JUDGMENT Dev Darshan Sud, J(Oral). The petitioner has preferred this petition against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Solan allowing the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. instituted by the plaintiff-Bank for permission to lead additional evidence, namely, application form for agricultural credit, loan agreement, revival letter, notice and affidavit and other documents pertaining to the loan account. The suit of the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned trial Court only on the ground that the evidence Ext.P1 is insufficient to prove the case of the Bank. In appeal, application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. filed by the Bank has been allowed. 2.Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the documents cannot be allowed to be admitted in evidence for the reason that no foundation has been laid to invoke the provisions of Section under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C., the bank has been negligent and seeks to convert the Appellate Court into Court of original jurisdiction for retrial of the case denovo. 3.Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Lala Pancham and others, AIR 1965 S.C. 1008 and Malayalam Plantations Limited Vs. State of Kerala and another, (2010) 13 S.C.C. 487, holding that additional evidence cannot be allowed to fill- up any lacunae in the evidence of a party. 4.Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has referred to the Constitutional Bench decision of the Supreme Court in K. Venkataramiah Vs. Setharama Reddy and others, AIR 1963, S.C. 1526, holding: 16...................Apart from this, it is well to remember that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment” but also for “any other substantial cause.” There may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment,” it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence “for any other substantial cause” under R-27(1) (b) of the Code.” 17.It is easy to see that such requirement of the Court to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause is not likely to arise ordinarily unless some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent on an examination of the evidence. That is why in Parsotim Thakur V. Lal Mohar Thakur, 53 Ind App 254: (AIR 1931 PC 143) the Privy Council while discussing whether additional evidence can be admitted observed: “It may be required to enable the Court to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, but in either case it must be the Court that requires it. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but “when on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent.” 18. As the Privy Council proceeded to point out: “It may well be that the defect may be pointed out by a party, or that a party may move the Court to supply the defect, but the requirement must be the requirement of the Court upon its appreciation of the evidence as it stands.” (P.1530) 5. This is the settled law and does not call for any further elaboration. However, from the facts of the present case what I find is that no lacunae is being filled in as the defendant himself admits in his cross-examination that he has taken loan of Rs. 95,000/- from the Bank. The relevant part of his cross- examination reads: “Mainay S.B.I. say Rs.95,000/- loan leeya tha jo 2001 may leeya tha. Pata na hai kee kaya rate of interest taiy hoaa thaa. Loan agreement mainay sign keya thaa. Application Mark ‘A’ par mairay dastkhwat batouer loanee hai. Application form Mark ‘B’ par bhee mairay dustkhwat hai. Theek hai kee rate of interest @ 12% per annum with quarterly rest taia hooa thaa. Mainay Rs.500/- kee dow kishtay dee thee. May loan amount pay karney ko taiyare hoo. May sadhanheen hoo” {“Translation: I have taken loan of Rs.95,000/- from the S.B.I. in 2001. I do not know what the rate of interest is now. I signed the loan agreement. Mainay Rs.500/- kee dow kishtay dee thee. May loan amount pay karney ko taiyare hoo. May sadhanheen hoo” {“Translation: I have taken loan of Rs.95,000/- from the S.B.I. in 2001. I do not know what the rate of interest is now. I signed the loan agreement. Application form mark ‘A’ has also been singed by me as a loanee and application form mark ‘B’ has also been singed by me. It is correct that the rate of interest 12% per annum with quarterly interest was agreed to. I paid two instalments of Rs.500/- each. I am prepared to re-pay the loan amount. I do not have any means.”} 6. This statement is itself sufficient to establish the case of the respondent-plaintiff that no lacunae is being filled in as the substantive part what the bank alleges, has already been admitted by the defendant. I need not say anything further since one of the grounds urged before me was that even if the documents are excluded, a decree on admission should follow. That would be a matter for the learned appellate Court to consider. 7.In these circumstances, I do not find any error of jurisdiction committed by the learned appellate Court. Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.