Judgment :- 1. This second appeal has been filed by the defendants 1,2,3,5 and 6, inveighing the judgement and decree dated 03.11.2003 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Erode in A.S.No.5 of 2003 modifying the judgment and decree dated 15.11.2002 passed by the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Perundurai in O.S.No.34 of 1997. 2. The parties, for thesake of convenience, are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this second appeal would run thus: a. The first respondent/plaintiff-Sampoornammal filed the suit seeking the following reliefs: To pass a judgment and decree - - to grant a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents and men from putting up any further constructions in the encroached area of about 40 cents in the south eastern portion of the schedule land and immediately north of the property belonging to the defendants; - to grant a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the foundation and such other constructions made by them in the encroached area of about 40 cents in the south eastern portion of the schedule lands, on or before a date to be fixed. - in default thereof, directing the removal of such foundation and constructions made by the defendants over and above the said encroached area of the suit lands through an officer ; andfor costs. (extracted as such) on the main ground that the defendants who are having their respective lands to the south of the plaintiff's land attempted to trespass into her land to an extent of 40 cents, out of the large tract of land belonging to the plaintiff and some of the defendants also barged into the plaintiff's area and had put up foundation and also a little bit of construction. b. The defendants filed the written statement resisting the suit. Whereupon, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed and thrice the Advocate Commissioner visited the spot and submitted his report with sketch. The Surveyor, who accompanied the Advocate Commissioner also submitted the sketch Ex.C7. c. Whereupon the issues were framed by the trial court. d. During trial, the plaintiff examined herself as PW1 and marked Exs.A1 to A11. Whereupon, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed and thrice the Advocate Commissioner visited the spot and submitted his report with sketch. The Surveyor, who accompanied the Advocate Commissioner also submitted the sketch Ex.C7. c. Whereupon the issues were framed by the trial court. d. During trial, the plaintiff examined herself as PW1 and marked Exs.A1 to A11. On the defendant's side, the first defendant examined himself as DW1 and marked Exs.B1 to B4 and the Court documents Exs.C1 to C7 were also marked. e. Ultimately, the trial court decreed the suit in toto. As against which, the defendants preferred appeal. Whereupon, the first appellate court modified the judgment and decree to the effect that the actual extent of encroachment was about 15.12 cents and not 40 cents and consequently in commensurate with Ex.C7, the first appellate court modified the decree of the trial court. f. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgments and decrees of both the courts below, the defendants, 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 preferred this second appeal on various grounds and also suggesting several substantial questions of law. 4. My learned Predecessor framed the following substantial question of law: Would not the Advocate Commissioner's report in the earlier proceedings namely O.S.No.86 of 1972 to which the present plaintiff is a party (the said report is marked in this proceeding as Ex.B1) wouldlegally come in the way of the plaintiff maintaining her claim for mandatory injunction? (extracted as such) 5. After hearing both sides, I was of the opinion that along with substantial question of law framed by my learned Predecessor, the following substantial questions of law should be framed and accordingly they are framed to the knowledge of both the sides. Additional substantial question of laws: 1. Whether the plaint was bad for want of specific measurements cited in the schedule relating to the area attempted to be encroached by the defendants and whether the Advocate Commissioner was expected to measure the entire holdings of the plaintiff to find out as to whether the are attempted to be encroached belongs to the plaintiff or not? 2. Whether the plaint was bad for want of specific measurements cited in the schedule relating to the area attempted to be encroached by the defendants and whether the Advocate Commissioner was expected to measure the entire holdings of the plaintiff to find out as to whether the are attempted to be encroached belongs to the plaintiff or not? 2. Whether both the courts below despite the finding of the Commissioner that as on the dates of his measurements, the encroached areas were under the enjoyment of the defendants, were justified in not insisting for a prayer for recovery of possession and corresponding payment of court fee, but straightaway ordering mandatory injunction? 6. Both sides, after understanding the purport of the aforesaid substantial questions of law, advanced their arguments. 7. The gist and kernel, the pith and marrow of the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would run thus: a) The description of the suit property, is as vague as vagueness could be and no head or tail could be made out of it. Vaguely it is found stated in the plaint that nine independent land owners adjacent to the plaintiff's land, attempted to encroach, to an extent of 40 cents of the plaintiff's land on the southern side, so to say, in the land to the North of the defendants' holdings and thereby giving an impression as though all the defendants jointly encroached 40 cents of lands. b) Instead of seeking for possession, a bare mandatory injunction was sought for, which was faulty. c) The Advocate Commissioner in his report pointed out that there was a compound wall enclosing D7's holdings and D1 to D3 are found to be having in the well their motors for pumping water from the well and in the wake of these facts, the plaintiff was enjoined to seek for possession, if at all she could prove her case and not for mandatory injunction; however, both the courts below fell into error in not considering this vital point. d) Ex.B1, the Advocate Commissioner's report in the earlier suit instituted by the plaintiff, would indicate and connote that there was no encroachment in the plaintiff's land and in such a case, both the courts below were not justified in holding that there was encroachment. d) Ex.B1, the Advocate Commissioner's report in the earlier suit instituted by the plaintiff, would indicate and connote that there was no encroachment in the plaintiff's land and in such a case, both the courts below were not justified in holding that there was encroachment. e) The courts below also failed to take note of the fact that the defendants acquired title by adverse possession. In the written arguments filed before the trial court, the defendants also raised the plea that there might have been encroachment by the defendants on the road portion and that might have been misunderstood by the Advocate Commissioner as though the defendants are in enjoyment of area in excess of their entitlements. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the defendants would pray for the dismissal of the suit. 8. Per contra, in a bid to extirpate, torpedo and pulverise the arguments as put forth on the side of the defendants, the learned counsel for first respondent/plaintiff would pyramid and portray his argument, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: (i) Both the courts below appropriately held that there was encroachment by the defendants in to the plaintiff's land. When the plaintiff was in turmoil and confusion because of the high handed act of the nine defendants, who happened to be the adjacent land owners, the plaintiff could file suit only with such description as found in the schedule of the plaint; moreover, the plaintiff took steps to get exactly the concerned area attempted to be trespassed into, by the defendants including the foundation mote dug and other small structures put up, by the defendants and accordingly, the Commissioner visited thrice the suit property and submitted his report with sketch. Based on that the first appellate court correctly moulded the relief and granted, which cannot be found fault with. (ii) Ex.B1 in no way helps the defendants, but it would only strengthen the case of the plaintiff because, had really there been encroachment as pleaded by the defendants, in 1972 itself in the said Ex.B1 that would have got reflected. (iii) It is absolutely not necessary to measure the entire property of the plaintiff to come to the conclusion as to whether the area attempted to be encroached by the defendants, actually belonged to the plaintiff. (iv) The defendants tried to achieve success on conjectures and surmises and also pleaded adverse possession unsuccessfully. (iii) It is absolutely not necessary to measure the entire property of the plaintiff to come to the conclusion as to whether the area attempted to be encroached by the defendants, actually belonged to the plaintiff. (iv) The defendants tried to achieve success on conjectures and surmises and also pleaded adverse possession unsuccessfully. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/R1 would submit that there is no question of law much less substantial question of law is involved in this case and he would pray for the dismissal of the second appeal. 9. All these points are taken together for discussion as they are inter-linked and interwoven, inter-connected and entwined with one another. 10. The whole kit and caboodle of facts and figures that stood transpired from the records as well as on hearing the arguments of both sides, could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: i) Indubitably and indisputably, a vast tract of land originally belonged to the plaintiff's ancestor. Subsequently, in the suit O.S..No.86 of 1972, the property described in the schedule of the plaint, was allotted to the share of the plaintiff and during such partition proceedings the Commissioner's report Ex.B1 also emerged. ii) Unassailably and unarguably, the defendants nine in number purchased lands as per their sale deeds, from the ancestor of the plaintiff. iii) It is the case of the plaintiff that shortly anterior to the filing of the present suit on 09.02.1997, the defendants attempted to barge into the southern most portion of the plaintiff's property and put up foundation and small constructions so as to encroach upon it and in a bid to thwart and nullify their attempt the suit was filed. However, the defendants' case could succinctly and precisely be stated that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the area noted in Ex.C5 under their possession for over 30 years as the original sale deeds in respect of their respective areas emerged during 1950's; but the suit was filed only in the year 1997 and wherefore, adverse possession could rightly be discerned and there was acquiescence also, obviously and axiomatically on the part of the plaintiff and their predecessor-in-title. 11. 11. Trite the proposition of law, is that because of the conduct of the neighbouring land owners, the plaintiff who approached the court was put in puzzlement and more so in a confusion confounded situation; wherefore, with mathematical precision, she was not able to set out in detail the area attempted to be encroached by the defendants. As such, the plaintiff with the available materials hurriedly filed the plaint. However, the plaintiff with all earnestness filed successive applications to get demarcated precisely with mathematical accuracy the areas attempted to be encroached by the defendants by putting up foundation mote and also raising small constructions. If the law is fastidious in expecting that the persons like the plaintiff, should with mathematical precision come to the court detailing and delineating the property attempted to be described, then that would amount to shutting the doors of the court on such hapless and helpless persons. Scarcely could it be stated that the maxim Lex non cogit ad impossibilia – The law does not compel to impossible ends is not applicable in this factual matrix. 12. It is a common or garden principle of law that with the help of the court, a genuine plaintiff can get demarcated the actual area of encroachment or the area attempted to be encroached by putting up foundation mote or by raising construction. The plaintiff can get the plaint schedule amended or he could straightaway pray for passing a decree as per the Commissioner's report and sketch and such a procedure cannot be looked askance at. 13. Technicalities are hand mades of justice, which cannot be pressed into service for the purpose of thwarting the course of justice. While holding so, I would like to caution that the court procedures are not meant for being flouted, but to be followed. In proper cases the court has to bent the procedures to do justice without detriment to the other side. Accordingly, here the Advocate Commissioner visited thrice, the suit property and measured it also and the following are the reports and sketches. In proper cases the court has to bent the procedures to do justice without detriment to the other side. Accordingly, here the Advocate Commissioner visited thrice, the suit property and measured it also and the following are the reports and sketches. Ex.C1 – Commissioner's report dated 18.02.1997 Ex.C2 – Sketch of the Commissioner dated 18.02.1997 Ex.C3 – Commissioner's report dated 16.04.1997 Ex.C4 – Sketch of the Commissioner dated 16.04.1997 Ex.C5 – Commissioner's report dated 04.04.2001 Ex.C6 – Sketch of the Commissioner dated 04.04.2001 Ex.C7 – Sketch of the Surveyor dated 04.04.2001 A cumulative reading of those exhibits would unambiguously and unequivocally high light and spotlight the fact that the Commissioner earlier visited the suit property and noted the physical features and at that time, he found that D1 and other persons like him, were only attempting to lay foundation and during his subsequent visit, he found that to an extent of two feet or so, the construction was raised. However, in his report, Ex.C5 he would state that the defendants were enjoying excess areas over and above the areas to which they are entitled to. 14. The core question arises as to whether that itself would be indicative of the fact that the legal possession was with the defendants. I would like to shed light on the concept "possessionis". If the defendants are in established possession of an encroached area, then the only course open to the plaintiff is to seek for recovery of possession and not for mandatory injunction. However, in this case, as on the date of the filing of the suit, there is nothing to indicate and exemplify that the defendants after barging into the land, came into effective and established possession of the suit property. 15. At this juncture, I would like to extract here under the concepts 'corpus possessionis and 'animus possidendi', as found in the famous treatise Salmond on Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition, by P.J.Fitzgerald. Certain excerpts from it, would run thus: ". . . . . Salmond considered that possession consisted of a corpus possessionis and an animus possidendi. The former, he thought, comprised both the power to use the thing possessed and the existence of grounds for the expectation that the possessor's use will not be interfered with. The latter consisted of an intent to appropriate to oneself the exclusive use of the thing possessed. Salmond considered that possession consisted of a corpus possessionis and an animus possidendi. The former, he thought, comprised both the power to use the thing possessed and the existence of grounds for the expectation that the possessor's use will not be interfered with. The latter consisted of an intent to appropriate to oneself the exclusive use of the thing possessed. It is certainly true that in assessing whether possession has been acquired, lost or abandoned intention may be highly relevant. . . . . . The test then for determining whether a man is in possession of anything is whether he is in general control of it. Unless he is actually holding or using it – in which event he clearly has possession – we have to ask whether the facts are such that we can expect him to be able to enjoy the use of it without interference on the part of others."(emphasis supplied) 16. I would also like to refer to the Hon'ble Apex Court precedents in this regard. 1. 2008(6) CTC 237 (S.C.) [Anathula Sudhakar vs. P.Buchi Reddy (dead) by L.Rs.and others. Certain excerpts from it would run thus" "13. In a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with plaintiff's possession the plaintiff will have to establish that as on the date of the suit he was in lawful possession of the suit property and defendant tried to interfere or disturb such lawful possession. Where the property is a building or building with appurtenant land, there may not be much difficulty in establishing possession. The plaintiff may prove physical or lawful possession, either of himself or by him through his family members or agents or lessees/licenses. Even in respect of a land without structures, as for example an agricultural land, possession may be established with reference to the actual use and cultivation. The question of title is not in issue in such a suit, though it may arise incidentally or collaterally." 2. AIR 2004 SC 4609 [ Rame Gowda (D) byL.Rs. vs. M.Varadappa Naidu (D) by L.Rs and another] "8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian Law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. AIR 2004 SC 4609 [ Rame Gowda (D) byL.Rs. vs. M.Varadappa Naidu (D) by L.Rs and another] "8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian Law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation). If the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner. 9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions. 9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions. .........." A perusal of those precedents would shed light on the point that a person in established possession for a pretty long time alone can seek for protecting his possession and all others cannot simply placing reliance on their temporary possession seek for protection of the court. If the mandates as contained in the cited precedents are not followed, then the right of the real owners of the land in possession would be jeopardised and it would lead to lawlessness. From such dicta, the corollary can be discerned rightly that the persons who are not in established possession of an area, cannot demand that no injunction could be obtained by the real owner as against them. Here the defendants are not found to be in established possession of the area under the area attempted to be encroached by them. 17. Accordingly, in this connection, I would like to refer to the Hon'ble Apex Court's decision reported in (2012) 5 MLJ 618 (SC) [A.Shanmugam vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam rep.by its President etc.] "False and irrelevant pleas: 41. The appellant is also guilty of introducing untenable pleas. The plea of adverse possession which has no foundation or basis in the facts and circumstances of the case was introduced to gain undue benefit. The Court must be cautious in granting relief to a party guilty of deliberately introducing irrelevant and untenable pleas responsible for creating unnecessary confusion by introducing such documents and pleas. These factors must be taken into consideration while granting relief and/or imposing the costs. 42. On the facts of the present case, following principles emerge: 1. It is the bounden duty of the court to uphold the truth and do justice. 2. Every litigant is expected to state truth before the law Court whether it is pleadings, affidavits or evidence. Dishonest and unscrupulous litigants have no place in law courts. 3. The ultimate object of the judicial proceedings is to discern the truth and do justice. It is the bounden duty of the court to uphold the truth and do justice. 2. Every litigant is expected to state truth before the law Court whether it is pleadings, affidavits or evidence. Dishonest and unscrupulous litigants have no place in law courts. 3. The ultimate object of the judicial proceedings is to discern the truth and do justice. It is imperative that pleadings and all other presentations before the court should be truthful. 4. Once the court discovers falsehood, concealment, distortion, obstruction or confusion in pleadings and documents, the Court should in addition to full restitution impose appropriate costs. The Court must ensure that there is no incentive for wrong doer in the temple of justice. Truth is the foundation of justice and it has to be the common endeavour of all to uphold the truth and no one should be permitted to pollute the stream of justice. 5. It is the bounden obligation of the Court to neutralize any unjust and/or undeserved benefit or advantage obtained by abusing the judicial process. ........" 18. In the wake of the aforesaid precedent, it is just and necessary to find out as to whether there is any clinching evidence to show that the defendants have been in possession and enjoyment of the area demarcated as the area attempted to be encroached, for a pretty long time so as to drive the plaintiff to seek a prayer for recovery of possession after paying the necessary court fee. 19. In fact, the learned counsel for the defendants placing reliance on Ex.B1, the Commissioner's report emerged in the partition suit filed by the plaintiff herein, would advance his argument that the said Ex.B1, in fact would support the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff's property was not at all encroached by the defendants. 20. What I would like to observe, is that the reliance placed on Ex.B1 by the defendants boomerangs as against them for the simple reason that during the year 1972, there was no encroachment in plaintiff's property, wherefore, there was no reference about the encroachment by the defendants in the plaintiff's property and that is the ratiocination that should be adhered to in understanding Ex.B1. There is no ground for countenancing by the Court that the plaintiff had chosen the line of least resistance in resorting to pray for mandatory injunction instead of seeking a prayer for recovery of possession. 21. Witnesses might lie but the circumstances would not do so. Accordingly, there is nothing to indicate and convey that even during the year 1972 itself or even before that the defendants started enjoying more area than what they were entitled to. The plea of adverse possession has to be proved convincingly by the defendants. 22. In this connection, I would like to fruitfully refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2011) 10 SCC 404 [State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar and others]. Certain excerpts from it would run thus: "35. Paras 26-29 of Hemaji Waghaji Jat5 are set out as under: (SCC pp.526-28) “26. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession in the recent judgment of JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom14 which concerned the loss of ownership of land by virtue of adverse possession. In the said case, ‘the applicant company was the registered owner of a plot of 23 hectares of agricultural land. The owners of a property adjacent to the land, Mr and Mrs Graham (the Grahams) occupied the land under a grazing agreement. After a brief exchange of documents in December 1983 a chartered surveyor acting for the applicants wrote to the Grahams noting that the grazing agreement was about to expire and requiring them to vacate the land’. The Grahams continued to use the whole of the disputed land for farming without the permission of the applicants from September 1998 till 1999. In 1997, Mr Graham moved the Local Land Registry against the applicant on the ground that he had obtained title by adverse possession. The Grahams challenged the applicant company’s claims under the Limitation Act, 1980 (the 1980 Act) which provides that a person cannot bring an action to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years of adverse possession by another. 27. The judgment was pronounced in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham15. The Court held in favour of the Grahams but went on to observe the irony in law of adverse possession. 27. The judgment was pronounced in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham15. The Court held in favour of the Grahams but went on to observe the irony in law of adverse possession. The court observed that the law which provides to oust an owner on the basis of inaction of 12 years is ‘illogical and disproportionate’. The effect of such law would ‘seem draconian to the owner’ and ‘a windfall for the squatter’. The court expressed its astonishment on the prevalent law that ousting an owner for not taking action within limitation is illogical. The applicant company aggrieved by the said judgment filed an appeal and the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court decision. The Grahams then appealed to the House of Lords, which, allowed their appeal and restored the order of the High Court. 28. The House of Lords in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham16 observed that the Grahams had possession of the land in the ordinary sense of the word, and, therefore, the applicant company had been dispossessed of it within the meaning of the Limitation Act of 1980. 29. We deem it proper to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma6: (SCC p.79, paras.51-52) ‘51. Thereafter the applicants moved the European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) alleging that the United Kingdom law on adverse possession, by which they lost land to a neighbour, operated in violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”). 52. It was contended by the applicants that they had been deprived of their land by the operation of the domestic law on adverse possession which is in contravention with Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”), which reads as under: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possession. No one shall be deprived of his possession except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. No one shall be deprived of his possession except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” ’ This Court in Revamma case6 also mentioned that the European Council of Human Rights importantly laid down three-pronged test to judge the interference of the Government with the right of ‘peaceful enjoyment of property’: (SCC p.79, para 53) ‘53. … [In] Beyeler v. Italy17 it was held that the “interference” should comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue a legitimate aim (public interest) by means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.’ The Court observed: (Revamma case6 SCC pp.79-80, paras 54-56) ‘54. … “The question nevertheless remains whether, even having regard to the lack of care and inadvertence on the part of the applicants and their advisers, the deprivation of their title to the registered land and the transfer of beneficial ownership to those in unauthorised possession struck a fair balance with any legitimate public interest served. In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the application of the provisions of the 1925 and 1980 Acts to deprive the applicant companies of their title to the registered land imposed on them an individual and excessive burden and upset the fair balance between the demands of the public interest on the one hand and the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions on the other. There has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1.” 55. The question of the application of Article 41 was referred to for the Grand Chamber Hearing of the ECHR. This case sets the field of adverse possession and its interface with the right to peaceful enjoyment in all its complexity. 56. Therefore it will have to be kept in mind that the courts around the world are taking an unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights.’ ” (emphasis in original) 36. In Hemaji Waghaji Jat case5 this Court ultimately observed as under: (SCC p. 529, paras 32-33). “32. 56. Therefore it will have to be kept in mind that the courts around the world are taking an unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights.’ ” (emphasis in original) 36. In Hemaji Waghaji Jat case5 this Court ultimately observed as under: (SCC p. 529, paras 32-33). “32. Before parting with this case, we deem it appropriate to observe that the law of adverse possession which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate. The law as it exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law ought not to benefit a person who in a clandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that the law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner. 33. We fail to comprehend why the law should place premium on dishonesty by legitimising possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to lose his possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation.” 40. Parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish “bad faith” adverse possession i.e. adverse possession achieved through intentional trespassing, actually believing it to be their own could receive title through adverse possession, sends a wrong signal to the society at large. Such a change would ensure that only those who had established attachments to the land through honest means would be entitled to legal relief. 41. In case, Parliament decides to retain the law of adverse possession, Parliament might simply require the adverse possession claimants to possess the property in question for a period of 30 to 50 years, rather than a mere 12. Such an extension would help to ensure that the successful claimants have lived on the land for generations, and are therefore less likely to be individually culpable for the trespass (although their forebears might). A longer statutory period would also decrease the frequency of adverse possession suits and ensure that only those claimants most intimately connected with the land acquire it, while only the most passive and unprotective owners lose title. 42. A longer statutory period would also decrease the frequency of adverse possession suits and ensure that only those claimants most intimately connected with the land acquire it, while only the most passive and unprotective owners lose title. 42. Reverting to the facts of this case, if the Police Department of the State with all its might is bent upon taking possession of any land or building in a clandestine manner, then, perhaps no one would be able to effectively prevent them. 43. It is our bounden duty and obligation to ascertain the intention of Parliament while interpreting the law. Law and justice, more often than not, happily coincide, only rarely we find serious conflict. The archaic law of adverse possession is one such. A serious relook is absolutely imperative in the larger interest of the people. 44. Adverse possession allows a trespasser—a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, in the eye of the law—to gain legal title to land which he has illegally possessed for 12 years. How 12 years of illegality can suddenly be converted to legal title is, logically and morally speaking, baffling. This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible. The doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a great many legal minds. We are clearly of the opinion that time has come for change. 45. If the protectors of law become the grabbers of the property (land and building), then, people will be left with no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the entire country. It is indeed a very disturbing and dangerous trend. In our considered view, it must be arrested without further loss of time in the larger public interest. No government department, public undertaking, and much less the Police Department should be permitted to perfect the title of the land or building by invoking the provisions of adverse possession and grab the property of its own citizens in the manner that has been done in this case. 46. In our considered view, there is an urgent need for a fresh look on the entire law on adverse possession. We recommend the Union of India to immediately consider and seriously deliberate either abolition of the law of adverse possession and in the alternate to make suitable amendments in the law of adverse possession. 46. In our considered view, there is an urgent need for a fresh look on the entire law on adverse possession. We recommend the Union of India to immediately consider and seriously deliberate either abolition of the law of adverse possession and in the alternate to make suitable amendments in the law of adverse possession. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps in accordance with law. 47. This special leave petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) to be paid by the State of Haryana for filing a totally frivolous petition and unnecessarily wasting the time of the Court and demonstrating its evil design of grabbing the properties of the lawful owners in a clandestine manner. The costs be deposited within four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment. In this petition, we did not issue notice to the defendants, therefore, we direct that the costs be deposited with the National Legal Services Authority for utilising the same to enable the poor litigants to contest their cases." 23. On the defendant's side, only D1 was examined as DW1 and there is nothing to exemplify and demonstrate, convey and portray that the defendants have been in possession and enjoyment of the area located by the Advocate Commissioner. In such a case, even by phantasmagorical thoughts it cannot be assumed or presumed that long prior to the filing of the suit, the defendants had acquired title by adverse possession or in view of some alleged acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff or her predecessor-in-title. The plea of the defendants is improbable and sounds hallow. 24. The trial court without any reference to the demarcation by the Advocate Commissioner relating to the area attempted to be encroached by the defendants, simply decreed the suit for the entire extent of 40 cents of land, which belied logic; but the first appellate court appropriately and appositely, correctly and legally taking into account the Commissioner's reports and the sketches including the Surveyor sketch, Ex.C7 ordered mandatory injunction only in respect of 15.12 cents of land and in respect of permanent injunction concerned, the suit was decreed in entirety over which, there is no controversy. 25. 25. The contention on the side of the defendants that there might have been encroachment on the road side, and that would have made the Advocate Commissioner to believe as though they encroached into the plaintiff's property is neither here nor there. 26. The Surveyor Sketch, Ex.C7 clearly demarcated the road from the defendants properties, which are adjacent to the road. There is nothing to indicate and establish or at least faintly foreshadow that certain portions of the road are under the encroachment of the defendants. In such a case, the court cannot assume and presume on conjectures and surmises as though there might have been encroachment of road portions by the defendants and that might have lead the Advocate Commissioner to give a finding as though a part of the plaintiff's property was encroached. Such imaginary pleas are nothing but a load of baloney fraught with falsity and inconsistency, unworthy of being countenanced and upheld. 27. On balance, (a) The substantial question of law No.1 is decided to the effect that the Advocate Commissioner's report in the earlier proceedings namely O.S.No.86 of 1972 to which the present plaintiff is a party (the said report is marked in this proceeding as Ex.B1) would not legally come in the way of the plaintiff maintaining her claim for mandatory injunction. (b) The additional substantial question of law No.1 is decided to the effect that the plaint was not bad for want of specific measurements relating to the encroached area and the Advocate Commissioner was not expected to measure the entire holdings of the plaintiff to find out whether the area attempted to be encroached belongs to the plaintiff or not. (c) The additional substantial question of law No.2 is decided to the effect that the courts below despite the finding of the Commissioner that as on the dates of his measurements, the encroached areas were under the enjoyment of the defendants, were justified in not insisting for a prayer for recovery of possession and corresponding payment of court fee and in ordering mandatory injunction. 28. In the result, I could see no perversity or illegality in the findings of the first appellate court in passing such a judgment and decree and absolutely, there is no interference with the judgment and decree of the first appellate court is warranted and this second appeal is dismissed. 28. In the result, I could see no perversity or illegality in the findings of the first appellate court in passing such a judgment and decree and absolutely, there is no interference with the judgment and decree of the first appellate court is warranted and this second appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.