Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the first accused in case pending trial in S.C.No.387 of 2005 on the file of learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Chennai. 2. A final report was filed in P.R.C.No.387 of 2005 on the file of the learned XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, alleging offences under sections 376(1), 384, 385, 363, 354, 342, 343, 352, 448, 417, 420, 294(b), 427, 452, 406, 392, 506(i)(ii), 509 r/w 34 and 109 IPC. The prosecution case in brief is that the petitioner/A1 was running one Sri Ramanuja Mission Trust and delivering upanyas and lectures for Vaishnavites. The de facto complainant/ LW-1, his wife Geetha @ Sivagama Sundari, daughters Priyamvatha @ Mathuvanthi and Manasa called at the trust of the petitioner to hear his lectures and obtain his blessings during the month of October 2002. Using the devotion to God and the Vaishnavite religion of the LW-1 family, the petitioner/A1 caused them to believe that he was the incarnation ofLord Perumal and using the assistance of A2 to A7 caused them untold hardships. The gist of the accusations is as follows: 3. Pursuant to cognizance taken by learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Chennai, in S.C.No.387 of 2005, the petitioner moved Crl.M.P.No.1859 of 2006 seeking delinking of the various charges towards enabling separate trials thereof by appropriate Courts. Such petition stands dismissed under orders dated 31.12.2009 giving rise to the present revision. 4. Heard Mr.N.R.Elango, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Shanmugavelayutham, learned Public Prosecutor. 5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner would take this Court through Sections 218, 219, 220, 221 and 223 Cr.P.C. towards informing that none of the said provisions stand attracted and therefore, the various offences alleged separately would have to be tried. Learned senior counsel also referred to section 177 Cr.P.C. which provides for trial of cases before Courts within whose jurisdiction offence was commited. While Section 218 Cr.P.C provides for separate charge for distinct offence, 219 Cr.P.C provides that three offences of the same kind within a year may be charged together. 6. It is submitted that the Mahila Court had no jurisdiction in respect of offences covered under items 7, 11, 12 and 13 and excepting offences covered under items 2, 3, 6 and 8 all others were offences triable by a Judicial Magistrate. 6. It is submitted that the Mahila Court had no jurisdiction in respect of offences covered under items 7, 11, 12 and 13 and excepting offences covered under items 2, 3, 6 and 8 all others were offences triable by a Judicial Magistrate. In respect of offences falling under items 1, 4, 14, 16, 21, 22 and 23, it is submitted that the same related to offences wherein women were not victims and therefore, the Special Court dealing with women's cases could not try the same. The further submissions are to the effect that no charge under Sections 34 IPC – common intention, 149 IPC – common object, 120–B IPC – criminal conspiracy had been made, though the accused were seven in number. Though some of the offences were alleged to have taken place in states other than Tamil Nadu, a common charge sheet stands filed. It is the submission of learned senior counsel that on a case tried by a Judicial Magistrate, the accused would have a right of appeal before the Sessions Judge. By putting up cases triable by Judicial Magistrate before the Sessions Judge, such opportunity was being denied to the accused. It further is submitted that extreme prejudice against the accused would be occasioned in the mind of the trial Judge by wrongful mulcting of several charges in one and the same case. Informing that the first nine pages of the order of the trial Court were merely extracts of the petition and counter and that up to page No.15 only the legal provisions relied upon had been cited, it is submitted that the following was the only reasoning accorded by the trial Court: "In the instant case, series of acts are alleged to have been committed by the accused as to form same transaction by keeping L.W.1, L.W.2, L.W.3 and L.W.4 in his vicious grip and custody and thereby joint trial as contemplated u/s.220 Cr.P.C. is held proper. Further no prejudice will be caused to the accused if all these offences are tried together in joint trial. If the accused is tried separately for 23 distinct offences in separate courts, it will lead to multiplicity of proceedings and waste of court's precious time and public money besides causing embarrassment and harassment to the victims. Further no prejudice will be caused to the accused if all these offences are tried together in joint trial. If the accused is tried separately for 23 distinct offences in separate courts, it will lead to multiplicity of proceedings and waste of court's precious time and public money besides causing embarrassment and harassment to the victims. Under the above circumstances, I do not find any merits in the petition and the petition deserves to be dismissed and the points are answered accordingly." The submission is that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind. Reliance was placed on the following decisions: 1. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao and another [ (1964) 3 SCR 297 ]; and 2. K.T.M.S.Mohd. and another v. Union of India [ (1992) 3 SCC 178 ]. 7. Learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submitted that the various offences alleged against the accused all form part of the same transaction. Initially, A1 caused LWs.1 to 4, all members of a family being the husband and wife and two daughters, were led to believe that A1 was the incarnation of Lord Perumal. Consequently, all four were called to serve in different manners on several dates and at several places. LWs.1 to 4 had fallen prey to A1's overbearing influence. He would submit that the underlying intent of the petitioner having been to cheat all the members of the family, unity of purpose and continuity of action as would attract application of Section 220 (1) Cr.P.C.,exists. 8. In reply, it is submitted by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that on the one hand it was the prosecution submission that list witnesses were under the petitioner's influence, while, on the other, it was submitted that they entertained belief. The statement of witnesses under section 161(3) Cr.P.C. supported neither contention. It could not be said that various offences all form part of the same transaction merely because LWs.1 to 4 belong to the same family. 9. Section 223 Cr.P.C. reads as follows: "223. What persons may be charged jointly. The statement of witnesses under section 161(3) Cr.P.C. supported neither contention. It could not be said that various offences all form part of the same transaction merely because LWs.1 to 4 belong to the same family. 9. Section 223 Cr.P.C. reads as follows: "223. What persons may be charged jointly. The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely,- a. persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction; b. persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence; c. persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of Section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months; d. persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction; e. persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion, cheating, or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first-named persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last-named offence; f. persons accused of offences under Sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence; g. persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) relating to counterfeit coin and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such offence; and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, applied to all such charges: Provided that where a number of persons are charged with separate offences and such persons do not fall within any of the categories specified in this section, the Magistrate or Court of Session may, if such persons by an application in writing, so desire, and if he or it is satisfied that such persons would not be prejudicially affected thereby, and it is expedient so to do, try all such persons together." 10. In the instant case, this Court would have to ascertain if Section 223(d) Cr.P.C. which permits framing of charges against and trial together of persons accused ofdifferent offences committed in the course of same transaction stands attracted, with particular emphasis on whether various offences alleged can be considered to have been committed in the course of the same transaction. 11.It would be relevant to extract the following in decision of Apex Court inState of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao and another [ (1964) 3 SCR 297 ]: "24. ... The object of enacting Section 239 (old Section 239, new Section 223) was to avoid multiplicity of trials and the only limitation which could properly be placed on the trial of several persons for the same kind of or different offences would be that which considerations of justice and fairness would require. 25. ... The question is whether for the purposes of Section 239(d) it is necessary to ascertain anything more than this that the different offences were committed in the course of the same transaction or whether it must further be ascertained whether the acts are intrinsically connected with one another. .... What is meant by "same transaction" is not defined anywhere in the Code. Indeed, it would always be difficult to define precisely what the expression means. Whether a transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case and it seems to us to be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that which the Legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have not come across a single decision of any Court which has embarked upon the difficult task of defining the expression. But it is generally thought that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. It is, however, not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if several acts committed by a person show a unity of purpose or design that would be a, strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction. 28. ... It is, however, not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if several acts committed by a person show a unity of purpose or design that would be a, strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction. 28. ... A large number of decisions of the different High Courts and one of the Privy Council have been considered in this case. No doubt, as has been rightly pointed out in this case, separate trial is the normal rule and joint trial is an exception. But while this principle is easy to appreciate and follow where one person alone is the accused and the interaction or intervention of the acts of more persons than one does not come in, it would where the same act is committed by several persons, be not only inconvenient but injudicious to try all the several parsons separately. This would lead to unnecessary multiplicity of trials involving avoidable inconvenience to the witnesses and avoidable expenditure of public time and money. No corresponding advantage can be gained by the accused persons by following the procedure of separate trials. Where, however, several offences are alleged to have been committed by several accused persons it may be more reasonable to follow the normal rule of separate trials. But here, again, if those offences are alleged not to be wholly unconnected but as forming part of the same transaction the only consideration that will justify separate trials would be the embarrassment or difficulty caused to the accused persons in defending themselves." 12. It would be useful to extract the discussion in the above case upon the judgment in State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Subbaiah, 1962 (1) SCR 194 which is to the effect that "where several persons had committed offences in the course of the same transaction, they could jointly be tried in respect of all those offences, under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the limitation placed by Section 234, of the Code could not come into operation. There, nine persons were jointly tried for an offense under Section 5 (1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 109 IPC read with Section 420, Section 466 and Section 467, IPC and all except one for offences under Section 420, 467/471 IPC. There, nine persons were jointly tried for an offense under Section 5 (1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 109 IPC read with Section 420, Section 466 and Section 467, IPC and all except one for offences under Section 420, 467/471 IPC. Some of them were also charged with separate offences under some of these provisions. Two of the accused persons preferred a revision application before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in which they challenged the charges framed against them. The High Court allowed the revision application. But on appeal by the State of Andhra Pradesh to this Court, this Court held that there was no misjoinder of charges, that the introduction of a large number of charges spread over a long period was a question of propriety and that it should be left to the Judge or the Magistrate trying the case to adopt the course which he thought to be appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case. Insofor as some of the charges were concerned this Court pointed out that the Special Judge who was to try the case should consider splitting them up so that the accused persons would not be prejudiced in answering the charges and defending themselves. It is true that the question of reading the various clauses cumulatively did not specifically arise for decision in that case but the High Court had held that the first charge was an omnibus charge containing as many as 203 offences and that it was in direct violation of Sections 234, 235 and 239 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure. Dealing with this matter this Court held at p. 200: "No doubt, sub-sections (1) of Section 234 provides that not more than three offenses of the same kind committed by an accused person within the space of 12 months can be tried at the same trial. But then Section 235(1) provides that if in any one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence. Therefore, where the alleged offences have been committed in the course of the same transaction the limitation placed by Section 234(1) cannot operate. Therefore, where the alleged offences have been committed in the course of the same transaction the limitation placed by Section 234(1) cannot operate. No doubt, the offence mentioned in Charge 1 is alleged to have been committed not by just one person but by all the accused and the question is whether all these persons can be jointly tried in respect of all these offences. To this kind of charge Section 239 would apply. This section provides that the following persons may be charged and tried together, namely (1) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction; (2) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment, or an attempt to commit such an offence; (3) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction. Clearly, therefore, all the accused persons could be tried together in respect of all the offences now comprised in charge I." This Court has thus clearly read the provisions of the various clauses cumulatively and we see no reason to read them differently." 13. Following the judgment in PurshottamdasDalmia v. State of West Bengal [ AIR 1961 SC 1589 ], the Allahabad High Court in ChhoteyMian v. State [1973 Cri LJ 908] held that the Court can hold an enquiry or trial in respect of offences committed outside its jurisdiction if the offences were committed in the course of the same transaction. 14.InC. N. Krishna Murthy v. Abdul Subhan [AIR 1965 Mys 126], it has been observed as follows: "The word 'transaction' is not intended to be interpreted in any artificial or technical sense; common sense and ordinary use of language must decide whether on the facts of a particular case, one is concerned with one transaction or several transactions. In order that a series of acts be regarded as the same transaction, they must be connected together in some way as for instance by proximity of time, unity of place, unity or community of purpose or design and continuity of action. Proximity of time and unity of place are not essential though they furnish good evidence of what unites several acts. Proximity of time and unity of place are not essential though they furnish good evidence of what unites several acts. The main test must really be continuity of action by which is meant the following up of some initial act through all its consequences and incidents until the series of acts or group of connected acts come to an end either by attainment of the object or by being put an end to or abandoned. If any of these things happens and the whole process is begun ever again it is not the same transaction but a new one in spite of the fact that the same general purpose may continue. The vinculum juris which interlinks a series of acts so intimately as to form the same transaction is different in each case. It may be proximity of time and place, or continuity of action, or community of purpose and design, or relation of cause and effect, or that of principal and subsidiary". Following the above judgment, in State of Karnataka v. M.Balakrishna [1980 Cri. LJ 1145], it has been observed as follows: "Therefore, it is clear, to constitute 'same transaction' the series of acts alleged against the accused must be connected together in some way as for instance by proximity of time, unity of place, unity or community of purpose or design and continuity of action and the main test must really be continuity of action by which is meant the following up of some initial act through all its consequences and incidents until the series of acts or group of connected acts come to an end. It is, therefore, necessary to find out whether the offences alleged against the accused could be stated to be one committed during the same transaction." In the said judgment, it was concluded as follows: "12. What emerges from the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court which were followed by the various High Courts, are that the offences which consist of series of acts connected together so as to form the same transaction and more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may not only be charged and tried at one trial, but also be tried at any one of the places where such offence is committed by him. In other words, the main ingredients necessary for a trial of such a person at one of the places, are the series of acts which constitute an offence or offences must form the same transaction. The acts alleged against the accused must be connected in some way which spells out a continuity of action followed by its consequences and incidents until the series of acts or group of connected acts come to an end either by attainment of the object or by being put an end to or abandoned." 15. It has been explained in decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ (1955) 2 SCR 1140 ] that "the Code is a Code of Procedure and, like all procedural laws, is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities. The object of the Code is to ensure that an accused person gets a full and fair trial along certain well-established and well-understood lines that accord with our notions of natural justice. 16. With the aid of the guidelines above extracted, this Court may safely state that it would be reasonable to presume that the various offences alleged by the prosecution all form part of the same transaction. This Court carelessly is not using the word 'presume'. Only on conclusion of trial, whether or not the various offences do form part of the same transaction clearly can emerge, the same being a question of fact. For the present all that would be necessary for the trial Court to proceed would be to arrive at prima facie satisfaction that the various offences do form part of the same transaction. For this, this Court finds sufficient material. A cogent reading of 161(3) Cr.P.C statements of LWs.1 to 4 clearly reflects the position that being led to believe that the petitioner/A1 was the incarnation of Lord Perumal, they fell prey to him and became putty in his hands. The petitioner's abuses extended to occupation of the house of LW-1, deprivation of LW-1 of his properties, of physical abuse of LWs.1 to 4, of rape and outraging of modesty of LWs.2 and 3 and of acts of criminal intimidation, threat and coercion. The petitioner's abuses extended to occupation of the house of LW-1, deprivation of LW-1 of his properties, of physical abuse of LWs.1 to 4, of rape and outraging of modesty of LWs.2 and 3 and of acts of criminal intimidation, threat and coercion. As rightly submitted by learned Public Prosecutor all the offences do appear to have been committed under the cloak of the overbearing influence of the petitioner on LWs.1 to 4. The reasoning of the Court below, though brief, is correct. 17. As regards the contention of learned senior for the petitioner on Section 177 Cr.P.C. dealing with ordinary place of enquiry or trial, it may be stated that in decision of the Apex Court inPurshottamdasDalmia v. State of West Bengal AIR 1961 SC 1589 , it has been informed that provisions under Section 177 Cr.P.C. are not peremptory and there is no reason why provisions of Sections 233 to 239 (old code) may also not provide exceptions thereto, if they do permit a trial of a particular offence along with others in one Court. The concluding portion of Section 184 Cr.P.C. which informs that in cases where 223 Cr.P.C. applies, offences may be enquired into or tried by any Court competent to try any of the offences, answers the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner regards denial of an opportunity of appeal in respect of offences triable by Magistrates. As regards his contention that the final report does not reflect the attraction of Sections 109, 149 and 120-B IPC, it is only to be mentioned that there is no bar to the trial Court including the same if considered appropriate and in the course of framing charges. 18. For the aforesaid reason, this Criminal Revision stands dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.