Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary equitable jurisdiction of this Court with prayer for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari to quash the order of termination passed by the respondent. 2. The petitioner joined the Indian Bank and served in various places in various capacities. The petitioner, while functioning as Assistant General Manager, Madras and Zonal Manager, Madras, was issued a charge sheet No.1716:98:VG dated 18.3.1998, by the Vigilance Department of the Indian Bank, alleging acts of commission and omission. 3. An enquiry authority was appointed to look into the allegations as per the provisions of the Indian Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulation, 1985. The enquiry authority submitted a report dated 10.08.2000 to the respondent, exonerating the petitioner of all the charges. 4. The Chairperson & Managing Director disagreed with the findings of the enquiry authority and issued a show cause notice to the petitioner, as to why the charges be not held to be proved. 5. The petitioner filed a detailed reply to the show cause notice. On considering the reply submitted by petitioner, the respondent forwarded the enquiry authority's report, document produced with the findings of Managing Director-cum-Chairman on the charges to the Central Vigilance Commission for its opinion regarding imposition of maximum penalty of dismissal from service. 6. The Central Vigilance Commission accorded approval to dismiss the petitioner from service. The respondent no.1 thereafter forwarded copies of the Central Vigilance Commission's advice dated 18.12.2000 to the petitioner for filing reply, if any. 7. Thereafter, the petitioner was dismissed from service vide the impugned order, which is under challenge. 8. It is submitted by petitioner, that the impugned order has been passed by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, therefore, the remedy of appeal was not available to the petitioner. 9. The order of dismissal is challenged by petitioner on the following grounds THAT; i. the charge sheet issued to petitioner was in violation of the Indian Bank Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976, as no definite and distinct charges in terms of regulation No.6 was framed. The charges framed against the petitioner read as under:- 1) You as AGM (DC) had permitted Prabhadevi Branch to allow TOD of Rs.2.28 crores on 2.8.1991 and Rs.2.50 crores on 19.8.1991 without obtaining any formal sanction from the sanctioning authority. The charges framed against the petitioner read as under:- 1) You as AGM (DC) had permitted Prabhadevi Branch to allow TOD of Rs.2.28 crores on 2.8.1991 and Rs.2.50 crores on 19.8.1991 without obtaining any formal sanction from the sanctioning authority. 2) You had permitted/confirmed the branch to allow excess over the sanctioned limits inspite of Board directions that the exposure to the company should not be increased further. 3) The Board in their meeting dated 13.2.1995 had directed to contain the exposure and for recovery of dues. But the officer had been permitting/confirming the excesses wherever allowed by the branch, inspite of the directions of the Board. 4) You had permitted/confirmed the branch to issue guarantees in excess of the sanctioned limits and to open LCs when there is no limit sanctioned for such Lcs. 5) You had issued a comfort letter dated 14.8.1993 to M/s.Prasad Properties & Investments P.Ltd. for a sum of Rs.4,42,92,000/-on behalf of M/s.East West Travel & Trade Links Ltd. without obtaining permission from the sanctioning authority." The submission of petitioner is that charge nos.2 and 3 were vague and not specific. ii) the copies of statement and document relied in support of imputations of misconduct, were not furnished to the petitioner in violation of regulation 6 of the Service Regulation. iii) the enquiry authority had rightly not relied upon the documents, not relied upon while framing charge memo, but the competent authority wrongly placed reliance on the documents to impose maximum punishment of dismissal. iv) vide order dated 28.07.2000, the petitioner was reverted to the position of Assistant General Manager, though the order is under challenge in W.P.No.13423 of 2000, but on the date, on which the enquiry authority submitted the report, the disciplinary authority in the case of petitioner, was the Executive Director and not respondent no.1, therefore, the impugned order is without jurisdiction. v) before passing of the order of dismissal from service, the petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 31.12.2000 and retired from service, therefore, he could not be dismissed, in absence of extension of service. The impugned order therefore is without jurisdiction, thus, void. vi) the petitioner is not aware of the report filed by the Central Vigilance Commission, but on the basis of order of CVC dated 18.12.2000, it is clear that the regulations were not correctly followed. The impugned order therefore is without jurisdiction, thus, void. vi) the petitioner is not aware of the report filed by the Central Vigilance Commission, but on the basis of order of CVC dated 18.12.2000, it is clear that the regulations were not correctly followed. vii) the sanction accorded by the Central Vigilance Commission is perverse, as it gives no reason for accepting the advice of the respondent for approving imposition of major penalty of dismissal. viii) non supply of copy of report, submitted by CVC amounts to violations of principle of natural justice, therefore, the impugned order cannot sustained. ix) the ground that the charge of temporary overdraft extended on 02.08.1991 and 19.08.1991, was confirmed by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, therefore, could not be the basis to hold the petitioner guilty of misconduct. x) the charge nos.2 & 3 are challenged by petitioner on the ground that charges were vague and not specific. Furthermore, the petitioner had only accorded approval for the excess committed at the branch level, so was done by the General Manager. xi) there is no documentary evidence to show the personal involvement of petitioner, showing his personal interest. xii) as regards charge nos.4 is concerned, it is the stand of petitioner, that excess by way of guarantees and letter of credits were only expost facto granted by the petitioner and reported to the head office instantly without any delay. The Head Office had not declared it to be excess, therefore, is deemed to have been approved, therefore, no departmental action is called for. xiii) The charge no.5 with regard to issuance of comfort letter in regular course of business is explained by petitioner on the ground that this action of petitioner was approved by the Board, therefore, after the approval by the Board, the petitioner could not be held guilty of allegations. 10. The writ petition is opposed by the respondent by raising preliminary objection, that the petitioner has alternative remedy of appeal under Regulation 17 of the Indian Bank Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. That the ground raised by the petitioner cannot be gone into in exercise of writ jurisdiction, as this Court does not sit in appeal to consider the decision by the competent authority on merits. 11. That the ground raised by the petitioner cannot be gone into in exercise of writ jurisdiction, as this Court does not sit in appeal to consider the decision by the competent authority on merits. 11. The stand in the counter is that the petitioner was suspended on 01.04.1996 by the Chairman and Managing Director, while working as the Deputy General Manager with the Indian Bank, Custodial Service Branch. The petitioner was under suspension, when the Articles of Charges together with statement of imputations of misconduct were framed and issued to him. 12. It is denied that the petitioner was functioning as the Assistant General Manager, when the charge sheet was issued. The charge sheet was issued to the petitioner as Deputy General Manager (DC), Central Office, Chennai and not as Zonal Manager, Chennai in respect of the accounts of M/s.East West Travel and Trade Links Ltd., Nungambakkam High Road Branch, Indian Bank and Prabhadevi Branch of Indian Bank at Mumbai. 13. It is the case of respondent, that though the enquiry authority had exonerated the petitioner, but it was not the final authority. It is denied, that the petitioner did not have remedy of appeal by pleading that the order passed by the Chairperson and Managing Director could be challenged before the Board of Directors. It is the stand of respondent, that the provisions of Disciplinary Regulation were duly followed and the Articles of Charges were framed, which were clear and specific. 14. It is also the stand of respondent that the documents relied upon by the Bank were not furnished to the petitioner along with the charge sheet on the date of preliminary sitting of the Inquiring Authority on 13.10.1998. The Presenting Officer filed copies of document and also furnished copies to petitioner. It is the stand in the counter, that though the petitioner was reverted as the Assistant General Manager from the post of Deputy General Manager, by way of disciplinary action, the stand taken is that from May 2000 to December 2000, the post of Executive Director in the respondent Bank was vacant and the next higher authority for proceeding with the disciplinary proceeding were Chairman-cum-Managing Director. 15. It is also stand of the respondent, that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, when he was Deputy General Manager. 15. It is also stand of the respondent, that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, when he was Deputy General Manager. As already charge sheet was issued on 18.03.1998, it was felt appropriate to continue the whole departmental proceedings, according to the rank held by him on the date of issuance of charge sheet. It is also submitted, that no prejudice has been caused to petitioner, as remedy of appeal was available to petitioner with the Board of Directors. 16. It is submitted, that at the time of attaining the age of superannuation, the petitioner was informed as under: "You have been placed under suspension and disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against you for the charges framed and communicated to you on various dates. In view of this, though you will cease to be in service after the date of superannuation, the disciplinary proceedings will continue as if you were in service till the proceedings are concluded and the final orders are passed in respect thereof, in terms of Regulation 20 (3) (iii) of Indian Bank Officer's Service Regulations, 1979 as amended and communicated vide circular dated 06.04.1993." 17. It is further submitted, that the stand of petitioner, that no proceedings could be continued, cannot be sustained. It is the stand of respondent, that it was not requirement of Regulation to submit to the petitioner a copy of the report submitted by the Bank to the CVC, while seeking approval for taking disciplinary action against the petitioner. The stand of the petitioner to other charges levelled has been denied, as allegations are reiterated. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the impugned order by contending that the impugned order is without jurisdiction, as it has not been passed by the competent authority. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner was that it is not disputed that the petitioner was reverted as the Assistant General Manager from the post of Deputy General Manager, therefore, the competent authority to impose punishment against the petitioner was the Executive Director and not respondent no1., therefore the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 19. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner was that it is not disputed that the petitioner was reverted as the Assistant General Manager from the post of Deputy General Manager, therefore, the competent authority to impose punishment against the petitioner was the Executive Director and not respondent no1., therefore the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 19. In support of this contention, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Surjit Ghosh vs. Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank, and others, (1995) 2 SCC 474 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down, that infliction of punishment by appellate authority acting as disciplinary authority is discriminatory, as it results in denial of right of appeal and also the right of review. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Electronics Corporation of India vs. G.Muralidhar, (2001) 10 SCC 43 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by relying on the judgment in the case of Surjit Ghosh vs. Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank, and others, (supra), was pleased to hold that power to impose punishment cannot be exercised by the appellate authority, if it results in denial of right to appeal. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to para-9 of the counter, where it was admitted by the respondent that the petitioner was reverted and the disciplinary authority in the case of Assistant General was Executive Director and not respondent no.1. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner was that the defence of respondent, that between May 2000 and December 2000, the post of Executive Director was vacant, cannot advance the case of respondent, as admittedly neither disciplinary proceedings were initiated between May 2000 and December 2000, nor the order of punishment was passed. 22. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in defense contended, that the petitioner was issued charge memo on 18.03.1998, when the petitioner was in Scale-6 post, for which appointing authority was the Managing Director-cum-Chairman. The petitioner was reverted only on 18.01.2001, whereas the report in this case by the enquiry officer was submitted on 10.08.2000 and dissenting note was issued by the Managing Director-cum-Chairman on 14.10.2000, therefore it was not open to petitioner to contend that proceedings were not initiated by the competent authority. The petitioner was reverted only on 18.01.2001, whereas the report in this case by the enquiry officer was submitted on 10.08.2000 and dissenting note was issued by the Managing Director-cum-Chairman on 14.10.2000, therefore it was not open to petitioner to contend that proceedings were not initiated by the competent authority. 23. Learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.Sudhakar vs. Postmaster General, Hyderabad and another, (2006) 4 SCC 348 , in support of the contention, that the authority higher than the appointing authority can also act as disciplinary authority provided the delinquent officer is not deprived of his statutory right of appeal. He also referred to the Indian Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, to contend that where the Chairman & Managing Director acts as the disciplinary authority, appeal is provided to the committee of the Board, which is subject to further review, thus, no prejudice is caused to petitioner on account of Managing Director-cum-Chairman in taking disciplinary action against petitioner to claim violation of principle of natural justice. 24. On consideration, I find force in the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the responents. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Surjit Ghosh vs. Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank, and others (supra) and also the judgment in the case of Electronics Corporation of India vs. G.Muralidhar (supra), will have no application to the facts of the present case, firstly for the reason, once at the time of issuance of charge sheet, submission of enquiry report and at the time of issuance of dissenting note, the Managing Director-cum-Chairman was the competent authority, merely because at the time of passing of the order, the petitioner stood reverted in some other proceedings, the impugned order therefore cannot be said to be without jurisdiction of violative of natural justice, specially when under the service rules, the petitioner had not only remedy of appeal, but also remedy of review, which the petitioner did not choose to avail. 25. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended, that the charges against petitioner were vague and lacked material particulars. This contention also cannot be accepted. The charges cannot be said to be vague or indefinite, as it specifies the period of irregularities and also discloses the particulars of misconduct. 25. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended, that the charges against petitioner were vague and lacked material particulars. This contention also cannot be accepted. The charges cannot be said to be vague or indefinite, as it specifies the period of irregularities and also discloses the particulars of misconduct. It cannot be, therefore, said that the petitioner was prejudiced on account of vagueness of the charges. The statement of imputation of misconduct specified the charges in minute details. This contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner also deserves to be rejected. 26. Learned Senior Counsel thereafter contended, that the impugned order against petitioner cannot be sustained, as Charge No.1 deserves to be rejected only, on the ground of delay, as it related to the incident of 1991, whereas charge memo was issued in the year 1998 without giving any explanation for the delay. 27. This contention of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner was controverted by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, by contending that irregularities were noticed in the investigation carried out and it was only thereafter, that the irregularities came to light and the charge memo was issued to petitioner immediately thereafter. It cannot be therefore said that there was any delay in issuance of charge memo. The petitioner admittedly defended himself before the enquiry officer and did not plead that due to delay, he has suffered in his defense. It is well settled that mere delay in issuing charge memo cannot be a ground to quash the charge in absence of prejudice. 28. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also challenged the findings of charge no.1, on the ground, that action of the petitioner was confirmed by the Chairman, and in support reference was made to page no.252 of the typeset of papers, but noting of page no.252 shows confirmation by the Zonal Manager, Bombay. This fact cannot lead to the conclusion, that petitioner was not guilty of proved charge. 29. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also referred to page no.600 of paper book regarding resolution passed regarding the account of East West Travel & Trade Links Ltd., showing that the note was put up to propose the limits sanctioned by the petitioner to the Chairman and Managing Director. 30. 29. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also referred to page no.600 of paper book regarding resolution passed regarding the account of East West Travel & Trade Links Ltd., showing that the note was put up to propose the limits sanctioned by the petitioner to the Chairman and Managing Director. 30. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent on the other hand opposed this contention, on the ground, that the document cannot be said to be approval by the Board of Directors. The limit of CMD was only Rs.50 lakhs. The approval for the act of petitioner was required to be done by the Board of Directors, which was not done. It was further pointed out, that the petitioner had even exceeded the limit fixed by the Board of Directors, which was never approved at any stage. 31. In view of the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, there is no force in this contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. 32. Even otherwise, this Court cannot sit in appeal to go into a detailed finding. The approval by the higher officer can only be the ground to take lenient view, but cannot be the ground to wash out the allegations levelled against petitioner. 33. It was next contended, by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, that successor officer of petitioner also granted temporary over draft of Rs.13.5 crores, which leads to presumption of sanction by the Board. The finding of fact recorded cannot be questioned on presumptions. This contention, therefore, deserves also to be rejected. 34. It was also contention of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, that no proper reasons were forthcoming to disagree with the findings of the disciplinary authority. This contention is again misconceived. The reading of the dissenting note shows, that valid and good reasons were given to disagree with the finding recorded by the enquiring authority. 35. The finding on the 2nd charges was challenged on the ground, that it violates Rule 3 (3) of the Indian Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, which stipulates, that no officer employee shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgement except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior. 36. Reliance on this rule is misplaced. 36. Reliance on this rule is misplaced. It is not the case of petitioner, that the petitioner was acting under the directions of his superior, rather case of petitioner is that the acts of petitioner were subsequently approved by the superiors, therefore, reliance on the Rule 3(3) of the Indian Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 is misplaced. 37. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also challenged the charge no.2, on the ground, that the Board of Directors in their meeting held on 18.01.2005 confirmed the excess allowed in the account at Nungambakkam High Road Branch, Madras on various dates upto 05.12.1994 for Travel and Air Taxi Division requirements. It was thus contended, that the action of petitioner having been confirmed by the Board of Directors, could not be the basis to charge the petitioner. 38. This contention of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner was controverted by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, by contending that inspite of specific direction, that beyond the sanctioned limit, no limit should be extended to the party, the petitioner violated the direction and granted limit beyond the one fixed by the Board of Directors, which were never approved by the Board of Directors, therefore, the contention of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 39. There is force in this contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent. The charges against petitioner have been proved on appreciation of documents placed on record, which are not disputed by the petitioner, the only defense is that the acts of petitioner was finally approved by the authorities. 40. On the third charge, the stand of petitioner was that acts of the petitioner stood approved by the Board of Directors. As already referred to above, on appreciation of documentary evidence, it has been held, that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct, which stood proved against him. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit in appeal and substitute its opinion for the one of competent authority. It is well settled law, that even if two views are possible, the view of the competent authority cannot be set aside. It is only if the finding is totally perverse or not capable of arriving at that, this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction can interfere with such finding. 41. It is well settled law, that even if two views are possible, the view of the competent authority cannot be set aside. It is only if the finding is totally perverse or not capable of arriving at that, this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction can interfere with such finding. 41. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner thereafter vehemently contended, that issuance of comfort letter by petitioner to secure certain amount did not affect the Bank, as no action was taken on said letter of comfort. It was also contended, that the charge was framed after five years of issuance of comfort letter, therefore, cannot be sustain in law. 42. This contention is controverted by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, by contending, that the petitioner had no jurisdiction to issue letter of comfort, therefore, petitioner acted beyond his jurisdiction and exposed the Bank to possible loss. In support, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager and others vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 , laying down that acting beyond one's authority in allowing advances and overdrawals itself is misconduct. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case was pleased to lay down as under: "7.It may be mentioned that in the memorandum of charges, the aforesaid two regulations are said to have been violated by the respondent. Regulation 3 requires every officer/employee of the bank to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. It requires the officer/employee to maintain good conduct and discipline and to act to the best of his judgment in performance of his official duties or in exercise of the powers conferred upon him. Breach of Regulation 3 is ‘misconduct’ within the meaning of Regulation 24. The findings of the Inquiry Officer which have been accepted by the disciplinary authority, and which have not been disturbed by the High Court, clearly show that in a number of instances the respondent allowed overdrafts or passed cheques involving substantial amounts beyond his authority. True, it is that in some cases, no loss has resulted from such acts. The findings of the Inquiry Officer which have been accepted by the disciplinary authority, and which have not been disturbed by the High Court, clearly show that in a number of instances the respondent allowed overdrafts or passed cheques involving substantial amounts beyond his authority. True, it is that in some cases, no loss has resulted from such acts. It is also true that in some other instances such acts have yielded profit to the Bank but it is equally true that in some other instances, the funds of the Bank have been placed in jeopardy; the advances have become sticky and irrecoverable. It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of transactions. In the case of a bank — for that matter, in the case of any other organisation — every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will disappear; the functioning of the bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. Each officer of the bank cannot be allowed to carve out his own little empire wherein he dispenses favours and largesse. No organisation, more particularly, a bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations. The very act of acting beyond authority — that too a course of conduct spread over a sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances — is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to the employees of banks which deal with public funds. If what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its employees, Nick Leeson, a minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an organisation and more particularly, a bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an organisation and more particularly, a bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and overdrawals allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. Just because, similar acts have fetched some profit — huge profit, as the High Court characterises it — they are no less blameworthy. It is wrong to characterise them as errors of judgment. It is not suggested that the respondent being a Class I Officer was not aware of the limits of his authority or of his powers. Indeed, Charge 9, which has been held established in full is to the effect that in spite of instructions by the Regional Office to stop such practice, the respondent continued to indulge in such acts. The Inquiry Officer has recorded a clear finding that the respondent did flout the said instructions and has thereby committed an act of disobedience of lawful orders. Similarly, Charge 8, which has also been established in full is to the effect that in spite of reminders, the respondent did not submit “Control Returns” to the Regional Office. We fail to understand how could all this be characterised as errors of judgment and not as misconduct as defined by the Regulations. We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a clear error in holding that the aforesaid conduct of the respondent does not amount to misconduct or that it does not constitute violation of Regulations 3 and 24. 8. We must mention that Shri V.A. Mohta, the learned counsel for the respondent, stated fairly before us that it is not possible for him to sustain the reasoning and approach of the High Court in this case. His only submission was that having regard to the age of the respondent (37 years) and the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court may substitute the punishment awarded to the respondent by a lesser punishment. The learned counsel suggested that any punishment other than dismissal may be imposed by this Court. His only submission was that having regard to the age of the respondent (37 years) and the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court may substitute the punishment awarded to the respondent by a lesser punishment. The learned counsel suggested that any punishment other than dismissal may be imposed by this Court. We considered this request with the care it deserves, but we regret that we are unable to accede to it. The learned counsel for the Bank, Shri V.R. Reddy, Additional Solicitor General, also stated, on instructions of the Bank, that it is not possible for the Bank to accommodate the respondent in its service in view of his conduct." 43. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank, 2007-III-LLJ 245, to contend that disciplinary proceedings can be continued against the Officer after he ceases to be in service by means of a legal fiction providing that the delinquent officer would be deemed to be in service until the proceedings are concluded. 44. No other point was urged. 45. For the reasons stated above, finding no merit in this writ petition, it is ordered to be dismissed, but with no order as to costs.