Mandhata Singh, J. – Prosecution case initiated on Fardbeyan of Parmila Devi victim of the case, in brief, is that she was married to accused appellant no. 3 Bhondu Yadav two and half years ago. Appellant no.2 Guman Yadav was her father-in-law and appellant no. 1 Munma devi was her mother-in-law. Duragaman took place 7-8 months thereafter. After Duragaman, the allegation is that Rs. 10,000/- in cash was being demanded as dowry for which she was treated cruelly including beating, in that consequence on non-fulfilment of demand of dowry in the morning of 24.1.1995 father-in-law Guman Yadav exhorted to set her on fire which was complied and consequently she was overpowered by appellant nos. 1 and 3, then Guman Yadav poured kerosene oil on her body and appellant no.1 Munma Devi set her on fire by lighting a match stick. Informant-victim threw her baby in lap on straw and fought with the fire but burn injury appeared all around her body. Later she was confined in a room. Her father could learn the incident, came to her Sasural on 26.1.1995, queried about whereabout of the victim-informant and was replied by appellant no.1 that she had gone to her parents’ house but she was heard screaming, on entering the house, she was seen with burn injuries, so, was taken back his home and then to hospital at Biharsharif where treatment was provided to her as well her statement/Fardbeyan was recorded by the Police for lodging the case. 2. After concluding the trial, appellants are convicted for the offence under Sections 498A and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, validity of which has been questioned through filing this appeal. 3. In all five witnesses are examined in the case and they are P.W.1 Dr. Ram Kumar Prasad, P.W.2 Sumitra Devi mother of the informant, P.W.3 Hari Yadav father of the informant, P.W.4 Parmila Devi informant of the case and P.W.5 Rajeshwar Sharma I.O. of the case. 4. P.W. 1 is relevant on the point of injuries found on the person of P.W.4 (victim) and her treatment to Sadar hospital, Biharsharif. P.W.5 is relevant on the point of fair investigation in the case. P.Ws 2 and 3 are witnesses to state factum of torture upon the victim that for demand of dowry torture was being caused and lastly P.W.4 informant of the case was set on fire collectively by these appellants. 5. P.W.5 is relevant on the point of fair investigation in the case. P.Ws 2 and 3 are witnesses to state factum of torture upon the victim that for demand of dowry torture was being caused and lastly P.W.4 informant of the case was set on fire collectively by these appellants. 5. On the point of offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code the only submission is that no dowry ever was demanded, if any then that was after years of marriage. The demand if is in connection with marriage is well within the purview of constituting the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code if is followed by cruelty to the victim as in this case that is corroborated by all the three witnesses namely P.Ws 2, 3 and 4. 6. All the three witnesses further are constant on the point that P.W.4 was set on fire after pouring kerosene oil on her body that is specified by P.W.4 victim of the case that appellant no.2 Guman Yadav exhorted to set the victim on fire, complying thereon she was set on fire collectively by all the three appellants. 7. Now remains the intention if was not for murder. The only circumstance in the case is that victim remained in appellants’ house for two days more after her burning but not was killed, in my view, intention prevailing at the time of real causing of assault is relevant. In the instant case, victim is set on fire by pouring kerosene oil may never be viewed with other intention than to kill. Circumstance is that she remained in appellants’ house for two days clearly appears to not allowing her to come out of the house that never can be taken to minimise the allegation nor in any way can help the appellants if later they changed their opinion (intention) to kill the victim. 8. Last point remains to favour appellants is to compromise, if any, arrived in between the parties. Written compromise petition is there on the record, witnesses have been asked also about the same but that is denied by P.Ws 2, 3 and 4. No attempt has been made on behalf of defence to prove its genuineness by getting the same examined by any hand-writing expert moreover offence is non-compoundable and that could help any way for taking liberal view in the case. 9. No attempt has been made on behalf of defence to prove its genuineness by getting the same examined by any hand-writing expert moreover offence is non-compoundable and that could help any way for taking liberal view in the case. 9. Another point submitted on behalf of learned counsel for the appellants for liberal view on the point of sentence is that incident is of the year 1995, one of the appellants namely appellant no. 2 died during the pendency of this appeal. Next one namely appellant no.1 is a lady, aged 60 years at the time of judgment of the trial court that is in the year 1998. 10. In the case appellants have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of 10 years each for the offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and one year for the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 11. After having considered the evidence on record and the material recorded by the trial court, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment of conviction dated 28.8.1998 passed in S.T.no. 325/95 is affirmed with modification in sentence to the extent that the sentence which was awarded to appellants is reduced to the period of seven years each for the offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and one year for the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. 12. As the appellants 1 and 3 are on bail, their bail bond is cancelled. They are directed to surrender in the court below to serve out rest of sentences. The trial court is directed to take necessary steps to apprehend the appellants. 13. Let a copy of the judgment along with lower court records be sent back to the court below forthwith.