Judgment :- R.SUBBIAH, J. This Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of District Judge of the Nilgiris at Udhagamandalam in O.S.No.405 of 1994 (dated 14.02.2006). 2. Appellants are defendants 3, 4, 6, 11 and 12 and respondents, numbering 6, are plaintiff and defendants 1 and 7 to 10. For convenience, parties would be referred as in their original rank in the suit. 3. Brief facts of Plaintiff Bank are as follows: (a) Originally the suit was filed only as against D1 to D6. Since D2-K.J.Bheeman died during pendency of suit, D7 to D9 (respondents 3 to 5 in the appeal) were brought on record. Similarly, D5-Nataraj died during trial stage and his legal representatives were brought on record as D-10 to D-12 (6th respondent and appellants 4 and 5). D-10 Baby also died. (b) Case of Plaintiff Bank is that D1 Firm is carrying on business in manufacture and sale of paper bags at Nilgiris. D1 firm was originally constituted by D2 and one S.Bhojan as its partners on 19.08.1985. D1 and its partners approached the plaintiff bank for credit facilities for purchase of new machinery for making paper bags and also a deluxe printing machine. Plaintiff bank sanctioned a Medium Term Loan to the limit of Rs.96,000/- on 04.12.1986 and on that day, they had executed an Agreement for Medium Term Loan, agreeing to repay the said amount with interest at 1% below SBI Advance rate rising and falling therewith with a minimum of 12.5% with quarterly rests and other bank charges. D1 had also agreed to hypothecate the machineries to be purchased as security for the due repayment of the loan. Apart from that, D2 and the said S.Bhojan executed a Guarantee Agreement dated 04.12.1986 undertaking the due repayment and the guarantee shall remain in force until the entire claim of the plaintiff bank has been fully satisfied. (c)While so, D1-firm was reconstituted under the Deed of Partnership dated 16.07.1987 introducing D3 to D6 as partners on the retirement of one of the partners S.Bhojan on the same date and they desired to continue the said facility with the plaintiff bank and the bank had also agreed to accept the reconstituted D1 firm and its partners as its debtors and to discharge S.Bhojan, the retired partner from the liability. Thereafter, on 21.08.1987, at the request of D1 and its partners, D2 to D6, plaintiff bank had granted a Cash Credit Loan of Rs.50,000/-for the purpose of continuing its business. For which, they had executed a Promissory Note on the same day, agreeing to repay the same with interest at 2.5% below SBI Advance rate with a minimum of 14% per annum with quarterly rest. On the same day, D1 to D6 had executed a Letter of Continuity in favour of the plaintiff bank. In respect of the said loan, D1 to D6 had executed an Agreement for Cash Credit as well as Guarantee agreement. To secure the repayment of Cash Credit Loan, D1, who had already hypothecated the machineries to the plaintiff Bank, had agreed to cover the hypothecation to the Cash Credit Loan also. (d) Ledger accounts were opened separately with the plaintiff Bank in the name of D1 firm and payments made were duly credited in the account. Contrary to the Agreements, D1 to D6 did not honour the terms of payment. D1 by its separate Revival Letters dated 20.10.1989 and 04.12.1989 had acknowledged the liability of debt. Because of the irregular in repayment of the loan amounts, Plaintiff sent a legal notice to D1 to D6 calling upon them to settle the bank's account; but they did not do so. Plaintiff is entitled to bring the hypothecated machineries for sale described in the schedule. Therefore, plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of (i) Rs.5,51,285/- with interest on Rs.2,51,937/- at 15.5% per annum and on Rs.2,99,348/-at 14.5% per annum with quarterly rests from D1 firm and its partners. Pending suit, D2 and D5 died and their legal representatives were brought on record as parties. 4. Denying averments in the plaint, D3 (Meera Raju) filed the written statement contending that she was not aware of suit loan transactions. Medium Term loan said to have been availed by D1, D2 and Bhojan as partners cannot be tagged on to the liability of Cash Credit Loan. The remedy of plaintiff Bank with regard to Medium Term Loan is to proceed only against D1 and its then partners, namely, D2 and Bhojan and this defendant is not liable for the loan dated 04.12.1986 and there was no privity of contract between the reconstituted D1 firm and the newly inducted partners. The remedy of plaintiff Bank with regard to Medium Term Loan is to proceed only against D1 and its then partners, namely, D2 and Bhojan and this defendant is not liable for the loan dated 04.12.1986 and there was no privity of contract between the reconstituted D1 firm and the newly inducted partners. Allegation of plaintiff that she desired to continue the existing facility in pursuance of the loan granted on 04.12.1986 and agreed to accept liability of the firm before reconstitution is denied. The new loan is an independent transaction. 5. This defendant had not borrowed any amount. As urged by D2, D3 to D6 had been to the Bank on 21.08.1987 and signed several documents like promissory note, hypothecation agreement duly filled as well as blank including certain printed forms with blanks besides certain forms said to be revival letters. Plaintiff bank had materially altered and fabricated the same to foist the liability on this defendant. This defendant had not executed any revival letters. The signature of this defendant has been forged in collusion with D2. The action of plaintiff bank in discharging one of the partners Bhojan is illegal. Instead of proceeding against the erstwhile partner Bhojan for recovery of the amount lent on 04.12.1986, plaintiff has no right to absolve him on the liabilities. The amounts credited subsequent to the loan dated 21.08.1987 ought to have been credited only towards the loan availed on 21.08.1987. The unilateral action in crediting amounts towards earlier loan has no legal validity. Plaintiff bank is not entitled to personal decree against this defendant. The loans availed are independent and exclusive. Suit is barred by limitation. Interest claimed is excessive. Therefore, she prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 6. D4 and D5 filed the written statement stating that D3 to D6 had retired from the partnership in 1990 and, hence, the suit filed against them is not maintainable in law. Suit filed without including the original partners and the present partners is bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties and misjoinder of parties and on this ground, suit is liable to be dismissed. Allegations of plaintiff with regard to reconstitution of the firm, inclusion of D3 to D6 as partners, take over all liabilities and outstanding of the firm before reconstitution, etc., are all patently false. Allegations of plaintiff with regard to reconstitution of the firm, inclusion of D3 to D6 as partners, take over all liabilities and outstanding of the firm before reconstitution, etc., are all patently false. At no point of time, D3 to D6 had agreed to take over all the liabilities and outstanding of the firm as on the date of reconstitution. There is no privity of contract between the reconstituted firm and the plaintiff, much less, with newly inducted members, namely, D3 to D6 and, as such, D3 to D6 are not liable for any of the old debts or outstanding prior to their induction and subsequent to their retirement. Moreover, even after the induction of D3 to D6 and subsequent to their retirement and further subsequent to reconstitution of the partnership firm, the registration of D1 firm has not been changed or altered till date and as per the records in the Registrar of Firms, D1 firm still consists of D2 and S.Bhojan and not D3 to D6 and as such, the question of retirement of S.Bhojan and the induction of D3 to D6 does not arise. It is, no doubt, D2 had prevailed upon D3 to D6 to sign necessary documents for obtaining loan of Rs.50,000/- for the newly reconstituted partnership firm and accordingly, D3 to D6 and other partners of the newly reconstituted firm had been to the plaintiff's bank on 21.08.1987 and had signed several documents like promissory note, hypothecation agreement as well as several blank papers. Plaintiff have materially altered and fabricated such blank papers as revival letters by inserting a different date in order to save limitation. The promissory note dated 21.08.1987 will reveal that the said document has been executed by D1 in favour of D2 to D6 and in turn, D2 to D6 have alleged to be endorsed in favour of plaintiff on the very same day. Such execution of promissory note and the alleged endorsement in favour of plaintiff bank is unknown to law. With regard to loan granted on 21.08.1987, it had been repaid as per the schedule. It is absolutely false to state that D3 to D6 had acknowledged the liability by executing revival letters. At no point of time, D3 to D6 never executed the alleged revival letters. With regard to loan granted on 21.08.1987, it had been repaid as per the schedule. It is absolutely false to state that D3 to D6 had acknowledged the liability by executing revival letters. At no point of time, D3 to D6 never executed the alleged revival letters. Subsequent to the retirement of D3 to D6, D1 firm has been reconstituted by inducting D2's sons (D7 to D9) to the knowledge of plaintiff and as such, no liability can ever be fastened on these defendants since cause of action for two loans is distinct and independent and hence, plaintiff, in law, is not entitled to unite the same. Thus, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 7. D-11 filed a written statement, adopted by D-10 and D-12, stating that deceased D5 had not left any properties by way of movable or immovable to be inherited by these defendants and as such, plaintiff is not entitled for any decree against them. 8. On the above pleadings, the trial court has originally framed 13 issues and thereafter framed 13 additional issues. In order to prove the case, on the side of plaintiff, one witness was examined as P.W.1 and 27 documents were marked as Exs.A-1 to A-27 and on the side of defendants, three witnesses were examined as D.Ws.1 to 3 and 13 documents were marked as Exs.B-1 to B-13. Rejecting the case of contesting defendants that plaintiff bank is not entitled to unite the cause of action and that revival letters are fabricated and also that the suit is barred by limitation, trial court decreed the suit as prayed for. Challenging the correctness of the finding, D3, D4, D6, D11 and D12 have filed the present appeal. 9. Opposing the reasonings and findings of the trial court, it is the first and foremost submission of learned counsel for D3, D4, D6, D11 and D12 (contesting defendants) that the Medium Term loan of Rs.96,000/- was availed before re-constitution of partnership firm on 04.12.1986 while D2 and one S.Bhojan were the partners of the said firm. The firm was reconstituted only on 16.07.1987 inducting D3 to D6 as partners since one of the partners Bhojan retired from the firm. There was no privity of contract between the plaintiff bank and newly inducted partners regarding the payment of Medium Term Loan, which was availed prior to reconstitution. The firm was reconstituted only on 16.07.1987 inducting D3 to D6 as partners since one of the partners Bhojan retired from the firm. There was no privity of contract between the plaintiff bank and newly inducted partners regarding the payment of Medium Term Loan, which was availed prior to reconstitution. After reconstitution, the firm has obtained new Cash Credit loan from the bank to the extent of Rs.50,000/-on 21.08.1987, which is totally an independent transaction and has no connection with the Medium Term loan availed by the erstwhile partners. Though the firm was making payment towards cash credit loan, the bank has credited the payments effected by the partners towards Medium Term loan, without the consent of the partners. 10. By inviting the attention of this Court to Exs.A-10 to A-17 i.e.revival letters executed by D1 as well as D3 to D6 to the plaintiff bank, it is the second submission of contesting defendants that in Exs.A-10 and A-14 to A-16, the revival letters dated 20.10.1989 and 04.12.1991, the signatures of partners were forged by the bank in order to save limitation to file the suit. It is their further submission that the signatures were obtained on 21.08.1987 in the blank papers by the bank at the time of availing Cash Credit facility and the same were used by the bank with an intention to save limitation. Revival letters were sent to the Expert’s opinion since contesting defendants had disputed the signatures. The Director, Forensic Sciences Department had also sent a letter dated 25.11.2004 by comparing the disputed signatures with the admitted signatures, opining that questioned signatures have been simulated and they differ significantly from the standard in the handwriting characteristics. One Parthasarathy, Scientific Officer was examined as D.W.3. The evidence of P.W.3 coupled with Ex.B-13 would go to show that the signatures found in revival letters under Exs.A-10, A-11 and A-14 to A-17 are not of the defendants. 11. It is the further submission of contesting defendants that the loans advanced by the plaintiff bank, namely, Medium Term loan and Cash Credit loan are distinct, independent, exclusive and between different persons. Hence, the bank is not entitled to unite the cause of action of these separate loan accounts. Therefore, the court below ought to have dismissed the suit in limini. 12. Last submission is that D3 to D6 had retired from the partnership on 31.12.1989. Hence, the bank is not entitled to unite the cause of action of these separate loan accounts. Therefore, the court below ought to have dismissed the suit in limini. 12. Last submission is that D3 to D6 had retired from the partnership on 31.12.1989. D3 to D6 have nothing to do with the partnership firm after 31.12.1989. In the year 1993, subsequent to the retirement of D3 to D6 from D1 firm, D2’s sons were inducted. Therefore, the contesting defendants are not liable to pay the loan amount. 13. It is an alternative submission of contesting defendants that the claim made by the plaintiff to pay interest at 14.5% per annum with quarterly rests from the date of plaint pendent lite is not maintainable. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgment reported in R.Vijayakumar.vs. The Official Liquidator, High Court, Madras as the Provisional Liquidator of M/s.RBF Nidhi Limited 14. Repelling the arguments of the contesting defendants, learned counsel appearing for plaintiff bank made his submission, supporting the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 15. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, judgment of the lower court, grounds urged in the Memorandum of Appeal and other materials on record, the following points arise for our consideration; (1) Whether contesting defendants are liable to repay the Medium Tern loan amount availed by erstwhile partners ? (2) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (3) Whether contesting defendants are not liable to pay the loan amount since they are retired from the partnership on 31.12.1989 ? (4) Whether the bank is entitled to unite the cause of action of two loans granted on two different dates ? 16. It is the submission of the learned counsel for contesting defendants that the Medium Term Loan was availed by erstwhile partners before reconstitution of the firm and therefore, they are not liable to pay the said amount. But, we find, after reconstitution on 16.07.1987, D3 to D6 had executed a letter to the plaintiff bank on 01.04.1989 authorising D2-Bhiman to operate both loan accounts. The said document was marked as Ex.A-25. Further we find, under clause 7 of the Reconstituted Partnership Deed dated 16.07.1987, it was acknowledged by D3 to D6 for extending loan facilities by the plaintiff bank. The relevant clause in Ex.A-23 is as follows: "7. The said document was marked as Ex.A-25. Further we find, under clause 7 of the Reconstituted Partnership Deed dated 16.07.1987, it was acknowledged by D3 to D6 for extending loan facilities by the plaintiff bank. The relevant clause in Ex.A-23 is as follows: "7. BORROWING POWERS: The partners hereto are hereby acknowledged the loan facilities extended to the firm by State Bank of Travancore and District Industrial Centre, Ootacamud. The partners shall arrange all the available financial facilities to the maximum extent required to the firm from the above referred State Bank of Travancore or from any other financial instructions either Central or State Government or any Body Corporations". When both the loans were acknowledged by D3 to D6, now they cannot turn round and say that they are not liable to pay the loan availed by the erstwhile partners. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the contesting defendants are liable to pay both the loan amounts. 17. With regard to the submission that the signatures found in the revival letters Exs.B-10, B-11 and B-14 to B-17 were forged by the bank, which was strengthened by Ex.B-13 (Forensic Report) and the evidence of D.W.3, the Scientific Officer of the Forensic Department, it is a well settled principle that the opinion of Handwriting Expert is not a conclusive proof. Only if the court satisfied with the Expert’s opinion the same can be accepted. So far as the present case is concerned, it is pertinent to point out that though the contesting defendants had denied their signatures, except D4, nobody had chosen to enter into the witness box to substantiate their contention. In fact, the trial court in para 26 and 27 of the judgment elaborately discussed about the defence raised by the contesting defendants based on the disputed signatures and negatived the same. The trial court, in support of its conclusion has relied upon the evidence of D.W.3, who had categorically stated in his cross examination that Tamil Therefore, we are also of the opinion that the evidence of D.W.3 is not assertive enough to come to the conclusion that the signatures were forged. 18. Further, on a perusal of evidence of D.W.1, we find that D.W.1 had admitted in his evidence that they have signed all the documents on 21.08.1987. 18. Further, on a perusal of evidence of D.W.1, we find that D.W.1 had admitted in his evidence that they have signed all the documents on 21.08.1987. He had in stated his evidence that Tamil Hence, we are not inclined to accept the submission that the bank has forged the signatures of contesting defendants in order to save limitation. 19. Coming to the submission of the contesting defendants that since D3 to D6 have retired from the partnership on 31.12.1989, they cannot be held liable to pay the loan amount after their retirement, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment relied on by the plaintiff reported in LakshmiVilas Bank Ltd., .vs. M/s.Sun Finance & Others (1995-2-L.W.574), which gives a fitting answer to this issue and the relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder: "22. Section 72 of the Indian Partnership Act deals with the mode of giving public notice. It is useful to extract the following passage in J.P. Singhal's Indian Partnership Act, Fifth Edition, appearing at page 1215: "A partnership continues, as to third persons who deal with the members thereof as partners, until due notice of dissolution is given even though as between the partners, the firm has been dissolved prior to such notice, especially as to persons who dealt with the firm or extended credit prior to the dissolution as between partners. Accordingly, each member of a former firm is bound, and continues liable for the acts of any partner within the ordinary scope of the business of the firm, until due notice of such dissolution has been given. But, in case of dissolution by operation of law, notice thereof need not be given, nor is notice necessary where a valid partnership has never existed. Wherever a notice is required by law to be given, it ought to be given in such a manner as the law deems sufficient. In India, notice is regulated by this Act". 23. Under Section 32(3) of the Indian Partnership Act, a retired partner continues to be liable until public notice is given of his retirement and what the public notice under the Act is specified by Section 72. Therefore, on a reading of both the sections, it is clear that a retiring partner will be liable for any subsequent act on behalf of the firm which would bind the firm until the public notice as prescribed by Section 72 is given". 20. Therefore, on a reading of both the sections, it is clear that a retiring partner will be liable for any subsequent act on behalf of the firm which would bind the firm until the public notice as prescribed by Section 72 is given". 20. From the dictum laid down in the said judgment, it is clear that as per section 32(3) of Indian Partnership Act,a retired partner continues to be liable until public notice is given of his retirement. In the instant case, it is to be noted that no such notice was given. Moreover, by perusal of written statement filed by D3 on 10.01.1996, it is seen that she did not say anything about the retirement of D3 to D6. Only in the written statement of D4 filed in the month of September, 1998, he has stated about the retirement of D3 to D6 from D1 firm. Though it has been claimed by D3 to D6 that they have retired from the partnership firm, no notice was given to the plaintiff bank. In view of the factual aspects as well as the legal position laid down in the above judgment, we are of the opinion that D3 to D6 are liable to pay the amount. 21. It is the further contention of contesting defendants that the suit is liable to be dismissed for uniting two causes of action in respect of two loans availed in two different dates. For which, it is the reply of the plaintiff that even if two loans were availed on two different dates, it could be clubbed together and it should be treated as a single cause of action. In support of his contention, the plaintiff has also relied upon a judgment reported in R.S.Senthamaraikannanand another .vs. The Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal for Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry at Chennai and others ( 1997 (2) MLJ 394 ) and the relevant passages from the said judgment are extracted hereunder: "11. A cause of action means, 'every fact which it is necessary to establish to support right or obtain judgment. To put it differently, it means bundle of essential facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the case. It can as well be said to be the media upon which the Court arrives at a conclusion in the suit in favour of the plaintiff. To put it differently, it means bundle of essential facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the case. It can as well be said to be the media upon which the Court arrives at a conclusion in the suit in favour of the plaintiff. It means, every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment. 'In this case, It is not disputed that the petitioners herein moved a single application to get financial assistance by way of two facilities, namely, (1) Medium Term Loan, and (2) Cash Credit Facility, with certain conditions. Those conditions were violated. Naturally, to enforce the claim, the Bank instituted the present proceedings. In such a case, plaintiff will have to prove that there is a single application. That application was processed by the Bank and they gave two facilities on certain conditions. Those conditions have been violated. It is the proof of the above facts that constitutes the cause of action for the plaint. It is only one cause of action though the plaintiffs will be entitled to two reliefs, since the loan is under two heads. Both the facilities availed by defendant are also the same, and they were intended to be used for the first defendant-firm. The facts narrated above will make it clear that there was only one application and two facilities were given to enable the defendant, for easy repayment. 12. In Food Corporation of India, etc. v. M/ s.Mayavaram Financial Syndicate, etc. Food Corporation of India, etc. v. M/ s.Mayavaram Financial Syndicate, etc. Food Corporation of India, etc. v. M/ s.Mayavaram Financial Syndicate, etc. (1993)2 L.W. 453 a similar question came for consideration. There, the plaintiff filed a suit wherein three items of claims were put forward. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, their Lordships said that it will not amount to misjoinder of cause of action. In that case, there were various transactions which were ultimately crystalised into three items, and in such a case, the Bench said that it is not a misjoinder of cause of action. Here, there is only one transaction, but under two different claims arising out of the same transaction. Naturally, it cannot be doubted that it is the same cause of action". Here, there is only one transaction, but under two different claims arising out of the same transaction. Naturally, it cannot be doubted that it is the same cause of action". The dictum laid down in the judgment is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. Though two transactions are apparently made independent, the same are interlinked to each other and both loans were used for the business of D1 firm. Therefore, we are of the opinion that both loans were obtained for the business purpose of D1 firm by its partners and as such, single suit filed by combining two loans is legally valid. Therefore, we do not find any reason to accept the submission made by the contesting defendants. 22. With regard to the interest, in the plaint, plaintiff prayed for decreeing of the suit for an amount of Rs.5,51,285/- with interest at the rate of 15.5% p.a. on Rs.2,51,937/-and at the rate of 14.5% p.a. on Rs.2,99,348/-with quarterly rests from the date of suit till realisation to the plaintiff and the suit was decreed as prayed for. Resultantly the contesting defendants and other defendants are to pay suit claim of Rs.5,51,285/-with the above said rate of interest with quarterly rests. Capitalisation of interest over the period would multiply principal amount several times. In commercial transaction, contractual rate of interest should normally be awarded. Banking practice legitimises capitalisation of interest. In commercial transaction awarding contractual rate of interest should be the rule and departure a deviation. In the case on hand, defendants have availed the loan in 1986. Almost, two and half decades passed away. It is not known whether the business of the defendants was successful. At this distant point of time, to award contractual rate of interest of 15.5% and 14.5% together with quarterly rests would cause undue hardship to the defendants in repaying the amount. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise discretion under Section 34 C.P.C. in reducing pendentelite and post decree rate of interest. Considering the facts and circumstances and the hardship that would be caused to the defendants, we are of the view that plaintiff bank is entitled to only 12% simple interest from the date of plaint till the date of realisation on the suit amount of Rs.5,51,285/-. Considering the facts and circumstances and the hardship that would be caused to the defendants, we are of the view that plaintiff bank is entitled to only 12% simple interest from the date of plaint till the date of realisation on the suit amount of Rs.5,51,285/-. Except the modification in respect of interest, the judgment and decree of the trial court are confirmed. In fine, Appeal is partly allowed and Appellants are directed to pay Rs.5,51,285/-to the first respondent bank with simple interest at 12% per annum from the date of plaint till the date of realisation within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.