M. Shyamaladevi v. Tamil Nadu Dr. M. G. R. Medical University, rep. by its Registrar, Guindy, Chennai
2012-08-21
K.CHANDRU
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking for a direction to the respondents to furnish the complete set of answer sheets together with the first page containing the evaluation particularly in respect of the subjects Obstertrics Gynaecology and Family Welfare (Paper I and II) and Paediatrics including Neonatology of the petitioner pertaining to the final year MBBS examinations for 2011-2012 held during February, 2012 within a time frame and in the event of any error in the evaluation process being found, pass suitable orders for re-evaluating the petitioner's answer sheets. 2. When the matter came up on 19.7.2012, this court ordered notice on admission and directed Mrs.Narmadha Sampath, learned Standing Counsel for the Tamil Nadu Dr.MG.R. Medical University to take notice. On notice, a counter affidavit, dated 24.07.2012 has been filed on behalf of the respondents. 3. Heard arguments of Mr.S.Thankasivan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mrs.Narmadha Sampath, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents University. 4. The case of the petitioner was that she is a final year medical student having completed her course from Tirunelveli Medical College. She is a meritorious student. She wrote the final year examination during February, 2012 and she got passed only in General Medicine. The other two subjects, i.e., Obstertrics Gynaecology and Family Welfare (Paper I and II) and Paediatrics including Neonatology, she was declared fail. She had performed extremely well and was confident of getting pass mark in those subjects. But she was granted only 53 out of 110 marks in the written including oral in the subject Obstertrics Gynaecology and Family Welfare (Paper I and II) and 24 out of 50 in the written including oral in the subject Paediatrics including Neonatology. She had put in lot of efforts in preparing for the examination. She apprehended that there was some error in the evaluation process of her answer sheets in those two papers. If a photocopy of the answer sheets were furnished to her, she can point out as to how the error had occurred in evaluation. Therefore, invoking the power under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, she had made an application to the first respondent on 30.03.2012 and had requested to furnish photocopies of the answer sheets in those two papers, wherein she had been declared fail. By a letter dated 12.4.2012, the respondents had requested to remit Rs.1000/-per paper.
Therefore, invoking the power under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, she had made an application to the first respondent on 30.03.2012 and had requested to furnish photocopies of the answer sheets in those two papers, wherein she had been declared fail. By a letter dated 12.4.2012, the respondents had requested to remit Rs.1000/-per paper. Therefore, she had remitted a sum of Rs.3000/- in respect of those three papers. She was made to wait till July, 2012. Finally, they furnished a photocopy of the answer sheet without the first page which alone will disclose the evaluation process done by the authorities. When she and her parents continuously approached the authorities, they had denied to furnish the same. Therefore, having left with no other alternative remedy, the petitioner has moved this court. 5. It was stated that under Section 6 of the RTI Act, she is entitled to get the entire answer sheets including the first page. For the non furnishing of the first page, the provisions of the RTI Act will be defeated. By non furnishing of the complete answer sheet including the first page, she has been handicapped from verifying the evaluating process done. Reference was also made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay reported in (2011) 8 SCC 497 , wherein the Supreme Court held that the authorities are liable to furnish the full and complete set of answer sheets. 6. On notice from this court, the respondents have filed a counter affidavit stating that the University had given correct marks to the petitioner. Since number of representations were received by the University regarding revaluation and re-totalling of answer scripts, the Vice Chancellor of the University had ordered for double valuation from February, 2012 examination for the candidates who have obtained less than 50% of marks in theory in all under graduate degree courses. The double evaluation was already in existence for P.G. Courses. Therefore, the University had dispensed with the question of revaluation as all papers were evaluated twice. Since the petitioner in Obstetrics and Gynacology paper had secured only 11 marks in the first valuation out of 40 marks and that it was less than 50%, as per the guidelines, the evaluated papers were sent to an another examiner. In the second evaluation, the petitioner had scored only 15 marks in Theory I paper of Obstetrics and Gynacology.
Since the petitioner in Obstetrics and Gynacology paper had secured only 11 marks in the first valuation out of 40 marks and that it was less than 50%, as per the guidelines, the evaluated papers were sent to an another examiner. In the second evaluation, the petitioner had scored only 15 marks in Theory I paper of Obstetrics and Gynacology. Both first and second valuation marks were added and divided by two. The petitioner had scored only 13 marks in the First paper theory. In respect of the second theory paper. She had scored 25 marks out of maximum of 40 marks. Since it did not come within the guidelines as she had scored more than 50%, there is no second evaluation in the theory paper 2. Similarly in respect of Paediatrics paper, she had scored 25 out of 40 marks and there was no necessity for second evaluation. 7. When the petitioner sought for a photocopy of the answer sheets under the RTI Act, the same was given to her. It was only for their personal reference and for self assessing their performance to improve their answer presentation in future. There is no law by which they can have papers evaluated by some outside valuer and ask for revaluation on the basis of the opinion furnished by the outsider. The revaluation of answer papers were not permissible as per the University rules. The university had withdrawn revaluation of answer scripts of candidates based on the resolution of the Standing Academic Board of the University. One of the candidate by name P.Archana Meenakshi had challenged the said provision in W.P.No.12021 of 2012. It must be stated that the said writ petition was dismissed by a division bench of this court. Similarly several other cases, seeking for revaluation on the mode suggested by the petitioner, were rejected by this court. 8. In respect of the demand for the first page of the answer sheet to be given, the University took the following stand in the counter affidavit and in paragraph 11 it was averred as follows : "11. ....... originally the first page of the answer script also furnished to the candidates. Taking due advantage of the same, the failed candidates have came to know the name and other particulars of the evaluator and threatening the evaluators. So the University evaluator is facing endanger to his life.
....... originally the first page of the answer script also furnished to the candidates. Taking due advantage of the same, the failed candidates have came to know the name and other particulars of the evaluator and threatening the evaluators. So the University evaluator is facing endanger to his life. Further if the evaluator is working in the same institution, then the failed candidates take revenge against the said evaluator and making unnecessary allegations against the evaluator....." (Emphasis added) 9. Mr.Thankasivan, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay reported in (2011) 8 SCC 497 , wherein the Supreme Court while deciding the matter under the RTI Act regarding the right of the examinees in getting their answer scripts, in paragraphs 47 and 51 had answered as follows : "47. When an examinee is permitted to examine an answer book or obtain a certified copy, the examining body is not really giving him some information which is held by it in trust or confidence, but is only giving him an opportunity to read what he had written at the time of examination or to have a copy of his answers. Therefore, in furnishing the copy of an answer book, there is no question of breach of confidentiality, privacy, secrecy or trust. The real issue, therefore, is not in regard to the answer book but in regard to the marks awarded on the evaluation of the answer book. Even here the total marks given to the examinee in regard to his answer book are already declared and known to the examinee. What the examinee actually wants to know is the break-up of marks given to him, that is, how many marks were given by the examiner to each of his answers so that he can assess how his performance has been evaluated and whether the evaluation is proper as per his hopes and expectations. Therefore, the test for finding out whether the information is exempted or not, is not in regard to the answer book but in regard to the evaluation by the examiner. 51. We, therefore, hold that an examining body does not hold the evaluated answer books in a fiduciary relationship.
Therefore, the test for finding out whether the information is exempted or not, is not in regard to the answer book but in regard to the evaluation by the examiner. 51. We, therefore, hold that an examining body does not hold the evaluated answer books in a fiduciary relationship. Not being information available to an examining body in its fiduciary relationship, the exemption under Section 8(1)(e) is not available to the examining bodies with reference to the evaluated answer books. As no other exemption under Section 8 is available in respect of the evaluated answer books, the examining bodies will have to permit inspection sought by the examinees." 10. The learned counsel further referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in ICAI v. Shaunak H. Satya reported in (2011) 8 SCC 781 for contending that the petitioner is entitled for the first page of the answer sheet and no exemption can be claimed. In paragraphs 15,16,22 and 24, the Supreme Court had observed as follows : "15. Information can be sought under the RTI Act at different stages or different points of time. What is exempted from disclosure at one point of time may cease to be exempted at a later point of time, depending upon the nature of exemption. For example, any information which is exempted from disclosure under Section 8 is liable to be disclosed if the application is made in regard to the occurrence or event which took place or occurred or happened twenty years prior to the date of the request, vide Section 8(3) of the RTI Act. In other words, information which was exempted from disclosure, if an application is made within twenty years of the occurrence, may not be exempted if the application is made after twenty years. 16. Similarly, if information relating to the intellectual property, that is, the question papers, solutions/model answers and instructions, in regard to any particular examination conducted by the appellant cannot be disclosed before the examination is held, as it would harm the competitive position of innumerable third parties who are taking the said examination. Therefore it is obvious that the appellant examining body is not liable to give to any citizen any information relating to question papers, solutions/model answers and instructions relating to a particular examination before the date of such examination. But the position will be different once the examination is held.
Therefore it is obvious that the appellant examining body is not liable to give to any citizen any information relating to question papers, solutions/model answers and instructions relating to a particular examination before the date of such examination. But the position will be different once the examination is held. Disclosure of the question papers, model answers and instructions in regard to any particular examination, would not harm the competitive position of any third party once the examination is held. 22. It should be noted that Section 8(1)(e) uses the words “information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship”. Significantly Section 8(1)(e) does not use the words “information available to a public authority in its fiduciary relationship”. The use of the word “person” shows that the holder of the information in a fiduciary relationship need not only be a “public authority” as the word “person” is of much wider import than the words “public authority”. Therefore the exemption under Section 8(1)(e) is available not only in regard to information that is held by a public authority (in this case the examining body) in a fiduciary capacity, but also to any information that is given or made available by a public authority to anyone else for being held in a fiduciary relationship. In other words, anything given and taken in confidence expecting confidentiality to be maintained will be information available to a person in fiduciary relationship.As a consequence, it has to be held that the instructions and solutions to questions communicated by the examining body to the examiners, Head Examiners and moderators, are information available to such persons in their fiduciary relationship and therefore exempted from disclosure under Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI Act. 24. One of the objects of democracy is to bring about transparency of information to contain corruption and bring about accountability. But achieving this object does not mean that other equally important public interests including efficient functioning of the governments and public authorities, optimum use of limited fiscal resources, preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information, etc. are to be ignored or sacrificed.
But achieving this object does not mean that other equally important public interests including efficient functioning of the governments and public authorities, optimum use of limited fiscal resources, preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information, etc. are to be ignored or sacrificed. The object of the RTI Act is to harmonise the conflicting public interests, that is, ensuring transparency to bring in accountability and containing corruption on the one hand, and at the same time ensure that the revelation of information, in actual practice, does not harm or adversely affect other public interests which include efficient functioning of the governments, optimum use of limited fiscal resources and preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information, on the other hand. While Sections 3 and 4 seek to achieve the first objective, Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 seek to achieve the second objective." 11. On the question of alternative remedy, the learned counsel referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tantia Construction Private Limited reported in (2011) 5 SCC 697 and in paragraphs 33 and 34, the Supreme Court had observed as follows : "33. Apart from the above, even on the question of maintainability of the writ petition on account of the arbitration clause included in the agreement between the parties, it is now well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court or the Supreme Court and that without exhausting such alternative remedy, a writ petition would not be maintainable. The various decisions cited by Mr Chakraborty would clearly indicate that the constitutional powers vested in the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot be fettered by any alternative remedy available to the authorities. Injustice, whenever and wherever it takes place, has to be struck down as an anathema to the rule of law and the provisions of the Constitution. 34. We endorse the view of the High Court that notwithstanding the provisions relating to the arbitration clause contained in the agreement, the High Court was fully within its competence to entertain and dispose of the writ petition filed on behalf of the respondent Company. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the views expressed by the High Court on the maintainability of the writ petition and also on its merits." 12.
We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the views expressed by the High Court on the maintainability of the writ petition and also on its merits." 12. It is strongly refuted by Mrs.Narmadha Sampath, learned Standing Counsel for the University by stating that the University has its own apprehension about parting with the first page. As already averred in the counter affidavit, the apprehension of the university is not without any basis. On that score, the petitioner is not entitled to get the copy of the first page. 13. However, it must be noted that the petitioner had sought for an information under Section 6 of the RTI Act with the third respondent Public Information Officer. As against the same, the petitioner has remedy by way of an appeal before the appellate authority constituted under the said Act. Even thereafter if the petitioner is not satisfied, there is a further appeal to the Information Commission under Section 19 of the Act. Since the petitioner had invoked the RTI Act and substantial portion of the answer book had already been given to her, the omission of the first page not being granted is an issue which can be entirely dealt with either by the appellate authority or by the second appellate authority, i.e., Tamil Nadu Information Commission. The contention that the petitioner need not invoke the alternative remedy cannot be found acceptance as the RTI Act, 2005 is a complete code by itself. It is not as if it is giving remedy only to the information seeker. Even for the information provider and the third party, there are certain safeguards provided under the said Act. Section 8 deals with the exemption from disclosure of information. 14. In CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay's case (cited supra) and in ICAI v. Shaunak H. Satya's case (cited supra), the Supreme Court dealt with the exemption under Section 8 (1)(e) not being available for the information provider. But at the same time, in ICAI's case, the Supreme Court in paragraphs 25 and 26 had observed as follows : "25. Therefore, when Section 8 exempts certain information from being disclosed, it should not be considered to be a fetter on the right to information, but as an equally important provision protecting other public interests essential for the fulfilment and preservation of democratic ideals.
Therefore, when Section 8 exempts certain information from being disclosed, it should not be considered to be a fetter on the right to information, but as an equally important provision protecting other public interests essential for the fulfilment and preservation of democratic ideals. Therefore, in dealing with information not falling under Sections 4(1)(b) and (c), the competent authorities under the RTI Act will not read the exemptions in Section 8 in a restrictive manner but in a practical manner so that the other public interests are preserved and the RTI Act attains a fine balance between its goal of attaining transparency of information and safeguarding the other public interests. 26. Among the ten categories of information which are exempted from disclosure under Section 8 of the RTI Act, six categories which are described in clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (g) and (h) carry absolute exemption. Information enumerated in clauses (d), (e) and (j) on the other hand get only conditional exemption, that is, the exemption is subject to the overriding power of the competent authority under the RTI Act in larger public interest, to direct disclosure of such information. The information referred to in clause (i) relates to an exemption for a specific period, with an obligation to make the said information public after such period. The information relating to intellectual property and the information available to persons in their fiduciary relationship, referred to in clauses (d) and (e) of Section 8(1) do not enjoy absolute exemption. Though exempted, if the competent authority under the Act is satisfied that larger public interest warrants disclosure of such information, such information will have to be disclosed. It is needless to say that the competent authority will have to record reasons for holding that an exempted information should be disclosed in larger public interest." (Emphasis added) 15. A perusal of the above passage will clearly show that the exemption claimed, whether it is reasonable and whether larger public interest requires exemption, can be allowed. In case of an exemption under Section 8(1)(g), it is considered as an absolute exemption. The matter is entirely to be decided by the competent authority under the Act and not by this court as held by the Supreme Court in ICAI's case (cited supra). 16. In the counter affidavit, the respondent University had pleaded about danger in disclosure as it will affect the safety of examiners.
The matter is entirely to be decided by the competent authority under the Act and not by this court as held by the Supreme Court in ICAI's case (cited supra). 16. In the counter affidavit, the respondent University had pleaded about danger in disclosure as it will affect the safety of examiners. The exemption Section 8(1)(g) reads as follows :- "8 (1)(g)information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes;" 17. As to how far the apprehension raised can be justified is a matter which will have to be decided by the Information commission as and when any appeal is filed before the Commission. The Commission will examine the same in the light of the materials which may be furnished to the Commission. Certainly this court cannot take over the power of the Commission and determine whether exemption claimed by the university is justified or not in terms of the apprehension raised in the counter affidavit reproduced above. 18. It is not that the question of alternative remedy is being bypassed. The only remedy available to the petitioner having sought for the information under Section 6 of the Act before the Information officer and it is the logical corollary that she has to move the appellate authority and thereafter the information commission. If there is still any grievance, the question of moving this court will arise. The contention raised by the university cannot be simply rejected without the issue being gone into by the competent authority as held by the Supreme Court in the decision cited above. 19. In view of the fact that the University had furnished the entire answer book except its first page and the petitioner having not availed the remedy provided under the Act, this court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs.