V.K. Bist, J.— Instant appeal has been filed by the plaintiff/appellant against the order dated 27.03.2012 passed by the Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Rudrapur, District Udham Singh Nagar, whereby the interim relief application-6c, moved by the appellant in Civil Suit No. 17 of 2012 has been rejected. 2. The plaintiff/appellant instituted the said civil suit for permanent injunction against the defendants with the prayer not to make auction of the property in question and also from interfering in his peaceful possession. 3. It is not disputed that the sale deed was executed by respondent no. 1 & 2 in favour of respondent no.3 on 13.12.1990 in respect of property in question. In the year 1991, the respondent no.3 took a loan amounting to ` 1.25 lacs from respondent nos. 4 to 8, against the property in question. As the amount of loan was not repaid by respondent no.3, proceedings under Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred as to the Act) were initiated and accordingly steps were taken under the Act. Learned counsel for respondent/Bank informed that the respondent/bank filed Original Application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal for recovery of the debt through the assets of respondent no.3. On 07.02.2012 a notice was published by IFCI, Ltd. in English newspaper Business Standard and the plaintiff/appellant came to know that the respondent/Bank has started proceeding for auction of the land in question, therefore the plaintiff/appellant instituted the said suit for permanent injunction and also moved interim injunction application which was rejected by the Court below vide order impugned dated 27.03.2012, holding the same as not maintainable inasmuch as, keeping in view Section 34 of the Act. 4. I have heard Mr. Piyush Garg, Advocate for the appellant, Mr. Rizwan Ali, Advocate for respondent nos. 4 to 8, Mr. Siddhartha Sah, Advocate for respondent no.3 and perused the record. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this appeal and invited attention to Section 34 of the Act, which reads as follows:- “34. Piyush Garg, Advocate for the appellant, Mr. Rizwan Ali, Advocate for respondent nos. 4 to 8, Mr. Siddhartha Sah, Advocate for respondent no.3 and perused the record. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this appeal and invited attention to Section 34 of the Act, which reads as follows:- “34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction:- No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.” 6. Mr. Piyush Garg, Advocate for the appellant submits that as far as the maintainability of appeal is concerned, Section 34 of the Act does not exclusively bar the jurisdiction of Civil Court. He submitted that Debt Recovery Tribunal is not empowered to determine the issues involved in the suit. Further, he contended, that the land in question belongs to four co-sharers i.e. the appellant as well as respondent nos. 1, 2 & 10, however, the respondent nos. 1 & 2 sold the said property to respondent no.3 in the year 1990 without obtaining prior consent from the appellant. He contended that undivided property cannot be sold without making partition and therefore, sale deed itself was null and void. He further contended that since the said deed, itself is void, the respondents cannot make auction of the portion of the property which falls on the share of the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the property transferred by virtue of the alleged sale deed is also void in view of the Explaination-2 of Section 5 of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. He further contended that the Ceiling Proceedings are still pending before this High Court, therefore, no further auction can be done of the property in question. He submitted that in view of the provisions of Ceiling Act, all the proceedings, including the mortgage deed, are null and void. 7. He further contended that the Ceiling Proceedings are still pending before this High Court, therefore, no further auction can be done of the property in question. He submitted that in view of the provisions of Ceiling Act, all the proceedings, including the mortgage deed, are null and void. 7. I have considered the rival arguments advanced by the respective parties and have also gone through the provisions of the Act. 8. The plaintiff/appellant is seeking relief of permanent injunction against the respondent/Bank knowingly that the sale deed in respect of same property was executed on 13th December, 1990. It is the matter of utter surprise that the plaintiff/appellant has yet not instituted any suit for cancellation of the sale deed dated 13th December, 1990. In such view of the matter, without filing suit for cancellation of alleged sale deed and without obtaining a decree of cancellation of alleged sale deed, the Civil Suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant for permanent injunction or for temporary injunction cannot be considered. 9. As pointed by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Original Application filed by the respondent/Bank is pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal in respect of the same property, the Court below has rightly rejected the application of the plaintiff/appellant seeking interim injunction on the ground of maintainability. Fact remains that execution of sale deed in respect of the property in question pertains to respondent no.3 and respondent no.1 & 2, however, the dispute in the case in hand, is in between the respondent no.3 and the respondent/Bank from whom the respondent no.3 took loan, I do not find any illegality, infirmity or perversity in the order impugned and no interference is called for at this stage. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed in limine. 10. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. _