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2012 DIGILAW 369 (ALL)

Ajit Singh v. State of U. P. and others

2012-02-09

NARAYAN SHUKLA

body2012
Shri Narayan Shukla, J.;- Heard Shri Lalit Kishore Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr Bireshwar Nath, learned counsel for the C.B.I. and Shri Arvind Jauhari, learned counsel for the victim. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 9th of January, 2012, passed by the Sessions Judge, Lucknow in Criminal Revision No.11 of 2012, whereby the learned Sessions Judge has rejected the petitioner's revision preferred against the order dated 4th November, 2011, passed by the Special Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I. framing charges against the petitioner, under Sections 420, 466,467,468,471,477-A/34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, being an interlocutory order. 3. The question for determination before this Court is whether the order of framing charges is of an interlocutory nature or final one. 4. The petitioner still claims the order of framing charges as final order. 5. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon following decisions:- (1)1993 Cri. L.J. 3599 Prabhakaran Vs. Excise Circle Inspector (2)1979 Cri.L.J.338 R.K. Vol. Goldstain and another Vs. Stainley Haque (3)AIR 1978 S.C.47 Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra (4)1999 Crl. L.J. 311 Mukhtar Ali Vs. Statements (5)1977 Crl.L.J.1891 Amar Nath Vs. State (6)Crl. Revision No.1180 and 1493 of 1987 Arshad Ali Vs. State (7)1994 S.C.C.(Crl.) 1181 Minakshi Bala Vs. Sudhir Kumar & Ors. (8)1982 Crl. L.J. 810 Jarnail Singh Vs. State 6. On the other hand Sri Arvind Jauhari, learned counsel for the victim placed some decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered on the same very point, which are as under; (1) Kanti Bhadra Shah and and others Vs. State of W.B. reported in (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 722. In paragraph 12 of the aforesaid Judgment Hon'ble Court has held as under:- "If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial. It is a salutary guideline that when orders rejecting or granting bail are passed, the court should avoid expressing one way or the other on contentious issues, except in cases such as those falling within Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985." 7. Aforesaid judgment has been followed in the case of Smt. Om Wati and another Vs. State through Delhi Admn. and others, rendered in Crl. Appeal No. 304 of 2001. 8. In the case of Poonam Chand Jain and another Vs. Fazru, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 371 of 2004, the Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under; " In V.C. Shukla's case itself the distinction between cases covered by the Code and the special Statute governing that case, as noted above, has been clearly indicated. It was inter alia, observed as follows;" To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia J in the case of Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtraa 1978 (1) SCR 749 clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage, extracted above, in Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in Corpus Juris Secundum. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term' interlocutory order' as used in Section 11 (1) of the Act. 60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in Corpus Juris Secundum. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term' interlocutory order' as used in Section 11 (1) of the Act. Wharton's Law Lexicon ( 14th Edn. P 529) defines interlocutory order thus: " An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties: 9. In the case of V.C. Shukla Vs. State through CBI 1980 Supreme Court Cases (Crl.) 695 majority of Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court held that the order framing of charges is purely to be an interlocutory order. Relevant para 35 of the judgment is reproduced herein above; "35.Applying these tests to the order impugned we find that the order framing of the charges is purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceedings but the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. It is true that if the Special Court would have refused to frame charges and discharged the accused, the proceedings would have terminated but that is only one side of the picture. The other side of the picture is that if the Special Court refused to discharge the accused and framed charges against him, then the order would be interlocutory because the trial would still be alive. Mr Mridul tried to repel the argument of the Solicitor General and explained the decisions, referred to above, on the ground that the English decisions as also the Federal Court's decisions made the observations while interpreting the provisions of the Government of India Act or the provisions of the Constitution where the word "final" order was expressly used. It was urged that the same construction would not apply to the present case where the word ''order' is not qualified by the word ''final'. With due respect to the learned counsel, in our opinion, the distinction sought to be drawn is a distinction without any difference. This court as also the Federal Court have clearly pointed out that so far as the tests to be applied to determine whether an order is final or interlocutory, apply as much to a civil case as to a criminal case. This court as also the Federal Court have clearly pointed out that so far as the tests to be applied to determine whether an order is final or interlocutory, apply as much to a civil case as to a criminal case. Furthermore, as already indicated, it is impossible to spell out the concept of an interlocutory order unless it is understood in contradistinction to or in contrast with a final order. This was held in a number of cases referred to, including Madhu Limaye case which has been expressly stressed by us in an earlier part of the judgment. For these reasons, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant on this aspect of the matter fails and is hereby overruled." 10. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, there is no ambiguity in holding that the order of framing charges is interlocutory order. That being so is not revisable. Therefore, I do not find any error in the order impugned. 11. With the aforesaid terms, the petition stands dismissed.