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2012 DIGILAW 3895 (MAD)

. v. .

2012-09-14

K.CHANDRU

body2012
Judgment : 1. This application is filed by the applicant who is the defendant in the suit in C.S.No.141 of 2012, seeking to revoke the leave granted in Application No.891 of 2012, dated 23.02.2012. The suit is filed by the respondent against the applicant naming as Editor, Printer and Publisher of Dinamalar, having address at Tiruchirappalli, claiming damages for a sum of Rs.1 Crore with future interest at the rate of 18% per annum and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from publishing any article concerning the plaintiff, his family, his private life, private life of his family members, his business activities carried on by him lawfully in Dinamalar, a daily newspaper, without ascertaining the truthfulness from the plaintiff. 2. The respondent / plaintiff had stated that the applicant newspaper in its Trichy Edition had published several defamatory statements against him. It was stated that the cause of action arose at Chennai where the plaintiff is residing. The defamatory article was reported from Chennai and published by the defendant in its newspaper on 11.02.2012 in Trichy edition. The news paper was made available and read by the general public at Chennai. Enquiries were made by various people on reading the newspaper, which lowered down the reputation of the plaintiff and their esteem. It had caused great mental agony and loss of reputation to the plaintiff and his family members. 3. Based upon the said cause of action, this court had granted leave to sue the applicant / defendant before the Original Side of this court. The defendant upon receipt of the same filed the present application and took out judges summons to ask the respondent as to why the leave granted in A.No.891 of 2012, dated 23.02.2012 should not be revoked as the suit is not maintainable both in law and on facts and without jurisdiction. 4. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, it was claimed by the applicant that he is the Editor, Printer and Publisher of the Trichy Edition of the newspaper Dinamalar. The said newspaper is having circulation only in that area. He has no right to sell the paper beyond the territorial limit of Trichy or its outskirts. Insofar as Chennai is concerned, the newspaper has a separate edition with its own editor, printer and publisher as per the rules of the Press and Registration of Books Act. The said newspaper is having circulation only in that area. He has no right to sell the paper beyond the territorial limit of Trichy or its outskirts. Insofar as Chennai is concerned, the newspaper has a separate edition with its own editor, printer and publisher as per the rules of the Press and Registration of Books Act. The respondent / plaintiff had merely pleaded that the publication is available in Chennai only to maintain the suit. He had not alleged that he had caused defamation by effecting publication at Chennai. Since the entire cause of action for the publication of the impugned article was only at Trichy edition and the office of publication is only at Trichy and as per the Press and Registration of Books Act and rules, the plaintiff cannot sue them. It was stated by the applicant that he had already filed an application in A.No.2384 of 2012 seeking to dismiss the suit as without jurisdiction. But it was contended that the respondent / plaintiff had obtained leave and therefore, his application was dismissed vide order dated 22.08.2012, but however, with liberty to file an application to revoke the leave granted by this court. Hence this application. 5. In support of the averments, Mrs.Chitra Sampath, learned Senior Counsel leading Mr.T.S.Baskaran, learned counsel for the applicant, contended that even assuming without admitting that the circulation of paper at Chennai by itself will not be a ground for suing the applicant at Chennai. She referred to a judgment of the Karnataka High Court in C.S. Sathya Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 1994 Crl.L.J. 1954. In that case, the Karnataka High Court had considered the order passed for discharge on the complaint made under Section 500 IPC. The learned Senior Counsel referred to the following passage found in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said judgment, which reads as follows : "16....But in the case on hand, it is not the case of complainant that there was any other publication at Udupi. The publication is only once and that is at Bangalore. There was no fresh publication of the alleged defamatory matter at Udupi. Therefore, there was no ensured consequence forming part of the offence of defamation that has ensured within the jurisdiction of Udupi Court...." 17. The publication is only once and that is at Bangalore. There was no fresh publication of the alleged defamatory matter at Udupi. Therefore, there was no ensured consequence forming part of the offence of defamation that has ensured within the jurisdiction of Udupi Court...." 17. Therefore, mere circulation of the paper at Udupi is not a consequence ensured from the act of the accused which forms part of the ingredients of the offence alleged in the case, as no part of the offence or its consequence has ensured within the jurisdiction of Udupi Court, that Court has no jurisdiction to try the offence alleged by the complainant in his complaint." The learned Senior counsel submitted that though the matter arose under Section 500 IPC and the jurisdiction of the criminal court to try the complaint, the principles laid down therein will also apply. 6. The learned Senior counsel also referred to a judgment a division bench of this court in National Westminster Bank Ltd., U.K. Vs. M/s.Devraj Nensee & Co., and others reported in 1997 (1) L.W. 117 for contending that if there is no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this court and the transaction took place outside the court, this court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and that if any leave granted contrary to the law can be revoked. 7. She further referred to Section 19 of CPC to contend that it is only in a case where the wrong is done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one court or in alternative the defendant resides or carries on business within the local limit of the jurisdiction of another court, the plaintiff will have an option of suing the defendant in either of the forum. But, in the present case, neither the wrong was done at Chennai nor the defendant is residing at Chennai. 8. However, Mrs.N.Sneha, learned counsel for the respondent / plaintiff stated that since the applicant is the publisher of the newspaper, wherever the newspaper is circulated, the cause of action arose in that area. They had the supply of the copy of the newspaper at Chennai. Therefore, since the defamation took place at Chennai due to circulation of the newspaper, they are entitled to sue the applicant at Chennai. They had the supply of the copy of the newspaper at Chennai. Therefore, since the defamation took place at Chennai due to circulation of the newspaper, they are entitled to sue the applicant at Chennai. Further, she had submitted that as to whether the respondent / plaintiff had been defamed at Chennai due to circulation of the newspaper, it is essentially the question of fact. Inasmuch as they had pleaded in the cause of action paragraph in the plaint that they had the supply of the copy of the newspaper, there is jurisdiction with this court. 9. In this context, a reference may be made to a judgment of the Bombay High Court in The State of Maharashtra Vs. Sarvodaya Industries reported in AIR 1975 Bombay 197, wherein the scope of Section 19 CPC was considered and in paragraphs 13 and 14, it was observed as follows: "13. Provisions of Section 19 are specific in subject and clear in its operation. Firstly it governs a suit seeking restitutive reliefs of compensation on the basis of wrong done to the person or to movable property. Secondly it offers and furnishes option or choice if the conditions indicated by the qualifying clause are satisfied in that wrong complained of was done within the local limit of one Court while the defendant in fact resides or carries on business within the local limits of jurisdiction of another Court. Unless both these conditions together are available, no question of option or choice for forum can conceivably, arise. The conjunction "and" in the qualifying clause is very much indicative of this result, leaving aside the cases where these conditions together are not available, the matters of such suit are still governed by other provisions of the Code. It is noticeable that in the body of Section 19 the phrase "the cause of action, wholly or in part" has not been used and it only finds place in Section 20 of the Code. In a suit for compensation "wrong done" or "complained of" is the cause of action by which Code understands and contemplates all the bundle of necessary facts capable on proof of sustaining the relief claimed. Compensation clearly posits an injury resulting in loss and damage. Mere injury or wrong without anything more would not suffice to sustain the claim for compensation. Compensation clearly posits an injury resulting in loss and damage. Mere injury or wrong without anything more would not suffice to sustain the claim for compensation. It is clear that the phrase "wrong done" is not used in any narrow sense but has to be understood in all its amplitude so as to afford forum and necessary relief. That clearly takes in both cause and effect. Injury or actual wrong may occur at place A but its effect may be felt at places other than 'A' and may effect places 'B' or 'C'. Act or actions taking place at a given place may still give rise to results affecting persons or property at places quite different and at all these places and for all those effects, cause would arise seeking compensation. Without resultant loss or its proof restitutive justice may not afford any relief nor there could be any remedy in vacuum. Thus the phraseology used by Section 19 about "the wrong done" would clearly take in not only the initial action complained of but its resultant effect. 14. Putting the matter in terms of Section 20(c) the resultant damage would surely be the part of cause of action and would feedback the answer for jurisdiction. Assuming, therefore, that both Sections are to be read together the same would indicate a overlapping which is not at all attributable to such legislative scheme. It is enough to answer that Section 19, which deals with cases of compensation for wrong done to the person or movable property, is wide enough to take in those places where plaintiff or person complaining actually suffered the loss because of the alleged wrongful act notwithstanding the place of such wrongful act clearly furnishing place of action. The phrase "wrong done" is indicative of completed action as stated (supra) and is wide enough to take in the results as the basis for the purposes of restitution. The Court within whose local jurisdiction damage was caused or suffered or sustained would clearly answer the requirements of Section 19 for the purpose of suits mentioned therein. The matters of option afforded are not relevant nor decisive for t his purpose nor the provisions of Section 20(c). The extract of the provisions of Section 20 (supra) by its opening part indicates that Section 19 is treated as limitation upon the generality of the provisions of Section 20 itself. The matters of option afforded are not relevant nor decisive for t his purpose nor the provisions of Section 20(c). The extract of the provisions of Section 20 (supra) by its opening part indicates that Section 19 is treated as limitation upon the generality of the provisions of Section 20 itself. Reading both sections together if a case is not squarely answered by the earlier sections then it may still be answered by Section 20 itself. Its term are thus residuary. Turning to suits for compensation, if any narrow construction is to be placed on the phrase "wrong done" available in Section 19 then the matter still can be answered by Section 20(c) of the Code. For then Section 19 would indicate and only operate as "part of cause of action" having in mind only the initial act or cause indicated by "wrong done" and not its effect and though the latter as of necessity must be established to have relief, for t hat reliance will have to be placed on the intendments of Section 20(c) of the Code. Such dichotomy is not indicated nor such exercise necessary for in the structure of Section 19 itself both parts of cause of action, i.e., the initial act and its effect are capable of being worked out. Therefore, by its contemplation a suit filed in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the damage was suffered would still uphold its jurisdiction." 10. Similarly, the Gauhati High Court in State of Meghalaya and others Vs. Jyotsna Das reported in AIR 1991 Gauhati 96 also had an occasion to consider the true meaning of the term "wrong done" found in Section 19 and in paragraph 13, it was observed as follows : "13. The question is whether the expression "wrong done" should be construed to mean only the act which caused the wrong or should also include and cover the effect of the act. The question is whether the expression "wrong done" should be construed to mean only the act which caused the wrong or should also include and cover the effect of the act. There would be no difficulty if only the act which caused wrong has to be taken into consideration for then the place where the act was done would be the place where wrong was done, but in my opinion, it shall not be reasonable and proper to put such a restrictive meaning to the expression "wrong done", which could very well and justifiably include the effect of the act, for "wrong done" is in reality the effect of the 'act'. The 'act' by itself if it does not have any effect or results in causing effect would hardly be actionable, it is its effect which results in harm, loss or damage, etc. which together with such effect constitutes the 'wrong done'. It should consequently follow that if an act is done, say at place 'X' and its effect which constitutes the wrong is at place 'Y', it should not be said that the wrong was not done at place 'Y', i.e., that it should not be restricted to mean that the wrong was done only at place 'X'." 11. A division bench of this court in V.Selladurai Vs. N.Nethaji reported in (2006) 4 MLJ 680 , while analysing Section 19 as well as the power of this court to grant leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, in paragraph 11 had observed as follows : "11. Section 19 of C.P.C specifically refers to suits for compensation for wrong done to the person. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that the plaintiff has option to sue a wrong doer at the place within whose local limits the wrong was done or in the court within whose jurisdiction the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Illustration (b) to such section 19 makes this position very clear. However, where there are more defendants than one and some of such defendants stay within the jurisdiction of the Court and other stay beyond such jurisdiction, Section 19 may not be applicable. On the other hand, Section 20(b) may be applicable. While interpreting the provisions contained in clause 12 of the Letters Patent, similar interpretations should be given. However, where there are more defendants than one and some of such defendants stay within the jurisdiction of the Court and other stay beyond such jurisdiction, Section 19 may not be applicable. On the other hand, Section 20(b) may be applicable. While interpreting the provisions contained in clause 12 of the Letters Patent, similar interpretations should be given. In other words, the expression "defendant" should be interpreted to mean all the defendants and not any one of the defendants. If there is sole defendant, who resides within the territorial jurisdiction, such suit can be filed. Similarly, if all the defendants reside within the territorial jurisdiction, such suit can be filed. However, where out of the defendants some reside beyond the jurisdiction and some reside within the jurisdiction, suit can be filed only if cause of action arises in part within the local limits of ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court. However, before filing such suit, the plaintiff is required to obtain leave of the court." (Emphasis added) 12. In the light of the above, the contention raised by the applicant / defendant is misconceived. The leave granted by this court vide order dated 23.02.2012 cannot be revoked as the issue will have to be tried only on the basis of evidence let in by the parties. At this threshold this court is not inclined to revoke the leave granted. Accordingly, the application to revoke the leave will stand dismissed. No costs.