Judgment :- 1. Petitioner is the daughter of late B.M. Appa Reddy, who was the owner of Sy.No.15/1 of Beniganahalli village to an extent of 6 acres 28 guntas. The said land was sought to be acquired for extension of NGEF Factory. For the said purpose, preliminary notification was issued on 6.6.1964 under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and final notification was issued on 30.1.1965 under section 6(1) of the said Act. The Award came to be passed on 21.12.1966. According to the respondents, the award amount came to be deposited in the Civil Court on 9.7.1986 i.e. after 20 years from the date of passing of the Award. However the petitioner’s case is that the award amount is not deposited at all even till today. Though the notification under Section-16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act relating to taking of possession was issued on 11.2.1983, the possession was not taken till 19.4.1990, on which date the actual/physical possession of the land was taken under the Mahazar Annexure-D. The petitioner and her father alongwith all the family members were living over the land in question and were cultivating the said land till 19.4.1990. They have also constructed their houses. However the property which was acquired for the purpose of extension of NGEF factory was not utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired inasmuch as the NGEF factory became sick by the time the possession was taken. The petitioner made applications/representations repeatedly for restoration of land in her favour. 2. M/s NGEF Limited is a State Government Company inasmuch as more than 90% shares are held by the Government of Karnataka. The net worth of the company eroded and the company approached Board for Industrial Financial Reconstruction (‘BIFR’ for short) under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (‘SICA’ for short) for revival of the company during the year 1993-94. But the BIFR referred the matter to Company Court for winding up of Company, having felt that the company cannot be revived. The Company Court after considering the material on record in Company Petition No.154/2002 ordered for winding up of NGEF Limited on 3.8.2004. The possession of the assets of NGEF was taken over by the Official Liquidator in association with secured creditors of the company from 27.9.2004 to 12.10.2004. The Company Court after considering the material on record in Company Petition No.154/2002 ordered for winding up of NGEF Limited on 3.8.2004. The possession of the assets of NGEF was taken over by the Official Liquidator in association with secured creditors of the company from 27.9.2004 to 12.10.2004. The Official Liquidator filed a report in OLR 614/2004 regarding valuation of assets such as land, building, plant and machinery. The total land held by NGEF was measuring about 173 acres 7 guntas. The assets included the aforementioned extent of land including the land in question, buildings, plant & machinery. All the assets of the company were valued by TECSOK (a Government of Karnataka undertaking) and valuation report was submitted to the Company Court on 19.9.2005. A permission was granted by Company Court on 28.10.2005 in OLR No.678/2005 to sell the assets belonging to the company in liquidation. The advertisement was published on 3.11.2005 for selling the assets. The assets put for sale in terms of the advertisement included the land in question i.e. land bearing Sy.No.15/1 of Binnamangala village. Though the sale took place, confirmation of sale was not made, since the Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited (‘BMRCL’ for short), Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (‘KSRTC’ for short) etc., and State Government filed applications on 28.11.2005 seeking stay of the sale notice and proceedings. The highest bid was by M/s Prestige Garden Estates Private Limited (‘M/s Prestige Garden’ for short). Ultimately, the Company Court rejected the sale of the assets by an order dated 22.12.2005 passed in C.A.Nos.1052 & 1053/2005. The highest bidder i.e. M/s Prestige Garden preferred appeal before the Division Bench against the order passed by the Company Court by filing OSA 53-55/2007. The Division Bench of this Court disposed of OSA No.53-55/2007 on 30.3.2007 confirming the order passed by the Company Court. M/s Prestige Garden took the matter to the Apex Court in SLP Nos.15617-15619/2007 questioning the order passed by the Company Court as well as the Division Bench. The SLPs were disposed of on 25.9.2008 and the fresh sale of the assets was ordered. However, the matter is pending as no sale is made till this date. In the meanwhile, certain portions of the NGEF property i.e. land to an extent of about 53 acres is acquired for the purpose of BMRCL and KSRTC by Government of Karnataka as per the notification dated 18.7.2008. However, the matter is pending as no sale is made till this date. In the meanwhile, certain portions of the NGEF property i.e. land to an extent of about 53 acres is acquired for the purpose of BMRCL and KSRTC by Government of Karnataka as per the notification dated 18.7.2008. Notification under Section-4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act proposing to acquire about 53 acres of land is issued including the land in question i.e. land in Sy.No.15/1. The final notification under Section-6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued for acquiring the property in question on 19.9.2008. The award notification is not issued as on this date with regard to acquisition made pursuant to the final notification dated 19.9.2008. However part of the compensation amount is said to have been deposited before the Court vide cheque No.681193 dated 12.7.2010 in respect of acquisition of the year 2008. 3. As aforementioned, the petitioner and her father had made representations to the State Government for restoration of possession of the land, immediately after the possession has been taken. However no action relating to restoration of possession was taken by the State Government, inasmuch as the matter was pending before the Company Court relating to the liquidation of the NGEF company. The petitioner filed W.P. No.49214/2003 before this Court praying for a direction to consider the representation for returning the property in his favour. The said writ petition came to be disposed of on 18.11.2003 as per the order Annexure-F directing the State Government to consider the representations filed by the father of the petitioner and the petitioner dated 10.10.2000 and 13.10.2003 expeditiously. Once again the representations of the petitioner and her father were considered and the same came to be rejected on 18.9.2006 as per the Endorsement Annexure-H on the ground that the State Government wants to revive the NGEF factory. However the revival did not take place and on the other hand as aforementioned the company went into liquidation and the properties were sold in auction and the auction was set aside by Company Court later as aforementioned. In the said circumstances, one more representation as per Annexure-J was filed by the petitioner on 12.11.2009 praying for return of the property in question in her favour as the said property is the only property which remained with her. But no action is taken on the said representation till this date. In the said circumstances, one more representation as per Annexure-J was filed by the petitioner on 12.11.2009 praying for return of the property in question in her favour as the said property is the only property which remained with her. But no action is taken on the said representation till this date. Hence this writ petition is filed by the petitioner praying for the following reliefs: (a) Issue writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to treat the petitioner as the owner for 6 Acres 28 Guntas of land in Sy.No.15/1 of Beniganahalli Village, Bangalore East taluk; (b) It is just and expedient that this Hon’ble Court may further direct by way of Mandamus to the Respondents to pass an Award in the name of the petitioner for 6 Acres 28 Guntas of land in Sy.No.15/1 of Beniganahalli village, Bangalore East taluk to pay the compensation to the petitioner. (c) It is further just and expedient if the award is already passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, for the 6 Acres 28 Guntas of land in Sy.No.15/1 of Beniganahalli village, Bangalore East Taluk, which amount should be ordered to be deposited in the Civil Court, until the dispute is settled. 4. It is relevant to note at this stage that the NGEF did not have any objection for returning the property in favour of the petitioner as is revealed from the document at Annexure-L dated 23.10.2003. The then Chairman of the NGEF has informed the petitioner that the land in question is lying vacant since the date of taking possession and has not been utilized by the company for the purpose for which it was acquired and that if the Government of Karnataka considers the request of the petitioner to return the above land, the NGEF has no objection from their side for the same. From the above, it is clear that the land was not utilized by the NGEF though acquired for extension of NGEF factory and the land has remained vacant till this date. 5. Basedon the aforementioned facts, Sri Gangi Reddy, learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the land should revert back to the petitioner inasmuch as the same is not utilized by anybody muchless by NGEF for extension of the factory. 5. Basedon the aforementioned facts, Sri Gangi Reddy, learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the land should revert back to the petitioner inasmuch as the same is not utilized by anybody muchless by NGEF for extension of the factory. Admittedly the factory itself was under loss in view of the fact that net worth of the company eroded in the year 1993 itself i.e. during the period of taking possession of the property from the petitioner; the company itself had approached BIFR under SICA for revival of the company during the year 1993-94, but the BIFR did not find that the factory was fit to be revived; the BIFR having found that the NGEF factory should be wound up referred the matter to Company Court for winding up of the company; since the property is not utilized for the purpose for which it is acquired, the same should revert back to the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner is not paid the compensation. He further submits that the petitioner’s family has lost more than 100 acres under the different acquisitions and the only property remained with the petitioner is the property in question and that the petitioner and her family members are completely depending on the said property. It is further submitted that the Official Liquidator was permitted to sell the property to the third parties by auction and NGEF/State Government want to make profits out of the petitioner’s property by doing real estate business. He has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/S ROYAL ORCHID HOTELS LIMITED –vs- G. JAYARAMA REDDY reported in 2011 AIR SCW 6081 in support of the aforementioned contentions. Per contra, it is argued on behalf of Respondent No.5 i.e. Official Liquidator of the NGEF company that the possession is already taken by issuing notification under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act in the year 1983 itself and therefore it is not open for the petitioner to contend that he is entitled to get back possession of the property. Since the NGEF is the owner of the property in question after the acquisition of the property for the purpose of NGEF, the petitioner cannot claim ownership over the said property and consequently cannot even claim compensation in respect of the property acquired for the purpose of BMRCL, in the year 2008. Since the NGEF is the owner of the property in question after the acquisition of the property for the purpose of NGEF, the petitioner cannot claim ownership over the said property and consequently cannot even claim compensation in respect of the property acquired for the purpose of BMRCL, in the year 2008. Learned Government Advocate also concurs with the arguments of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 5th respondent. The original records are produced before the Court by the State Government on the direction of the Court. Perused the records and heard the arguments fully on both sides. 6. Though the final notification was issued on 30.1.1965, the actual/physical possession of the land is taken from the petitioner only on 19.4.1990 i.e. after the lapse of about 25 years. Mahazar Annexure-D dated 19.4.1990 relates to taking possession of the property by the NGEF. So, it is undisputed that the petitioner continued over the property in question alongwith her family members till 19.4.1990, on which date the physical possess is taken. But, by then the NGEF had become sick and consequently the property which was acquired and which was taken possession of for the purpose of extension of NGEF factory was not utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired even till this date. The sick industry approached the BIFR under SICA for revival of the company in the year 1993-94. At that point of time, the net worth of the company had eroded. However BIFR having satisfied that the NGEF cannot be revived, referred the matter to Company Court for winding up of the company itself. This Court in Company Petition No.154/2002 ordered for winding up of the NGEF company on 3.8.2004 and consequently the company was wound up. Thereafter the Company Court permitted the Official Liquidator to sell the property of NGEF as per law. The property was sold by the Official Liquidator in auction. However the sale was not confirmed by this Court and consequently the sale of the assets of the NGEF factory including the property in question is not affirmed. The matter reached the Apex Court in SLP Nos.15617-15619/2007 and the Apex Court ordered for fresh sale by the Official Liquidator. However the matter is pending inasmuch as no sale is made till this date. The matter reached the Apex Court in SLP Nos.15617-15619/2007 and the Apex Court ordered for fresh sale by the Official Liquidator. However the matter is pending inasmuch as no sale is made till this date. In the meanwhile, about 53 acres including the property in question is acquired by the Land Acquisition Officer for public purpose i.e. for the purpose of BMRCL and KSRTC. Thus it is clear that all though the property in question remained unutilized by NGEF for its extension. The possession of the property remained with the petitioner till the year 1990. However the petitioner was forcibly dispossessed by drawing the mahazar dated 19.4.1990 and the possession was handed over to sick industry. As aforementioned, NGEF could not utilize the land inasmuch as it had become sick and ultimately wound up. This property is now being acquired for BMRCL in the year 2008. Had the land not been acquired by BMRCL, the petitioner would have been justified in asking the Court to return the property in her favour inasmuch as neither the compensation was paid to her nor the property was utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired. Since the property in question is acquired for the purpose of BMRCL in the year 2008 and as the said acquisition made is in the public interest and as the work of metro rail project is in fast progress, this Court refuses to order for return of the property in favour of the petitioner. 7. From the facts mentioned supra, it is clear that though the final acquisition notification was issued acquiring the petition property on 30.1.1965 and though the award came to be passed on 21.12.1966, the award amount was not deposited in the Civil Court thereafter. According to the petitioner’s counsel, the award amount is still not deposited as on this date. Whereas the Government Advocate based on the records maintained by the State Government submits that the award amount of Rs.2,78,084-85 was sent to the Prl. City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, Bangalore through cheque bearing No.B 401500 date 9.7.1986. In page No.158 of the records maintained by the State Government, a letter of Deputy Director of State Huzur Treasury, Bangalore dated 9.7.1986 addressed to the Prl. City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, Bangalore is found. City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, Bangalore through cheque bearing No.B 401500 date 9.7.1986. In page No.158 of the records maintained by the State Government, a letter of Deputy Director of State Huzur Treasury, Bangalore dated 9.7.1986 addressed to the Prl. City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, Bangalore is found. The said letter reveals that a revalidated cheque bearing No.B 401500 dated 9.7.1986 for Rs.2,78,084-85 was sent from the office of the Deputy Director, State Huzur Treasury, Bangalore to the Prl. City Civil Judge, Bangalore city, Bangalore. Since there were contradictory contentions on the question as to whether the award amount was deposited in the Civil Court or not, this Court directed the Registrar (Administration) of this Court to get the report from the Registrar of City Civil Court, Bangalore to find out as to whether the award amount actually was deposited in the City Civil Court or not. The report of the Registrar (Administration) of this Court coupled with the report of the Registrar of City Civil Court, Bangalore and the documents are received on 3.4.2012. The same reveal that amount under Cheque No.B 401500 dated 9.7.1986 has not been deposited in the City Civil Court. The report of Registrar (Administration) further states as under: “The xerox copy of Civil Register No.II discloses that the cheque for Rs.2,78,084-85 dated 7.1.1986 was received in the office of the City Civil Court and number of the said cheque was B 272114. Even the said cheque is not encashed by the City Civil Court and the amount is not taken to Civil Court Deposits account.” 8. Thus it is clear from the report of the Registrar (Administration) of this Court dated 3rd April 2012 that though the amount of Rs.2,78,084-85 was received by the office of the City Civil Court on 7.1.1986 through Cheque No.B 272114, the same was not encashed by the City Civil Court and consequently the amount was not taken in the Civil Court Deposits Account. The encashment might not have been made by the City Civil Court because of the expiry of the date of the cheque or for any other valid reason. The encashment might not have been made by the City Civil Court because of the expiry of the date of the cheque or for any other valid reason. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the amount awarded in respect of acquisition of land in question for extension of NGEF factory was and is not in deposit before the City Civil Court and consequently the same was and is not available for land owner to withdraw the compensation. Till this date, the compensation is not deposited in respect of acquisition of the property in question by the State Government for extension of NGEF factory. NGEF was under loss during relevant time. thus this Court concludes that though the award came to be passed on 21.12.1966, till this date, award amount is not deposited in the Civil Court and the land owner is not paid compensation. 9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioner is definitely entitled to compensation as on the date of acquisition in the year 2008 for the benefit of BMRCL. The petitioner has suffered without compensation right from the date of first preliminary notification i.e. 6.6.1964 till this date. Though more than 47 years have elapsed, the compensation is not deposited in the Civil Court as required in law in respect of the said acquisition and hence the petitioner is made to suffer without any compensation. Petitioner has lost her father and her father lost his life fighting the litigation itself. The records maintained by the State Government clearly reveal that the petitioner’s father had made 4 to 5 representations praying for4 disbursement of compensation. He has also made representation for return of the said land in his favour. Even though, he was in possession of the property after acquisition, his representation for de-notification was not considered in his favour. However the matter was dragged on. The action of the respondents in not paying compensation in respect of acquisition of 1966, to the petitioner or her father for more than 47 years is intolerable and cannot be pardoned. Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 mandates that the award shall be made by the Deputy Commissioner within a period of two years from the date of publication of the final declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 mandates that the award shall be made by the Deputy Commissioner within a period of two years from the date of publication of the final declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is also clarified in the very section that if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of land shall lapse. Making of award within two years presupposes that the compensation shall be paid to the landloser immediately after passing of the award. In the matter on hand, though the award was made as back as on 21.12.1966, till this date, the compensation is not deposited. Therefore it can be safely said that the award was nominally made on 21.12.1966, which was not intended to be practically acted upon. Such an award which does not result in actual payment of compensation within a reasonable period from the date of the award, is only an ‘inoperative award’. Therefore the award dated 21.12.1966 can only be termed as a “nominal award” or “make believe document” issued by the State Government. Such an award though was valid at the time of passing the same, becomes invalid or inoperative or futile or redundant or non existent, or infructuous with the passage of time, if no payment of compensation is made within reasonable period. The very fact that the petitioner is not paid compensation for more than 47 years itself shows that the passing of the award on 21.12.1966 was a futile exercise by the State Government and therefore the same cannot be recognised as a valid award. Similar view is taken under similar circumstances by this Court in W.P. No.38548-38550/2009 (LA-RES) disposed of on 11th April 2012, by observing thus: 3. xxx xxx Even assuming that there was any confusion with regard to apportionment or entitlement of compensation, it was open for the acquiring authority to deposit the compensation under Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act before the Court. The respondents have not show their bonafides in depositing the amount of compensation till this date though the final acquisition notification was passed as back as in the year 1969. It is no doubt true that the petitioners are entitled to interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. The provisions of Sections 11-A, 31 and 34 are to be read together the homogeneously. It is no doubt true that the petitioners are entitled to interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. The provisions of Sections 11-A, 31 and 34 are to be read together the homogeneously. If they are read homogeneously, one cane definitely come to the conclusion that the award not only is to be made within the prescribed period of two years, but the compensation to be deposited within the reasonable period thereafter. Section 31(1) of the Land Acquisition Act further makes it clear that on making the award under Section-11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him. From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the compensation shall be paid to the landloser or to be deposited (if payment is not possible due to one or more contingencies mentioned in Section-31), as early as possible after passing of the award, but definitely within the reasonable period. Merely because Section-34 specifies that interest should be paid by the State if the amount of compensation is not deposited within one year or so, State cannot ever postpone deposit of compensation for ever. Ultimately the money involved is the tax payers money. The landloser has to be compensated within the reasonable period, if not forthwith. He cannot be made to wait for such an unreasonable period of more than 40 years. The persons having one site or a small piece of land would be ruined in case if he is not compensated within the reasonable period. Had the compensation been deposited immediately after the final notification or after passing the award, the petitioners would have made arrangements to buy the sites in the alternative. Because of the lapse on the part of the respondents, the petitioners are suffering. Such an attitude of the respondents cannot be tolerated. From the facts it is clear that the award made in the year 1970 was not intended to be acted upon and was only nominal. The award never operated, thus was only a inoperative award. It was a make believe document. Such a award which was valid at the time of passing the same, becomes invalid or inoperative or futile or non existent or infructuous award by passage of huge time, as compensation is not paid. The award never operated, thus was only a inoperative award. It was a make believe document. Such a award which was valid at the time of passing the same, becomes invalid or inoperative or futile or non existent or infructuous award by passage of huge time, as compensation is not paid. As the award of 1970 was never acted upon and no compensation is paid till today, virtually there is no award in the eye of law, in the matter. Hence, in law, the acquisition of the sites in question is bad and is liable to be quashed. But as the possession of the property was taken about 44 years prior to this day, in my considered opinion the acquired sites of the petitioner cannot be ordered to be returned to them. Therefore under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice would be met if the respondents are liable to pay heavy costs to each of the petitioners; or the petitioners shall be paid compensation treating the date of preliminary notification as 22.12.2009 (i.e. date of filing this writ petition) or the respondents will be directed to allot a site measuring 40 feet x 60 feet in any lay-out of Mysore subject to payment of sital value fixed by the MUDA. 10. In the case of SUBRAMANIAN ASARI –vs- THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL REPRESENTED BY THE COLLECTOR OF TINNEVELLY reported in Madras Law Journal Reports, Pat XX, Volume XVII page 557, the Division Bench of Madras High Court has concluded that where compensation money paid to an owner under the Land Acquisition Act is taken back from him by the Government, the land not being really required for public purposes, the title to the land reverts to the owner. In the said matter, the compensation paid earlier to the land owner who had lost his land in the acquisition, was taken back subsequently from him by the Government. In addition to the same, the land was not really required for the public purposes. Under such circumstances, the Division Bench of Madras High Court has held that the title to the land would revert to the land owner. 11. In the matter on hand also, the compensation is not paid in favour of the land owner under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Under such circumstances, the Division Bench of Madras High Court has held that the title to the land would revert to the land owner. 11. In the matter on hand also, the compensation is not paid in favour of the land owner under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The land is also not really required for the public purposes inasmuch as the public purpose for which the land was acquired i.e. for extension of NGEF factory was not fulfilled in view of the fact that NGEF factory was wound up by Company Court and the land acquired remained unutilized till the same is re-acquired for the execution of metro rail project. Thus the lands should have reverted back to the land owner in the normal circumstances, prior to acquisition for BMRCL. 12. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court could have directed the respondents to return the property in favour of the petitioner had it not been acquired for the purpose of BMRCL. Admittedly, NGEF has been trying to sell all its properties including the property in question to the third parties since the year 2005, which means it is indulging in real estate business by taking advantage of the petitioner’s helpless condition. Such an event cannot be permitted to happen under any circumstance to the disadvantage of the petitioner-land owner. 10. In the light of the facts and circumstances as aforementioned, normally the land should revert back to the erstwhile land owner i.e. the petitioner. In this context, it is relevant to note the observations of the Apex Court in the case of M/S ROYAL ORCHID HOTELS LIMITED –vs-G. JAYARAMA REDDY reported in 2011 AIR SCW 6081, which read thus: “The pleadings and documents filed by the parties in these cases clearly show that the Corporation had made a false projection to the State Government that land was needed for execution of tourism related projects. In the meeting of officers held on 13.1.1987 i.e. after almost four years of the issue of declaration under Section 6, the Managing Director of the Corporation candidly admitted that the Corporation did not have the requisite finances to pay for the acquisition of land and that Dayanada Pai, who had already entered into agreements with some of the land owners for purchase of land, was prepared to provide funds subject to certain conditions including transfer of 12 acres 34 guntas land to him for house building project. After 8 months, the Corporation passed resolution for transfer of over 12 acres of land to Dayanada Pai. The corporation also transferred two other parcels of land in favour of Bangalore International Centre and M/s Universal Resort Limited. These transactions reveal the true design of the officers of the Corporation, who first succeeded in persuading the State Government to acquire huge chunk of land for a public purpose and then transferred major portion of the acquired land to private individual and corporate entities by citing poor financial health of the Corporation as the cause for doing so. The Courts have repeatedly held that in exercise of its power of eminent domain, the State can compulsorily acquire land of the private persons but this proposition cannot be over-stretched to legitimize a patently illegal and fraudulent exercise undertaken for depriving the landowners of their constitutional right to property with a view to favour private persons. It needs no emphasis that if land is to be acquired for a company, the State Government and the company is bound to comply with the mandate of the provisions contained in Part VII of the Act. Therefore, the Corporation did not have the jurisdiction to transfer the land acquired for a public purpose to the companies and thereby allow them to bypass the provisions of Part VII. The diversification of the purpose for which land was acquired under Section 4(1) read with Section 6 clearly amounted to a fraud on the power of eminent domain. Therefore, the Corporation did not have the jurisdiction to transfer the land acquired for a public purpose to the companies and thereby allow them to bypass the provisions of Part VII. The diversification of the purpose for which land was acquired under Section 4(1) read with Section 6 clearly amounted to a fraud on the power of eminent domain. This is precisely what the High Court has held in the judgment under appeal and we do not find any valid ground to interfere with the same moreso because in Annaiah and others .vs. State of Karnataka and others (supra), the High Court had quashed the notification issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 in their entirety and that judgment has become final.” (emphasis supplied) 11. In the matter on hand also, the facts are almost similar to the circumstances found in the Judgment of the Apex Court. The NGEF did not have funds to pay compensation at the time of taking possession of the property from the petitioner in the year 1990. NGEF itself was under huge loss inasmuch as the networth of the company had eroded. The NGEF company itself had approached BIFR under SICA for revival, but ultimately the company was ordered to be wound up. In addition to the above, the Chairman of the NGEF Limited himself has intimated the petitioner in his letter Annexure-L dated 23.10.2003 that he has no objection from his end for return of the property in favour of the petitioner inasmuch as the property in question is lying vacant till this date and is not utilized by the company for the purpose for which it was acquired. In the very letter Annexure-L, it is mentioned that 33 guntas of the land is sold to the Government of Karnataka for formation of Judges Colony. However the Judges Colony is not formed. But the fact remains that the entire area of 6 acres 28 guntas has remained un-utilised by NGEF till this date. In view of the above, in the normal course the Court would have directed the respondents to return the property in favour of the petitioners inasmuch as diversification of the purpose for which land was acquired under the acquisition notification clearly amounted to fraud on the power of eminent domain. 12. In view of the above, in the normal course the Court would have directed the respondents to return the property in favour of the petitioners inasmuch as diversification of the purpose for which land was acquired under the acquisition notification clearly amounted to fraud on the power of eminent domain. 12. Since the property is acquired for the purpose of BMRCL in the year 2008 for establishing metro rail project, this court will not direct the respondents to return the land. However, the petitioner is entitled to compensation from BMRCL inasmuch as she has not paid compensation till this date. This Court has already concluded that the award dated 21.12.1966 has rendered itself nugatory inasmuch as the same is not acted upon till this date. At this stage, it is relevant to note the provisions of Sections-31 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. “31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court:- (1) On making an award under Section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section. (2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted: Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount: Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under section 18: Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. (3) xxx xxx (4) xxx xxx 34. (3) xxx xxx (4) xxx xxx 34. Payment of interest: - When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited: Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry. 13. A bare perusal of Section-31 makes it clear that the acquiring authority, on making an award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act shall tender payment of the compensation awarded to the landloser entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Section-31. If any of the landlosers do not consent to receive compensation, the Deputy Commissioner shall deposit the amount of compensation in the Court to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted. In the matter on hand, the Deputy Commissioner has not tendered payment of the compensation to the petitioner’s father or to the petitioner immediately after making the award. There was no dispute with regard to title of the land. Consequently there was or is no dispute with regard to persons entitled to receive the compensation. Thus there was no hurdle for the Deputy Commissioner to tender payment of compensation immediately after making the award. Even assuming that there was protest by the landloser (petitioner’s father) for receiving the compensation or if the landloser had refused to receive the compensation, the Deputy Commissioner should have deposited the amount of compensation in the Court as per Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. No such exercise is made by the acquiring authority. Even assuming that there was protest by the landloser (petitioner’s father) for receiving the compensation or if the landloser had refused to receive the compensation, the Deputy Commissioner should have deposited the amount of compensation in the Court as per Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. No such exercise is made by the acquiring authority. Firstly the records maintained by the State Government clearly reveal that the landloser tried to convince the authorities by filing representations for deletion of land from acquisition; secondly the records reveal that the State Government has repeatedly directed the beneficiary under the acquisition i.e. NGEF to deposit the amount of compensation. In spite of the same, NGEF has not chosen to pay or deposit the amount of compensation. Finally the amount of compensation was sent to the Civil Court only on 9.7.1986 though the final notification was passed on 30.1.1965 and the award came to be passed on 21.12.1966, which means that the acquiring authority and the beneficiary under the acquisition tried to deposit the compensation after the long lapse of 20 years in the Court. However the cheque through which the compensation was intended to be deposited was not encashed by the Court obviously for the reason that the Court must have found that such cheque must have been time barred or for any other valid reasons. Subsequently also the NGEF as well as the State Government did not choose to deposit the amount in Court through valid cheque as per law. It is not open for the respondents, particularly having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case to contend that the interest as prescribed under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act can be levied on the acquiring authority. if Sections 11A, 31 and 34 are read homogeneously, it is crystal clear that the compensation should be deposited immediately after the award or in any case which the reasonable period from the date of passing the award. The question as to what is the reasonable period depends upon the facts of each case. The acquiring authority cannot take disadvantage of the provisions of Section-34 of the Land Acquisition Act by depositing the compensation after long lapse of time as per its whims and fancies. The question as to what is the reasonable period depends upon the facts of each case. The acquiring authority cannot take disadvantage of the provisions of Section-34 of the Land Acquisition Act by depositing the compensation after long lapse of time as per its whims and fancies. The acquiring authority cannot wash off its hands after passing the award under Section-11 of the Land Acquisition Act without depositing the compensation as per the award within at least a reasonable period. In the matter on hand, the compensation is not deposited till this date event hough award came to be passed in the year 1966. Already about 45 years have lapsed after passing of the award. Such an unreasonable period taken by the acquiring authority/beneficiary to deposit the compensation in the Court cannot certainly be termed as reasonable period. It is well settled that the acquisition process will be completed only after payment of compensation. In the case of BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS –vs- R. HANUMAIAH AND OTHERS reported in (2005) 12 SCC 508, the Apex Court has observed thus: 47. The High Court also erred in hold that land acquisition process and the vesting process became incomplete since the landowners were asked to redeposit the amount of compensation. The High Court failed to take notice of Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 31 contemplates that on making of an award under Section 11 the Collector shall tender amount of compensation awarded by him to the person interested and entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay to them unless prevented by any one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the subsequent clauses. None of those contingencies arose in the present case. Thus, once the amount was tendered and paid the acquisition process was complete. After making the award under Section 11 the Collector can take possession of the land under Section 16 which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. In the instant case, after making the payment in terms of the award, possession was taken. The acquisition process stood completed. The subsequent development will not alter the fact that the acquisition was complete. In the instant case, after making the payment in terms of the award, possession was taken. The acquisition process stood completed. The subsequent development will not alter the fact that the acquisition was complete. (emphasis supplied) Hence under the aforementioned peculiar, extraordinary & exceptional facts and circumstances of the case, the only inevitable conclusion that can be reached is that the acquisition is deemed to have been lapsed or that the petitioner is deemed to have been continued as the owner of the property in question till at least the acquisition of the very property made by the State Government for the benefit of BMRCL in the year 2008. 14. Thus as aforementioned, the petitioner continued to be the land owner till the acquisition for the benefit of BMRCL. The land in question came to be acquired by the State Government for the purpose of BMRCL by issuing preliminary notification dated 18.7.2008 and final notification dated 19.9.2008. Award notification is not issued as on this date. But certain of the compensation is said to have been deposited before the Civil Court vide Cheque No.681193 dated 12.7.2010 in respect of acquisition of the year 2008. 15. In view of the above, the petitioner is entitled to compensation deposited and to be deposited by the BMRCL. If the petitioner is made to accept the compensation to be deposited by NGEF after lapse of more than 47 years, the same would result in travesty of justice. Petitioner has been fighting the litigation since long time to save the property or in the alternative to get compensation. Neither he was able to save his property nor able to get the compensation in time. under these circumstances, the award dated 21.12.1966 cannot be acted upon and therefore the same cannot be the basis of payment of compensation and consequently the petitioner is entitled to compensation to be deposited by the BMRCL/the State Government in respect of the acquisition made through the preliminary notification dated 18.7.2008 and the final notification dated 19.9.2008. Accordingly, the following order is made: (a) The property bearing Sy.No.15/1 measuring 6 acres 29 guntas situated at Beniganahalli village, Bangalore East taluk shall not revert back to the petitioner and the acquisition for BMRCL under the final notification dated 19.9.2008 stands. Accordingly, the following order is made: (a) The property bearing Sy.No.15/1 measuring 6 acres 29 guntas situated at Beniganahalli village, Bangalore East taluk shall not revert back to the petitioner and the acquisition for BMRCL under the final notification dated 19.9.2008 stands. (b) The Respondents 1 to 3 are directed to pass award in the name of the petitioner afresh in respect of the land in Sy.No.15/1 measuring 6 acres 28 guntas situated at Beniganahalli village, Bangalore East taluk and to pay compensation to her in respect of the acquisition of the said property made for the benefit of BMRCL through preliminary notification dated 18.7.2008 and the final notification dated 19.9.2008. Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.