JUDGMENT : Thisappeal has been preferred by the plaintiff. This Court vide order dated 1-5-2009 while admitting the appealhad formulated following substantial questions of law : - "( i ) Whether the Courts below erredin dismissing the suit against the evidence and the agreement to sale ( Exh . P-1) on this point that the plaintiff was not readyand willing to perform part of contract as provided under Section 16(1) (c) ofthe Specific Relief Act even though he had paid the maximum part ofconsideration ? (ii)Whether the Courts below erred in accepting the plea of bonafide purchasers in respect of defendant Nos. 2 to 4 against the evidence ofdefendants?" 2.Facts giving rise to filing of the appeal, briefly stated, are that theplaintiff filed a suit seeking relief of specific performance of contract aswell as permanent injunction on the ground that on 6-1-1998 the defendant No. 1entered into an agreement to sell the suit plot admeasuring 4271 sq. ft. for aconsideration of Rs . 15,000/-. At the time ofexecution of the agreement a sum of Rs . 13,000/- waspaid. It was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 that on receiptof balance amount, for which no time limit was prescribed, the defendant No. 1would execute the sale-deed in favour of theplaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that under the agreement, thepossession of the plot in question was handed over to the plaintiff. However,on 15-1-2001 the defendantNo. 2 informed the plaintiff that the construction which has been raised by himon the plot in question is unauthorised . Thereuponthe plaintiff informed him about the agreement dated 6-1-1998 . The plaintiff got a notice published on 21-1-2001 in daily ' Dainik Bhaskar ' and sent atelegraphic notice to defendant No. 1 on 21-1-2001 . Thereafter, the plaintiff field the suitseeking relief of specific performance of contract and permanent injunctionrestraining the defendant No. 1 from alienating the suit plot. 3.The defendant No. 1 filed written statement in which, inter alia ,it was pleaded that agreement was executed by way of security for loan. It wasfurther pleaded that plaintiff was never placed in possession of the suit plotand the possession of the suit plot continued with the defendant No. 1. Thedefendant No. 1 executed the sale deeds on 16-1-2001 and 17-1-2001 in favour ofdefendant Nos. 2 to 4 had handed-over possession to them. It wasfurther pleaded that plaintiff was never placed in possession of the suit plotand the possession of the suit plot continued with the defendant No. 1. Thedefendant No. 1 executed the sale deeds on 16-1-2001 and 17-1-2001 in favour ofdefendant Nos. 2 to 4 had handed-over possession to them. It was furtherpleaded that market value of the suit plot was Rs .30/- per sq. ft. and, therefore, the question of selling the same for Rs . 15,000/- does not arise. It was further pleaded thatdefendant No. 1 sold the plot for a consideration of Rs .1.28 lacs . It was further pleaded that the suit isbarred by limitation. The defendant Nos. 2 to 4 filed their written statementin which, inter alia , it was pleaded that defendantNos. 2 to 4 had made an enquiry and found out that defendant No. 1 is theowner. They got the plot in question demarcated on 13-1-2001 . The defendant Nos. 2to 4 are bonafide purchasers for valuableconsideration without any notice of previous agreement. 4.The Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 17-8-2006, inter alia , held that in the sale deed ( Exh .P-1) no time limit was prescribed for payment of remaining sale consideration.It was further held that execution of the agreement ( Exh .P-1) was duly proved. However, the defendant No. 1 failed to prove thatagreement was executed by way of security for loan. The Trial Court furtherheld that there is no plea with regard to readiness and willingness of theplaintiff to perform his part of the contract in the plaint. It was also heldthat plaintiff after execution of the agreement did not make any effort toobtain permission from the Gram Panchayat and onlysent a notice ( Exh . P-2) on 21-1-2001 . Accordingly, it was held that theplaintiff failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part ofthe contract. It was also held that there is no material on record to show thatdefendant Nos. 2 to 4 had notice of previous transaction. The Trial Courtfurther held that the plaintiffs are bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration and that the possession of the plot inquestion was not handed over to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the suit wasdismissed. 5.Being aggrieved by the decree passed by the Trial Court the plaintiff preferredan appeal. The respondent No. 1 filed cross objection with regard to findingson issue Nos. 1 and 7. Accordingly, the suit wasdismissed. 5.Being aggrieved by the decree passed by the Trial Court the plaintiff preferredan appeal. The respondent No. 1 filed cross objection with regard to findingson issue Nos. 1 and 7. The Lower Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated31-10-2008, inter alia , held that agreement was notexecuted by way of security for the loan. It was further held that from thedate of execution of the agreement dated 6-1-1998 ,on 21-1-2001 , i.e., thedate when the plaintiff sent notice, there is no documentary evidence on recordto suggest that plaintiff ever asked the defendant No. 1 to execute the saledeed. Accordingly, it was held that plaintiff has failed to prove his readinessand willingness. The Lower Appellate Court further held that plaintiff isentitled to refund of Rs . 13,000/- along withinterest at the rate of 6% p.a. Accordingly , thedecree passed by the Trial Court was modified. The Lower Appellate Court,however, affirmed the findings of the Trial Court on issue Nos. 1 and 7 anddismissed the cross-objection filed by the defendant No. 1. 6. Shri A.K. Jain, learned Counsel for the appellantsubmitted that in the instant case since the defendant No. 1 has taken a standthat agreement is executed by way of security for the loan, therefore, he isnot entitled to take advantage of provisions of Specific Relief Act, 1963. Itwas further submitted that under the agreement the plaintiff had paid thesubstantial amount, i.e., a sum of Rs . 13,000/- outof total sale consideration of Rs . 15,000/-,therefore, the finding recorded by the Courts below that plaintiff is not readyand willing to perform his part of contract is perverse. It was furthersubmitted recital contained in the agreement does not prescribe time for makingpayment of sale consideration and, therefore, time was not the essence of thecontract. It was further submitted that subsequent purchaser cannot raise aplea that plaintiff has failed to prove his readiness and willingness. Whileinviting the attention of this Court to the statement of subsequent purchasers,namely, Ms. Lalita and Surendra it was submitted that defendants did not make any inquiry prior to execution ofthe sale deed with regard to previous agreement with the plaintiff. The Courtsbelow, therefore, grossly erred in holding that defendant Nos. 2 to 4 were bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration withoutnotice of the previous transaction. Lalita and Surendra it was submitted that defendants did not make any inquiry prior to execution ofthe sale deed with regard to previous agreement with the plaintiff. The Courtsbelow, therefore, grossly erred in holding that defendant Nos. 2 to 4 were bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration withoutnotice of the previous transaction. In support of his submissions, learnedCounsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decisions reported in (2005) 3 SCC 342 , R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah and othersVs. Hajee C. Abdul Wahad (D) by LRs . and others, (2000) 6 SCC 402 , Motilal Jain Vs. Ramdasi Devi ( Smt .) and others, (2000) 6SCC 420, Jugraj Singh and another Vs. Labh Singh and others, (1995) 2 SCC 31 , 1993 MPLJ 889 and Nirmal Singh (deceased by LRs .)and others Vs. Smt . Gejo d/o Mihan Singh and another, AIR 1997 P & H 260. 7.On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 while invitingattention of this Court to the agreement ( Exh . P-1)submitted that for execution of the sale deed it was necessary to obtainpermission from the Gram Panchayat . However, theplaintiff failed to even obtain permission from the Gram Panchayat and did not take steps nearly for a period of three years. The notice in the newspaper as well as telegraphic notice were sent to defendant No. 1 after execution of the sale deed. It was furthersubmitted that concurrent findings of fact have been recorded against theappellant by the Courts below that he has failed to prove his readiness andwillingness to perform his part of the contract. Accordingly, it was urged thatplaintiff is not entitled to decree for specific performance of contract. Insupport of his submissions learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decisionsreported in AIR 1985 Orissa 84, Smt . Sundari Devi Vs. Deo Narayan Prasad, AIR 2011 Patna 89, Jugraj Singh andanother Vs. Labh Singh and others, AIR 1995 SC 945 and Ram Awadh (dead) by LRs .and others Vs. Achhaibar Dubey and another, AIR 2000 SC 860 . 8.Learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 4 submitted that defendant Nos. 2.to 4are bonafide purchasers for valuable considerationwithout any previous transaction and finding in this regard has been recordedby the Courts below on meticulous appreciation of evidence and, therefore, thesame does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise ofjurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 to 4 submitted that defendant Nos. 2.to 4are bonafide purchasers for valuable considerationwithout any previous transaction and finding in this regard has been recordedby the Courts below on meticulous appreciation of evidence and, therefore, thesame does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise ofjurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9.I have considered the submissions made on both the sides. In Ardeshir H. Mama Vs. Flora Sassoon, AIR 1928 Privy Council208, it has been held that where the plaintiff claims a decree for specificperformance of contract, it is necessary for him to prove his readiness andwillingness to perform his part of contract. Section 16 (c) of the SpecificRelief Act, 1963 provides that plaintiff must plead and prove that he is readyand willing to perform his part of the contract. The continuous readiness andwillingness at all stages from the date of agreement till the date of filing ofthe suit need to be proved. [ See : Raj Kishore (dead) by LRs . Vs. Prem Singh and others, (2010) 1 SCC 657, Laxman Tatyaba Kankate and another Vs. Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak , (2010) 7SCC 717, Jugraj Singh (supra). It is well settled inlaw that by virtue of Section 20 of Specific Relief Act the relief of specificperformance of contract lies in the discretion of the Court and the Court isnot bound to grant decree of specific performance of contract merely because itis lawful to do scf . [ See : Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak (supra) and (2008) 12 SCC 145]. 10. In the instant case, the agreement ( Exh . P-1) was executed on 6-1-1998 . The agreement contained a stipulation that toget the sale deed executed it is necessary that plaintiff should obtainpermission from the Gram Panchayat for construction andshould raise some construction. The plaintiff neither obtained any permissionfrom the Gram Panchayat for construction nor raisedany construction on the plot. Nearly after a period of three years from thedate of execution of the agreement, the plaintiff for the first time sent anotice on 21-1-2001 . Thereis no averment in the plaint that plaintiff made any effort for execution ofthe sale-deed from the date of execution of the agreement till notice ( Exh . P-2) was sent. In Paragraph 9 of the plaint, theplaintiff has merely stated that he is ready and willing to deposit the balanceof amount of sale consideration, i.e., Rs . Thereis no averment in the plaint that plaintiff made any effort for execution ofthe sale-deed from the date of execution of the agreement till notice ( Exh . P-2) was sent. In Paragraph 9 of the plaint, theplaintiff has merely stated that he is ready and willing to deposit the balanceof amount of sale consideration, i.e., Rs . 2000A inthe CCD as and when the Court passes and order in thisregard. Thus, the plaintiff has neither pleaded his readiness and willingnessto perform his part of the contract nor has proved the same. Merely becausemaximum part of the sale consideration has been paid by the plaintiff, itcannot be inferred that plaintiff is ready and wiling to perform his part ofthe contract. For the aforementioned reasons, first substantial question of lawis answered in the negative and against the appellant. 11.Both the Courts have concurrently recorded a finding that the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are bonafide purchasers for valuation consideration. Patwari ,namely, Krishna Manoranjan Shrivastava has been examined as D.W. 3. In his statement, the aforesaid witness had statedthat he has carried out demarcation on 13-1-2001 .It has further been stated by him that he found the defendant No. 1 to bepossession of the suit plot and suit plot was vacant. It has also been statedby him that possession of the defendant No. 1 was recorded in the revenuerecords. The respondent No. 4, Smt . Lalita , who has been examined as defendant witness inParagraph 6 of her statement had stated that her son made enquiry from Patwari and it was found that defendant No. 1 is the ownerand in possession of the suit plot. It has further been stated that demarcationwas also carried out. Similarly, the respondent No. 2 who has been examined asdefendant witness has stated in Paragraph 5 as well as 8 of his statement thathe had made enquiry on the spot and found out that defendant No. 1 is the ownerand is in possession of the suit plot. It has further been stated by him thathe got the suit land demarcated. Even otherwise, the question whether or notthe person is bonafide purchaser for valuableconsideration is a question of fact. 12.The jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the findings of fact under Section100 of CPC is limited to the case where the finding is either perverse or basedon no evidence. Even otherwise, the question whether or notthe person is bonafide purchaser for valuableconsideration is a question of fact. 12.The jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the findings of fact under Section100 of CPC is limited to the case where the finding is either perverse or basedon no evidence. This Court cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of factuntil or unless the same is perverse or contrary to material on record. [ See : Sugani ( Mst .)Vs. Rameshwar Das andanother, (2006) 11 SCC 587 , Gurdev Kaur Vs. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546 , Praksah Kumar Vs. State of Gujrat , (2004) 5 SCC 140 , Thiagarajan and others Vs. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil and others, (2004) 5 SCC 762 and Narayanan Rajendran and another Vs. Lekshmy Sarojini and others, (2009) 5 SCC 264 ]. It is equallywell settled that this Court in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Codeof Civil Procedure cannot re-appreciate evidence. [ See : Thimmaiah and others Vs. Ningamma and another, (2000) 7 SCC 409 ]. It is equally well settled that where onappreciation of evidence, even if two views are possible, this Court inexercise of powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure would notinterfere. [ See : Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs. Savitribai Sopan Guzar and others, (1999) 3 SCC 722 and Veerayee Ammal Vs. Seeni Ammal , (2002) 1 SCC 134 ]. It has further been held by theSupreme Court that interference with a question of fact is not permissible. [ See : Basayya I. Mathad Vs. Rudrayya S. Mathad and others, (2008) 3 SCC 120 ]. In S. Appadurai Nadar and another Vs.A. Chokalinga Nadar andanother, (2007) 12 SCC 774 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that inexercise of power under Section 100 the Courts should be slow in reversing thefinding of fact. The finding of fact even if erroneous wouldnot be disturbed in second appeal unless the finding is shown to beperverse and based on surmises and conjectures. [ See : Kulwant Kaur and others Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann and others, (2001) 4 SCC 262 , Hafazat Hussain Vs. Abdul Majeed and others, (2001) 7 SCC 189 and Bharath Matha Vs. R. Vijay Rengandathan , (2010) 11 SCC 483 ]. 13.The finding recorded by the Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court thatdefendant Nos. [ See : Kulwant Kaur and others Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann and others, (2001) 4 SCC 262 , Hafazat Hussain Vs. Abdul Majeed and others, (2001) 7 SCC 189 and Bharath Matha Vs. R. Vijay Rengandathan , (2010) 11 SCC 483 ]. 13.The finding recorded by the Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court thatdefendant Nos. 2 to 4 are bonafide purchases forvaluable consideration without notice of precious transaction, by no stretch ofimagination, can either be said to be perverse or based on no evidence. ThisCourt in exercise of powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedurecannot re-appreciate the evidence. For the aforementioned reasons, the secondsubstantial question of law is also answered in the negative and against theappellant. 14.In the result, the appeal failed and is hereby dismissed.