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2012 DIGILAW 392 (GAU)

Giasuddin v. State of Assam

2012-03-26

I.A.ANSARI

body2012
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By judgment and order, dated 07.01.2004, passed in GR Case No. 486 of 1999, by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, the accused-petitioner was convicted under Sections 304A and 279 IPC and sentenced to suffer, for his conviction under Section 304A IPC, rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and also to pay, for his conviction under Section 279 IPC a fine of Rs. 500/- and, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one month. By judgment and order, dated 28.06.2004, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Karimganj, in Criminal Appeal No. 4(1)/2004, while the conviction of the accused-petitioner, under Section 304A IPC and 279 IPC has been maintained, the sentence of imprisonment for the accused-petitioner's conviction under Section 304A IPC has been reduced to 6 (six) months. With the help of the present revision petition, the petitioner has put to challenge the appellate judgment aforementioned, which has, while maintaining the conviction, has modified the sentence in respect of the offence under Section 304A IPC to the extent as indicated above. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be described thus: On 24.9.2009, at about 10.30 A.M., when Matilal Rabidas (since deceased) was proceeding, on foot, to Nilambazar, a bus, bearing registration No. AMT 276, came from the opposite direction, driven by the accused-petitioner in a negligent manner, knocked down Matilal Rabidas and killed him on the spot. On the First Information Report having been lodged about the occurrence by Bijoy Rabidas, son of the deceased victim, a case under Sections 279/427/304A IPC was registered against the present accused petitioner. During the course of investigation, police visited the place of occurrence, drew a sketch map of the place of occurrence, held inquest over the dead body of the victim, recorded statements of the witnesses and, then, submitted charge-sheet against the accused-petitioner under Sections 279/427/304A IPC. 2. During trial, when particulars of offences, under Sections 279/427/304A IPC, were explained to the accused-petitioner, the accused-petitioner pleaded not guilty thereto. 3. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether 7 (seven) witnesses including the Medical Officer and Investigating Officer. The accused petitioner was, then, examined Under Section 313 Cr. 2. During trial, when particulars of offences, under Sections 279/427/304A IPC, were explained to the accused-petitioner, the accused-petitioner pleaded not guilty thereto. 3. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether 7 (seven) witnesses including the Medical Officer and Investigating Officer. The accused petitioner was, then, examined Under Section 313 Cr. P.C. and, in his examination aforementioned, he denied that he had committed the offences, which were alleged to have been committed by him, the case of the defence being, in brief, thus: When the accused, driving the bus, came near the place of occurrence, he found that a truck was lying parked on his left side of the road and the accused had to come to his right side of the road and as soon as he came to the right side of the road, he found a cow on the road and as he wanted to save the cow, he happened to hit and knock down the said deceased. The accused has, thus, not committed any offence inasmuch as the incident was an accident and the accident took place for reasons beyond his control. 4. Having, however, found the accused guilty of commission of offences under Sections 304A and 279 IPC, the learned trial Court convicted him accordingly and passed sentences against him as mentioned above. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentences, passed against him, the accused-petitioner preferred an appeal, which, as already indicated above, has been dismissed by modifying the sentence passed against him. Hence, the accused has, now, come to this Court with the present revision. 5. I have-heard Dr. B. Ahmed, learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, and Mr. K. Munir, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 6. While considering the present revision, it needs to be noted that there is no dispute that Matilal Rabidas died on being knocked down by the bus, which the accused petitioner, at the relevant point of time, was driving. However, there is no eye-witness to the occurrence except PW 4, who also could not adduce any evidence to show negligence or recklessness in driving the vehicle by the accused-petitioner. 7. The informant (PW 1) did not, admittedly, see the occurrence and lodged the FIR on coming to know about the occurrence. However, there is no eye-witness to the occurrence except PW 4, who also could not adduce any evidence to show negligence or recklessness in driving the vehicle by the accused-petitioner. 7. The informant (PW 1) did not, admittedly, see the occurrence and lodged the FIR on coming to know about the occurrence. As far as PW 2 is concerned, he, too, had not seen the occurrence inasmuch as the occurrence took place about half-a-kilometer ahead of him, when his uncle (i.e. Matilal Rabidas), was proceeding towards market. PW 4 is also not an eye witness to the occurrence in as much as he is merely a witness to the seizure of the vehicle and its documents. 8. So far as P W 5 is concerned, he was a passenger in the bus; but, being inside the bus, he did not have any clue as to how the accident had taken place inasmuch as he has merely stated that he was traveling in the said bus, which met with the accident, and, after the accident, the driver stopped the bus near Nilambazar Police outpost. 9. It is of immense importance to note, now, that the Investigation Officer visited the place of occurrence after the occurrence, because the occurrence had taken place near Nilambazar police outpost, he prepared a sketch map of the place of occurrence, the map having been proved as Ext. 3. The vehicle, as the learned trial Court has pointed out, was, admittedly proceeding from Patharkandi to Karimganj, i.e., from southern side to northern side and the sketch map (Ext. 3) shows, as the learned trial Court noted, that the occurrence took place on the extreme eastern side of the highway. The learned trial Court further concluded that the vehicle was, admittedly, brought by the driver on his extreme right side of the road and it is on his right side of the road that the accused knocked down Matilal Rabidas. 10. While considering the above aspects of the case, it needs to be pointed out, as noted by the learned two Courts below, that according to the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C, a truck was standing on his left side and, as such, he was compelled to go to his right side, i.e., on the right side of the road. The sketch map (Ext. P.C, a truck was standing on his left side and, as such, he was compelled to go to his right side, i.e., on the right side of the road. The sketch map (Ext. 3) does not reveal, however, existence of any truck standing on the western side of the road at the place of occurrence. The defence did not adduce any evidence to show that the truck, as contended by the accused, was really lying parked on the western side of the road. The evidence on record does not justify the contention of the accused-petitioner that he had to move to his right side of the road, because of the fact that the truck was lying parked on his left side of the road. 11. While driving a vehicle, it is the primary duty of the driver to ensure that when he comes to his wrong side of the road, he avoids collision with anything. It was, therefore, the duty to show, in the circumstances projected by the accused petitioner himself, that he had taken the care, which was expected of him and he came to his right side of the road after having noticed that there was a truck on his left side of the road. PW 2 has clearly deposed that before knocking down the victim, the accused petitioner had knocked down the cow on the road. This indicates that the accused was not, as a driver, in total control of the vehicle, while driving the same. It was his duty to keep the vehicle under his control. If the evidence on record is considered, in the light of the statement made by the accused-petitioner under Section 313 Cr. P.C, it becomes abundantly clear that the offending vehicle was brought by the accused-petitioner, as driver, to his extreme right side of the road, knocked down the cow, and, then, the said victim. There is no evidence to show that the accident took place despite the care, which the driver ought to have taken, was taken by him. 12. One question, which may validly arise is: what shall be the value or affect of the statement, made by the accused-petitioner, under Section 313 Cr. There is no evidence to show that the accident took place despite the care, which the driver ought to have taken, was taken by him. 12. One question, which may validly arise is: what shall be the value or affect of the statement, made by the accused-petitioner, under Section 313 Cr. P.C, that there was a truck lying parked on his left side of the road, which made him come to his right side of the road, when the evidence on record, as reflected by the sketch map (Ext. 3), does not support such a plea of the accused-petitioner? 13. While considering the scope and value of a statement made by an accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C., what needs to be pointed out is that under Section 313(1) (a) Cr. P.C., a trial Judge is empowered to put any question to an accused at any stage of the trial; but at the end of the trial, it is, under Section 313 (1)(b), mandatory for the trial Judge to put to the accused, facing trial, every such piece of evidence, which appears to be incriminating against the accused, and reply of the accused shall be sought thereto. In fact, Section 313 Cr. P.C. aims at enabling an accused to personally explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. Examination of an accused, under Section 313(1) (b) Cr. P.C., is, therefore, not an empty formality, but a solemn act of every trial Court. 14. As observed by the Supreme Court, in State of Maharashtra vs. Sukhdeo Singh, AIR 1992 SC 2100 , Section 313 Cr. P.C. is a statutory provision, which embodies the fundamental principle of a fair trial based on the maxim audi alteram partem, that attention of the accused must be specifically invited to inculpatory pieces of evidence or circumstances, laid on record, with a view to giving the accused an opportunity to offer his explanation if he chooses to do so. 15. As a matter of fact, as indicated in Sukhdeo Singh (supra), Section 313(1)(b) Cr. 15. As a matter of fact, as indicated in Sukhdeo Singh (supra), Section 313(1)(b) Cr. P.C. not only casts a solemn duty on the trial Court to elicit the response of the accused to every piece of incriminating circumstance, which may appear against him, but also confers a corresponding right on the accused to receive an opportunity so that he can offer his explanation, if he has any, with regard to such incriminating materials or circumstances as may be appearing against him from the evidence on record howsoever weak or scanty that circumstances may be. Examination of an accused under Section 313 (1)(b) Cr. P.C. is reached after the witnesses of the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called on to enter upon his defence. At the stage of closure of prosecution's evidence and before recording statement of the accused under Section 313(1) (b) Cr. PC, the trial Judge is not expected to evaluate the evidence for the purpose of deciding whether or not he should question the accused. 16. Before an accused is examined under Section 313(1) (b) Cr. P.C., the trial Judge is not expected to sift the evidence and pronounce whether or not he would accept the evidence regarding any incriminating material against the accused to determine whether or not he would examine the accused on that material. To do so, points out the Supreme Court, in Sukhdeo Singh (supra), would amount to pre-judging the evidence without hearing the prosecution under Section 314 Cr. P.C. No wonder, therefore, that the Supreme Court, in Sukhdeo Singh (supra), has observed that however weak or scanty the prosecution evidence may be with regard to an incriminating material, it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation thereto. It is only after that stage is over that the oral arguments have to be heard before the judgment is rendered and it is only where the Court finds that no incriminating material has surfaced that the accused may not be examined under Section 313. In short, if there is material against the accused, he must be examined, under Section 313(1) (b) Cr. P.C., however weak or scanty the evidence against the accused may be. The relevant observations read as follows: To do so would be to pre-judge the evidence without hearing the prosecution under Section 314 of the Code. In short, if there is material against the accused, he must be examined, under Section 313(1) (b) Cr. P.C., however weak or scanty the evidence against the accused may be. The relevant observations read as follows: To do so would be to pre-judge the evidence without hearing the prosecution under Section 314 of the Code. Therefore, no matter how weak or scanty the prosecution evidence is in regard to a certain incriminating material, it is the duty of the court to examine the accused and seek his explanation thereon. It is only after that stage is over that the oral arguments have to be heard before the judgment is rendered. It is only where the court finds that no incriminating material has surfaced that the accused may not be examined under Section 313 of the Code. If there is material against the accused he must be examined. In the instant case it is not correct to say that no incriminating material had surfaced against the accused, particularly accused 5, and hence the learned trial Judge was not justified in examining the accused under Section 313 of the Code. (Emphasis is added) 17. What emerges from the above discussion is that when the prosecution's evidence is closed, it is imperative, on the part of the trial Judge, to examine the accused under Section 313 (1) (b) Cr. P.C. In such examination, the Judge has the duty to put to the accused all such circumstances, which appear from the evidence on record, incriminating against the accused and elicit the response of the accused thereto. This would give an opportunity to the accused to explain incriminating materials, which may have surfaced on the record against him. The answer, so given, by the accused may be taken into consideration along with the evidence on record. 18. In order to correctly appreciate the scope of Section 313 Cr. P.C., it is necessary to recall the facts of the case of Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha (supra). In Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha (supra), accused 1 (Sukhdev Singh @ Sukha) and accused 5 (Jinda), along with others, faced, amongst others, a charge, under Section 302 IPC, on the ground that they had killed General Vaidya, retired Chief of Army Staff, and his wife. In Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha (supra), accused 1 (Sukhdev Singh @ Sukha) and accused 5 (Jinda), along with others, faced, amongst others, a charge, under Section 302 IPC, on the ground that they had killed General Vaidya, retired Chief of Army Staff, and his wife. When the charges were framed at the trial, both these accused, along with others, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried; but barely two weeks thereafter," the accused 1, orally, informed the learned trial Judge that he had killed General Vaidya and he did not desire to contest the case. At a latter stage, when accused 1 was examined under Section 313 Cr. P.C, he made a statement to the effect that according to him, killing of General Vaidya was not a crime, because General Vaidya was responsible for conducting operation Blue Star, which had damaged a sacred religious place like the Akal Takht of the Golden Temple and, that is why, he had not pleaded guilty. The learned trial Judge gave time to accused 1 to reflect on the admissions, which he had made, and, on the date fixed, accused 1 presented a written statement, wherein also he had admitted to have fired four shots to General Vaidya and killed him. Even when his statement, under Section 313 Cr. P.C, was, later on, recorded, accused 1 owned the statement, which he had so made in writing (Ext. 60a). 19. So far as accused 5, in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra), was concerned, he, having not pleaded guilty to the charge, continued to contest the case until he was examined under Section 313 Cr. P.C., wherein he made statements, in writing, admitting to have driven the motor cycle with accused 1 as a pillion rider and also admitting that the accused 1 had fired fatal shots on General Vaidya, while still sitting in the pillion seat. Accused 5 supplemented this statement by yet another statement, which he submitted, in writing, and proved as Ext. 922. 20. Accused 5 supplemented this statement by yet another statement, which he submitted, in writing, and proved as Ext. 922. 20. Thus, in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra), the two accused, in their oral as well as written statements, had made it clear that they believed that General Vaidya was responsible for conducting operation Blue Star, which had damaged Akal Takht, and it also injured the religious belief and sentiments of the Sikh community, and General Vaidya was, therefore, guilty of serious crime and they had merely executed him and, in doing so, they had not committed any crime whatsoever. These facts are clearly noted at Paragraph 46, 47 and 48 of the decision in Sukhdev Singh (supra). 21. It was in the above fact situation that it was submitted before the Supreme Court, on behalf of the two accused, in Sukhdev Singh (supra), that when there is no evidence or circumstance, appearing in the prosecution evidence implicating an accused with the commission of a crime with which he is charged, there is really nothing for the accused to explain and, hence, his examination would be wholly unnecessary and improper. In fact, it was submitted, in Sukhdev Singh (supra), that in such a situation, the accused cannot be questioned at all and his answers cannot be used in the evidence, which may have been adduced, and, hence, the statements, made by accused 1 and accused 5, during their examinations under Section 313 Cr. P.C., should be totally discarded. It was further suggested to the Court that the evidence, adduced by the prosecution, was so weak that even if such evidence was taken to have been proved, the Court would not be in a position to convict the two accused and, hence, in such circumstances, it was unnecessary to examine the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C., for, the answers cannot be used for the purpose of filling up the gaps in the evidence, which the prosecution has adduced against them. This apart, the statements, made by the said two accused in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra), being admission of guilt, the question was as to whether the Court could have acted upon the said admission of guilt. 22. Reacting to the above submissions made in Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha (supra), the Supreme Court pointed out, already indicated above, that at the stage of examination under Section 313 Cr. 22. Reacting to the above submissions made in Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha (supra), the Supreme Court pointed out, already indicated above, that at the stage of examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C, the Court does not sit on the judgment and so long as there is any incriminating evidence appearing against an accused, however weak such evidence may be, the court is duty bound to question the accused. 23. Before proceeding any further what is important to bear in mind is that though a statement, recorded under section 313 Cr. P.C., is not a statement made on oath and is not, strictly speaking, evidence, yet the statement, so made, can, indeed, be taken into consideration, at the trial, against the accused for the purpose of arriving at the guilt or otherwise of the accused. In no uncertain words made the Supreme Court clear this position of law, when it observed and held, in Sukhdev Singh (supra), as follows: 51. That brings us to the question whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he give false answer. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads: "313 (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed." Thus, the answers given by the accused, in response to his examination, under Section 313, can be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra vs. R.B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708 , AIR 1968 SC 110 : 1968 Cri LJ 95). This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra vs. R.B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708 , AIR 1968 SC 110 : 1968 Cri LJ 95). This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs. State of M.B. (1953 Cri LJ 1933 AIR 1953 SC 468 ) held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh vs. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678 : (1964) 1 Crl 730), this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at page 684-685: Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may, at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence, shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing, in the evidence, against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident, which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may 'be taken into consideration' at the enquiry or the trial. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may 'be taken into consideration' at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him, the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him; but if he does not confess and, explaining circumstance, appearing in the evidence against him, sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety." Sub-Section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code except that it, now, stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons case, where the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub Section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old subsection (4) and the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Therefore, the a fore stated observations apply with equal force. 24. From what have been observed and laid down in Sukhdev Singh (supra), it becomes transparent that if an accused person, in his examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C., confesses to the commission of the offence (s) charged with, the Court may, relying upon such confession, proceed to convict the accused and it is only when the accused does not confess and/or the accused chooses to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him or sets up his own version of the occurrence claiming to the effect that he had committed no offence, the statement of the accused, made during the course of examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C., can be considered in its entirety along with other pieces of evidence on record. To put it a little differently, there is no impediment in law for a Court to found conviction of an accused on his confession made by him during his examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C. and/or to rely upon an admission of facts made by an accused during his examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C. 25. To put it a little differently, there is no impediment in law for a Court to found conviction of an accused on his confession made by him during his examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C. and/or to rely upon an admission of facts made by an accused during his examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C. 25. It further logically follows from what have been observed and laid down, in Sukhdev Singh (supra), that an admission of a piece of evidence, which an accused may voluntarily make, at the stage of his examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C., can be relied upon and there is no impediment, in law, in convicting an accused on such admission made in the statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C. if such statement, taken in its entirety, in the light of the other evidence on record, proves beyond doubt that the accused is the one, who has committed the offence. 26. The legal position, as discussed above, with regard to the object and scope of Section 313 Cr. P.C, is further reinforced by a three Judge Bench decision in State of U.P. Vs. Lakhmi, reported in (1998)4 SCC 336 . In order to appreciate the law, on the use of the statement of an accused made under Section 313 Cr. P.C., it is necessary to take note of the material facts of the case in Lakhmi (supra), wherein accused Lakhmi faced the charge of murder for having put his wife to death intentionally. Prosecution's case was largely based on the testimony of PW2 (Ramey). On the day of the occurrence, according to prosecution, Lakhmi inflicted blows with phalli (a spade-like agricultural implement) on the head of the deceased. Her skull got smashed and she died on the spot Ramey, who claims to have been working in the adjacent field, claimed that on hearing the screams of the deceased, he had rushed to the house of the accused and, on peeping through the windows, witnessed the accused smashing his wife's head by giving her blows with a phalli and, on hue and cry being raised by him (PW2), some neighbours, who heard the noise, came to the place of occurrence, broke open the door, which was bolted from inside, and overpowered the assailant. During the course of examination of the accused, under Section 313 Cr. During the course of examination of the accused, under Section 313 Cr. P.C., in Lakhmi (supra), one of the questions put by the Court to the accused and the answer to the question read as follows:- What have you to say about the evidence of Ramey (PW2) that he peeped through the window and saw you standing near her bed and you killed her with phalli (Ex. Ka-1) and Kunda (Ex.Ka-2). The answer of the accused to the said question was this it was not like that. I murdered her with a kunda and not with a phalli. 27. The learned Sessions Judge, in Lakhmi (supra), convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The High Court, while acquitting the appellant, held the evidence of PW2 (Ramey) was not credit worthy and at any rate, his evidence had received no corroboration from any other reliable evidence. While so acquitting the accused, the High Court did not attribute any importance to the answers, given by the appellant, which we have reproduced hereinabove, wherein, he had practically, admitted, that he had killed his wife. 28. In the circumstances, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court, in Lakhmi (supra), has pointed out that answers to questions put to the accused may be, on most of the occasions, flat denial or outright repudiation of those circumstances; but, in certain cases, the accused would offer some explanations to the incriminating circumstances and, in very rare instances, the accused may even admit or own incriminating circumstances adduced against him, perhaps, for the purpose of adopting legally recognized defences. In all such cases, points the Supreme Court, in Lakhmi (supra), the court gets the advantage of knowing the version of the accused about those aspects and it helps the court to effectively appreciate and evaluate the evidence in the case. If an accused admits any incriminating circumstance, appearing in the evidence against him, there is no warrant for the proposition that those admissions should altogether be ignored merely on the ground that such admissions were advanced as a defence strategy. 29. If an accused admits any incriminating circumstance, appearing in the evidence against him, there is no warrant for the proposition that those admissions should altogether be ignored merely on the ground that such admissions were advanced as a defence strategy. 29. Having pointed out that Sub-Section (4) of Section 313 amounts to a legislative guideline for the courts to give due weight to the answers, which an accused may give to the question put to him, the Court has clarified, in Lakhmi (supra), that when answers, given by an accused, contain admissions of circumstances appearing against him and when such admissions are not delinked from the evidence, such admissions can be used for arriving at a finding that the accused had committed the offence. 30. From the law, as discussed above, with regard to use of a statement made by an accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C., it becomes clear that when the accused-petitioner had taken a specific plea of a truck lying parked on his left of the road and this plea is belied by the evidence on record, the conclusion, inescapable in law, would be that the plea of the accused-petitioner was wholly false and if this plea was false, then, the accused-petitioner had no reason to come to his right of the road, which was his wrong side, that, too, in the manner that he had no control on his vehicle inasmuch as he first knocked down a cow and, then, the said deceased. All these facts, when combined together, leave no room for doubt that the accused had killed the said deceased-petitioner by his negligent driving and this killing did not amount to culpable homicide. 31. The accused-petitioner was, therefore, clearly guilty of the offences not only under Section 304A IPC, but also under Section 279 IPC inasmuch as Section 279 IPC gets attracted, when a person drives any vehicle, on any public way, in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life. 32. The learned trial Court committed, thus, no error, factual or legal, in convicting the accused-petitioner under Section 304A IPC as well as under Section 279 IPC and the learned appellate Court has rightly upheld the findings of the guilt and sustained the conviction of the accused-petitioner. 33. 32. The learned trial Court committed, thus, no error, factual or legal, in convicting the accused-petitioner under Section 304A IPC as well as under Section 279 IPC and the learned appellate Court has rightly upheld the findings of the guilt and sustained the conviction of the accused-petitioner. 33. The learned appellate court, I find, discussed the evidence on record threadbare and came to the conclusion that the evidence on record clearly prove that the vehicle was being driven negligently inasmuch as the driver took the vehicle to his extreme right side of the road with no justification being available on record or discernible from the evidence on record, knocked down the cow and, then, Matilal Rabidas, and hence, he has committed offences under Section 304A IPC and also under Section 279 IPC. This Court does not find any infirmity, legal or factual, in the conclusion(s), so reached by the learned trial Court and affirmed and upheld by the learned appellate Court. 34. This Court does not find any merit in this revision. The revision, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. The accused petitioner is hereby directed to surrender, forthwith, in the court of the learned Chief judicial Magistrate to serve out the sentence of imprisonment, which has been passed against him. 35. Send back the LCR forthwith. With the above observations and directions, this revision shall stand disposed of.