ORDER 1. The petitioner, after passing Secondary Grade Teacher Training in the year 1975-77, joined as a Substitute Teacher against leave vacancies in various schools including the schools run by the respondent Diocese. The petitioner, after being regularly appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher on 1.6.1981, was sent to St. Thomas Middle School, Kurichi, Melapalayam, Tirunelveli District of Tuticorin Diocese. 2. The petitioner was transferred to Bishop Roche RC Primary School at Keela Amabalaseri in the year 1982 and thereafter, transferred to RC Middle School at Saveriapuram. During the service, he passed B.A. History in the year 1982 and M.A. History in the year 1984. The petitioner also acquired the qualification B.Ed degree in the year 1983. The petitioner was promoted as Headmaster of RC Middle School at Somanathaperi on 10.6.1985. 3. It is the submission of the petitioner that Rev.Fr. A. Peter Rajah, the Correspondent of St. Mary’s Higher Secondary School at Pothakalanvilai, asked the petitioner to resign the post of Headmaster and to accept the post of PG Assistant in his school, on the assurance that he will be promoted as Headmaster against the vacancy likely to be occurred on 31.5.1992. It was in view of the offer that the petitioner resigned from the post of Headmaster and joined as PG Assistant in History on 1.2.1989. 4. The petitioner requests that he had a right to the post of Headmaster. It is however admitted that the post of Headmaster was not approved, though the school was upgraded as Higher Secondary School. It was also made clear that the salary for the post of Headmaster will be released, after the post is approved. 5. It is submitted that Rev.Fr. A. Peter Rajah, Correspondent left the school and new Correspondent was appointed, after, the petitioner was put to a lot of troubles, and the promise made to the petitioner was not kept. Instead of promoting the petitioner as Headmaster, one Mr. Joseph was appointed as Headmaster on 1.12.1994. These submissions of the petitioner have no relevance to the question raised in this writ petition. 6. The question for determination in this case, is whether the punishment awarded to the petitioner, is disproportionate to the proved charges, of misconduct and not whether the petitioner was rightly ignored for the post of Headmaster. 7. It is not in dispute that the departmental enquiry against the petitioner was held. 6. The question for determination in this case, is whether the punishment awarded to the petitioner, is disproportionate to the proved charges, of misconduct and not whether the petitioner was rightly ignored for the post of Headmaster. 7. It is not in dispute that the departmental enquiry against the petitioner was held. The petitioner was issued a charge memo alleging 7 charges and out of which, the charges 1, 3, 4 and 7 were proved against the petitioner. The Competent Authority had agreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. 8. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of dismissal, approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 14632 of 1998. This Court allowed the Writ Petition on 10.1.2006, holding that the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the proved charges against the petitioner. The case was, remitted back to the Competent Authority to pass fresh order of punishment, by taking into consideration the gravity of charges proved against the petitioner. 9. In compliance of the order passed by this Court, the petitioner was imposed with the punishment of removal from service, instead of dismissal from service. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of removal of service, once again came to this Court by filing W.P. No. 3427 of 2006. This writ petition was again allowed, and the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effects was ordered with 25% back wages. 10. The respondent/Management being aggrieved by the judgment of the Honourable single Judge passed in W.P. No. 3427 of 2006, filed W.A. (MD) No. 60 of 2011. The Writ Appeal was allowed and this Court held that it was not open to the Honourable single Judge to substitute the punishment and accordingly, remitted back the case to the Management, to pass fresh orders of punishment. 11. In pursuance of the judgment of the Honourable Division Bench of this Court in W.A. (MD) No. 60 of 2011, the Management has, now, passed the impugned order of compulsory retirement from service with retrospective effect. 12. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner to challenge the impugned order, (i) firstly on the ground that the punishment of compulsory retirement is again disproportionate to the proved charges; (ii) secondly that it was not open to the respondent School to pass an order of compulsory retirement. 13. 12. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner to challenge the impugned order, (i) firstly on the ground that the punishment of compulsory retirement is again disproportionate to the proved charges; (ii) secondly that it was not open to the respondent School to pass an order of compulsory retirement. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents opposed this writ petition, on the ground that the conduct of the petitioner in School was very bad in case he is reinstated in service by imposing any other punishment, it will spoil the atmosphere of the School. 14. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, that it is a case where the Management has lost the confidence in the petitioner and therefore, no other order will be appropriate or adequate on the proved charges, except the order of compulsory retirement, as by compulsory retirement, the retirement benefit of the petitioner stands duly protected. 15. In support of the contentions, the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya AIR 2011 SC 1931 : (2011) 4 SCC 584 : 2011-III-LLJ-13 : (2011) 4 LW 769 , wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has held under: “7. When a Court is considering whether punishment of ‘termination from service’ imposed upon a bank employee is shockingly excessive or disproportionate to the gravity of the proved misconduct, the loss of confidence in the employee will be an important and relevant factor. When an unknown person comes to the bank and claims to be the account holder of a long inoperative account, and a bank employee, who does not know such person, instructs his colleague to transfer the account from “dormant” to “operative” category (contrary to instructions regulating dormant accounts) without any kind of verification, and accepts the money withdrawal form from such person, gets a token and collects the amount on behalf of such person for the purpose of handing it over to such person, he in effect enables such unknown person to withdraw the amount contrary to the banking procedures; and ultimately, if it transpires that the person who claimed to be account holder was an imposter, the bank can not be found fault with if it says that it has lost confidence in the employee concerned. A Bank is justified in contending that not only employees who are dishonest, but those who are guilty of gross negligence, are not fit to continue in its service.” 16. The reliance on this judgment by the learned counsel for the respondents is totally misplaced. In that case, the Honourable Supreme Court was considering the conduct of the Bank employee, who was guilty of misconduct in dealing with the customers. The charges against the Bank employee were very serious in nature. It was on the proved charge that the Honourable Supreme Court held that there was a full justification for the Bank lose confidence in the employee, but, there is no justification in the case in hand. The petitioner was charge-sheeted on the charges out of which two charges were not proved. There is no material to justify the loss of confidence. It was not even the case set up in the charge memo, nor the allegations justify the loss of confidence. 17. Even the Competent Authority while passing order of dismissal at the first stage, did not form opinion regarding the loss of confidence. It, therefore, not open to the respondents, now, to take a plea of loss of confidence, after having lost before this Court twice, in trying to defend their order of major punishment against the petitioner. The loss of confidence is to be based on subjective satisfaction, on available material, it is not a ground to justify an order which is disproportionate to proved charges. 18. The learned counsel for the respondents also placed reliance on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Francis Klein & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Their Workmen and Another 1971-II-LLJ-615 , wherein the Honourable Supreme Court, while dealing with the dispute between the Management and the workers, was pleased to justify the direction of the Management in not ordering reinstatement, on account of loss of confidence. The judgment has no relevance to this case. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that this Court should not interfere with the order of compulsory retirement, as the order of compulsory retirement does not affect the service benefits of employee as the rights of the employee are duly protected as he is entitled to all benefits for the service rendered by him before the order of compulsory retirement. 20. 20. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pyare Mohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand and Others AIR 2010 SC 3753 : (2010) 10 SCC 693 , wherein the Honourable Supreme Court was pleased to lay the judicial review in case of compulsory retirement is permissible only on grounds of non-application of mind, mala fides, or want of material particulars. The power to retire compulsorily a government servant in terms of service rules is absolute, provided the authority concerned forms a bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement is in public interest. 21. It has also been held in the judgment that while ordering the compulsory retirement, the authority concerned has to consider the entire service record of the employee. 22. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is again misconceived. The Honourable Supreme Court, was dealing with case of compulsory retirement from service under service rules and not with an order of compulsory retirement by way of punishment. 23. If the order of compulsory retirement is by way of punishment, then the rules applicable for imposing major punishment are required to be followed and in the absence of a charge being proved, the order of compulsory retirement cannot be sustained. The management in such case is also required to justify that the order is proportionate to proved charges. 24. The judgment in the case of Pyare Mohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand and Others (supra), again, is not applicable to this case. 25. The impugned order of compulsory retirement has been passed on the charges i.e. (i) the first proved charge against the petitioner is that the petitioner failed to produce M.A. degree in spite of repeated requests. (ii) This charge can hardly be a ground for compulsory retirement, as the M.A. degree was admittedly produced. (iii) The second charge proved against the petitioner is that the petitioner cheated the Management and the Education Department by suppressing the fact that old service book was with the petitioner, but he got issued new service book in the year 1977 in order to get service benefits. (iv) This charge is also outcome of non application of mind as it is not understood as on receipt of second service book how the person can avail the service benefits, to which he is otherwise not entitled to. (iv) This charge is also outcome of non application of mind as it is not understood as on receipt of second service book how the person can avail the service benefits, to which he is otherwise not entitled to. In new service book in place of old service book, the service entries will remain the same. This charge again cannot be ground to major punishment of compulsory retirement. 26. The third proved charge against the petitioner, is that the petitioner gave false information to the Joint Director of School Education about the appointment of Headmaster. It was alleged that misrepresentation was out come of enmity with the Correspondent. This prima facie cannot be said to be misrepresentation, as it was merely a complaint based on the opinion of the petitioner. Nothing has been shown as to what prejudice was caused to the respondents on this account. 27. The final charge against the petitioner was that he made grunting noise on 11.12.2005 when the Correspondent crossed the staff room. This again is minor charge to impose the major punishment of compulsory retirement, as main charge of misbehaviour with the Correspondent was not proved. 28. The observations about charges have been made in order to see the gravity of the charges, to consider the quantum of punishment, otherwise this Court is not concerned, as the findings on charges has been upheld in the previous litigation between the parties. For the reasons stated, the punishment of compulsory retirement certainly is shockingly disproportionate to the proved charges therefore cannot be sustained in law. 29. The question now to be decided is “Whether the case should be remitted back to the punishing authority to take a fresh decision or this Court can impose the punishment on the proved charges.” 30. It is settled law that the Court should normally not interfere with the administrative decision of the punishing authority unless it is illogical or suffers from procedure impropriety or is shocking to the conscious of the Court, in the sense it was in defiance of logic or moral standard. 31. Thus in normal circumstances it is not open to the Court to go into the correctness of the penalty imposed by the punishing authority. The Court normally does not substitute its decision, as the scope of judicial review is limited in the judicial making process and not the decision. 31. Thus in normal circumstances it is not open to the Court to go into the correctness of the penalty imposed by the punishing authority. The Court normally does not substitute its decision, as the scope of judicial review is limited in the judicial making process and not the decision. In such cases, the Court normally remands the case to the competent authority to re-consider the imposed penalty, but in exceptional and rare cases, the Court/Tribunal can impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reason in support thereof. 32. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court on an earlier occasion followed the normal course, and directed the disciplinary authority to re-consider its punishment. This was also earlier done by this Court, when the order was set aside and the case was remitted back to the disciplinary authority to re-consider the decision. 33. The conduct of disciplinary authority in this case, in imposing the punishment of dismissal, removal and now compulsory retirement shows that it is one of those rare cases where this Court should substitute its opinion and impose appropriate punishment on the proved charges. 34. As already noticed herein above, the charge of non submission M.A. Degree was hardly a charge to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement, as admittedly, M.A. Degree was produced. 35. Similarly, getting of a new service book did not in any way affect the rights of the Management or of the petitioner, as no benefit could be drawn by the petitioner by new service book to which he was otherwise not entitled to. 36. The allegations of giving false information to the Director is also not of such nature, as it was an application for appointment as Headmaster, which was to be considered on merit. It is not the case of Management that any bogus or fabricated documents were submitted by the petitioner so as to make this charge a serious misconduct. 37. The last charge of having made grunting noise also looses importance as the main charge of abusing the Correspondent was not proved in the Enquiry proceedings. 38. This Court, not on one, but on two occasions came to the conclusion that the punishment awarded were shockingly disproportionate but in spite of two opportunities, the respondents have insisted on imposing the punishment with ulterior motive to keep the petitioner out of service. 38. This Court, not on one, but on two occasions came to the conclusion that the punishment awarded were shockingly disproportionate but in spite of two opportunities, the respondents have insisted on imposing the punishment with ulterior motive to keep the petitioner out of service. This motive stands proved on plea of loss of confidence though not raised earlier either before the Enquiry Officer or authorities. This plea was raised for the first time to defend major punishment of compulsory retirement on proved minor charges. 39. The view that in rare cases, Court can substitute the punishment finds support from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India. v. K.G. Soni (2006) 4 SCT 149 . 40. Consequently, this Writ Petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of Certiorari is issued, quashing the impugned order of compulsory retirement. The punishment is modified to punishment of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits arising from this order. No costs. The connected M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2012 is closed. Petition allowed.