Judgment Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Aggrieved by the award of compensation, original respondent No.1 Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, has preferred the present Appeal. 3. The legal representatives, as well as dependents of deceased Nitayanand, who are present respondent Nos.1 to 7 had filed petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Tribunal. Nityanand died in accident of Bus of the present appellant MSRTC with goods truck No MWA-7171 on 18.12.1988, on Aurangabad-Pune Road. There was collision between these two vehicles, in which Nitayanand died. 4. The original claimants state that due to rash and negligent driving of the drivers of both vehicles, the owners as well as insurers of the bus and goods truck are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation. The learned Member, on merits, came to the conclusion that driver, owner and insurer of the goods truck are equally liable to pay 1/2 portion of the compensation i.e. Rs.1,40,000/-. Present appellant was held liable for balance 1/2 portion of the compensation. Aggrieved by the said award, the present Appeal is preferred by the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation. 5. Mrs. Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently submits that since bus driver was not made party and he was not examined by the original claimants in the proceedings, in absence of the driver, the claim could not have been proceeded and ought to have been dismissed by the learned Member of the Tribunal. She further took me through the evidence to buttress the contentions that the bus driver was not driving the bus in rash and negligent manner. 6. Mrs. Reddy further submits that an amount of Rs.30,000/-was paid towards exgretia compensation by the appellant to the original claimants and at least that amount ought to have deducted by the learned Member. In the circumstances, she submits that the award deserves to be set aside. 7. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents support the award. 8. On this material, following points arise for my determination. (I) Whether bus driver was necessary party to the proceeding? (II) Whether the learned Member has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the drivers of both the vehicles were equally rash and negligent in driver their respective vehicles? 8. On this material, following points arise for my determination. (I) Whether bus driver was necessary party to the proceeding? (II) Whether the learned Member has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the drivers of both the vehicles were equally rash and negligent in driver their respective vehicles? My finding to the said points are in the negative and the appeal is dismissed without any orders as to costs for the reasons to follows 9. As regards joining of the driver as a party, Mrs. Reddy relied on the judgment in the case of Machindranath Kernath Kasar Vs. D.S. Mylarappa and others reported in 2008 DGLS (Soft) 547. In that case, the bus driver himself has claimed compensation as his bus was involved in the accident with a truck. Other passengers of the bus had also filed petition, in which the said bus driver was examined as one of the witness. Ultimately, the Tribunal therein held that the bus driver was also rash and negligent in driver the bus. The Bus driver was not made party in the proceedings filed by the other claimants i.e. passengers. The Supreme Court has considered as to whether bus driver is necessary party. It was held by the Supreme Court that in the given situation, owner of the vehicle may take the plea that the driver had used the vehicle without his authority or permission and in that view of the matter he is not liable for the tortuous acts of the driver at all. It was further held that there are innumerable instances where the insurance company had been absolved of its liability to compensate the owner of the vehicle, interalia, on the premise that the driver did not hold a valid license. In such situations, it was observed that in appropriate case, liability of the driver would be primary. However, it was also reiterated that on the basis of principle of vicarious liability, the acts of driver and owner of the vehicle would be joint tortuous act. In the circumstances, both of them would be equally liable. 10. Thus one has to find out in given set of circumstances as to whether the driver of the vehicle is necessary party, proper party or no party at all. In the circumstances, both of them would be equally liable. 10. Thus one has to find out in given set of circumstances as to whether the driver of the vehicle is necessary party, proper party or no party at all. In the present case, it is not the case of the appellant that driver was, any way, acting in breach of the instructions of the appellant. In the circumstances, at the most driver was a proper party. It is settled principle of law that the claim can proceed in absence of any proper party. 11. In the present case, admittedly, MSRTC is employer of the driver and as such, it had full control over the driver. In the circumstances, it could very well be said that the driver of the bus could be brought in the witness box by his master i.e. the appellant vice versa as has been submitted by Mrs. Reddy that the claimants ought to have examined the driver. In that view of the matter, I hold in the present case that the bus driver was not a necessary party. 12. Mrs. Reddy further submits that an amount of Rs.30,000/-was paid towards exgretia compensation by the appellant to the original claimants and at least that amount ought to have deducted by the learned Member. However, except bare statement in the written statement there is no other evidence to that effect. Even the said statement was not put to respondent No.1 i.e. claimant No.1 when she was in the witness box. Further, the said ground is also not taken in the appeal memo. The contention therefore cannot be upheld. 13. As regards the contention that the learned Member has held that both drivers were equally rash and negligent in driving their respective vehicles, it is necessary to go through the oral, as well as documentary, evidence placed on record. Respondent No.1 Kusum-widow of the deceased, had examined passengers of the bus i.e. P.W.2 Anil Bapurao Kulkarni and P.W.3 Shrikant Kulkarni. Out of them P.W.2 Anil Kulkarni had suffered injuries in the accident, but he deposed that he came to know about the incident after accident. 14. P.W.3 Shrinkant Kulkarni, deposed that he was sitting on the fourth bench from the driver's side and truck has cut the side body sheet of the bus. Out of them P.W.2 Anil Kulkarni had suffered injuries in the accident, but he deposed that he came to know about the incident after accident. 14. P.W.3 Shrinkant Kulkarni, deposed that he was sitting on the fourth bench from the driver's side and truck has cut the side body sheet of the bus. He further deposed that "in his opinion," accident might have taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the truck driver. It is, thus, clear that oral evidence is not of any help to any of the parties. 15. Mrs. Reddy, learned counsel vehemently submits that witness P.W.3 Shrikant has expressed his opinion that accident might have taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the truck driver. I am afraid, as the opinion of the witness does not carry any weightage on the question of facts. 16. In that view of the matter, we shall have to come back to the other evidence on record. The other evidence on record is the certified copy of the panchnama of occurrence at Exh.50. The panchnama was recorded immediately after occurrence. The learned Member had minutely perused the contents of the panchnama. It would show that each of the vehicles had suffered damage from its front side, and therefore, by applying principle of res-ipsa-loquitor held that both drivers are equally rash and negligent in driving their respective vehicles. The very principle was reiterated in the case of Pushpabai Parashottam Udeshi and others Vs. M/s Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd and another (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1735), as relied on by the learned counsel for respondent No.8. In that view of the matter, reasoning adopted by the learned Member, cannot be faulted with. 17. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and the same is, therefore, dismissed without any order as to costs.