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2012 DIGILAW 360 (AP)

Shaik Bikkam Ali @ Gulam Mohd. Sarvar v. Wali Pasha

2012-03-30

R.KANTHA RAO

body2012
Judgment : This second appeal is filed against the decree and judgment dated 25.08.2005 passed by the III Additional District Judge, Karimnagar in A.S.No.38 of 2003 reversing the decree and judgment dated 10.04.2003 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Karimnagar in O.S.No.84 of 1996. 2. I have heard Sri Vedula Venkata Ramanna, Senior Counsel representing Sri K.K. Mahender Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and of Sri Y.V. Ravi Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 3. The plaintiff filed the present second appeal. He instituted the suit seeking declaration of title to the plaint schedule property and for consequential injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The learned trial Court after considering the entire material on record with reference to the pleadings of both parties, decreed the suit filed by the appellant. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents preferred A.S.No.38 of 2003 and the learned first appellate Court reversed the judgment passed by the learned trial Court and dismissed the suit filed by the appellant. 4. Challenging the said judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court, the plaintiff preferred the present second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, I would like to refer the parties as ‘the plaintiff and the defendants’. 6. According to Shaik Bikkam Ali @ Gulam Mohd. Sarvar, the plaintiff, he purchased the schedule land from late Khaja Moinuddin on 23.04.1964 for a consideration of Rs.1590/- under unregistered sale deed executed on the said date. Late Khaja Moinuddin is the husband of the first defendant and the father of the defendants 2 to 7. It is the version of the plaintiff that as he purchased the property under unregistered sale deed by means of which no title could be conveyed, he applied to the Mandal Revenue Officer, Thimmapur under Sub-section 1 of Section 5-A of A.P. Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act 1971 (for short ‘Pattadar Passbooks Act,1971’) seeking issuance of a certificate to the effect that the sale deed is valid. He submitted that after making an enquiry under Sub-section 2 of Section 5-A of Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 the Mandal Revenue Officer declared that the sale covered by unregistered sale deed dated 23.04.1964 is valid. Subsequently the name of the plaintiff was recorded as owner and possessor of the suit land under the provisions of Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971. He submitted that after making an enquiry under Sub-section 2 of Section 5-A of Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 the Mandal Revenue Officer declared that the sale covered by unregistered sale deed dated 23.04.1964 is valid. Subsequently the name of the plaintiff was recorded as owner and possessor of the suit land under the provisions of Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971. Thereafter, a certificate under Rule 14-A and 14-B of Pattadar Passbooks Act,1971 was issued to the plaintiff. In pursuance of the aforementioned proceedings, the name of the plaintiff was recorded as pattedar and possessor in the pahani patrika for the year 1995-96. The plaintiff’s specific case is that the defendants are fully aware of the fact that late Khaja Moinuddin sold the property to him but taking the advantage of the situations viz. that late Khaja Moinuddin, his vendor died and that he purchased the property under unregistered sale deed they have been trying to interfere with his possession and enjoyment of the suit land. 7. The defendants in the course of written statement had set up the plea that the unregistered sale deed is a forged document and the sale transaction covered by the said document cannot be validated under the provisions of Record of Rights Act and the Mandal Revenue Officer issued certificate under Section 5-A of Pattadar Passbooks Act,1971 without conducting any proper enquiry and even without giving notice to them in contravention of Pattadar Passbooks Act,1971 and therefore, the said certificate is not valid. They also specifically contend that since the plaintiff did not obtain requisite permission prior to purchasing the suit land required under Section 47 of A.P. (T.A.) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and not getting the same validated under Section 50-B of A.P. Telangana Area Tenancy Act within the time allowed by law i.e. before 1952. The alleged sale under unregistered sale deed being illegal has to be declared as null and void. They also contended that the plaintiff has never been in possession of the suit land and that they are in possession of the same. They prayed for dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff. 8. The alleged sale under unregistered sale deed being illegal has to be declared as null and void. They also contended that the plaintiff has never been in possession of the suit land and that they are in possession of the same. They prayed for dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff. 8. In this context, it is relevant to mention that the certificate issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer under Section 5-A of Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 in favour of the plaintiff validating the sale under the unregistered sale deed is challenged by the appellants in an appeal filed before the Revenue Divisional Officer and the said appeal is pending. 9. The issues fell for determination before the trial Court were: 1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title and perpetual injunction in respect of the suit land bearing Sy.No.785/A measuring Ac.08.01 guntas as prayed for? 2) Whether the sale deed executed by Khaja Moinuddin in favour of the plaintiff dated 23.04.1964 is forged and not valid under R.O.R. Act? 3) Whether the certificate issued by M.R.O. under Section 5-A is valid or not? 10. Before the trial Court, the plaintiff examined PWs.1 to 3 and marked Exs.A-1 to A21; whereas the defendants examined DWs.1 to 3 and marked Exs.B-1 to B-22. Ex. X-1 was marked by the Court. 11. Learned trial Court upon considering the entire evidence on record in the light of the rival contentions, answered all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff as prayed for. The learned first appellate Court, however, on reappraisal of the evidence on record, took a different view and reversed the judgment passed by the learned trial Court and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff holding that the sale transaction covered by Ex.A-16 unregistered sale deed under which the defendants allegedly purchased the suit land cannot be validated, that the plaintiff could not prove the sale under Ex.A-16 and also that they are not in possession of the schedule mentioned property. The said judgment of the first appellate Court is put to challenge by the plaintiff in the present second appeal. 12. It is true that the first appellate Court is the final court on the question of fact. But, the first appellate Court is duty bound to give adequate reasons while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. The said judgment of the first appellate Court is put to challenge by the plaintiff in the present second appeal. 12. It is true that the first appellate Court is the final court on the question of fact. But, the first appellate Court is duty bound to give adequate reasons while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. It is also well established that if the judgment of the trial Court is contrary to the evidence on record and if it is perverse, it raises a substantial question of law for consideration in the second appeal and this Court while deciding the second appeal can interfere with the findings of the fact recorded by the first appellate Court. The plaintiff besides himself being examined as PW-1, examined the attestor of Ex.A-16 unregistered sale deed under which he claims to have purchased the schedule mentioned property as PW-2 and another neighbouring land owner as PW-3 to prove his possession in respect of the schedule mentioned property. The specific case of the plaintiff is that late Khaja Moinuddin purchased the schedule mentioned property under Ex.A-16 unregistered sale deed on 23.04.1964 for a consideration of Rs.1,590/-and he himself scribed the Ex.A-16 and signed in the said document. PW-2 is one of the attesting witnesses to the said document. PW-2 fully supported the version of the plaintiff. PW-3 a neighbouring land owner had categorically stated in his deposition before the trial Court that the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property since the date of his purchase and as a neighbouring land owner he is a witness to the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff of the said property. 13. PW-1 deposed before the trial Court that he purchased the suit land from Khaja Moinuddin for an amount of Rs.1590/-on 23.04.1964 under Ex.A-16 sale deed. The said document was scribed by Khaja Moinuddin himself and having received the consideration, he signed on the said document and also took possession of the property under the said document. According to him, the said document was attested by Abdul Razak and Jahangir, out of them, he said that Jahangir is alive and the other attesting witness Abdul Razak is no more. He also examined Khaja Jahangeeruddin as PW-2. According to him, the said document was attested by Abdul Razak and Jahangir, out of them, he said that Jahangir is alive and the other attesting witness Abdul Razak is no more. He also examined Khaja Jahangeeruddin as PW-2. PW-2 also fully supported the version of PW-1 and he also asserted that he was present on the date of Ex.A-16 which was scribed by Khaja Moinuddin himself. He received consideration under the said document, singed on the said document and handed over the possession of the suit land to PW-1 under the said document. PW-2 also stated that he attested the document as attesting witness. Here it requires to be noticed that the plaintiff and the husband of the first defendant who is the vendor of the plaintiff are muslims. The defendants took a plea that Khaja Moinuddin being a muslim, he must not have scribed the document Ex.A-16 which is in Telugu and he must not have signed in Telugu as is evidenced from Ex.A-16. As to this, it is the version of the plaintiff that late Khaja Moinuddin worked under patwari and he knew writing Telugu and therefore, they reiterated the stand that Khaja Moinuddin himself scribed Ex.A-16 in Telugu and he singed on the said document in Telugu. It is also their version that Khaja Moinuddin used to scribe the documents in Telugu for other persons also. When DW-1 who is the son of late Khaja Moinuddin was cross examined, a question was put to him as to whether he was aware of the fact that his father used to scribe the documents in Telugu for other people, he replied that he is not aware of the said fact. As rightly found by the learned trial Court that if really late Khaja Moinuddin does not know Telugu at all, the answer of DW-1 would have been that he never scribed any document in Telugu. But, curiously the answer in the cross examination was that he was not aware. Therefore, the learned trial Court drew an inference that taking the advantage of the fact that late Khaja Moinuddin is a muslim, the defendants purposefully took a plea that he does not know Telugu and the document which is said to have been written by him in Telugu is a genuine document. Therefore, the learned trial Court drew an inference that taking the advantage of the fact that late Khaja Moinuddin is a muslim, the defendants purposefully took a plea that he does not know Telugu and the document which is said to have been written by him in Telugu is a genuine document. As to this, the learned trial Court rightly held that if really the attestor late Khaja Moinuddin did not know Telugu which fact must be within the knowledge of the plaintiff and the plaintiff could as well create a sale deed in Urgu with signature of Khaja Moinuddin. 14. The other crucial documents which the learned trial Court relied upon to record a finding that Ex.A-16 unregistered sale deed is a true, valid and genuine document, are Exs.A-19, 20 and 21, Ex.A-19 is the declaration filed by the plaintiff before the Land Ceiling Authorities. In the said declaration Ex.A-19 it is mentioned that the plaint schedule property is the property which he purchased under Ex.A-16 sale deed from late Khaja Moinuddin. Ex.A-20 is the verification report filed before the Special Tahsildar. Ex.A-21 is the order passed by the learned Ceiling Authority. All these documents clearly reveal that the plaintiff as far back in 1975 had shown his property in the declaration furnished to the land ceiling authorities as the property purchased from late Khaja Moinuddin under Ex.A-16 unregistered sale deed. The plaintiff filed the suit in the year 1996. As rightly pointed out by the learned trial Court, if really the document was fabricated in the year 1996 for the purpose of filing of the suit or for the purpose of obtaining the certificate from the Mandal Revenue Officer in or about the same year validating the sale under the unregistered sale deed, there was no possibility for the plaintiff to file a declaration in 1975 itself showing it in the declaration that he purchased the said property under unregistered sale deed from late Khaja Moinuddin. 15. Thus, the learned trial Court gave highly convincing reasons for it’s reaching conclusion that Ex.A-16 unregistered sale deed was validly executed by late Khaja Moinuddin in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the sale consideration and that the plaintiff was put in possession by late Khaja Moinuddin under the said sale deed. However, the learned first appellate Court pointed out certain circumstances viz. However, the learned first appellate Court pointed out certain circumstances viz. that the date of execution of Ex.A-16 was not mentioned on the top of document, the date and month are kept blank in Ex.A-16 and the year of execution is mentioned as 1964, the date is mentioned underneath the signature of late Khaja Moinuddin, the signature of Khaja Moinuddin Ex.B-1 was not confronted to PW-2 while he was giving evidence, in Ex.A-16 the Survey No.785/A is mentioned with a different handwriting and also the extent Ac.8.01 guntas is mentioned in different ink and in different handwriting, that Ex.A-16 which was admittedly presented before the Mandal Revenue Officer for validation and issuance of certificate under Section 5 of Record of Rights Act should have contained the seal of the Mandal Revenue Officer but it does not contain such seal, doubted the genuineness of Ex.A-16. The learned first appellate Court in my view without considering the broader aspects relating to execution of Ex.A-16 document indulged in going into unnecessary details and recorded a contrary finding to that of the learned trial Court which was recorded basing on the pleadings and evidence of the parties. The reasons furnished by the learned first appellate Court to reverse the judgment passed by the learned trial Court are flimsy and irrational. Ex.A-16 is a document which was executed in 1964 and the document being of 30 years old, the genuineness of its execution has to be presumed. Though the sale deed is not a compulsorily attestable document, the plaintiff examined one attesting witness who supported the version of the plaintiff and stated that the document was duly executed by late Khaja Moinuddin in favour of the plaintiff after receiving full consideration under the said document. The plaintiff was also put in possession of the suit land under the said document by his vendor. More importantly in 1975 when no litigation was contemplated between the parties, the plaintiff mentioned in the declaration submitted before the Land Ceiling Authorities that he purchased the suit schedule property under Ex.A-16 from late Khaja Moinuddin. Though it is a subject matter of the appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, the fact remains that the Mandal Revenue Officer conducted enquiry before issuing the certificate in faovur of the plaintiff validating the unregistered sale deed. Though it is a subject matter of the appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, the fact remains that the Mandal Revenue Officer conducted enquiry before issuing the certificate in faovur of the plaintiff validating the unregistered sale deed. Subsequently, the name of the plaintiff was incorporated as pattedar and possessor of the schedule mentioned property in the relevant revenue records. Further in Exs.A-5 to 11 pahani patraks filed by the plaintiff, it is mentioned that the plaintiff is the possessor of the schedule mentioned property. Furthermore, even in pahani patraks filed by the defendants, viz. Exs.B-6, 7 and 17 though the name of Khaja Moinuddin is mentioned as pattedar, the name of the plaintiff is mentioned as possessor. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that on account of the fact that he purchased the suit schedule lands under unregistered sale deed, no mutation was effected till the date of issuing the certificate in his favour by the Mandal Revenue Officer and therefore, his name was not mentioned in the pattedar column but was only mentioned in possessor’s column. Mentioning the name of the plaintiff in possessor’s column is indicative of the fact that the plaintiff having purchased the property under unregistered sale deed from late Khaja Moinuddin, has been continuing in possession of the suit property under the said unregistered sale deed since the date of purchase. Therefore, the learned trial Court on a proper analysis of the evidence before it in the light of the rival contentions of the parties rightly arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff could be able to prove Ex.A-16 unregistered sale deed which was executed in his favour by late Khaja Moinuddin and also could be able to establish that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the property since the date of purchase. The said well reasoned finding had been upset by the first appellate Court by recording findings contrary to the evidence on record and pleadings of the parties and the reasons assigned by the first appellate Court to reach those conclusions are absolutely perverse. This Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC can set aside the said findings though they relate to fact. This Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC can set aside the said findings though they relate to fact. In this appeal, therefore, the above findings of the first appellate Court are set aside and the findings recorded by the learned trial Court holding that the plaintiff proved Ex.A-16 unregistered sale deed and that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same since the date of purchase have been affirmed. 16. The next question to be addressed is whether for not taking prior permission from the Tahsildar before purchasing the plaint schedule property under Ex.A-16 as required under Section 47 of A.P. (T.A.) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and for not getting the said sale validated having recourse to Section 50-B of the A.P. (T.A.) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act within the time allowed by law, the sale under Ex.A-16 is liable to be invalidated as void under law. 17. In the instant case, the plaintiff purchased the schedule property under unregistered sale deed Ex.A-16 dated 213.04.1964. Admittedly, the property was purchased without obtaining the permission required under Section 47 of the Tenancy Act. Similarly, the validation certificate required under Section 50-B of the Tenancy Act was also not obtained. By Act 12 of 1969, Sections 47,48, 49, 50 and 50-A of the Tenancy Act were deleted with effect from 18.03.1969. By virtue of Act 12/1969 the benefit of validation conferred by Section 50-B came to an end by 31.03.1972. Therefore, subsequent to the said date, there was no possibility for the plaintiff to get the alienation under Ex.A-16 validated. In C.V. NARAYANA REDDY v. KATANGURU RAGHAVA REDDY AND ANOTHER ( AIR 1980 AP 89 )a Division Bench of this Court following the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in K. PARVATHAMMA v. EXCISE COMMISSIONER AIR 1970 AP 333 held that the agreements of sale entered into prior to 18.03.1969 will be deemed to be valid, legal and authorized and they do not remain invalid or illegal or unauthorized, even after 31.03.1972, when the so-called benefit of validation contemplated under Section 50-B ended. According to the Division Bench subsequent to the deletion of Section 47, it is needless to establish, for the purposing of availing Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, that the contracts of sale entered into during the period when Section 47 was in vogue were with permission. According to the Division Bench subsequent to the deletion of Section 47, it is needless to establish, for the purposing of availing Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, that the contracts of sale entered into during the period when Section 47 was in vogue were with permission. Since it stood deleted, it is no more imperative to show that any such permission was obtained, nor the absence would invalidate either the transaction or the possession of the land in the hands of the alienee of transferee. Thus, according to the division bench, subsequent to the deletion of Section 47 of the Tenancy Act, no sanction is at all necessary for the finalization even with regard to agreements of sale entered into prior to the deletion of Section 47, by way of registration of sale deeds or otherwise. A fortiori, the possession of the lands given in pursuance of agreements of sale is quite valid and lawful and, therefore, the parties concerned are entitled to avail the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. (Emphasis supplied). 18. The object of bringing into force, the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 is to validate the alienations prior to 1971 Act. There is no specific embargo under Section 5-A of the Act which mandates that if the sale was not validated under Section 50-B of the Tenancy Act, 1972, they cannot be valid under Section 5-A of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971. The non-obstante clause in Section 5-A of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 clearly shows that the provision was given overriding effect over the earlier enactments. Subsection 3 of Section 5-A of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 makes it clear that the alienation shall not be validated only when such alienation is in contravention of the provisions of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act,1973, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the A.P. Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 and the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977. There is nothing in Section 5-A of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 indicating that the alienation shall not be deemed to have been validated if it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Act, 1950. The alienation cannot be validated only if such alienation is in contravention of the provisions of the enactments mentioned in sub-section 3 of Section 5-A of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971. Barring the said restriction, under Section 5-A of the 1971 Act, the 1971 Act has has overriding effect over any other law for the time being in force. 19. Therefore, from the very language of Section 5-A and also from the objections of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971, it can be clearly understood that the provisions of Section 5-A of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 would operate notwithstanding the non-compliance of provisions of Section 47 and 50-B of A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. However, in the present case, against the certificate issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, an appeal was preferred by the defendants before the Revenue Divisional Officer, the Revenue Divisional Officer remanded the matter back to the Mandal Revenue Officer, against which there is an appeal pending before the Joint Collector. Therefore, I am not going into the question whether a certificate under Section 5-A of the Act can be issued in favour of the plaintiff. But despite the pendency of the proceedings before the revenue authorities, the plaintiff can as well approach the civil Court seeking declaration of his title and consequential permanent injunction. Such a course is always open to the plaintiff and the civil Court basing on the evidence adduced before it can decide the title of the plaintiff and also his entitlement for relief of permanent injunction. The learned trial Court for all the reasons which are stated hereinabove appreciated the evidence in a proper perspective in the light of the settled legal principles having recourse to the pleadings of both parties and rightly held that the plaintiff is entitled to reliefs prayed for. Whereas, the first appellate Court by giving perverse reasoning contrary to the evidence on record, reversed the well considered judgment of the learned trial Court. Whereas, the first appellate Court by giving perverse reasoning contrary to the evidence on record, reversed the well considered judgment of the learned trial Court. Therefore, this Court can interfere with the said finding of fact and law recorded by the first appellate Court in this second appeal. The findings of the learned first appellate Court are therefore set aside and the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Court are upheld. Consequently, the second appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.