Judgment :- 1. This appeal is focussed by the defendants in the suit as against the judgment and decree dated11.2.2002 passed by the 7th Additional City Civil Court, Chennai, in O.S.No.6397 of 1996, which was one for recovery of money. 2. A summation and summarization of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this appeal would run thus: (i) The respondent herein filed the suit C.S.No.599 of 1983, seeking the following reliefs: "To pass a decree and judgment a) Directing the defendants to pay a sum of Rs.3,85,401.28 (Rs. Three lakhs eighty five thousand four hundred and one and paise twenty eight only) which represents Rs.1,85,271.40 being the principal amount due towards refund of deposits and Rs.2,00,135.88 towards interest thereon. b) Directing the defendants to pay interest on the suit amount at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the plaint to that of the decree. c) Directing the defendants to pay interest on the decreetal amount at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the decree to the date of realization. d) Directing the defendants to bear the cost of the suit." (extracted as such) (ii) Tersely and briefly the case of the plaintiff as found exemplified in the plaint could be set out thus: (a) During the year 1974, the plaintiff deposited Rs.1,85,271.40 towards excise duty in connection with Import Permits No.92, 150, 188, 189, 190, 191, 623, 624 and 638 of 1974; however, the plaintiff did not utilize the import permits at all. Whereupon the permits were surrendered by the plaintiff and such surrender became effective also. Wherefore, the defendants, in the normal course, should have refunded the entire amount within a reasonable time. (b) During the year 1974 itself, after such surrender, when the plaintiff demanded back the amount, there was no response. Whereupon during the year 1975, the plaintiff issued reminders. (c) On 5.2.1976, the defendants made claims in respect of certain duties in connection with some other transaction and in that connection, the defendants arbitrarily, without adhering to the principles of natural justice, adjusted the said amount due payable to the plaintiff as aforesaid. Whereupon during the year 1975, the plaintiff issued reminders. (c) On 5.2.1976, the defendants made claims in respect of certain duties in connection with some other transaction and in that connection, the defendants arbitrarily, without adhering to the principles of natural justice, adjusted the said amount due payable to the plaintiff as aforesaid. (d) Whereupon the defendants issued notice for the remaining amount of Rs.23,253.93, after such adjustment, vide proceedings in Prsc No.L4-121878/75, under the Medicinal and Toilet preparations(Excise Duties) Act, 1955, even though, the aforesaid deposit which was made during the year 1974 was under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act 1937. Wherefore, such adjustment was illegal. (e) Whereupon the plaintiff filed the writ petition, in W.P.No.1047 of 1976, challenging such adjustment. The said writ petition was allowed vide order dated 8.2.1998, setting aside the order passed by the said authority; however, giving liberty to the authority concerned to cpmdict proceedings and pass orders after giving due opportunity of being heard to the plaintiff. (f) The High Court’s order in the writ petition was made available only on 19.5.1980, during vacation, wherefore, immediately the suit could not be filed, and the suit was filed on the reopening day. As such, the said amount which was adjusted improperly is liable to be returned with 12% interest per annum to the plaintiff and accordingly, the suit was filed. (iii) The gist and kernel of D3’s written statement, which was adopted by D1 and D2, would run thus: (a) The suit was barred by limitation, as according to the plaintiff, the amount was allegedly due payable in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant in the year 1974 itself, whereas, the suit was filed in the year 1980. (b) The averments in the plaint are all denied. As per the order in the writ petition, if ultimately order is passed, the amount of excise duty payable by the plaintiff would be much more than what was already adjusted by the authorities concerned. Accordingly, the defendants would pray for dismissal of the suit. (iv) Relevant issues were framed. During enquiry, one Mugundhan examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A4 were marked. On the defendants' side one Sundaresan examined himself as R.W.1 and no document was marked. 3. Accordingly, the defendants would pray for dismissal of the suit. (iv) Relevant issues were framed. During enquiry, one Mugundhan examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A4 were marked. On the defendants' side one Sundaresan examined himself as R.W.1 and no document was marked. 3. Ultimately, the Court below decreed the suit directing the defendants to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- with 6% interest from the date of decree till the date of deposit. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, this appeal is focused by the defendants on various grounds. 5. The learned Special Government Pleader for the appellants would put forth and set forth his arguments based on the grounds of appeal, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: (i) Even though the suit was barred by limitation, the lower Court simply on conjectures and surmises, without applying the provisions of the Limitation Act, held as though the suit was not barred by limitation. (ii) The evidence of D.W.1 was not considered in proper perspective. The documents have been marked on the plaintiff’s side without proper proof. There is no question of unjust enrichment on the part of the appellants herein/defendants. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants orally would put forth certain grounds to the effect that despite opportunities having been given to the plaintiff, he had not chosen to appear before the authorities concerned in obedience to the mandates as contained in the order of the High Court in the writ petition; further, the plaintiff without cooperating with the authorities concerned for getting quantified the actual amount payable by him under the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955, simply rushed to the Court for recovering the alleged dues payable to him by the Excise Department. 7. Per contra, in a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the appellants/defendants, the learned counsel for the respondent herein/plaintiff would pyramid his arguments, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (i) The grounds of appeal are as vague as vagueness could be. 7. Per contra, in a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the appellants/defendants, the learned counsel for the respondent herein/plaintiff would pyramid his arguments, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (i) The grounds of appeal are as vague as vagueness could be. In fact, some of the grounds as found set out in the grounds of appeal are totally irrelevant to the present appeal and in a stereo typed and perfunctory manner such grounds were dished out by the department and filed before this Court which are liable to be struck down as quite unsustainable. (ii) As orally put forth by the learned Special Government Pleader no notice was sent to the plaintiff in obedience to the order dated 8.2.1980 of this Court in the writ petition. Had really any notice been sent to the plaintiff, then the acknowledgments should have been filed before this Court, but that was not done so. (iii) The plaintiff before filing the suit was enjoined legally to get quashed the wrong adjustment order passed by the authority concerned and accordingly, without any loss of time the plaintiff filed the writ petition before this Court so as to get quashed the said adjustment order. (iv) The Court also, after considering the merit of the plaintiff’s case in the writ petition quashed the said order giving liberty to the authority concerned to proceed afresh and pass order after giving due opportunity of hearing to the plaintiff; whereas, the authorities kept quiet and allowed grass to grow under the feet and in such a case, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to keep quiet ad nauseam and ad infinitum and thereby lose their right to recover the amount. On getting the certified copy of the order during vacation period in the writ petition, the suit was filed after the expiry of the vacation period. Till date no order was passed by the authority concerned as directed by this Court in the order passed in the writ petition. In such a case, the lower Court was justified in ordering the authority concerned to refund the amount to which the plaintiffs were entitled. (v) Consequent upon the decree, an E.P. was filed, in which the Executing Court directed the defendants to deposit the amount and on such deposit, it was also withdrawn by the plaintiff. In such a case, the lower Court was justified in ordering the authority concerned to refund the amount to which the plaintiffs were entitled. (v) Consequent upon the decree, an E.P. was filed, in which the Executing Court directed the defendants to deposit the amount and on such deposit, it was also withdrawn by the plaintiff. Wherefore it has become a fait accompli and it is too late on the part of the defendants to pray for setting aside the reasoned judgment and decree of the lower Court. (vi) Even relating to the limitation point is concerned there is also one other view prevailing to the effect that the Government should not place reliance on the limitation point so as to nullify or falsify the claim of the citizen for refund of the money payable by the Government. In that connection he would also cite a few decisions. Accordingly the learned counsel for the respondent herein/plaintiff he would pray for the dismissal of the appeal. 8. The points for consideration are as under: (1) Whether the lower Court was not justified in deciding the limitation point in favour of the plaintiff taking into account the period covered by the writ proceedings and whether the Government could plead, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the limitation point as against the plaintiff? (2) Whether in response to the High Court’s order in the writ petition any proceedings were taken by the authority concerned, in which the plaintiff did not attend, despite receipt of notice? (3) Whether the lower Court was justified in ordering refund of the deposit made by the plaintiff with the defendants during the year 1974 with 6% interest from the date of the decree?. 9. The whole kit and caboodle of facts and figures as stood transpired from the records would be to the effect that admittedly and indubitably the plaintiff deposited a sum of Rs.1,85,271.40 towards excise duty in connection with the import permits with the Collector of Madras-D3 herein. It is also not in dispute that such permits were surrendered without being made use of. However, according to the Department under the control of D2-the Commissioner of prohibition and Excise, certain duties were payable by the plaintiff under the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955 and in fact Ex.A1-the proceeding dated 5.2.1976 was passed by the Collector of Madras-I/D3 herein. However, according to the Department under the control of D2-the Commissioner of prohibition and Excise, certain duties were payable by the plaintiff under the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955 and in fact Ex.A1-the proceeding dated 5.2.1976 was passed by the Collector of Madras-I/D3 herein. The said proceeding was challenged by the plaintiff by filing the writ petition in W.P.No.1047 of 1976 raising various pleas to the effect that D3 could not pass such order adjusting the amount due payable by D2 in favour of the plaintiff, which was under a different account. 10. This High Court, vide order dated 8.2.1980, in W.P.No.1047 of 1976 mandated thus: "Though various contentions have been urged by the company, having regard to the fact that the quantification of the sum of Rs.2,08,753.33 has been made without notice to the petitioner and without hearing it, it does not appear to be necessary to deal with all of them, as the impugned order has to be quashed on the short ground that it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is not in dispute that in this case prior to the quantification of the amount the company was not given any notice and its representations heard. As already stated, even before the impugned order was passed the company has been stating that it is not liable to pay excise duty on the toilet preparations made out of duty paid tinctures, that even if excise duty is payable it is entitled to claim a set off for the excess duty paid on the manufacture of tinctures, but without considering those objections the impugned order has been passed quantifying the amount due as excise duty on medicinal preparations made out of duty tinctures and adjusting the deposits made by the company for L-1 and L-2 licences got by it for the import of foreign liquor. Thus the company had no opportunity to make its representations as regards it liability to pay excise duty on the medicinal preparations and also on the question of set off claimed by it for the excise duty paid for the manufacture of tinctures which have gone for the production of medicinal preparations. Thus the company had no opportunity to make its representations as regards it liability to pay excise duty on the medicinal preparations and also on the question of set off claimed by it for the excise duty paid for the manufacture of tinctures which have gone for the production of medicinal preparations. Though the company specifically alleged in the affidavit in support of the writ petition that the impugned order is in violation of the principles of natural justice, the counter affidavit merely states that the excise duty payable by the company has been arrived at on the basis of the preparations made by the petitioner under these licences and if there is any discrepancy it is for the petitioner to place the relevant materials before the second respondent and prove its case. In a way the counter affidavit proceeds on the basis that it is open to the petitioner to place the relevant materials before the second respondent and prove that the quantification of excise duty has not been done on a proper basis. Since there is no dispute that the company had no opportunity to make its representations for the quantification of the amount of excise duty which is in violation of the principles of natural justice, the impugned order is set aside on that ground alone with a direction to the second respondent to quantify the excise duty payable by the company and to decide the question as to whether the company is entitled to claim set off under Section 4 of the Act for the amount of excise duty paid for the manufacture of tinctures. It must be noted that though the petitioner claimed in his letter dated 16.12.1975 that even if it is liable to pay excise duty on the medicinal preparations made out of tinctures it is entitled to the benefit of set off under Section 4 that plea had not been considered in the impugned order passed on 15.2.1976. Therefore, the second respondent is under a duty to consider that question as well when considering the question of the company's liability, after giving notice to the company and hearing its objections as directed above. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed with costs. Counsels fee Rs.100/-" 11. Therefore, the second respondent is under a duty to consider that question as well when considering the question of the company's liability, after giving notice to the company and hearing its objections as directed above. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed with costs. Counsels fee Rs.100/-" 11. A mere perusal of the said order would exemplify and demonstrate that this Court set aside the impugned order as contained in Ex.A1 on the ground that the principle of audi alteram partem was not adhered to and gave direction to the second respondent therein, namely, the Collector of Madras/D3 to quantify the excise duty payable by the plaintiff and also to decide the question whether the department concerned is entitled to claim set off under Section 4 of the Excise Duties for the manufacture of tinctures. 12. Even though orally the learned Special Government Pleader, for the first time before this Court would state that after the said order of this Court in the writ petition, several notices were sent to the plaintiff for participating in the enquiry and that the plaintiff did not appear, yet in the grounds of appeal there is no whisper about it and for that matter no documents have been filed so as to demonstrate and display that such notices were acknowledged by the plaintiff and despite that the plaintiff did not appear for enquiry. 13. Over and above that the perusal of the grounds of appeal to say the least are not relating to this case and it appears as though those grounds are relating to some other case and the Government may do well to see that such mistakes are creeping in. 14. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would convincingly argue that after this Court as per the order in the writ petition having set aside the order of adjustment, the plaintiff cannot wait ad infinitum; until the cows come home; until the Twelfth of never or till the dooms day the plaintiff cannot be made to wait and ultimately lose its right to recover the dues payable to it by the department concerned. Hence, in order to safe-guard its interest, the plaintiff filed the suit, in which decree also was passed by the Court. 15. Hence, in order to safe-guard its interest, the plaintiff filed the suit, in which decree also was passed by the Court. 15. I could see considerable force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, because the order as contained in Ex.A1 was an embargo for the plaintiff to seek recovery of the dues and that order was got set aside by instituting W.P.1047/1976 and ultimately the order in the said writ petition was passed on 8.2.1980 and the certified copy was obtained on 19.5.1980, which fact remains undisputed. In fact, the plaint was originally presented on the original side of this Court as per the then existed pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain suits on the original side. As such, it was presented on 7.6.1983, so to say, on the reopening date of the High Court, after vacation. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff the suit was filed within three years' limitation period from the date of having got quashed the impugned order of the Collector as contained in Ex.A1. 16. Those details relating to limitation furnished in paragraph No.7 of the plaint was not disputed specifically by the defendants. However, they would generally contend that the amount was deposited in the year 1974, but the suit was filed in the year 1983. Such evasive and vague denial would not amount to a valid plea of limitation for the reason that in paragraph No.7 of the plaint it has been specifically pleaded by the plaintiff as to how the suit was within three years' limitation period. Without getting erased the order of the Collector as contained in Ex.A1, the plaintiff would not have been in a position to file the suit for recovery of the amount and as such, appropriately and correctly the plaintiff, after getting set aside the impugned order as contained in Ex.A1, filed the suit within three years, which the lower Court correctly held to be within the limitation period. 17. Over and above that the learned counsel for the plaintiff also cited the following decisions of this Court: (i) AIR 2007 MAD 228 – DISTRICT COLLECTOR V. JOHN NADAR. (ii) The unreported judgment of this Court dated 26.3.2008 passed in C.M.A.No.690 of 2001 – THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER V. A.BOOMAN. 18. 17. Over and above that the learned counsel for the plaintiff also cited the following decisions of this Court: (i) AIR 2007 MAD 228 – DISTRICT COLLECTOR V. JOHN NADAR. (ii) The unreported judgment of this Court dated 26.3.2008 passed in C.M.A.No.690 of 2001 – THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER V. A.BOOMAN. 18. Those precedents are to the effect that the Government should not simply plead limitation as against the person seeking recovery of amount when there are dues payable by the Government. In fact in the decision dated 26.3.2008 in C.M.A.No.690 of 2001-THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER V. A.BOOMAN, two precedents of the Honorable Apex Court are found set out and certain excerpts from them would run thus: (i) (1996) 10 SUPREME COURT CASES 172 – S.R.BHANRALE V. UNION OFH INDIA, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "4. The amounts now paid to the appellant admittedly fell due to him much before his retirement. The same was wrongfully withheld. It was, to say the least, improper on the part of the Union of India to plead the bar of limitation against such claims of its employees, when it had defaulted in making the payments promptly when the same fell due. It is not as if the appellant had woken up after a decade to claim his dues. He had been asking the Department to pay him his dues both while in service and after superannuation also but to no avail. In these circumstances it ill behoved the Union of India to plead bar of limitation against the dues of the appellant. We need say no more about it because better sense has prevailed and claim of the appellant has now been settled and payment made to him. The appellant who had served the Department for almost 40 years before his superannuation was made to run from pillar to post to get his legitimate dues. It is a sad commentary of affairs. He has undoubtedly suffered a lot. Had the amount which has now been found due and paid, been paid to him at the appropriate time at least in 1984 when he retired, the appellant would have been saved from a lot of unnecessary harassment; besides he would have earned interest on that amount also. He could have utilised that amount for other purposes. He was denied the same on account of the default of the Department. He could have utilised that amount for other purposes. He was denied the same on account of the default of the Department. The appellant in his reply to the statement of account filed by Shri Aryah in this Court has claimed almost 18 lakhs of rupees from the Department out of which more than Rs.16 lakhs has been claimed towards interest and compensation etc." (ii) An excerpt from the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1997 SC 1144 – Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International, would run thus: "2. The plea of limitation based on this Section is one which the Court always looks upon with disfavour and it is unfortunate that a public authority like the Port Trust should in all morality and justice take up such a plea to defeat a just claim of the citizen. It is high time that Governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. Of course, if a Government or a Public Authority takes up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well-founded, it has to be upheld by the Court, but what we feel is that such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up by a Government or a Public Authority, unless of course the claim is not well-founded and by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of resisting such a claim has become unavailable... & quot; The above observation of the Supreme Court decries the technical plea taken by the Insurance Company. We have already held that though the claim was repudiated by the Insurance Company on 23.09.85, the same was received only on 28.09.85 and the 12 months' period from the date of the said disclaimer ends on 28.9.86. The said day (28.9.86) being a Sunday, the plaintiff Bank is entitled to file a suit on 29.9.86 that is on the next working day as observed by the Supreme Court, it is unfortunate that the appellant Insurance Company having taken a policy cannot be permitted to take such a plea to defeat the just claim of the plaintiff. The said day (28.9.86) being a Sunday, the plaintiff Bank is entitled to file a suit on 29.9.86 that is on the next working day as observed by the Supreme Court, it is unfortunate that the appellant Insurance Company having taken a policy cannot be permitted to take such a plea to defeat the just claim of the plaintiff. The Insurance Companies, when citizens make claim based on their policies, must act fairly and such technical plea should not ordinarily be taken up unless the claim is not well-founded. We have already observed in the earlier part of our judgment immediately after the fire accident that is on 5.10.83, there were serious of correspondences and discussions for the settlement of claim in terms of the policy at the higher level and due to failure in settling the claim through negotiations, the plaintiff Bank has rightly filed the suit within the prescribed period; accordingly the objection by the Insurance Company on the ground of delay in filing the suit cannot be sustained. As a matter of fact except filing a written statement nothing has been brought before the Trial Court in the form of oral and documentary evidence in support of their defence. The learned Subordinate Judge, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence let in by the plaintiff Bank, has correctly granted the decree to the extent of Rs.19,18,792 with interest 12 per cent from 5.10.83 that is the date of occurrence till date of settlement. We do not find any error or infirmity in the impugned judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. On the other hand, we are in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge, since the same is based on acceptable and legal evidence." (emphasis supplied) 19. A mere running of the eye over those excerpts would clearly shed light that in matters of this nature when the plaintiff seeks recovery of dues payable by the Government, the latter by pleading limitation, cannot wriggle out of its liability on the sole ground of limitation. As such, I am of the view that no interference with the findings of the lower Court in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation, is required. Accordingly, the limitation point is answered in favour of the plaintiff. 20. As such, I am of the view that no interference with the findings of the lower Court in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation, is required. Accordingly, the limitation point is answered in favour of the plaintiff. 20. Point Nos.(ii) & (iii) Absolutely there is no iota or smidgeon of evidence to convey or establish that consequent upon the order passed by this Court in the writ petition, the authority concerned took proceedings and quantified the amount payable by the plaintiff and that too, after giving due opportunity of being heard to the plaintiff. Only orally the learned Special Government Pleader submitted that the authority took steps in response to the order passed by this Court in the writ petition, but absolutely there is no evidence in that regard. 21. Over and above that I would like to visualize a situation hypothetically; for example in a case where the assessee is not co-operating with the authority concerned, still the authority is not helpless, as he can, after issuing notice and obtaining acknowledgment, very well proceed further and decide the matter with the available materials and in that eventuality a case, at a later date the assessee cannot contend otherwise capitalizing his own fault. 22. In this case, if the plaintiff flouted the notices allegedly sent repeatedly by the authority, there is no knowing of the fact as to why the authority did not proceed further and pass suitable orders. Till date no order was passed in that regard in response to the High Court's order. As such, the plaintiff was justified in filing the suit and recovering the amounts due payable to it by the Government. Till date no order was passed in that regard in response to the High Court's order. As such, the plaintiff was justified in filing the suit and recovering the amounts due payable to it by the Government. The awarding of refund of the amount with 6% interest from the date of decree till the date of deposit is incommensurate with Section 34 of C.P.C. While holding so, in order to disambiguate the ambiguity if any, I would observe that the said suit was not for the purpose of preventing the defendants from quantifying the amount concerned payable by the plaintiff and the defendants are always at liberty to proceed further as per law as mandated by the High Court in the order passed in the writ petition and quantify the amount and in such an event, the authorities can very well proceed as against the plaintiff and recover the dues as per the order that would be passed as against the plaintiff. Scarcely could it be stated that the authorities are helpless. Accordingly, point Nos.(2) and (3) are decided. 23. Accordingly, the points are decided as under: Point No.(1) is decided to the effect that the lower Court was justified in deciding the limitation point in favour of the plaintiff. Point No.(2) is decided to the effect that in response to the High Court's order in the writ petition no proceedings were taken by the authorities concerned and there is nothing to show that notices were sent by such authorities to the plaintiff to attend such proceedings and there is nothing also to exemplify that despite receipt of notice from such authority the plaintiff did not attend the proceedings. Point No.(3) is decided to the effect that there is no reason to interfere with the lower Court's judgment in ordering refund of the deposit made by the plaintiff with 6% interest from the date of the decree till the date of deposit. 24. In the result, I could see no merit in the appeal and it is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.