P. M. Venkatachalapathi v. Minor K. B. Ishwarya by next friend V. Chakrapani
2012-09-17
G.RAJASURIA
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. This appeal is focussed at the instance of the defendants as against the judgment and decree dated 07.06.2010 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Krishnagiri in O.S.No.178 of 2004. 2. The parties, for convenience sake, are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. Compendiously and concisely, the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this appeal would run thus: (i) The defendants are the appellants herein. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit seeking the following reliefs: - To pass a judgment and decree a) declaring the title of the plaintiff to the suit properties fully described here under in schedule. b) directing the first defendant to deliver the possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff's next friend and on failure to do so the possession of the suit properties be delivered to the plaintiff's next friend through process of court. c) granting mandatory injunction directing the first defendant to deposit the balance income derived from the suit properties after deducting the taxes and incidental expenses into this court, and for costs. (extracted as such) (ii) The defendants filed the written statement resisting the suit. (iii) The trial court framed the relevant issues. (iv) During trial, on the side of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A8 were marked. The first defendant examined himself as DW1 and marked Exs.B1 to B16. (v) Ultimately, the trial court decreed the suit. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial court, viz., Principal District Court, Krishnagiri the defendants' have preferred this appeal on various grounds. 5. The learned senior counsel for the appellants/defendants inviting the attention of this court to Ground No.15 of the grounds of appeal would develop his argument to the effect that as on the date of the pronouncement of the judgment by the learned Principal District Judge, Krishnagiri dated 07.06.2010, he had no jurisdiction at all in view of Section 12 Tamil Nadu Civil Courts and Chennai City Civil Court (Amendment) Act, 2010 (T.N.Act 19 of 2010). 6. Hence, it is therefore just and proper for me to formulate the following point for consideration: 1.
6. Hence, it is therefore just and proper for me to formulate the following point for consideration: 1. Whether the learned Principal District Judge, Krishnagiri had jurisdiction to pronounce judgment in this matter in view of the provisions contained in Section 12 Tamil Nadu Civil Courts and Chennai City Civil Court (Amendment) Act, 2010 (T.N.Act 19 of 2010)? 7. Heard both sides. 8. The learned senior counsel for the appellants/defendants would reiterate his stand as found in the aforesaid ground, citing Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts and Chennai City Civil Court (Amendment) Act, 2010 (T.N.Act 19 of 2010). 9. Whereas the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would pyramid his argument, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (a) The trial court, viz., the Principal District Court, Krishnagiri cannot be labelled as the court, which had no inherent jurisdiction at all to render judgment in this case. (b) No doubt, the transitory provision as relied on by the learned senior counsel for the appellants/defendants might mandate that all pending suits should be transferred from the said court to the Sub court; however, both sides at that time were not aware of the said provision and consequently enlighten the court and the court also passed the judgment. However, on merits this court can consider the appeal itself. (c) On the other hand, subject matter wise, if the trial court was lacking in inherent jurisdiction to deal with the matter, then the matter would be entirely different. In this connection, he would cite the decision of the learned Single Judge of this court reported in 2012(2) CTC 623 [V.T.R.Palanisamy Chettiar vs. V.T.R.Srinivasan and two others]. Certain excerpts from it would run thus: "11.) As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, which is reiterated by the Honourable Supreme Court in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi vs. DLF Universal Limited and another, 2005(5) CTC 133 that only inherent lack of jurisdiction, which goes to the root of jurisdiction or competence of a court to try the case, makes a decree passed by the said court which has no competence, a nullity. But, there is a difference between lack of jurisdiciton which goes to the root of jurisdiction and lack of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction.
But, there is a difference between lack of jurisdiciton which goes to the root of jurisdiction and lack of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. An objection regarding lack of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction is merely technical and does not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the court to try a case and therefore, a party would be precluded from raising such objection, when has has not raised the said objection at the earliest possible opportunity. In the present case, the respondents have not taken the objection before the trial court at the earliest possible opportunity, that is, immediately after the Civil Courts Amendment Act, 2004 had come into force. He has also not raised it as a ground in the memorandum of grounds in the appeal filed before the First Appellate court also. Only by way of application, they have raised the said issue before the first appellate court. Since the case has been tried on merits and judgment has been delivered by the trial court, the same cannot be reversed purely on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction, in the absence of any evidence to show that it has resulted in failure of justice. The first appellate court was not justified in remanding the suit to the trial court. The lower appellate court should have disposed of the case on merits. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate court remanding the matter tot he trial court is liable to be set aside." Accordingly, he would pray for the dismissal of the appeal. 10.) The learned senior counsel for the appellants/defendants would place reliance on one other judgment of this court reported in 2012 (2) CTC 89 [Sivabakkiyam Muthusamy Trust rep.by its Trustees 1.Dr.S.Natesan 2. Dr.N.Kavitha vs. S.Sivasankaran and S.Gunasekaran] Certain excerpt from it would run thus: "7.) For better clarity, I would like to extract hereunder the amended Sec.12 of the Tamil Nadu Civil courts Act, 1973: "Sec.12.Jurisdiction of District Judge or Subordinate Judge in original suits -The jurisdiction of a District Judge extends, subject to the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, of which the amount of value of the subject matter exceeds ten lakh rupees.
The jurisdiction of a Subordinate Judge extends, subject to the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, to all like original suits and proceedings, of which the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds one lakh rupees, but does not exceed ten lakh rupees. Jurisdiction of District Munsif - The jurisdiction of a District Munsif extends to all like suits and proceedings, not otherwise exempted from his cognizance, of which the amount of value of the subject matter does not exceed one lakh rupees. Section 4 of Act No.19/2010 (the transitory provision) would run thus: "Sec.4(1) All suits pending in a District Court on the date of the commencement of this Act and which would be within the cognizance of the Subordinate Court under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873 (Central Act III of 1873), as amended by this Act, shall stand transferred to the Subordinate Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter. (2) All suits pending before an Additional Judge or a Principal Judge or in the High Court on the date of the commencement of this Act and which would be within the cognizance of the Chennai City Civil Court under the provisions of the Chennai Civil Civil Court Act, 1892 (Central Act VII of 1892), as amended by this Act, shall stand transferred to the Assistant Judge, Additional Judge or the Principal judge, having jurisdiction over the subject matter." 8. It is not in controversy that the suit was valued as under by the plaintiffs: Details of valuation: Rs. Rs. a) Plaintiffs valuation of the relief of declaration prayed for a paras XVI (a) 1000.00 --- Court Fee thereon under Sec.25(d) 75.50 b) Plaintiffs valuation of the relief claimed under Sec.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 5,00,000.00 Court fee thereon under Sec.47 of the Court Fees Act 200.00 c) Plaintiffs tentative valuation of the relief of accounting 1,000.00 Court-fee thereon under Sec.35 of the Court-Fees Act 75.50 Total 5,02,000.00 351.00 9. In my considered view such a judgement is non-est in the eye of law for more than one reason. Any judgement rendered by a Judge, who has got no jurisdiction, would result in nullity. However, if there is only error in exercising the territorial jurisdiction only, at a later point of time objection cannot be raised to it. But this case is not of that nature.
Any judgement rendered by a Judge, who has got no jurisdiction, would result in nullity. However, if there is only error in exercising the territorial jurisdiction only, at a later point of time objection cannot be raised to it. But this case is not of that nature. Had really the matter been transferred to the Subordinate Court concerned and the said Court pronounced the judgement, then either of the aggrieved parties would have had the opportunity of filing appeal before the District Court and thereafter second appeal before the High Court. Now by the judgement of the District Judge, one right of appeal to District Court is lost, over and above that, the chance of second appeal has got extinct. 10. At this juncture, I recollect the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in -A.R.Antulay v. R.S.Nayak and another - (1988) 2 SCC 602 , certain excerpts from it would run thus: "55.) . . . . . Four valuable rights, it appears to us, of the appellant have been taken away by the impugned directions: (i) The right to be tried by a Special Judge in accordance with the procedure established by law and enacted by Parliament. (ii) The right of revision to the High Court under Section 9 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. (iii) The right of first appeal to the High Court under the same section. (iv) The right to move the Supreme Court under Article 136 thereafter by way of a second appeal, if necessary. 57.) . . . . 58.) We are clearly of the opinion that the right of the appellant under Article 14 regarding equality before the law and equal protection of law in this case has been violated. The appellant has also a right not to be singled out for special treatment by a Special Court created for him alone. This right is implicit in the right to equality. . . . . . . . . . . . 73.) . . . . .There was prejudice to the accused in being singled out as a special class of accused for a special dispensation without room for any appeal as of right and without power of the revision to the High Court. There is prejudice in that.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .There was prejudice to the accused in being singled out as a special class of accused for a special dispensation without room for any appeal as of right and without power of the revision to the High Court. There is prejudice in that.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.) It is the settled position in law that jurisdiction of courts comes solely from the law of the land cannot be exercised otherwise. . . . ." 11.) A mere poring over and perusal of the precedent of the Honourable Apex Court would leave no doubt in the mind of the Court that the judgement of District Court should necessarily be set aside and the matter remitted back to the appropriate Court, namely, the Sub-Court, Thiruchengode, which Court has to deal with the matter further as per law and render judgement and accordingly, it is ordered. Both the parties are directed to appear before the Sub-Court, Thiruchengode, on 1.3.2012." The decision of this court reported in 2012 (2) CTC 89 rendered by me earlier would refer to the transitory provision as found mandated in Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1973 and that would exemplify and evince that necessarily the matter should be transferred from District Court to Sub Court on point of jurisdiction. Whereas in the one other judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff reported in 2012(2) CTC 623 , the purport of the transitory provision was not referred to and considered. Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts and Chennai City Civil Court (Amendment) Act, 2010 (T.N.Act 19 of 2010), passed sub-silentio in that decision. 11. I would like to stick on to the principles laid down by me in the judgment rendered in 2012(2) CTC 89 and verbatim the ratiocination adhered to by me in rendering the said judgment shall be applicable to this judgment in the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. Accordingly, the point is decided to the effect that as on the date of pronouncement of judgment in the suit O.S.No.178 of 2004, the learned Principal District Judge, Krishnagiri had no jurisdiction at all to pronounce the judgment in view of the mandate contained in Section 12 Tamil Nadu Civil Courts and Chennai City Civil Court (Amendment) Act, 2010 (T.N.Act 19 of 2010). 13.
13. Admittedly, the suit was valued in a sum of Rs.5,01,000/-. As such, as on the date of rendering judgment by the trial court, viz., the Principal District Court, Krishnagiri the matter should have been dealt with only by the Sub Court. Hence, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Krishnagiri dated 07.06.2010 is set aside and the matter is sent to the Sub Court at Hosur with the following mandate. 14. The judgment and decree dated 07.06.2010 passed by the trial court is set aside. The Registry is directed to send back the records immediately to the Sub Court, Hosur, which is hereby directed to hear both sides' arguments and deliver judgment within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the evidence already recorded before the former court shall hold good. Both parties or their advocates shall appear before the Sub Court, Hosur on 28.09.2012. 15. I would like to disambiguate the ambiguity, if any, by pointing out that this court has not decided the case on merits. 16. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Krishnagiri is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Sub Court, Hosur to deal with the matter as mandated supra. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.