ORDER 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 5.5.1995 passed by the District Judge, Raipur in Civil Suit No. 57-B/1985 refusing to set aside the award of the Arbitrators, instant appeal under Section 39 (VI) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short 'the Act of 1940') has been preferred by the appellant - Karmachari Grih Nirman Co-operative Housing Society Limited. 2. Brief facts necessary for deciding this miscellaneous appeal are as under: (i) The dispute and differences arose between the parties regarding execution of works under contract. Pursuant to arbitration agreement, the matter was referred for its settlement to the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of Shri L.D. Deoras and Shri J.H.R. Naidu. (ii) Learned Arbitrators, vide award dated 26th April, 1994, finding inter alia, the appellant committed breach of the contract entered into between the parties on 20.10.1984, awarded Rs.1,30,000/along with interest at the rate of 24% per annum for the period commending from 13.06.1985 till the date of actual recovery. (iii) The arbitral award was assailed by the appellant by filing objection under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Act of 1940. The respondent also moved an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act for making the award as a rule of the Court. The trial Court, after rejecting the objection raised by the appellant, passed the impugned order in terms of the award. Hence, this appeal. 3. Shri B.D.Guru, learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailed the judgment/order impugned of the Court below mainly on the following grounds: (i) the learned Arbitrators have passed the award without there being any evidence, which is a legal misconduct and the above error is apparent on the face of the record; (ii) one of the Arbitrators has misconducted himself inasmuch as he demanded the donation for a temple; and (iii) award of 24% interest per annum itself amounts to legal misconduct on the part of Arbitrators, and therefore, the award as well as judgment/order deserve to be set aside. 4. 4. On the other hand, Shri B.P. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent supported the judgment/order and contended, the Arbitrators have passed the award after considering the documentary evidence produced by the parties; the donation taken by one of the Arbitrators was voluntary from both the parties, for which, the appellant had never raised any objection; the appellant also continuously participated in the arbitration proceedings; the above Arbitrator was of appellant's choice; clause 11 of the agreement dated 20.10.1984 provides for payment of interest at the rate of 24% per annum; the Arbitrators have power to grant interest for all three stages, pre-reference, pendente lite and post-award; and the judgment/order impugned does not call for any interference. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the order impugned and the record. 6. As per section 30 of the Act of 1940, the award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely:- (i) An arbitration award cannot be upset except on the specific grounds given in the Section. (ii) It is not open to the Court to attempt to probe into mental process by which the arbitrator arrived at his conclusion and find out whether his view is right or wrong. The Court in dealing with an application under this section has to satisfy itself whether any of the enumerated grounds have been made out and it has no inherent power, apart from these grounds specified, to set aside the award. The Court, while exercising the power under Section 30 of the Act of 1940 cannot re-appreciate the evidence or examine the correctness of the conclusions arrived at by the Arbitrator. The jurisdiction is not appealable in nature and the award passed by an Arbitrator cannot be set aside on the ground that it was erroneous. It is not open to the Court to interfere with the award merely because, in the opinion of the Court, another view is equally possible. 7. Now, I shall examine the correctness or otherwise of the judgment/order impugned in the light of above settled principles. 8. As per paragraphs 7 & 8 of the award, on the request of the parties, the award has been passed by referring to pleadings and documents produced by them and by going carefully through their written arguments. The Supreme Court in case of State of Rajasthan and another Vs. 8. As per paragraphs 7 & 8 of the award, on the request of the parties, the award has been passed by referring to pleadings and documents produced by them and by going carefully through their written arguments. The Supreme Court in case of State of Rajasthan and another Vs. Ferro Concrete Construction Private Limited (2009) 12 SCC 1, has held in paragraph 55 of its judgment: while the quantum of evidence required to accept a claim may be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide, if there was no evidence at all and if the arbitrator makes an award of the amount claimed in the claim statement, merely on the basis of the claim statement without anything more, it has to be held that the award on that account would be invalid. 9. In the instant case, the facts are entirely different. The learned Arbitrators, on the request of the parties, have decided the matter based on documentary evidence produced by them. It is not a case where claim has been decided merely on the basis of claim statement. Admittedly, clause - 11 of the• agreement dated 20.10.1984 provides for grant of interest at the rate of 24% per annum; the Arbitrators, after having carefully gone through the entire record of the case and after discussing the matter in detail between them, have passed the award, which cannot be said as invalid for want of any evidence. Therefore, the first question raised by the appellant is devoid of merit. 10. Voluntary donation for temple taken by one of the Arbitrators, of appellant's choice from both the parties without there being any objection raised by the appellant during arbitral proceedings, certainly would not amount to misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, especially, in a case where unanimous arbitral award has been passed by both the arbitrators and the above contention raised by Mr. B.D.Guru is sans substance. 11. Admittedly, clause 11 of the agreement provides for award of interest at the rate of 24% per annum and the dispute regarding payment of interest was also referred to learned Arbitrators for their decision. 12. The Supreme Court, in the case of Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division Vs. B.D.Guru is sans substance. 11. Admittedly, clause 11 of the agreement provides for award of interest at the rate of 24% per annum and the dispute regarding payment of interest was also referred to learned Arbitrators for their decision. 12. The Supreme Court, in the case of Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division Vs. N.C. Budhrai (2001) 2 SCC 721, has held that an arbitrator has power to grant interest for pre-reference period provided there is no prohibition in the arbitration agreement excluding his jurisdiction to grant interest. 13. Regarding interest pendente lite also, the Supreme Court, in the case of Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa Vs. G.C. Roy observed in paragraph 43 as under: "43. The question still remains whether arbitrator has the power to award interest pendent elite, and if so on what principle. We must reiterate that we are dealing with the situation where the agreement does not provide for grant of such interest nor does it prohibit such grant. In other words, we are dealing with a case where the agreement is silent as to award of interest. On a conspectus of aforementioned decisions, the following principles emerge: (i) A person deprived of the use of money to which he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest, compensation or damages. This basic consideration is as valid for the period the dispute is pending before the arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the arbitrator entering upon the reference. This is the principle of Section 34, Civil Procedure Code and there is no reason or principle to hold otherwise in the case of arbitrator. (ii) An arbitrator is an alternative forum for resolution of disputes arising between the parties. If so, he must have the power to decide all the disputes or differences arising between the parties. If the arbitrator has no power to award interest pendente lite, the party claiming it would have to approach the court for that purpose, even though he may have obtained satisfaction in respect of other claims from the arbitrator. This would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. (iii) An arbitrator is the creature of an agreement. If the arbitrator has no power to award interest pendente lite, the party claiming it would have to approach the court for that purpose, even though he may have obtained satisfaction in respect of other claims from the arbitrator. This would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. (iii) An arbitrator is the creature of an agreement. It is open to the parties to confer upon him such powers and prescribe such procedure for him to follow, as they think fit, so long as they are not opposed to law. (The proviso to section 41 and Section 3 of Arbitration Act illustrate this point). The arbitrator must also act and make his award in accordance with the general law of the land and the agreement. (iv) Over the years, the English and Indian courts have acted on the assumption that where the agreement does not prohibit and a party to the reference makes a claim for interest, the arbitrator must have the power to award interest pendente lite, Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India, AIR 1955 SC 468 has not been followed in the later decisions of this court. It has been explained and distinguished on the basis that in that case there was no claim for interest but only a claim for unliquidated damages. It has been said repeatedly that observations in the said judgment were not intended to lay down any such absolute or universal rule as they appear to, on first impression. Until Jena case [Executive Engineer (Irrigation) v. Abhadutta Jena, (1988) 1 SCC 418] almost all the courts in the country had upheld the power of the arbitrator to award interest pendente lite. Continuity and certainty is a highly desirable feature of law. (v) Interest pendente lite is not a matter of substantive law, like interest for the period anterior to reference (pre-reference period). For doing complete justice between the parties, such power has always Been inferred." 14. As to post-award interest, the point is covered by the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. State of J & K (1992) 4 SCC 217, wherein the Supreme Court has held that an arbitrator is competent to award interest for the period from the date of the award to the date of decree or date of realization, whichever is earlier. 15. The Supreme Court, in the case of Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. Vs. Ltd. Vs. State of J & K (1992) 4 SCC 217, wherein the Supreme Court has held that an arbitrator is competent to award interest for the period from the date of the award to the date of decree or date of realization, whichever is earlier. 15. The Supreme Court, in the case of Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (2005) 6 SCC 462, has held in paragraph 37 of its judgment as under: "37. Now Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to arbitration proceedings since Arbitrator cannot be said to be a 'court' within the meaning of the Code. But an Arbitrator has power and jurisdiction to grant interest for all the three stages provided the rate of interest is reasonable." 16. In the instant case, the interest has been awarded by the Arbitrators at the agreed rate of interest i.e. 24% per annum. In the case of Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. (2005) 6 SCC 462 (supra), the arbitrator had awarded interest at the rate of 18% per annum for all the three stages. The learned Single Judge of the High Court held, in the absence of any contract between the parties with regard to rate of interest payable, the appropriate rate of interest would be at 6% per annum. The Supreme Court has held, the interest part of the award passed by the Arbitrators did not deserve interference and the learned Single and Division Benches were not right in reducing the rate of interest. 17. The case in hand is on better footings inasmuch as in the instant case, the agreement between the parties itself provides for grant of interest at the rate of 24% per annum. 18. By applying the ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court with regard to payment of interest, in the light of the fact that parties have entered into agreement, which itself provides for grant of interest at the rate of 24% per annum. Third contention raised by the appellant is also devoid of merit. 19. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, I do not find any illegality, absurdity or perversity in the judgment/order impugned. The appeal, being devoid of merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 20. No order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.