. Under such circumstances, the contention that the plaintiff alone gave the date of birth as entered in the service register cannot be accepted. In fact, the date of birth as originally entered in the service register is not 04.07.1942, but 31.12.1946. A mere glance of Ex.A-4 service register and examination of Ex.A-4 with a magnifying glass would clearly go to show that there is a definite fabrication from 31.12.1946 to 04.07.1942. When the fact of correction is apparent to the naked eye and the details of correction are visible through magnifying lens, there is no need to send it for any expert opinion. 16. Then the next issue to consider is on whom is the burden to prove as to "who, why and how of the fabrication"? i.e., who could have done the fabrication, how it could have been done, and why it could have been done? 17. To Answer these questions, it is obviously necessary to determine which party shall begin or upon whom the burden of the whole case lies. The general rule is that the party who alleges any matter in issue must prove it. This would be simple enough if there were only one fact in issue, but there may be several facts in issue, the burden of proof of someone being on one party and of others on the other party. In other words, the burden of proof lies at first on the party against whom judgment will be given if no evidence at all were produced. In other words, the burden of proof lies at first on the party against whom judgment will be given if no evidence at all were produced. This section is based on a general rule that burden of proof lies on the party who assets the affirmation of the issue and not on who deny it, but the burden of proof is not confined to Section 101 of the Evidence Act alone. The more relevant section to be considered is Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, under which when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. 18. So far as this case is concerned, the appellants are the custodian of the service register i.e., Ex.A-4. It is within the exclusive custody of the appellants and any correction / alteration/fabrication should not have been made without the knowledge of the appellants. Therefore it is for the appellants to explain the fabrication is by whom and under what circumstances. To escape from answering such embarrassing question, the appellants have simply taken the defence that there is no fabrication and the record bears only the original date of birth as given by the plaintiff himself. 19. As already discussed, the plaintiff ought not to have given that date, namely, 04.07.1942, as the date of birth, as it is against the document possessed and relied on by the plaintiff on other occasions. Any person with eyes wide open cannot dispute the fact that there is fabrication in the date of birth under Ex.A-4-service register. It is not the case of the appellants that correction was done by the plaintiff himself or done at his instance. It is not the case of the appellants that the correction was done under justifying circumstances. Therefore, it is for the appellants to prove that either there was no correction or the correction was done reasonably/justifiably. This duty and responsibility has not been discharged by the appellant. In other words, the appellants failed in proving that there was no fabrication. Therefore, the appellants are answerable for all the direct consequences suffered by the plaintiff on account of the fabrication. 20. The plaintiff wanted mandatory injunction directing the employer to give reinstatement. Now that on account of the undue delay involved in the disposal of the case, the plaintiff has retired from service. Therefore, the appellants are answerable for all the direct consequences suffered by the plaintiff on account of the fabrication. 20. The plaintiff wanted mandatory injunction directing the employer to give reinstatement. Now that on account of the undue delay involved in the disposal of the case, the plaintiff has retired from service. Therefore, the only alternative is to compensate him by directing the appellants to provide all the service benefits that should have been gained by the plaintiff if at all he had been reinstated. 21. At the time of making entry with regard to date of birth the employer ought to have insisted upon production of contemporaneous document i.e., the birth certificate/Transfer Certificate or any other relevant document. When all the available documents indicate the date of birth only as 31.12.1946, there is no possibility at all for the plaintiff to have produced any other document showing his date of birth as 04.07.1942. Therefore, the contention that the entry of date of birth, as 04.07.1942, was at the instance of the plaintiff falls to the ground. If at all any other document had been really produced by the plaintiff, it is for the appellants to expose the plaintiff by producing such documents. It is not done. Therefore, the inference is that the plaintiff ought not to have given the date of birth as 04.07.1942. The omission on the part of the appellants in not obtaining the signature of the plaintiff once in five years as contemplated in the Rules speaks volumes about the fabrication done. Under such circumstances, it is not open to the appellants to contend that there is no fabrication. The probable reason for the fabrication may be the anticipated appointment for anybody who could be substituted in the place of the plaintiff. 22. The finding of the trial court justifying the order passed by the second defendant who misinterpreted Rules 49 and 49-A of the Tamil Nadu Service Manual is perverse and it is rightly set-aside by the first appellate court. 23. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed with costs throughout, by confirming the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court passed in A.S.No.38 of 2003, dated 13.06.2003. The dismissal of the suit by the trial court, in O.S.No.162 of 2001, dated 27.11.2002, is hereby set-aside. The suit is decreed with modification. 23. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed with costs throughout, by confirming the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court passed in A.S.No.38 of 2003, dated 13.06.2003. The dismissal of the suit by the trial court, in O.S.No.162 of 2001, dated 27.11.2002, is hereby set-aside. The suit is decreed with modification. It is declared that the alteration of date of birth of the plaintiff in the service register from 31.12.1946 to 04.07.1942 is illegal and the appellants are directed to restore the date of birth as 31.12.1946. Consequently, the appellants are directed to pay the monetary benefits that would have been payable to the plaintiff had he been continued in service till his real of retirement i.e., 31.12.2004. Consequently the connected CMP is closed.