JUDGMENT : RAJIV SHARMA, J. 1. This Letter Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24.02.2009 of learned Single Judge, rendered in CWP (T) No. 2953 of 2008. Material facts necessary for adjudication of this appeal are that the appellant was appointed temporarily with respondent-H.P. Khadi and Village Industries Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board' for the sake of convenience) in October/1972 as Technician (Bamboo). He was served with a memorandum dated 29.04.1995 under Rule-14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. He filed reply to the charge-sheet on 15.05.1995. He has also appeared before the Managing Director of the respondent-Board on 31.05.2005. The disciplinary authority, i.e., Chairman of the respondent-Board has dismissed the petitioner on 15th June, 1995. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has filed an Original Application No. 5 of 1996, which was transferred to this Court and was assigned CWP(T) No. 2953 of 2008. Learned Single Judge dismissed the CWP(T) No. 2953 of 2008 on 24.02.2009. 2. Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the petitioner has not admitted his charges and he has only explained the same. He then contended that a regular inquiry should have been held on the basis of charge-sheet dated 29.04.1995. He then contended that his client has been acquitted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur in criminal case on 19.06.2004 and in these circumstances, the dismissal order is liable to be set aside. He also argued in the alternative that the gratuity of the petitioner could not be withheld. 3. Ms. Rita Goswami, learned Counsel for the respondent has sup-ported the judgment dated 24.02.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge. 4. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the entire records of CWP (T) No. 2953 of 2008. 5. The appellant has been served with a chargesheet on 29.04.1995. The first charge levelled against the petitioner was that while he was working as Incharge, Sale Shop, Hamirpur during 1993-94, he failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty inasmuch as he embezzled an amount of Rs. 41,483.65 p. w.e.f. 24.11.1993 to 30.12.1993. The petitioner has categorically admitted in reply to the charge-sheet that a sum of Rs. The first charge levelled against the petitioner was that while he was working as Incharge, Sale Shop, Hamirpur during 1993-94, he failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty inasmuch as he embezzled an amount of Rs. 41,483.65 p. w.e.f. 24.11.1993 to 30.12.1993. The petitioner has categorically admitted in reply to the charge-sheet that a sum of Rs. 41,483.65 p. on account of sale proceeds w.e.f. 24.11.1993 to 30.12.1993 could not be deposited due to rush of work during the rebate period. According to him, he has already deposited a sum of Rs. 26,000/- on 09.03.1994 and another sum of Rs. 15,504/- was deducted from his salary for the months of January, 1994 to July, 1994. 6. The second charge levelled against the petitioner was that the cash book of the sale shop was not written after 24.11.1993 and the sale book of the shop was not written after 14.12.1993. According to the petitioner, the same could not be done due to rush of work. 7. According to the third charge, the petitioner has effected bogus credit purchases in his own name being himself Incharge of the sale shop worth Rs. 69,538.43 paise. Petitioner has admitted that during the period 1992 to 1994, credit sale worth Rs. 69,538-43 paise was made in his name. The explanation given by him is that this was due to shortfall of Khadi and woolen cloths. 8. Since the petitioner has admitted the charges levelled against him, the regular inquiry was not required. The disciplinary authority, after taking into consideration the reply filed by the petitioner to the charge-sheet, also afforded him reasonable opportunity of being heard on 31.05.1995. The disciplinary authority has passed a self speaking order on 15.06.1995, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service and all the financial benefits accruing to him, were ordered to be forfeited. The employees of the respondent-Board are entitled to get gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. 9. It is settled law by now that when an employee admits the relevant facts/guilt, the regular inquiry is not required to be conducted. 10. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Channabasappa Basappa Happali Vs. The State of Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 32 have held that there is no distinction between admission of facts and admission of guilt. 9. It is settled law by now that when an employee admits the relevant facts/guilt, the regular inquiry is not required to be conducted. 10. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Channabasappa Basappa Happali Vs. The State of Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 32 have held that there is no distinction between admission of facts and admission of guilt. When the delinquent admits the facts he is guilty, and his plea amounts to a plea of guilty on the facts on which he is charged. Their Lordships have held as under: 5. It was contended on the basis of the ruling reported in R. v. Durham Quarter Sessions; Exparte Virgo, (1952 (2) QBD 1) that the facts admitted in the present case, a plea of guilty ought not to be entered upon the record and a plea of not guilty entered instead. Under the English law, a plea of guilty has to be unequivocal and the Court must ask the person and if the plea of guilty is qualified the Court must not enter a plea of guilty but one of not guilty. The Police constable here was not on his trial for a criminal offence. It was a departmental enquiry, on facts of which due notice was given to him. He admitted the facts. In fact his Counsel argued before us that he admitted the facts but not his guilt. We do not see any distinction between admission of facts and admission of guilt. When he admitted the facts, he was guilty. The facts speak for themselves. It was a clear case of indiscipline and nothing less. If a Police Officer remains absent without leave and also resorts to fast as a demonstration against the action of the superior officer the indiscipline is fully established. The learned Single Judges in the High Court was right when he laid down that the plea amounted to a plea of guilty on the facts on which the petitioner was charged and we are in full agreement with the observations of the learned Single Judge. 11. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Shyam Lal, AIR 2004 SC 4271 have held that admission is the best piece of evidence against its maker, though it is open to the maker to show why it should not be acted upon. Their Lordships have held as under: 7. 11. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Shyam Lal, AIR 2004 SC 4271 have held that admission is the best piece of evidence against its maker, though it is open to the maker to show why it should not be acted upon. Their Lordships have held as under: 7. We find that the Tribunal's conclusions are prima facie not correct. The statement made by the passenger who had paid excess money to the Checking Officer is not in the nature of hearsay evidence. Additionally, the effect of the admission regarding guilt as contained in the letters dated 13.1.1989 and 24.2.1989 have not been considered in the proper perspective. It is a fairly settled position in law that admission is the best piece of evidence against the person making the admission. It is, however, open to the person making the admission to show why the admission is not to be acted upon. 12. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chairman and MD V.S.P. and Others Vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, (2008) 5 SCC 569 have held that when the charges are admitted, penalty based on delinquent's admission is valid and the principles of natural justice are not violated. Their Lordships have held as under: 16. Indisputably, respondent was a habitual absentee. He in his explanation, in answer to the charge sheet pleaded guilty admitting the charges. In terms of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, charges having been admitted were not required to be proved. It was on that premise that the enquiry proceeding was closed. Before the enquiry officer, he did not submit the explanation that his mother being ill. He, despite opportunities granted to report to duty, did not do it. He failed to explain even his prior conduct. 18. It was observed that judicial admissions can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. 19. A subsequent explanation before another authority, which had not been pleaded in the departmental proceedings, cannot by itself a ground to hold that the principles of natural justice had not been complied with in the disciplinary proceedings. 13. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Himachal Road Transport Corpn. and Another Vs. Hukam Chand, (2009) 11 SCC 222 have held that where employee admits his misconduct enquiry in such an eventuality is not necessary. 13. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Himachal Road Transport Corpn. and Another Vs. Hukam Chand, (2009) 11 SCC 222 have held that where employee admits his misconduct enquiry in such an eventuality is not necessary. Their Lordships have held as under: 12. Compliance with the principles of natural justice, either by holding an enquiry or by giving the employee an opportunity of hearing or showing cause, is necessary, where an employer proposes to punish an employee on a charge of misconduct which is denied, or when any term or condition of employment is proposed to be altered to the employee's disadvantage without his consent. 13. On the other hand, if there is an admission of misconduct, or if the employee pleads guilty in respect of the charge, or if the employee consents to the alteration of any terms and condition of service, or where the employee himself seeks the alteration in the conditions of service, there is no need for holding an enquiry or for giving an opportunity to the employee to be heard or show cause. Holding an employee guilty of a misconduct on admission, or altering the conditions of service with consent, without enquiry or opportunity to show cause, does not violate principles of natural justice. In the instant case, as discussed hereinabove, the appellant has admitted his mis-conduct and, in these circumstances, the inquiry proceedings were closed and the disciplinary authority has passed a detailed order, imposing the penalty of dismissal upon him. 14. There is no merit in the contention of Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant that it was not an admission of guilt but an explanation. The letter dated 15.05.1995 is to be read as a whole. Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant has also argued that his client has been acquitted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur on 19.6.2004 and, in these circumstances, the dismissal order is liable to be set aside. 15. It is settled law under the service jurisprudence that during departmental proceedings, the charges are to be proved within the preponderance of probabilities and in criminal trial, the same have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In criminal proceedings, the Evidence Act is applicable. In the present case, the petitioner has admitted his guilt and the inquiry was closed. 16. It is settled law under the service jurisprudence that during departmental proceedings, the charges are to be proved within the preponderance of probabilities and in criminal trial, the same have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In criminal proceedings, the Evidence Act is applicable. In the present case, the petitioner has admitted his guilt and the inquiry was closed. 16. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Samar Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2011) 10 SCALE 113 have held that acquittal in criminal case has no bearing or relevance to departmental proceedings as standard of proof in both cases is totally different. Their Lordships have held as under: 6. We have considered all the aforesaid submissions in the light of the records that are available with us. The medical report which is placed on record indicates that the appellant had consumed alcohol, but he was not intoxicated. The appellant was missing from the headquarters on 27.10.1991 from the morning and he was caught in the case registered u/s 392 I.P.C. in the evening. The appellant wishes to make a defence that he was advised to take medicine but the prescription which is placed in the departmental proceedings does not indicate that any medicine was prescribed in that prescription. The appellant was arrested in the criminal case in connection with stealing of a bottle of foreign liquor and even during that time he had consumed alcohol prior to the incident. These facts have been brought out in the inquiry proceedings initiated against him in which the appellant did not participate. Therefore, whatever allegations have been brought against him, have been proved by placing cogent materials on record, which go unrebutted due to his absence in the proceedings. We also find that the appellant has been charged on the ground of negligence, dereliction of duty and consuming liquor, The aforesaid facts are found proved in the departmental proceedings. 8. Now, the issue is whether punishment awarded to the appellant is disproportionate to the offence alleged. The appellant belongs to a disciplinary force and the members of such a force is required to maintain discipline and to act in a befitting manner in public. Instead of that, he was found under the influence of liquor and then indulged himself in an offence. The appellant belongs to a disciplinary force and the members of such a force is required to maintain discipline and to act in a befitting manner in public. Instead of that, he was found under the influence of liquor and then indulged himself in an offence. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to interfere with the satisfaction arrived at by the disciplinary authority that in the present case punishment of dismissal from service is called for. The punishment awarded, in our considered opinion, cannot be said to be shocking to our conscience and, therefore, the aforesaid punishment awarded does not call for any interference. 17. In a recent judgment The Divisional Controller, KSRTC Vs. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2011) 13 JT 247 their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have reiterated the same principles. Their Lordships have held as under: 11. The question of considering reinstatement after decision of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal Court arises only and only if the dismissal from services was based on conviction by the criminal Court in view of the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, 1950, or analogous provisions in the statutory rules applicable in a case. In a case where enquiry has been held independently of the criminal proceedings, acquittal in a criminal Court is of no help. The law is otherwise. Even if a person stood acquitted by a criminal Court, domestic enquiry can be held, the reason being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry it is the preponderance of probabilities that constitutes the test to be applied. 18. Now, we will advert to the plea raised by Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant that the gratuity of the petitioner could not be forfeited. 19. According to Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or partially forfeited, if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment. 20. In the instant case, the services of the petitioner have been terminated for embezzlement. 20. In the instant case, the services of the petitioner have been terminated for embezzlement. He had already admitted his misconduct and thereafter he has been dismissed. In view of this legal position, there is no illegality in the order of the disciplinary authority, whereby all the monetary benefits accruing to the petitioner have been forfeited. 21. According to Rule-24 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 also, dismissal or removal of a Government servant from a service or post entails forfeiture of his past service. 22. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd. Vs. Workmen and Others etc., have held that in a case of termination of employment on ground of misconduct a distinction should be made between technical misconduct which leaves no trail of indiscipline, misconduct resulting in damage to the employer's property which may be compensated by forfeiture of gratuity or part thereof and serious misconduct which though not directly causing damage such as acts of violence against the management or other employees or riotous or disorderly behaviour, in or near the place of employment is conducive to grave indiscipline. Their Lordships have held as under: 35. A similar view was expressed in The Remington Rand of India Ltd. Vs. The Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 224 , In Calcutta Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 1286 however protest was raised against acceptance of this rule without qualification. Mitter, J. observed at p. 9, (of Lab LJ) = (At p. 1293 of AIR) that it was difficult to concur in principle with the opinion expressed in the The Garment Cleaning Works Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1962 SC 673 . Mitter, J., observed: We are inclined to think that it (gratuity) is paid to a workman to ensure good conduct throughout the period he serves the employer. 'Long and meritorious service' must mean long and unbroken period of service meritorious to the end. As the period of service must be unbroken, so must the continuity of meritorious service be a condition for entitling the workman to gratuity. 'Long and meritorious service' must mean long and unbroken period of service meritorious to the end. As the period of service must be unbroken, so must the continuity of meritorious service be a condition for entitling the workman to gratuity. If a workman commits such misconduct "as causes financial loss to his employer, the employer would, under the general law, have a right of action against the employee for the loss caused, and making a provision for withholding payment of gratuity where such loss was caused to the employer does not seem to aid to the harmonious employment of labourers or workmen, further, the misconduct may be such as to undermine the discipline in the workers-a case in which it would be extremely difficult to assess the financial loss to the employer. Misconduct" spreads over a wide and hazy spectrum of industrial activity; the most seriously subversive conduct rendering an employee wholly unfit for employment to mere technical default are (sic) covered thereby. The Parliament enacted the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, which by Section 15 had authorised the appropriate Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act and in respect of additional matters to be included in the Schedule, The Central Government has framed certain model standing rules by notification dated December 18, 1946, called 'The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1946'. In Schedule I-Model Standing Orders-Clause 14 provides: (1) X X X X (2) A workman may be suspended for a period not exceeding four days at a time, or dismissed without notice or any compensation in lieu of notice, if he is found to be guilty of misconduct. (3) The following acts and omissions shall be treated as misconduct:-- (a) wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether alone or in combination with others, to any lawful and reasonable order of a superior, (b) theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's business or property. (3) The following acts and omissions shall be treated as misconduct:-- (a) wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether alone or in combination with others, to any lawful and reasonable order of a superior, (b) theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's business or property. (c) wilful damage to or loss of employer's goods or property, (d) taking or giving bribes or any illegal gratification, (e) habitual absence without leave or absence without leave for more than 10 days, (f) habitual late attendance, (g) habitual breach of any law applicable to the establishment, (h) riotous or disorderly behaviour during working hours at the establish-merit or any act subversive of discipline, (i) habitual negligence or neglect of work, (j) frequent repetition of any act or omission for which a fine may be imposed to a maximum of 2 per cent, of the wages in a month, (k) striking work or inciting others to strike work in contravention of the provisions of any law, or rule having the force of law. A bare perusal of the Schedule shows that the expression "misconduct" covers a large area of human conduct. On the one hand are the habitual late attendance, habitual negligence and neglect of works: on the other had are riotous or disorderly behaviour during working hours at the establishment or any act subversive of discipline, wilful insubordination or disobedience. Misconduct falling under several of these latter heads of misconduct may involve no direct loss or damage to the employer, but would render the functioning of the establishment impossible or extremely hazardous. For instance, assault on the Manager of an establishment may not directly involve the employer in any loss or damage which could be equated in terms of money, but it would render the working of the establishment impossible. One may also envisage several acts of misconduct not directly involving the establishment in any loss, but which are destructive of discipline and cannot be tolerated. In none of the cases cited any detailed examination of what type of misconduct would or would not involve to the employer loss capable of being compensated in terms of money was made: it was broadly stated in the cases which have come before this Court that notwithstanding dismissal for misconduct a workman will be entitled to gratuity after deducting the loss occasioned to the employer. If the cases cited do not enunciate any broad principle we think that in the application of those cases as precedents a distinction should be made between technical misconduct which leaves no trial of indiscipline, misconduct resulting in damage to the employer's property, which may be compensated by forfeiture of gratuity or part thereof, and serious misconduct which though not directly causing damage, such as acts of violence against the management or other employees or riotous or disorderly behaviour, in or near the place the employment is conducive to grave indiscipline. The first should involve no forfeiture: the second may involve forfeiture of an amount equal to the loss directly suffered by the employer in consequence of the misconduct and the third may entail forfeiture of gratuity due to the workmen. The precedents of this Court e.g., Management of Wenger and Co. Vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1964 SC 864 ), Ramington Rand of India Ltd. case, (1968) 2 Lab LJ 542 (SC) and Motipur Zamindari (P) Ltd.'s case, 1965-2 Lab LJ 139 (SC) do not compel us to hold that no misconduct however grave may be visited with forfeiture of gratuity. In our judgment, the rule set out by this Court in Management of Wenger and Co. Vs. Their Workmen, and Motipur Zamindari (P) Ltd.'s case, 1965-2 Lab LJ 139 (SC) applies only to those cases where there has been by action wilful or negligent any loss occasioned to the property of the employer and the misconduct does not involve acts of violence against the management or other employees, or riotous or disorderly behaviour in or near the place of employment. In these exceptional cases-the third class of cases-the employer may exercise the right of forfeit gratuity: to hold otherwise would be to put a premium upon conduct destructive of maintenance of discipline. In the instant case, since the petitioner has committed grave misconduct of embezzlement he cannot be granted gratuity. 23. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Y.P. Sarabhai Vs. Union Bank of India and Another, AIR 2006 SC 2316 have held that the person dismissed from service is entitled to get only the provident fund, but no gratuity. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh Gill Vs. 23. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Y.P. Sarabhai Vs. Union Bank of India and Another, AIR 2006 SC 2316 have held that the person dismissed from service is entitled to get only the provident fund, but no gratuity. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh Gill Vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Others, (2006) 11 SCALE 624 have held that termination of services in terms of Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is imperative. Their Lordships have held as under: 13. The Act provides for a close-knit scheme providing for payment of gratuity. It is a complete code containing detailed provisions covering the essential provisions of a scheme for a gratuity. It not only creates a right to payment of gratuity but also lays down the principles for quantification thereof as also the conditions on which he may be denied therefrom. As noticed hereinbefore, sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act contains a non-obstante clause vis-a-vis sub-section (1) thereof. As by reason thereof, an accrued or vested right is sought to be taken away, the conditions laid down thereunder must be fulfilled. The provisions contained therein must, therefore, be scrupulously observed. Clause (a) of Subsection (6) of Section 4 of the Act speaks of termination of service of an employee for any act, willful omission or negligence causing any damage. However, the amount liable to be forfeited would be only to the extent of damage or loss caused. The disciplinary authority has not quantified the loss or damage. It was not found that the damages or loss caused to Respondent No. 1 was more than the amount of gratuity payable to the appellant. Clause (b) of sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act also provides for forfeiture of the whole amount of gratuity or part in the event his services had been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part or if he has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude. Conditions laid down therein are also not satisfied. 14. Termination of services for any of the causes enumerated in sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act, therefore, is imperative. 25. Conditions laid down therein are also not satisfied. 14. Termination of services for any of the causes enumerated in sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act, therefore, is imperative. 25. Petitioner has been charge-sheeted for one of the misconducts falling under the acts specified u/s 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the same stood proved on the basis of admission made by him. In view of this, no separate order or hearing was required before forfeiting the gratuity of the petitioner. In view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, there is no scope of interference with the well reasoned judgment of the learned Single Judge. Consequently, the Letter Patent Appeal is dismissed.