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Andhra High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 395 (AP)

Surisetti Lakshmi v. Government of A. P.

2012-04-04

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2012
Judgment : The 1st petitioner is the sister of late Sesetti Appa Rao and petitioners 2 and 3 are the sons of Appa Rao. It is stated that the mother of the 1st petitioner and Appa Rao purchased an extent of Acs.2.25 cents of land in R.S.No.914 of Peddapuram Town, East Godavari District, way back in the year 1953, and executed a Will, dated 09.09.1978, in respect of Ac.1.25 cents in favour of the 1st petitioner. It is also stated that remaining Ac.1.00 of land was given to the 1st petitioner at the time of her marriage. The entire extent of Acs.2.25 cents was acquired by the Government by issuing a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’), on 30.09.1994, for the establishment of an Industrial Area. Enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was dispensed with and declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 06.10.1994. There were disputes between the 1st petitioner, on the one hand, and her brother, Appa Rao, on the other hand. The 1st petitioner claimed the property of her own. In the process, none pursued the matter. The possession of the land was taken on 07.01.1995. However, the 1st petitioner got issued a notice, dated 14.02.1995, through her Advocate to the Land Acquisition Officer, Ramanaiahpet, the 2nd respondent, with a request to pass award and pay compensation. Faced with rival claim from her brother -Appa Rao, the 1st petitioner filed a suit, as an indigent person, for declaration of her title, in respect of the acquired property and for payment of compensation. Initially, it was numbered as O.P.No.40 of 1998 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Peddapuram. After she was declared as indigent person, the suit was numbered as O.S.No.11 of 2000. In the meanwhile, an award was passed on 10.06.1996. The dispute in the suit was settled before the Lok Adalat. The 1st petitioner, on the one hand, and petitioners 2 and 3, on the other hand, agreed to share the compensation equally. They have also agreed to pursue the matter regarding enhancement of compensation, together. On an I.A. filed by the petitioners, the amount of compensation, determined under the award was deposited into the Court, and it is stated that the amount was received on 09.03.2005. They have also agreed to pursue the matter regarding enhancement of compensation, together. On an I.A. filed by the petitioners, the amount of compensation, determined under the award was deposited into the Court, and it is stated that the amount was received on 09.03.2005. Petitioners submitted an application on 05.04.2005 to the 2nd respondent with a request to refer the matter to civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. On finding that the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kakinada, is not the proper person, another application was made to Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapuram, on 12.04.2005. Their grievance is that the reference is not being made. They contend that no notice was served upon them under Section 12(2) of the Act, and the application was made within the stipulated time from the date of receiving the compensation. The respondents did not file any counter-affidavit. However, the entire record is produced and extensive submissions are made by the respondents. Sri G.Vidya Sagar, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the starting point for computing the limitation for the purpose of making application under Section 18 of the Act is the date of service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, and in the instant case, no notice whatever, was served on the petitioners. He contends that the owner of acquired land cannot seek any reference, unless the compensation is received, that too, under protest. He submits that after a long drawn legal battle, the petitioners received the compensation only on 09.03.2005 and the application seeking reference was filed within the stipulated time. According to the learned counsel, there is no justification for the respondents in refusing to refer the matter under Section 18 of the Act to civil Court. He places reliance upon the judgment rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in Special Deputy Collector, Singareni Collieries Co., Ltd., Godavarikhani v. Dasari Ramulu 2000 (2) ALD 418 (FB). Learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition, on the other hand, submits that the award was passed way back on 10.06.1996, and by no stretch of imagination, an application filed 9 years thereafter can be said to be within limitation. It is pleaded that the 2nd respondent did not receive any claim in respect of the land in question and left with no alternative, he passed the award by making deposit of the compensation. It is pleaded that the 2nd respondent did not receive any claim in respect of the land in question and left with no alternative, he passed the award by making deposit of the compensation. According to him, the application for reference ought to have been made at least when the petitioners came to know about the award in the year 2002. One of the rights conferred by the Act, upon a person whose land is acquired by invoking the provisions of the Act is, to seek reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation. Such a right, however, can be availed only when (a) the compensation is received under protest; and (b) an application is filed within the time stipulated under Section 18 of the Act. It is relevant to extract Section 18 of the Act: “18. Reference to Court:-(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. Provided that every such application shall be made:- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award; (b) in other cases, within two months of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire.” A perusal of this provision makes it clear that, if the owner is present, when the award was passed, the application seeking reference must be filed, within six weeks from the date of the award, and if he is not present, it must be filed within two months from the date of receipt of the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. In either case, the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer must have been received under protest. The case on hand has certain typical features. In either case, the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer must have been received under protest. The case on hand has certain typical features. There were some disputes between the 1st petitioner, on the one hand, and petitioners 2 and 3, on the other hand as to the right to receive the compensation for the land. The 1st petitioner claimed the property exclusively to herself. In the process, none of them pursued the matter properly, with the 2nd respondent. However, the 1st petitioner got issued a notice in the year 1995, much before the award was passed. That was not taken into account by the 2nd respondent, and he passed the award on 10.06.1996, in respect of the land of the petitioners. He observed as under: “Out of an extent of Acs.40.76 in S.No.914 of Peddapuram (V) award was passed for an extent of Acs.38.53 cents. There is balance of Acs.2.23 cents. No body has claimed compensation for this land. The compensation amount for Acs.2.23 cents is ordered to be kept under Revenue Deposit under Government Head of A/c.1) Name of the Awardee : -- 2) S.No.: 914 3) Classification: G.Dry 4) Rate per acre: Rs.1,05,000/- 5) Extent: Ac.2.23 cents. 6) Total compensation: Rs.2,34,150/-.” The very approach of the 2nd respondent was objectionable. Once he has received notice from the 1st petitioner, he cannot say that no one is coming forward. That, however, is besides the issue. The 1st petitioner instituted proceedings before a civil Court, seeking declaration of her rights. Ultimately, a compromise decree was passed in a Lok Adalat. The 1st petitioner, on the one hand, and petitioners 2 and 3, on the other hand, became entitled to receive the compensation, in equal shares. The amount, no doubt, was deposited into the Court by the 2nd respondent, in compliance with an order passed in I.A., in the year 2002. The fact, however, remains that the petitioners received compensation on 09.03.2005. Within a period of less than one month, from that date, they submitted applications seeking reference. If one looks at the date of the award, on the one hand, and the date of application submitted by the petitioners, on the other hand, the reference becomes virtually impossible. However, if the intervening events are taken into account, and relevant provisions of law are examined, totally different picture emerges. If one looks at the date of the award, on the one hand, and the date of application submitted by the petitioners, on the other hand, the reference becomes virtually impossible. However, if the intervening events are taken into account, and relevant provisions of law are examined, totally different picture emerges. Service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is an important step from the point of view of computing the period, within which, an application for reference is to be made. Explaining this, Full Bench in Dasari Ramulu’s case (supra) held in para 32 as under: “Mere knowledge of the award cannot commence the period of limitation or set the period of limitation to run against the claimant depriving of his right to seek the reference. It is well known that the legal provisions of limitation are artificial and would not always satisfy the test of either logic or equality. The provisions are being enacted with an object in a civilized society that the sword of Damocles should not be kept hanging for all times to come. It does not obliterate the right, but only bars the remedy. As a necessary corollary the limitation cannot commence on the knowledge of an award when statute provides that it would commence from the date of service of the notice. The commencement of the limitation has been provided by the Legislation by legal fiction, which should be taken to a logical end. Neither the limitation can be extended, nor we can read into the statutory provisions especially when they are not capable of two interpretations at all. In our considered view since the period of limitation provided is six months from the date of award, interpreted to be the date of knowledge, the commencement of six months would not be attracted to the specific statutory provisions providing for the commencement of the limitation of two months from the date of service of the award. The limitation cannot run against the claimant. In spite of no form of notice or mode of service of the award having been provided yet service of notice has been specifically provided for. The limitation cannot run against the claimant. In spite of no form of notice or mode of service of the award having been provided yet service of notice has been specifically provided for. Service of notice can safely be considered to mean tender of the notice to the claimant and not his mere knowledge acquired through various means.” The contention of the petitioner that no notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was served upon them remains un-rebutted. Section 18(2) of the Act, as it applies to other parts of the country, contains a clause to the effect that, if no notice under Section 12(2) is served, an application under Section 18 of the Act must be made within six months from the date of award. Obviously by taking into account, the fact that the rights of a citizen cannot be taken away, on account of the lapses on the part of the authorities under the Act, the said clause was done away with, by the A.P. State Legislature. The inescapable conclusion is that in the absence of service of notice under Section 12(2), there cannot be any clear, definite or effective starting point for reckoning the limitation, to submit application under Section 18 of the Act. Non-service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act should not result in total denial of remedy under Section 18 of the Act at all. The application can be filed within the same period of limitation from the date of knowledge. The Full Bench in Dasari Ramulu’s case (supra) held that the knowledge of the award must be effective and not the one of mere information. Viewed in this context, the effective knowledge can be only when the owner of the land receives compensation and becomes aware of the contents of the award. In the instant case, the application was made within the stipulated time from the date on which the compensation was received. Viewed in this context, the effective knowledge can be only when the owner of the land receives compensation and becomes aware of the contents of the award. In the instant case, the application was made within the stipulated time from the date on which the compensation was received. Even if more than one interpretation is possible, in this scenario, the one that permits, the enforcement of a statutory right in the context of compulsory acquisition, must be adopted.Therefore, the writ petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to refer the matter pertaining to the adequacy of compensation under award, dated 10.06.1996 in respect of Acs.2.23 cents of land, in survey No.914 of Peddapuram Village, under Section 18 of the Act, to civil Court within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of a copy of this order. The miscellaneous petition filed in this writ petition shall also stand disposed of.There shall be no order as to costs.