Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 3719 (MAD)

K. Kaliaperumal v. Union Of India

2012-08-28

N.PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR

body2012
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, who is General Secretary of Pondicherry University Non-Teaching Staff Welfare Association, filed this writ petition praying to issue a Writ of Quo-Warranto directing the third respondent to show cause as to on what authority he continues as Vice Chancellor of the Pondicherry University after his term of office ended on 15.4.2012. 2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of this writ petition are as follows: (a) The third respondent was appointed as Vice Chancellor of the Pondicherry University for a period of five years beginning from 16.4.2007 and the said period of five years came to an end on 15.4.2012. As per the Statute of Pondicherry University framed under Section 26(1) of the Pondicherry University Act, 1985, particularly Statute 1(A)(4), the term of office of a Vice Chancellor is for a period of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office and he shall be eligible for re-appointment for not more than another term. (b) According to second proviso to Statute 1(A)(4), the Visitor (President) may direct that a Vice Chancellor, whose term of office has expired, shall continue in office for such period, not exceeding a total period of one year. Relying on the said second proviso, the petitioner contends that after the expiry of the period of five years, the Vice Chancellor can continue in office only if the Visitor passes an order permitting to continue, that too upto a maximum period of one year and no order having been passed by the Visitor as on date, the third respondent's continuance as Vice Chancellor of the second respondent-University is without any authority. (c) The petitioner filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 raising the said query, for which, a reply was given stating that the Visitor has not passed any order and therefore, the petitioner contends that the third respondent is usurping the Public Office of Vice-Chancellor and a writ of quo warranto may be issued. (d) It is also stated in the affidavit that the first respondent has issued instruction on 7.2.2012 requesting the third respondent to refrain from initiating any action to make selections/promotions and also taking long term policy decisions and the third respondent has violated the said direction issued by the first respondent. (d) It is also stated in the affidavit that the first respondent has issued instruction on 7.2.2012 requesting the third respondent to refrain from initiating any action to make selections/promotions and also taking long term policy decisions and the third respondent has violated the said direction issued by the first respondent. (e) As per Statute 7, if the Office of the Vice-Chancellor has become vacant, the senior most Director or the senior most Dean, in case no Director is on roll, shall perform the duties of the Vice Chancellor until a new Vice Chancellor assumes office or until the existing Vice Chancellor attends to the duties of his office, as the case may be. Therefore, the continuance of the third respondent is contrary to Statute 7 and the same is illegal. 3. The first respondent has filed a counter affidavit stating that as per Statute 1(A)(4) first Proviso, the Vice Chancellor is entitled to continue notwithstanding the expiry of the period of five years until his successor is appointed and enters upon his office. Provisos one and two are independent and continuance as per the first Proviso is automatic and no specified order/instruction from the Visitor is necessary. The first respondent issued only an Advisory Note for the smooth transition. For continuance as per the First Proviso to Statute 1(A)(4), the approval of Visitor is not necessary and only if extension is sought, for a specified period, the Visitor's order is necessary as per the second Proviso to Statute 1(A)(4). The information furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005 only states that as per first Proviso to Statute 1(A)(4), the third respondent has been allowed to continue in office till his successor is appointed. 4. Regarding the instruction issued on 7.2.2012, the counter affidavit states that it is a usual advise given to all the autonomous organisations under the first respondent, whose heads are going to demit office within two to three months. Statute 1(A)(7) deals with handing over the charge to the senior-most Director/senior-most Dean is not relevant, as the contingency arose on 15.4.2012 was taken care of under Statute 1(A) (4) First Proviso, and there is no illegality in the continuance of the third respondent until new Vice-Chancellor is appointed. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that a Selection Committee has also been constituted to recommend panel of names for the selection of new Vice-Chancellor. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that a Selection Committee has also been constituted to recommend panel of names for the selection of new Vice-Chancellor. 5. Respondents 2 and 3 have filed a counter affidavit justifying the third respondent's continuance to perform the duties of the Vice-Chancellor till his successor is appointed. The continuance of the third respondent is as per the Statute and valid order is passed by the first respondent and the contention of the petitioner that the third respondent usurped the office after 15.4.2012, is misconceived. As the third respondent is in office after 15.4.2012 as per the first Proviso to Statute 1(A)(4), that is by operation of law and the writ petition filed praying to issue a writ of Quo-Warranto to the third respondent is not maintainable. It is averred in the counter affidavit that appointments/promotions were made in the University through duly constituted Selection Committee and all recommendations were placed before the Executive Council of the University for its decision. The appointments/promotions were not made by the Vice-Chancellor himself. Therefore, there is no violation of the instruction issued on 7.2.2012, as the Vice-Chancellor is not taking any decision on his own, much less long term policy decisions. 6. The maximum age to hold the office of the Vice-Chancellor is fixed as 70 years and in case of any contingency, namely, resignation, death or attainment of the age of 70 years of the incumbent Vice-Chancellor, Statute 7 will come into operation and the same is not applicable in this case, as the third respondent has not attained the age of 70 years and he has not resigned from his post and he is continuing as Vice-Chancellor in terms of first Proviso to Statute 1(A)(4). 7. A reply affidavit was filed by the petitioner reiterating the contention that Statute 1(A) (4) first Proviso should be read along with second Proviso and both are not independent and while interpreting the provisions, no part can be ignored or abrogated. The two provisos have to be read together and the Visitor having not issued any order to continue in office by the third respondent as Vice-Chancellor, his continuance as Vice-Chancellor is illegal. 8. The two provisos have to be read together and the Visitor having not issued any order to continue in office by the third respondent as Vice-Chancellor, his continuance as Vice-Chancellor is illegal. 8. Mr.V.T.Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner reiterated the contentions raised in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition argued that after the term of office of the third respondent was over, i.e. after 15.4.2012, he can continue as Vice-Chancellor only if the Visitor passes an order for his continuance for a specified period and no order having been passed by the Visitor, which is not in dispute, the third respondent is illegally continuing in the post of Vice-Chancellor beyond 15.4.2012. Hence a writ of quo warranto is maintainable. The learned Senior Counsel cited certain decisions in support of his contentions. 9. Mr.R.Viduthalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 submitted that the petitioner is questioning the authority under which the third respondent is continuing as Vice-Chancellor and first proviso to Statute 1(A)(4) is the answer and the writ petition seeking to issue quo-warranto is not sustainable. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that unlike the writ of certiorari, the courts will be reluctant to issue a writ of quo warranto, if there is any ambiguity in the statute, where two interpretations are possible. It is also contended by the learned Senior Counsel that first proviso to Statute 1(A)(4) is independent from that of second proviso and they are operating on two different circumstances. The first proviso is an enabling provision for the existing Vice-chancellor to continue as an interim measure, till a new Vice-Chancellor is appointed. The second proviso empowers the Visitor to pass an order permitting to continue the existing Vice-Chancellor, whose term of office is over for such period, which shall not exceed one year in toto. The learned Senior Counsel also cited several decisions in support of his contentions. 10. Mr.S.Haja Mohideen Gisthi, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the first respondent adopted the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 and submitted that the RTI reply given to the petitioner is only a note file signed by the Minister of HRD, reiterating the statutory provision viz., Statute 1 (A)(4) first proviso. 10. Mr.S.Haja Mohideen Gisthi, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the first respondent adopted the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 and submitted that the RTI reply given to the petitioner is only a note file signed by the Minister of HRD, reiterating the statutory provision viz., Statute 1 (A)(4) first proviso. The learned counsel further submitted that even without any order issued by the first respondent, the third respondent is entitled to continue till a new Vice-Chancellor is selected and assumes office as per the first proviso and as such there is no illegality in the continuance of the third respondent as Vice-Chancellor of the Pondicherry University and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 11. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Senior Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 and the learned Standing counsel for the first respondent. 12. The point arises for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether the petitioner has made out a case to issue a writ of quo-warranto against the third respondent for his continuance as Vice-Chancellor of the Pondicherry University after 15.4.2012. 13. The third respondent is qualified to be selected and appointed as Vice-Chancellor of the second respondent University and the first respondent, after selection, appointed the third respondent as Vice-Chancellor of the second respondent University and he took charge as Vice-Chancellor from 15.4.2007. The term of appointment was for five years as per the Statute 1(A)(4) of the Statutes of the University framed under section 26(1) of the Pondicherry University Act, 1985. The said Statute clearly says that the Vice-chancellor shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be eligible for re-appointment. For proper appreciation, Statute 1(A)(4) is extracted below: "1(A)(4) The Vice-Chancellor shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall be eligible for reappointment for not more than another term: Provided that notwithstanding the expiry of the said period of the five years, he shall continue in office until his successor is appointed and enters upon his office. Provided further that the visitor may direct that a Vice-Chancellor, whose term of office has expired, shall continue in office for such period, not exceeding a total period of one year, as may be specified in the direction." As per Statute 1(A)(5), if a Vice-Chancellor completes the age of 70 years during the term of his office or any extension thereof, shall retire from office. Statute 1(A)(5) reads thus, "1(A)(5)Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (2), a person appointed as Vice-Chancellor shall, if he completes the age of seventy years during the term of his office or any extension thereof, retire from office." Statute 1(A)(7) states how the University should function in case of vacancy in the post of Vice-Chancellor, which reads as follows: "1(A)(7) If the Office of Vice-Chancellor becomes vacant due to death, resignation or otherwise or if he is unable to perform the duties owing to absence, illness or any other cause, the senior most Director or the Senior most Dean, in case no Director is on roll, shall perform the duties of the Vice-Chancellor until a new Vice-Chancellor assumes office or until the existing Vice-Chancellor attends to the duties of his office, as the case may be." From the above referred provisions of Statutes, it is evident that the incumbent Vice-Chancellor, if not completed 70 years of age, is entitled to hold office until his successor assumes office. 14. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that as per proviso 2 to Statute 1(A)(4), unless the Visitor passes an order, the third respondent cannot continue as Vice-Chancellor beyond 15.4.2012. The said contention is sustainable or not can be decided only on going through the entire Statutes, particularly, Statutes 1(A), 1(A)(4), 1(A)(5) and 1(A)(7). A combined reading of the above said Statutes clearly establishes the fact that an incumbent Vice-Chancellor shall continue in office notwithstanding the expiry of the period of five years of his office until his successor is appointed and he enters or takes offices. If Statute 1(A)(4) second proviso alone is treated as the enabling proviso to treat the incumbent Vice-Chancellor to continue in office after expiry of the term, the said interpretation will have the effect of ignoring the first proviso to Statute 1(A)(4). If Statute 1(A)(4) second proviso alone is treated as the enabling proviso to treat the incumbent Vice-Chancellor to continue in office after expiry of the term, the said interpretation will have the effect of ignoring the first proviso to Statute 1(A)(4). As per the first proviso, there is no condition imposed to extend the order by the Visitor for the continuance of the Chancellor after the expiry of his term till his successor is appointed. 15. As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3, Statute 1(A)(7) makes the said position further clear that in case of vacancy in the post of Vice-Chancellor due to death, resignation or otherwise, or if he is unable to perform the duty owing to illness or on other cause, another person can be given power to perform the duties of the Vice-Chancellor. The said Statute will come into operation only if the incumbent Vice-Chancellor is unable to perform his duties owing to resignation, illness or any other cause including his completion of 70 years of age. No such contingency arises in this case as the third respondent has not completed 70 years of age and he is able to perform his duties continuously after 15.4.2012. 16. The learned Standing Counsel for the first respondent also rightly contended that the third respondent is entitled to continue till a new Vice-Chancellor is appointed or he takes office, without any order from the first respondent or Visitor in view of the said first proviso contained in the Statute mentioned above. 17. How the provisions of the Statutes must be interpreted while deciding a Statute by the Courts is well settled in the following decisions. (a) In (1976) 1 SCC 128 (Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf) the Honourable Supreme Court in paragraph 8 held thus, "18. We may mention in fairness to Counsel that the following, among other decisions, were cited at the Bar bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes: CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd, ( AIR 1959 SC 713 ); Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. CST ( AIR 1955 SC 765 ); Thompson v. Dibdin (192 AC 538, 541); Rex v. Dibdin (1910 Pro Div 57, 119, 125) and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P.( AIR 1959 SC 1012 ). The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. CST ( AIR 1955 SC 765 ); Thompson v. Dibdin (192 AC 538, 541); Rex v. Dibdin (1910 Pro Div 57, 119, 125) and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P.( AIR 1959 SC 1012 ). The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. “Words are dependent on the principal enacting words to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context” (1912 AC 544). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. “The proper course is to apply the broad general Rule of construction which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light if need be on the rest. The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound interpretation and meaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting clause, saving clause, and proviso, taken and construed together is to prevail. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 162)” (Emphasis Supplied) (b) In (2003) 2 SCC 111 (Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.) in paragraph 25 the Supreme Court held as follows: "25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 162)” (Emphasis Supplied) (b) In (2003) 2 SCC 111 (Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.) in paragraph 25 the Supreme Court held as follows: "25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute." (c) In (2005) 2 SCC 409 (Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat), paragraph 30 reads as follows: "30. By now it is well settled principle of law that no part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is also trite that the statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved." (d) In (2010) 5 SCC 196 (Pallawi Resources Limited v. Protos Engineering Company Private Limited), in paragraph 19 the Supreme Court held thus, "19. From these authorities, it is amply clear that a provision in a statute ought not to be read in isolation. On the contrary, a statute must be read as an integral whole keeping in view the other provisions which may be relevant to the provision in question in order to correctly arrive at the legislative intent behind the provision in question. Applying this principle to the case at hand which involves an interpretation of Section 17(4-A), it will not be appropriate for us to read sub-section (4-A) of Section 17 ignoring the other relevant provisions." (e) The said principle is followed in the decisions reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577 (Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal) and (2006) 3 SCC 758 (Gurpreet Singh Bhullar v. Union of India) also. 18. The third respondent cannot be treated as usurper of the post of Vice-Chancellor of the Pondicherry University after 15.4.2012. 18. The third respondent cannot be treated as usurper of the post of Vice-Chancellor of the Pondicherry University after 15.4.2012. The second proviso to statute 1(A)(4) empowers the Visitor to direct the Vice-Chancellor, whose term of office has expired for such period not exceeding total period of one year as may be specified in the direction to continue as Vice-Chancellor. If such an order was passed by the Visitor, the term for which the incumbent Vice-Chancellor is ordered to continue is necessarily to be mentioned and the period, on any event, shall not exceed one year. As per proviso one, the Vice-Chancellor can continue till new Vice-Chancellor is appointed. The word 'shall' is used in the first proviso, which means, till new Vice-Chancellor is appointed the incumbent Vice-Chancellor must continue as Vice-Chancellor. The second proviso is discretionary as the Visitor may give such direction. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted, it will have the effect of ignoring the first proviso and the said interpretation is impermissible. 19. When a writ of quo-warranto can be issued and what are the limitations while deciding the writ of quo-warranto was considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in the following decisions: (i) In (2001) 7 SCC 231 (B.R.Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu) the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the appointment of the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, as she was disqualified from contesting the election to the Legislative Assembly due to conviction and sentence imposed in a criminal case while interpreting Article 164(4) of the Constitution of India, which prohibits a non-legilative member to become a Chief Minister and continue as Chief Minister for six months. (ii) In the decision reported in AIR 1965 SC 491 : ( 1964 4 SCR 575 (University of Mysore v. C.D.Govinda Rao), in paragraphs 6 and 7 (in AIR), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held thus, "6. The judgment of the High Court does not indicate that the attention of the High Court was drawn to the technical nature of the writ of quo warranto which was claimed by the respondent in the present proceedings, and the conditions which had to be satisfied before a writ could issue in such proceedings. 7. The judgment of the High Court does not indicate that the attention of the High Court was drawn to the technical nature of the writ of quo warranto which was claimed by the respondent in the present proceedings, and the conditions which had to be satisfied before a writ could issue in such proceedings. 7. As Halsbury has observed: “An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolate writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined.” Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases, persons, not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not." (Emphasis Supplied) (iii) In (2009) 7 SCC 1 (N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose) paragraphs 131 to 135 reads thus, "131. Concededly, judicial review for the purpose of issuance of writ of quo warranto in a case of this nature would lie: (A) in the event the holder of a public office was not eligible for appointment; (B) processual machinery relating to consultation was not fully complied. The writ of quo warranto proceedings affords a judicial remedy by which any person who holds an independent substantive public office is called upon to show by what right he holds the same so that his title to it may be duly determined and in the event it is found that the holder has no title he would be directed to be removed from the said office by a judicial order. The proceedings not only give a weapon to control the executive from making appointments to public office against law but also tend to protect the public from being deprived of public office to which it has a right. It is indisputably a high prerogative writ which was reserved for the use of the Crown. The width and ambit of the writ, however, in the course of practice, have widened and it is permissible to pray for issuance of a writ in the nature of quo warranto. 132. In Corpus Juris Secundum [74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto 14], “Quo Warranto” is defined as under: “Quo warranto, or a proceeding in the nature thereof, is a proper and appropriate remedy to test the right or title to an office, and to remove or oust an incumbent. It is prosecuted by the State against a person who unlawfully usurps, intrudes, or holds a public office. The relator must establish that the office is being unlawfully held and exercised by the respondent, and that relator is entitled to the office.” 133. It is prosecuted by the State against a person who unlawfully usurps, intrudes, or holds a public office. The relator must establish that the office is being unlawfully held and exercised by the respondent, and that relator is entitled to the office.” 133. In Law Lexicon by J.J.S. Wharton, Esq., 1987, “Quo Warranto” has been defined as under: “QUO WARRANTO, a writ issuable out of the Queen's Bench, in the nature of a writ of right, for the Crown, against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right. It lies also in case of non-user, or long neglect of a franchise, or misuser or abuse of it; being a writ commanding the defendant to show by what warrant he exercises such a franchise having never had any grant of it, or having forfeited it by neglect or abuse.” 134. Indisputably, a writ of quo warranto can be issued inter alia when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules as has been held by this Court in High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and R.K. Jain v. Union of India. (See also Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Govt. of Haryana.) In Duryodhan Sahu (Dr.) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, this Court has stated that it is not for the court to embark upon an investigation of its own to ascertain the qualifications of the person concerned. (See also Arun Singh v. State of Bihar.) We may furthermore notice that while examining if a person holds a public office under valid authority or not, the court is not concerned with technical grounds of delay or motive behind the challenge, since it is necessary to prevent continuance of usurpation of office or perpetuation of an illegality. [See Kashinath G. Jalmi (Dr.) v. Speaker.] 135. Issuance of a writ of quo warranto is a discretionary remedy. Authority of a person to hold a high public office can be questioned inter alia in the event an appointment is violative of any statutory provisions. There concededly exists a distinction in regard to issuance of a writ of quo warranto and issuance of a writ of certiorari. The scope and ambit of these two writs are different and distinct. Authority of a person to hold a high public office can be questioned inter alia in the event an appointment is violative of any statutory provisions. There concededly exists a distinction in regard to issuance of a writ of quo warranto and issuance of a writ of certiorari. The scope and ambit of these two writs are different and distinct. Whereas a writ of quo warranto can be issued on a limited ground, the considerations for issuance of a writ of certiorari are wholly different." (Emphasis Supplied) (iv) The Supreme Court, in the decision reported in (2003) 4 SCC 712 (High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat) held, to what extend the High Court can go into the issue in a writ of quo warranto. In paragraphs 22 and 23 the Supreme Court held thus, "22. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required to determine at the outset as to whether a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writ of quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one. While issuing such a writ, the Court merely makes a public declaration but will not consider the respective impact of the candidates or other factors which may be relevant for issuance of a writ of certiorari. (See R.K.Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 3 SCC 119, para 74). 23. A writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. (See Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. & Secy. To Govt. of Haryana, (2002) 6 SCC 269 )." (v) In the judgment made in W.A.No.12128 of 1998 dated 14.2.2000 the Division Bench of this Court held that quo-warranto is not a writ of right and it is the discretion of the Court to refuse or grant, according to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Division Bench followed the decision of the Bombay High Court decision reported in AIR 1954 Bom 116 (Bhairulal Chunilal v. State of Bombay). The Division Bench followed the decision of the Bombay High Court decision reported in AIR 1954 Bom 116 (Bhairulal Chunilal v. State of Bombay). (vi) In the decision of mine reported in 2012 (1) CWC 352 (Dr.S.Kathiroli v. Government of India) writ of quo-warranto prayer against the Director of Institute of Ocean Technology, Chennai was considered and dismissed the said writ petition by following the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1964 (4) SCR 575 (University of Mysore v. C.D.Govinda Rao). In the said decision the Supreme Court held that in writ of quo-warranto the Courts should be slow in interfering with the opinion expressed by the experts, particularly when there are no allegations of mala fide. 20. On the principles laid down in the above cited decisions and having regard to the fact that the first respondent has already constituted a Search Committee to select a Vice-Chancellor to the second respondent University even before expiry of the term of office of the third respondent, the petitioner has not made out a case for issuing a writ of quo-warranto in this case due to the reasons stated below: 1. The third respondent was found qualified for being appointed as Vice-Chancellor of the second respondent University and was appointed as per Statute in April, 2007. 2. The third respondent is not found as disqualified till his completion of five years term. 3. The third respondent has not completed 70 years of age. 4. The third respondent is continuing as Vice-Chancellor after the expiry of five years term as per first proviso to Statute 1(A)(4) of the Pondicherry University, i.e., by operation of law. 5. The first respondent has initiated action by appointing a Search Committee for selection of new Vice-Chancellor even before the expiry of the term of office of the third respondent. 6. The Search Committee appointed by the visitor is likely to submit its panel shortly and new Vice-Chancellor is going to be appointed in the second respondent University soon. 21. The first respondent issued instructions to the third respondent on 7.2.2012 as to how he should function, as his term of office is going to be over. 6. The Search Committee appointed by the visitor is likely to submit its panel shortly and new Vice-Chancellor is going to be appointed in the second respondent University soon. 21. The first respondent issued instructions to the third respondent on 7.2.2012 as to how he should function, as his term of office is going to be over. The said instruction reads as follows: "No.F.39-16/2011-Desk(U) Government of India Ministry of Human Resource Development (Department of Higher Education) New Delhi, the 7th February, 2012 To Prof.J.A.K.Tareen, Vice-Chancellor, Pondicherry University, R.V.Nagar, Puducherry – 605 014 Subject: Instructions for Heads/Chairmen of Autonomous Bodies regarding Selections/ Promotions, three months before concluding their tenure. Sir, I am enclosing herewith a copy of this Ministry's letter dated 19th July, 2004 containing instructions for Heads of Autonomous Bodies, who are going to complete their term in the Office within two-three months. 2. In view of the above, I have been desired to request you (as you are going to complete term of Vice-Chancellor on 15.04.2012) to comply with the instructions contained in the above said letter and thus refrain from initiating any action to make selections/promotions and also take long term policy decisions. 3. Kindly acknowledge receipt of the letter. Yours faithfully, Sd/-xxxxxxx (Juglal Singh) Under Secretary to the Government of India Tel.No.23387342" As the third respondent is continuing as a stop-gap/care-taker Vice-Chancellor till a new Vice-Chancellor is appointed by virtue of Statute 1(A)(4) first proviso, he is bound to comply with the first respondent's instruction dated 7.2.2012 extracted above, while discharging his functions. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is dismissed with the above observations. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed.