ORDER 1. The petitioner in this writ petition is Srivilliputhur Bar Association represented by its Secretary. 2. In this writ petition, the petitioner challenges the order passed by the fifth respondent namely the Inspector of Police, Krishnankovil Police Station, in charge of Srivilliputhur Town Police Station, Srivilliputhur, dated 14.08.2012. 3. It transpires that the petitioner Bar Association sent a letter dated 13.08.2012 to the fifth respondent asking permission for conducting a procession on 17.08.2012 at 10.00 a.m. starting from the car shed at Srivilliputhur and passing though South Car Street, West Car Street, North Car Street and Jewellery Bazaar and ending at Srivilliputhur Bus Stand, to reieterate the demands of the Association. 4. The fifth respondent held that the power has been conferred on him by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Srivilliputhur Sub Division, under Section 42-A of the Police Act, 1861 and in the light of the law and order problem and also the communal situation prevailing, if any processions, meetings or struggles are conducted, it may affect the law and order. Therefore, from 12.08.2012 to 26.08.2012, a promulgation has been done under Section 42-A of the said Act. Hence, the processions and meetings are banned. The request made by the Association was denied. In support of his stand, he also enclosed the proceedings issued by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Srivilliputhur dated 12.08.2012. In that proceedings, by exercise of power under Section 42-A of the Police Act, 1861, the authority had banned any meeting or procession within the area comprising Srivilliputhur Sub Division and the persons who are intending for conducting any procession or meeting, should make appropriate application. 5. In this context, reference made to the Police Act, 1861, is misconceived, because the Police Act, 1861, do not contain any provision such as Section 42-A of the Act. It is only under the Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859 under Section 42-A by which a Police Officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, may in the interest of public order, depute by order in writing one or more Police Officers to be present in any assembly, meeting or procession, in any public place for the purpose of causing a report to be taken of the proceedings. 6. 6. It is not clear as to how Section 42-A of the Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859, will have relevance or give any power either to the Deputy Superintendent of Police or to the Inspector of Police, as the case may be, to prohibit any procession or assembly. The said provision only enables the authority to depute a Police Officer to be present in the meeting for the purpose of reporting the activities in any procession or a meeting, so that, they can give information regarding the happenings in the said meeting or procession. If at all, there is any regulation of public assemblies and processions and licensing of the same, the relevant provision is Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861. No records were produced to show the promulgation of an order under Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861. 7. In the present case, the grievance of the petitioner Association was that two of its Members namely M/s.Govindaraj and Neerathilingam, were illegally detained by the respondent police in a criminal case under various provisions including the Harassment of Women in Public place was registered against them. That case was lodged on the basis of a false complaint. Also false complaints were lodged against the Members of the Association. 8. It is also stated that two Members referred to therein had suffered injuries at the hands of the police. Therefore, they made a representation on 08.08.2012 and 13.08.2012 requesting to permit the Association to conduct a meeting and rally in Srivilliputhur Town on 17.08.2012 to condemn police atrocities and to demonstrate the role of the Advocates in connection with the public. With reference to the right to express their grievance in public, a reference was made to the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in S.Rangarajan v. P.Jagjivan Ram reported in 1989 (2) Supreme Court Cases 574. Further reference was also made to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in C.J.Rajan v. Deputy Superintendent of Police reported in (2008) 3 MLJ 926 , dated 30.01.2008. 9. Per contra, on behalf of the third respondent -the Superintendent of Police, a counter affidavit dated 20.08.2012, has been filed justifying the order passed by the Inspector of Police following the order of the fourth respondent -Deputy Superintendent of Police. 9. Per contra, on behalf of the third respondent -the Superintendent of Police, a counter affidavit dated 20.08.2012, has been filed justifying the order passed by the Inspector of Police following the order of the fourth respondent -Deputy Superintendent of Police. The broad contentions were that the police were not guilty of misdemeanor and the allegations made against the police were uncharitable and unwarranted. There was no personal animosity by the defacto complainant (by name Tmt.Rani) against the two Advocates and the injuries inflicted during the custody in police were imaginary. The guidelines under the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in D.K.Basu Vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR (1997) SC 610, were scrupulously followed. The allegations that the Superintendent of Police refused even to interact with the learned District Judge on 03.08.2012 was also denied. 10. It is further stated that against the conduct of the Bar Members, the public were also agitated and posters have also appeared in the Town. With reference to the case filed against the Bar Members, it was regarding the damage caused to a police vehicle and a case in Cr.No.418 of 2012 was registered under various provisions. If any permission was granted, they may indulge in further violence and the right to expression under Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India is subject to reasonable restrictions. Under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, all citizens are to be equally protected. The boycott of Courts called by the petitioner Association starting from 06.08.2012 till the date of the affidavit is causing misery to innocent public. The authorities were also prevented from entering into the Court Complex in the discharge of their duties. In the above context, it is just and necessary that the rally/meeting requesting to organise by the petitioner, should be denied to instil faith in the mind of the public. Further, it is also stated that there were other sections of the public who also want to agitate similarly and if any permission is granted, it may likely to cause very more violence. 11. In the light of the stand taken by the respective sides, it has to be seen whether the petitioner Association is entitled to conduct a rally culminating in a public meeting to ventilate their grievance. 12. 11. In the light of the stand taken by the respective sides, it has to be seen whether the petitioner Association is entitled to conduct a rally culminating in a public meeting to ventilate their grievance. 12. Before proceeding with the merits of the case, this Court noted that the petitioner Association moved this Court for the relief claimed in this writ petition. But, they were actually boycotting the Court right from 06.08.2012. Therefore, this Court informed the learned Counsel appearing for the Bar Association that it may not be proper for them to close the Courts in one District, but yet seek for a relief for the Members of the Bar Association in an Higher Court. The suffering of the litigant public must be taken note. If they want to have their grievances redressed that could be done in a lawful manner including moving this Court. This Court informed the learned Counsel for the Bar Association to convey the feelings of this Court, so that the Members can make up their mind as to whether they require a solution through Court proceedings or to solve the problem outside the Court. After such advise, the matter was posted today directing the respondents to file a counter affidavit so that the matter may be taken up for disposal. 13. When the matter is taken up for hearing, Mr.M.Saravanakumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner Bar Association produced a copy of the letter by the petitioner Bar Association dated 21.08.2012 informing the District Judge that they have resumed duty from today. Accordingly, they have also resumed to duty from this morning. This Court appreciates the correct stand taken by the Members of the petitioner Bar Association by realising their responsibilities towards the litigants and the general public. 14. As noted already, the stand of the Superintendent of Police as well as the Deputy Superintendent of Police invoking the powers under Section 42-A of the Police Act, 1861, is misconceived and under the power vested by virtue of Section 42-A of the Act, all that the authority can do, is to depute a Police Officer to be present in the meeting which otherwise may be considered as an intrusion into the private affairs of a Body which conducts a demonstration or a meeting. Even assuming that there was a promulgation under Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861, from conducting the meeting or procession, it has been considered by this Court, that the said provision only regulates the conduct of all assemblies and processions on the public roads, or in the public streets or thoroughfares by prescribing the routes by which and the times at which such processions may pass. 15. Section 30(2) and (3) of the Police Act, 1861, reads as follows: "Section 30(2): He may also, on being satisfied that it is intended by any person or class of persons to convene or collect an assembly in any such road, street or thoroughfare, or to form a procession which would in the judgment of the Magistrate of the district, or of the sub-division of a district, if uncontrolled, be likely to cause a breach of the peace, required by general or special notice, that the persons convening or collecting such assembly or directing or promoting such procession shall apply for a licence. (3) On such application being made, he may issue a licence, specifying the names of the licensees and defining the conditions on which alone such assembly or such possession is to be permitted to take place, and otherwise giving effect to this section: Provided that no fee shall be charged on the application for, or grant of, any such licence." 16. A perusal of the said provision would clearly show that it was regulatory and there is no blanket power to trifle any democratic dissent of the citizens by the Police. 17. While dealing with a similar situation on the powers conferred on the Commissioner of Police under Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act, 1888, this Court (R. Jayasimha Babu, J.) vide judgment in P. Nedumaran v. State of Tamil Nadu and others 1999 (1) L.W. (CRI) 73 defined the scope of the rights of citizen and the power of the State to impose reasonable restriction. The following passages found in paragraphs 15 to 18 may be usefully extracted: "15. The rights conferred on the citizens by Article 19 of the Constitution are precious rights and are not to be lightly breached or restricted by the State or any functionary of the State. The following passages found in paragraphs 15 to 18 may be usefully extracted: "15. The rights conferred on the citizens by Article 19 of the Constitution are precious rights and are not to be lightly breached or restricted by the State or any functionary of the State. Any regulation of exercise of those rights must be for the purposes specified in Article 19 of the Constitution itself, and that power must be so exercised as to subserve the larger public good. The power to impose restrictions is not the power which is available for exercise in an arbitrary manner or for the purpose of promoting the interest of those in power, or for suppressing dissent Democracy can be made dynamic an truly alive only when there is free market for ideas and discussion and debate is not only permitted but is encouraged. All expression of opposing view point cannot be regarded as dangerous to the safety or security of the country and all expressions which do not find the approval of those exercising the power of the State cannot be regarded as harmful to the State and to the public order. 16. The power conferred on the Commissioner under Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act is sweeping, that power is meant to be exercised with great care and caution. The Madras City Police Act is a pre-Constitution enactment, and the powers conferred on the authorities at a time when the country was under the colonial regime, and during the period when suppression of dissent was considered to be a legitimate policy of the State, cannot be exercised after the enactment of the Constitution in the same manner, as it was exercised earlier. The Intelligence Report placed before the Court shows that the police still have the attitude which does not seem to recognise that the country is a democratic nation, where every citizen has a right to full and equal participation in the process of Government. No citizen can be regarded as an enemy of the State merely because he has voiced a view which is not the one favoured by those in authority. 17. The fact that the police are vested with power should not make them assume that, that power is available for exercise in any manner that they consider fit. No citizen can be regarded as an enemy of the State merely because he has voiced a view which is not the one favoured by those in authority. 17. The fact that the police are vested with power should not make them assume that, that power is available for exercise in any manner that they consider fit. That power is to be exercised strictly within the ambit of the provisions of the Constitution, more particularly, the requirement that any restriction placed on the exercise of fundamental rights should be a reasonable restriction, and the restrictions so placed should be shown to be essential, having regard to the permissible purpose for which restrictions may be imposed. 18. The fact that the petitioner-Association is voicing a view point which may not be popular cannot be a justification for preventing that point of view being projected." This Court is in entire agreement with the views expressed therein. 18. It must be noted that the Honourable Supreme Court vide judgment in Himat Lal K.Shah v. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad, reported in AIR 1973 SC 87 : (1973) 1 SCC 227 rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court, wherein the Court struck down Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act on the ground that Rule, which empowered the Commissioner of Police to refuse permission to hold meetings without giving any guidance under the Rule and thereby conferring an arbitrary discretion, was an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of assembly guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also held that the work "regulating" in Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Act would include the power to prohibit and impose the condition that permission should be taken a few days before the holding of the meeting on a public street. Mathew, J., dissented from the view of the majority and held that the power to regulate did not include the right to prohibit and the permission sought for holding a meeting ought not be refused. The majority opinion was that regulation is necessary to enable citizens to enjoy the various rights in crowded public streets, and that the State can make regulation in aid of the right of the assemble of each citizen and can impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of Public order. 19. The majority opinion was that regulation is necessary to enable citizens to enjoy the various rights in crowded public streets, and that the State can make regulation in aid of the right of the assemble of each citizen and can impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of Public order. 19. Further, in S.Rangarajan v. P.Jagjivan Ram reported in (1989) 2 SCC 574 , this Court held as follows: "... freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India means the right to express one's own opinion by word of mouth, printing, picture or is any one manner of ideas made through any and the communication of ideas made through any medium. Such right, however, was held to be subject to reasonable restrictions in the larger interest of the community and the country as set out in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Those restrictions are intended to strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed, and the social interests specified under Article 19(2). The Court emphasised that the interest of freedom of expression and social interest cannot be regarded as of equal weight and the Court's commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far fetched, but should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interests. It should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a "spark in a powder keg."" 20. In the present case, this Court is not willing to go into the merits of the allegations made by both sides and no need to render any finding as to who was at fault. It is suffice to state that the Members of the petitioner Bar Association are having certain grievances and they want to ventilate the same in public by conducting a rally followed by a meeting. Even if the Superintendent of Police has a different view on the same matter, the justification or otherwise of the issue involved, will not decide the right. The Constitution of India had not set up different standards holding that permission should be given based upon the justness of the demands involved. Even if the Superintendent of Police has a different view on the same matter, the justification or otherwise of the issue involved, will not decide the right. The Constitution of India had not set up different standards holding that permission should be given based upon the justness of the demands involved. The only question is as to whether on account of the rival claims made for conducting processions or rallies or that if any procession has to be allowed, it has to be equally done in respect of other demands, cannot be a ground to deny the relief sought for by the petitioner Association. 21. On the other hand, the petitioner Association after rightly withdrawing the boycott, are entitled to ventilate their grievances in public. The only apprehension of the Superintendent of Police is that such permission may result in any violence and damage to public vehicles. 22. This Court is not convinced that the Members of the Bar being part of a noble profession, will stoop to the level of indulging in violence. However, by way of caution, this Court also directs that the procession and the rally should not give any room to public criticism. Indulging in violence is anathema to the right of protest for which alone the rally is organised. Since the earlier procession was scheduled for 17.08.2012 and the date is already over due to the refusal of the respondents, Mr.M.Saravanakumar, learned Counsel, on instructions, states that the Bar Association is willing to organise the rally on 27.08.2012. 23. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner Bar Association submits that the rally will start at 10.00 a.m. that may not be proper. Since the Town is very small one and the only purpose is to express their grievance against the police action, it can be done without hampering the work of the Courts which had already suffered for more than two weeks and the Members of the Bar Association must keep the call of duty in their mind and should call for any procession or rally only either outside the Court hours or without hampering the Court hours. 24. This Court, therefore, directs that the rally should start at 03.00 p.m., and that too, after fulfilling their legal obligations in the forenoon session and without further loss of energy/human resources. The Association must strive its full efforts in not hampering the work of the Courts. 24. This Court, therefore, directs that the rally should start at 03.00 p.m., and that too, after fulfilling their legal obligations in the forenoon session and without further loss of energy/human resources. The Association must strive its full efforts in not hampering the work of the Courts. They should not give any room for any further criticism of any violent acts. 25. The writ petition is disposed of with the above directions. Since the Superintendent of Police, Virudhunagar District, had expressed apprehension that there are rival groups which are also equally interested in counter protest, this Court directs the Superintendent of Police, to give appropriate police protection to the rally to be conducted by the petitioner Bar Association. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs.