Research › Search › Judgment

J&K High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 39 (JK)

Ab. Rashid Mir & Ors. v. Ahmad Ullah Mir & Ors.

2012-02-04

HASNAIN MASSODI

body2012
1. The Civil First Appeal on hand is directed against judgment dated 29.10.2001 passed by District Judge Pulwama in suit titled Ahmadullah Mir and others v. Abdul Rashid Mir and others (file no. 4-numbri) whereby learned Trial Judge decreed the suit and directed the defendants, appellants before the court, to be evicted from the suit premises and its vacant possession to be handed over to the plaintiffs — respondents in the present appeal — within a month from the date of judgment and also to pay Rs. 400 as arrears of rent from Feb 1987 till 31st Jan 1988 and at the rate of Rs. 500 per month from 1st. Feb 1988 till the possession was so handed over. - 2. To understand the controversy involved, it would be profitable to have an overview of facts discernable from record. 3. The respondents on 6th June 1992 commenced a suit for ejectment in respect of a shed measuring 35'x21' bearing survey no. 1412 situated on Pulwama-Srinagar road at Pulwama (hereafter referred to as suit property), and recovery of Rs. 15,800 y as arrears of the rent. The respondents also prayed for a permanent injunction decree restraining the appellants from making any change in the nature or user of the suit property. 4. The respondents' case was that that they at the request of appellants leased out the suit property as owners in possession thereof to the appellants on a rent of R? 400 per month for one year from 1st. Feb 1987 to 31st Jan 1988 and agreed to renew the lease on the expiry of the initial term. It was pleaded that the appellants though under an obligation not to violate any of the conditions set out in the lease deed, failed to pay the rent to the respondents for the lease period and also avoided to pay the charges on account of user of the suit property beyond the period of lease. The respondents' case was that the appellants were in illegal possession of the suit property after the lease came to an end on 1st. Feb 1988 and that despite a notice served on the appellants whereby the lease was determined, the appellants avoided to handover the vacant possession of the suit property to the respondents and also to pay Rs. The respondents' case was that the appellants were in illegal possession of the suit property after the lease came to an end on 1st. Feb 1988 and that despite a notice served on the appellants whereby the lease was determined, the appellants avoided to handover the vacant possession of the suit property to the respondents and also to pay Rs. 15,800 payable on account of rent and user of the suit premises after the lease period to the respondents. The respondents on the strength of the grounds urged in the plaint sought the reliefs set out in the concluding para of the plaint. The appellants in their written statement, refuting the case set up by the respondents denied to be tenants of the suit property or to have ever executed any document in favour of the respondents in respect of the suit property. The appellants instead claimed title, hostile to the title claimed by the respondents and insisted that as they were in continuous and Uninterrupted possession of the suit property since 1957 to the knowledge of the respondents, their possession was adverse and had ripened into ownership. The appellants claiming to be owners of the suit property in their own right denied their liability to pay any rent to the respondents. It was also denied that the respondents had any cause of action to file the suit or the court had jurisdiction to entertain and proceed with the suit. 5. The trial court on perusal of the pleadings settled following issues: 1. Whether the demised premises have been leased out by the plaintiff in favour of defendant from 1st. Feb. 1987 on monthly rental of Rs. 400? OPP 2. Whether the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed by not paying the rent till the institution of the suit and by not the lease deed while enhancing the premium of rent? OPP 3. Whether the defendant is illegally holding the possession of the demised premises from 1988 till date despite a notice issued to him by the plaintiff whereby the lease has been determined? OPP 4. Whether the demised premises are required by the plaintiff for bona fide personal necessity? OPP 5. Whether the defendant owes Rs. 4,800 by way of arrears of rent for the year 1987 up to ending Jan. 1988 and sum of Rs. OPP 4. Whether the demised premises are required by the plaintiff for bona fide personal necessity? OPP 5. Whether the defendant owes Rs. 4,800 by way of arrears of rent for the year 1987 up to ending Jan. 1988 and sum of Rs. 11,000 as use, enjoyment, occupation of the demised premises at the rate of Rs. 500 per month from Feb. 1988 till date together with interest till possession of the demised premises is handed over to the plaintiff? OPP 6. Whether the defendant is going to change the nature and user of the suit property which is likely to cause great loss to the plaintiff? OPP 7. In case of ejectment of the suit property, what are comparative advantages and disadvantages to the parties? OPP 8. Whether the suit in its present form and on the basis of the facts is not maintainable? OPD 9. Whether the suit is hit by limitation? 10. Whether the defendant continues in possession of the suit property from 1957 up to present within the knowledge of the plaintiff and by being in such position uninterruptedly his possession has ripened into ownership as possession is to be construed as adverse possession within the recognition of law? OPD 11. To what relief plaintiff is entitled to? On 18th Nov 2000 following two additional issues were framed: I. Whether the defendant has taken up the plea of being the owner of the demised premises and denied the status of being the tenant thereof. It so, what shall be the legal implication of such a fact? OPP II. Whether the amount of rent has been claimed by the plaintiff from the defendant in excess of the amount fixed by way of monthly (rental) for the use of demised premises? OPD 6. The parties led evidence in support of their respective stands. The respondents examined 13 witnesses to substantiate their case and one of the respondents Shri Ahmad Ullah Mir also stepped in the witness box. The witnesses examined by the respondents included scribes of rent deeds Expw 2, Expw 2/1 and Expw 2/2 executed by the appellants in favour of the respondents and the marginal witnesses to the rent deeds. The respondents also examined two local Patwaris (Pw Muhammad Maqbool and Mohammad Ramzan) to prove the revenue record Expw P/1 and the mutation no. The witnesses examined by the respondents included scribes of rent deeds Expw 2, Expw 2/1 and Expw 2/2 executed by the appellants in favour of the respondents and the marginal witnesses to the rent deeds. The respondents also examined two local Patwaris (Pw Muhammad Maqbool and Mohammad Ramzan) to prove the revenue record Expw P/1 and the mutation no. 2100 recording the respondents as owners in possession of the suit property. The appellants on the other hand examined four witnesses including Shri Ghulam Ahmad Hajam, Patvvari, to prove their case. Shri Ghulam Ahmad Mir, appellant, also crossed the witness box. 7. Learned trial judge on going through the evidence brought on the file and after hearing counsel for the parties decided issues 1,2,3,5,8,9,10,10-A in favour of the respondents and against the appellants. Rest of the issues were either decided in favour of the appellants or held to have been covered by finding returned on other issues framed in the suit. The trial court in effect held the respondents to have leased out the suit property to the appellants on the annual rent of Rs 400 for the period 1st. Feb. 1987 to 31SI Jan 1988. The appellants were held to have violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed in not paying the rent and getting the lease renewed in their favour. It was further held that the appellants were illegally holding the premises after the lease period came to an end by efflux of time. However, the trail court found the respondents not to have been able to prove that the suit properly was required by them because of a bona fide personal necessity or that the appellants were keen to change the nature of the suit property or nature of its user. The respondents were also found not to have adduced any evidence touching comparative advantage and disadvantage of the parties in the event the appellants were ejected from the suit property. The trial court did not find any merit the appellants' case that the suit in its format was not maintainable or was hit by limitation. The appellants were held to have failed to prove that they were owners of the suit property as their adverse possession over the suit had ripened into the ownership. The trial court did not find any merit the appellants' case that the suit in its format was not maintainable or was hit by limitation. The appellants were held to have failed to prove that they were owners of the suit property as their adverse possession over the suit had ripened into the ownership. The trial court further held that the hostile title to the suit property claimed by the appellants resulted in forfeiture of the lease within meaning of Section 111 (g) Transfer of Property Act. The trial court accordingly proceeded to decree the suit and grant reliefs detailed above in favour of the respondents and against the appellants. 8. The appellants question the conclusions drawn by the trial court that they were in illegal possession of the suit property after Feb 1988 on the ground that the trial court in light of the evidence brought on the file ought to have declared the respondents as the tenants "holding over" and not in illegal possession of the suit property. It is further pleaded that the trial court in view of the conclusion as regards the actual rent fixed by the parties ought not to have held the appellants in arrears or treated the notice for payment of rent as the notice determining the lease. It is also urged that the trial court mis-appreciated the evidence and failed to notice that the respondents' stand in the plaint that the suit property was leased out to the appellants in Feb 1987 was belied by the evidence adduced by the respondents in particular rent deeds that lead to the conclusion that the suit property was in possession of the appellants right from 1957 as tenants thereof. 9. The next ground urged in the memorandum of appeal is that as the trial court failed to arrive at the conclusion that the suit property was required by the respondents due to personal necessity and that comparative advantage and disadvantage in the event of ejectment tilted in favour of the respondents, the judgment impugned in the appeal is liable to be set aside. The appellants insist that the impugned judgment resulted in miscarriage of justice and depicts non-application of judicial mind and is not sustainable on facts as well as law. 10. I have gone through the memorandum of appeal as also the record received from the trial court. The appellants insist that the impugned judgment resulted in miscarriage of justice and depicts non-application of judicial mind and is not sustainable on facts as well as law. 10. I have gone through the memorandum of appeal as also the record received from the trial court. I have heard counsel for the parties. The case set up by the appellant makes it necessary to notice section 116 of the Evidence Act, and section 111 (g) Transfer of Property Act, which read as under: "116. Estoppel of tenant and of licence of person in possession No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be permit- ted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given Section 111(g) Transfer of Property Act: "by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lesseebreaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event;) and in (any of these cases) the lessor or his transferee (gives notice in writing to the lessee of) his intention to determine the lease; 11. Section 116, Evidence Act incorporates a principle of equity and general principle of estoppel between the landlord and the tenant. The object is not to permit the tenant to take undue advantage of his possession over the immovable property handed over to him under a tenancy or lease agreement. In terms of section 111 (g) Transfer of Property Act, the lease is automatically determined by forfeiture once the tenant renounces his character as tenant and sets up a title in third person or claims a title in himself. In terms of section 111 (g) Transfer of Property Act, the lease is automatically determined by forfeiture once the tenant renounces his character as tenant and sets up a title in third person or claims a title in himself. The tenant by repudiating the title of a person over immovable property from whom he has got possession of such property accepting him as landlord, assumes a character other than that of a tenant once such hostile claim is set up. The tenant thereafter cannot claim continuance of his relationship that is repudiated by none else than him. The cases are conceivable where a tenant does not disown his character and nature of possession over the subject matter but asks the landlord because of the events subsequent to his having entered into the property, to establish his title. In such an event the tenant is not to be said to have renounced his character. However, where the tenant renounces his character and claims to be landlord of the property or sets up such title in a third party, Section 111 (g) Transfer of Property Act would come into play and render tenant liable to be evicted. It would be advantageous to refer to the following observations made by Supreme Court in Sheela and others v. Firms Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 1265: "Denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of CI. (c) of subsection (1) of S. 12 of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial or disclaimer as would entail forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a third party." 12. In the present case the appellant expressly in his written statement set up a title hostile to that of the landlord. The appellant claimed to have been in adverse possession of the suit property and insisted that such possession had ripened into the ownership. The appellant, however, was not able to establish the claim and the issue reflecting the appellant's stand was decided in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. The appellant claimed to have been in adverse possession of the suit property and insisted that such possession had ripened into the ownership. The appellant, however, was not able to establish the claim and the issue reflecting the appellant's stand was decided in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. Learned trial court was thus right in holding that section 111 (g) Transfer of Property Act had come into play and that the tenancy stood determined because of forfeiture due to disclaimer of the appellant of his character as tenant and claiming title hostile to that of the respondents. The trial court found that the respondents had inducted the appellant as tenant and that the appellant continued to pay rent to the respondents till the appellant defaulted. In a case where a tenant disputes status of the landlord, the factor determinative of landlordship as held in Sheela's case is the factum of his receiving or his entitlement to receive the rent in respect of the premises in question. The irresistible conclusion to be drawn from the evidence brought on the file was that the parties were in the relationship of tenant and the landlord and the rival title set up by the tenant in the subject matter of the suit was devoid of any substance. In view of the finding returned by the trial court on the issue as regards adverse possession and acquisition of ownership by prescription, all other grounds set up by the appellant in opposition to the relief sought in the suit receded to background and paled into insignificance. The appellant's case that the trial court did not go into comparative advantage and disadvantage of the parties in the event the suit was decreed or the question of personal requirement, is of no consequence and cannot help the appellant to get the judgment and decree reversed, because of the title set up by the appellant in himself qua suit property. 13. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal is bereft of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. Resultantly, the trial court judgment and order are upheld. The decree sheet be drawn up. 14. File to go to records after due completion.