Judgment :- In view of the inter-connectivity of the above proceedings, the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties were heard simultaneously and this common judgment is rendered. 2. For the sake of convenience, the status of the parties are mentioned as referred to in the plaint. 3. Following are the allegations in short available in the plaint:- 3(a). The first plaintiff is son of Dittakavi Veerabhadra Murthy. The second plaintiff is son of Kandukuri Rama Krishna Rao and the third plaintiff is son of Kandukuri Pulla Rao. The second and third plaintiffs are represented by their power of attorney K.V.S.Prasad. The property situate in Plot No.A4A, S.No.96 part and 97 part of Kodambakkam Village, measuring about 3 grounds and 480 sq.ft. more fully described in the schedule was originally purchased by Smt.M.Lakshmi Devi, wife of Sathyanarayanan by a deed of sale dated 25.10.1066 from Madras State Housing Board. Ever since the said purchase she was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the same as its absolute owner. Smt. Lakshmi Devi bequeathed the said property in favour of the plaintiffs to be shared equally among themselves, by a registered Will dated 15th October, 1973. Smt.Lakshmi Devi had no issues. The first plaintiff was the foster son of one Lakshmi Kanthamma with whom the said Lakshmi Devi lived till her last days and the second and third plaintiffs are the son of Lakshmi Devi's brother. The said Lakshmi Devi died at Madras on 19.10.1973 and her husband predeceased her. Thereafter, the plaintiffs obtained letters of administration with the Will annexed in respect of the property described in the schedule as per the order dated 11.02.1994 passed in O.P.No.752 of 1993. Thus, they have become the absolute owners of the suit property and no one else has any right, title or interest in the said property. While so, the defendants knowing fully well that they have no right, title or interest in the said property and that they were in no way related either to Smt.Lakshmi Devi or her husband Satyanarayana, are now with the criminal intention or grabbing the property, trying to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs. While so, the defendants knowing fully well that they have no right, title or interest in the said property and that they were in no way related either to Smt.Lakshmi Devi or her husband Satyanarayana, are now with the criminal intention or grabbing the property, trying to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs. In fact, one Pandian alias Bandha Pandian originally tried to stake a claim in respect of the scheduled property and filed a O.P. for grant of probate through the first defendant stating that the first defendant is the adopted son of deceased Lakshmi Devi by producing a forged and false Will and the said O.P. was dismissed by this Court. In the said O.P. the third defendant himself represented as the husband of the said Lakshmi Devi claimed interest in the schedule property and opposed the grant of probate. Having failed in his attempt, the said Bandha Pandian tried to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property by the plaintiffs. Hence, the plaintiffs filed a suit on 30.09.1992 before the II Asst. City Civil Judge, Madras, for a permanent injunction restraining the said Bandha Pandian and his agents, servants, etc. from interfering with peaceful enjoyment of the property by the plaintiffs. Since the said Bandha Pandian died, the plaintiffs were advised to file the present comprehensive suit for declaration and also for injunction. 3(b). While so, to their utter shock and surprise, the plaintiffs came across a public notice in the issue of The Hindu dated 30.07.1994 stating that the fourth defendant purchased the scheduled property from Lakshmi Devi. As the said Smt. Lakshmi Devi died on 19.10.1973, it is not known as to how and from whom the fourth defendant had purchased the said property. Since the alleged vendor of the fourth defendant is not the person who owned the scheduled property, the plaintiffs sent a reply notice to the Advocate of the defendant stating that the sale deed is not valid and not at all binding on the plaintiffs and called for further details as to the name of the vendor, purchaser and other particulars of the said transaction for taking further action. Though the said notice was acknowledged by the Advocate, till date no reply has been received by the plaintiffs or their counsel. 3(c). Though the said notice was acknowledged by the Advocate, till date no reply has been received by the plaintiffs or their counsel. 3(c). Since the plaintiffs were residing outside Madras city for the past several years, the defendants, taking advantage of that, are making attempts to grab the property by illegal means by setting up false and fabricated documents. The said act of the defendants is liable for prosecution under various offences under Indian Penal Code. However, the plaintiffs have already entered into agreement with Mr.K.V.Sivaram Prasad and T.S.Barnapas for developing the scheduled property and for construction. While the said promoters were storing materials at the site, on 07.08.1994, some unidentified persons at the instance of the defendants attempted to interfere with the work. The plaintiffs apprehended that the defendants and their henchmen may interfere and obstruct the construction of the building in the said property by the promoter with whom the plaintiffs have entered into agreement. If the defendants are not restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the scheduled property by the plaintiffs and their promoters, they would be put to serious loss and hardship and injury. The defendants are impleaded as party defendants in the suit as they are purchasers of the suit property pendente lite from the fifth defendant. The same deeds under which the defendants 6 to 9 purchased the property from the fifth defendant are not valid and binding on the plaintiffs as they are pendente lite and therefore, non-exist in law and pass other orders. 4. In the written statement filed by the third defendant, it is averred as under:- 4(a). This defendant denies all the allegations except those are specifically admitted and puts the plaintiffs to strict proof of the rest. This defendant admits that the ownership and possession of M.Lakshmi Devi. 4. In the written statement filed by the third defendant, it is averred as under:- 4(a). This defendant denies all the allegations except those are specifically admitted and puts the plaintiffs to strict proof of the rest. This defendant admits that the ownership and possession of M.Lakshmi Devi. At the out set the suit is not maintainable either on facts or in law for the reasons that the relief of declaration of title is claimed on the basis of Letters of Administration dated 11.02.1994 obtained by the plaintiffs from the High Court of Madras in Testamentary O.P.No.752 of 1993; that Letters of Administration is obtained by the plaintiffs by completely suppressing material fact of pendency of another - Testamentary O.P.No.385 of 1990, converted into T.O.S.No.2 of 1997 filed by one S.Ganesan in which the three plaintiffs herein and C.Balakrishnan, this third defendant, were impleaded as respondents on the applications filed by this third defendant; that the plaintiffs also knew in August, 1993, at the time of filing of the abovesaid Testamentary O.P.No.752 of 1993 that the above said O.P.No.385 of 1990 was pending in the High Court and apart from that several other persons were claiming their right to the suit vacant land under another Will, or by other means but the plaintiffs did not implead either this defendant, who is the husband of Late Lakshmi Devi, or any other persons as the respondent in the above petitioner. Due to the pendency of of Testamentary O.P.No.385 of 1990 in August 1993 and even till today the Letters of Administration dated 11.02.1994 which forms the basis of the present suit, was obtained by the plaintiffs by misleading the Hon'ble High Court, if not by committing a fraud on the Hon'ble High Court. The plaintiffs clearly knew even in September 1992 or even before, when they applied for transfer of patta in respect of the suit vacant land to their own name, when the Collector of Madras informed the plaintiffs by order dated 23.09.1992 which clearly states that C.Balakrishnan, this defendant claims transfer of patta in his name as he is the husband of Late.Lakshmi Devi. Due to these reasons, the suit is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed. 4(b). Due to these reasons, the suit is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed. 4(b). Further, the said Lakshmi Devi bequeathed the suit vacant land in favour plaintiffs by Will dated 15.10.1973, the said Will is a forged document that Lakshmi Devi died on 19.10.1973 is false; and that the letters of Administration dated 11.02.1994 in O.P.No.752 of 1993; the same is obtained by suppression of material facts and misleading the High Court. The allegation in para 5 of the plaint are false, twisted to suit the case of the plaintiffs and are flagrant misrepresentation about the stage of the Testamentary O.P. filed by Bandha Pandian. Though the said Bandha Pandian died, since he filed the O.P, through his agent and the said O.P. is still pending. 4(c). Further, the allegations stated in para 7 are false and it is stated that it is only the plaintiffs who are liable for criminal action as they have filed false death extract and forged Will and obtained letters of administration by misleading the Court and not this third defendant. The suit is not maintainable, false and frivolous and is liable to be dismissed. 5. In the written statement filed by the fourth defendant, it is averred as under:- 5(a). The fourth defendant's wife K.Durga was one of the partners in Blue Bells Constructions and she had entered into an agreement of sale dated 26.11.1990 with the third defendant and in pursuance of the said agreement the third defendant has agreed to sell the suit property for a total sale consideration of Rs.17,00,000/-; that the third defendant had represented that the property originally belonged to one Lakshmi Devi wife of third defendant and the said Lakshmi Devi has purchased the same from Madras State Housing Board by deed of sale dated 25.10.1066; that the said Lakshmi Devi died on 05.09.1979 without leaving any issue; that the third defendant being the husband of the said Lakshmi Devi and her sole heir under the Hindu Succession Act the third defendant become entitled to the property and in possession and enjoyment as absolute owner from the date of death of his wife and that in that capacity, the third defendant and this defendant's wife had entered into an agreement of sale as stated above and also paid a sum of Rs.1,25,000/-as and by way of advance towards sale consideration. 5(b). 5(b). Further, the said third defendant had totally received a sum of Rs.17,00,000/-from this defendant on various dates in various heads; that at the time of execution of the aforesaid agreement, the property was occupied by so many unauthorised persons and after entering into aforesaid agreement, this defendant has spent huge amount by vacating the trespassers who have illegally and unauthorisedly squatted on the property; that this defendant also spent considerable amount towards protecting the property; that the third defendant had executed a registered power of attorney dated 28.08.1992 in favour of this defendant and the same is still in force; that by virtue of the said power, this defendant's has taken possession of the property and also vacated the unauthorised occupants in the suit property and thereby incurred heavy expenses and that apart from that this defendant has spent amount towards legal expenses and other expenses towards maintenance and protection of the suit property. 5(c). This defendant denies the allegations made in para 4 of the plaint that the said Lakshmi Deve bequeathed the property in favour of the plaintiffs. The third defendant is disputing the alleged Will said to be executed by Lakshmi Devi in favour of the plaintiffs. Taking advantage of the death of Lakshmi Devi, the plaintiffs are claiming the property as if they are legal heirs of Lakshmi Devi. This defendant denies the allegation that the Lakshmi Devi died on 19.10.1973 and her husband pre-deceased and puts the plaintiff to strict proof of the same. This defendant does not aware that the plaintiffs obtained the letters of administration with Will annexed in respect of the property. As a matter of fact, the plaintiffs are not at all related to the late Lakshmi Devi and therefore, Lakshmi Devi need not execute any Will in favour of the plaintiffs. However, the said Lakshmi Devi was the wife of the third defendant and therefore, he is claiming right over the property as husband of the deceased. The plaintiffs are well aware that the third defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of the fourth defendant but the plaintiffs have not taken any steps to challenge the said power t the earliest possible point of time. The plaintiffs are well aware that the third defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of the fourth defendant but the plaintiffs have not taken any steps to challenge the said power t the earliest possible point of time. Even in the letters of administration proceeding this defendant was not made as one of the respondents which clearly shows that the plaintiffs have suppressed the material facts before this Court at the time of obtaining order in the letters of administration proceedings. The plaintiffs were well aware of the power of attorney and the maintenance of the property by this defendant. The plaintiffs were never in possession of the property and therefore they are not entitled for any relief in the suit. Hence, the suit may be dismissed with cost. 6. In the written statement filed by the fifth defendant, it is averred as under:- 6(a). The above suit as framed and filed is not maintainable in law or on the facts set out. This defendant being a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration, through the mediator Mr.Jinna of Kovalam and the Power Agent of the vendor Mr.Rangasamy after obtaining the opinion rendered by the Additional Government Pleader, High Court, Madras; that he has been doing real estate business promoting layout at Arunothayam Nagar, Nanmangalam, Velacherri, Pallikaranai and Vandalur, for more than 30 years and he successfully completed the layouts by selling house sites with perfect Title, during his career in real estate field, to the appreciation and admiration of all concerned whoever came across this defendant either as purchaser or seller; that he being a layman not well-versed with the legal formalities, has been all along availing legal advice from the Advocates particularly from law officers and cleared Title in respect of suit property holding that there was no impediment to purchase the suit property by getting the sale deed directly from the owner instead of the Power Agent; that the power agent Mr.Rangasamy negotiated the sale consideration and ultimately an agreement for sale was entered by the power agent to sell the suit property in favour of this defendant or infavour of his nominee or nominees and that as the legal Advisor of this defendant insisted to get the sale deed executed by the owner and attested by the power agent, the sale deed ultimately was executed by the vendor Lakshmi Devi. 6(b). 6(b). Further, this defendant was put in possession of the suit property by virtue of the said sale deed; that while he put up compound wall in the said property, the plaintiffs and their associates interfered with this defendant's possession and enjoyment, which necessiated him to file a suit in O.S.No.6141 of 1994 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras for the issuance of interim injunction and after due consideration the said relief was granted on 23.08.1994; that the plaintiffs having evaded to receive the injunction order, they filed the above suit in C.S.No.1038 of 1994 on the file of the Hon'ble High Court with an ulterior motive, which was later on transferred to the City Civil Court due to administrative reason; that the the defendant could not enjoy the suit property peacefully in view of the rival claims put forth by the plaintiffs on the one hand and the defendants 1 to 4 on the other hand and insisted the power agent, the commission agent and the vendor to refund the same consideration including the expenses incurred by this defendant; that thereafter they arranged for sale of the suit property in favour of Mr.Chiranjilal Rathi and three others and ultimately sale deeds were executed by this defendant as directed by the power agent as well as the commission agent and that this defendant had no knowledge about the alleged dispute and the rival claim to the suit property prior to his purchase and if he had such knowledge, he would not have purchased the suit property. 6(c). This defendant was also advised by his counsel for sale of the suit property in view of the rival claims and as a law abiding citizen, he was left with no other alternative, except to sell the suit property; that subsequently he was advised to revoke the same deeds executed by him in favour of Mr.Chiranjilal Rathi and others in view of certain subsequent events; that unfortunately he could not do it as the power agent, commission agent who were responsible for effecting the sales, had received substantial sale consideration from the purchasers; this defendant had to part away with the suit property desperately in view of the numerous rival claims in respect of the suit property; that ultimately this defendant was content with receiving the actual sale consideration paid by him and the expenses incurred therein. 6(d). 6(d). Further, while the vendor was alive, the question of applying for Letters of Administration would not arise; that this defendant was not a party to the said proceedings and as such it is not binding on him; that the plaintiffs have become the absolute owners of the suit property and no one else has got any right, title or interest in the suit property are frivolous and untenable; that this defendant was no way connected with the defendants 1 to 4 and as such the averments made against him are unwarranted and unsustainable; that Lakshmi Devi, the original owner of the suit property died on 19.10.1973 are utter falsehood to the knowledge of the plaintiffs; that the alleged objections raised by the plaintiffs in respect of the public notice in the issue of The Hindu dated 30.07.1994 were not brought to the notice of this defendant; that if the said objections had been brought to his notice, this defendant would not have executed the sale deed. 6(e). The suit property was in absolute possession and enjoyment of this defendant till the date of the sale; that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit property at any time either at the time of filing of the above suit or till this defendant sold the suit property; that while parting with the suit property, the purchasers were put on notice about the pendency of the proceedings and after knowing fully well, they agreed to indemnify this defendant from any other claim; that no relief can be prayed for against this defendant; that as on date, this defendant ceased to have any interest or claim regarding the suit property and as such the suit is not maintainable hence the Court may be pleased to dismiss the above suit against this defendant. 7. In the written statement filed by the seventh defendant and adopted by the eighth defendant, it is averred as under:- 7(a). Lakshmi Devi purchased Plot No.4A, Survey No.96 part and 97 part, Kodambakkam Village, measuring 3 grounds and 840 square feet from Madras State Housing Board and she was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the same as its absolute owner. Lakshmi Devi purchased Plot No.4A, Survey No.96 part and 97 part, Kodambakkam Village, measuring 3 grounds and 840 square feet from Madras State Housing Board and she was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the same as its absolute owner. It is denied that Lakshmi Devi bequeathed the said property in favour of the plaintiffs the share equally to among themselves by registered Will dated 15.10.1973; that the first plaintiff is the foster son of Lakshmi Kanthamma with whom the said Lakshmi Devi lived till her last days and the second and third plaintiffs are the sons of Lakshmi Devi's brothers and that Lakshmi Devi died on 19.10.1973. These defendants have no knowledge about the letters of administration obtained by the plaintiffs from the High Court; that they suspect that the plaintiffs have obtained Letters of Administration by misleading and misrepresenting before the High Court; that they have a strong suspicion that the Will itself is a fabricated one for the purpose of grabbing the suit property and that they deserve to take steps to cancel the letters of administration granted in favour of the plaintiffs. 7(b). Further, even assuming without admitting that the said Lakshmi Devi executed a Will, the plaintiffs cannot claim the property sold by Lakshmi Devi in favour of V.M.Natarajan by means of a sale deed 22.01.1994. Subsequently, V.M.Natarajan sold the property purchased by him from Lakshmi Devi in favour of the defendants 6, 7, 8 and 9 by means of 4 sale deeds dated 22.12.1995. Ever since, the date of purchase the defendants 6, 7, 8 and 9 are in absolute possession and enjoyment of their respective share without any let and hindrance. The property is also assessed to property tax in the names of defendants 6, 7, 8 and 9. 7(c). The plaintiffs are trying to grab the suit scheduled property sold by Lakshmi Devi to V.M.Natarajan and who in turn sold the same to the defendants 6, 7, 8 and 9 and it is once again specifically denied that the property purchased by the defendants 6,7,8 and 9 have nothing to do with the property and even assuming without admitting that the plaintiffs are referring to the suit property purchased and owned by the defendants 6, 7, 8 and 9, the plaintiffs have no right whatsoever due to the reason that they have nothing to do with the properties of Lakshmi Devi. These defendants have no knowledge and at no point of time the plaintiff informed these defendants about the fact alleged in para 5 of the plaint. The averment made in para 6 has nothing to do with these defendants since these defendants and 6th and 9th defendants are bona fide purchasers of the suit property. 7(d). The plaintiffs have entered into an agreement with K.Sivaram Prasad and T.S.Barnabas for developing the suit property has been made with the intention to create a scene as if the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and they have all right to enter into agreement with third parties. It is denied that K.V.Sivaram Prasad and T.S.Barnabas started the preliminary work for construction. When the defendants 6, 7, 8 and 9 are in absolute possession and enjoyment of the suit property, there is no possibility for doing any construction work in the suit property. The suit is not maintainable as against the defendants 6, 7, 8 and 9 as they are bona fide purchasers of the suit property and they are in absolute possession and enjoyment of the suit property. Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 8. In the written statement filed by the tenth defendant, it is averred as under:- 8(a). The suit was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants 1 to 9. Subsequently, the plaintiffs have filed petition in I.A.No.2998 of 2003 for impleading the Collector of Chennai as the proposed 10th defendant in the above suit and as per the orders of this Court in I.A.No.2998 of 2003 that the Collector of Chennai be impleaded as one of the defendants in the above suit. The suit is purely a private dispute between two parties over a property in Kodambakkam Village of Chennai city. It is also seen from the plaint that the Collector of Chennai is in no way connected to this suit and hence there is no necessity for impleading the Collector as a defendant without any specific reasons for impleading the Collector as a defendant. The plaint deserves no merit and the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts. 9. After scrutiny of the pleadings, exhibits and oral evidence on record, the learned II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, has decreed the suit granting declaration and injunction as prayed for. The plaint deserves no merit and the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts. 9. After scrutiny of the pleadings, exhibits and oral evidence on record, the learned II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, has decreed the suit granting declaration and injunction as prayed for. Since the third defendant C.Balakrishnan died, his legal representatives viz., his wife, daughters and son preferred appeal in A.S.No.981 of 2004 and the defendants 7 and 8 have preferred A.S.No.772 of 2006. Pending hearing of the appeals, the second appellant by name M.D.Rathi died, his legal representatives being third and fourth appellants are arrayed on record and the same is recorded. 10. Further, during the pendency of the appeal, the said Periyammal filed an application in C.M.P.No.712 of 2010 praying for ad interim injunction restraining the respondents, their men, agents and subordinates from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit property. One Saurabh Rathi, son of Late M.D.Rathi has filed an application in A.No.4576 of 2007 praying the Court to revoke the grant of probate in favour of the respondent, first plaintiff in O.P.No.752 of 1993 and fifth respondent in C.M.P.No.712 of 2010. The plaintiffs have filed an application in C.M.P.No.588 of 2012 to receive additional evidence on the verge of completion of arguments of both sides in appeals. 11. The following points have arisen for consideration in these proceedings: (1) Whether C.M.P.No.588 of 2012 has to be allowed? (2) Whether C.M.P.No.712 of 2010 in A.S.No.981 of 2004 deserves to be allowed? (3) Whether the grant of probate by this Court in O.P.No.752 of 1993 is liable to be revoked? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are true titleholders of the suit property and whether they are entitled for declaration and injunction? (5) To what reliefs the parties are entitled to? Point 1: 12. The suit property isa vacant site which is situate at Kodambakkam. It is alleged by the plaintiffs that the second and third plaintiffs are Lakshmi Devi's brothers. The first plaintiff claims to be foster son of one Suryakantham, a Cine Artiste with whom Lakshmi Devi was living. The plaintiffs make claim upon the suit property under a registered Will dated 15.10.1973 reportedly executed by the Lakshmi Devi who was original owner of the suit property. The first plaintiff claims to be foster son of one Suryakantham, a Cine Artiste with whom Lakshmi Devi was living. The plaintiffs make claim upon the suit property under a registered Will dated 15.10.1973 reportedly executed by the Lakshmi Devi who was original owner of the suit property. The first plaintiff had filed O.P.No.752 of 1993 on the file of this Court for getting probate of the Will and he got the same in Ex.A7 on 11.02.1994. By means of the Will Ex.A5, Lakshmi Devi reportedly bequeathed her properties to the plaintiffs to take in equal share absolutely. The four immovable properties have been specified in the Will which are enlisted hereunder as found in the Will: "(1) A terraced house and an outhouse in Adi Seshayya Street, Satyanarayanapuram, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh. (2) A house site of about four grounds in Plot No.A4A, Ashok Pillar Road, Ist Avenue, (Next to Police Quarters), Kodambakkam, Madras. (3) A house site of about 520 Sq. Yds. in Yellareddiguda, Hyderabad, lying to the east of Smt.Suryakantham's house. (4) About 1/3rd acre of land in Jubilee Hills Colony, Hyderabad, allotted to me by Jubilee Hills Co-operative Society." 13. The suit property is second item in the above said list. The plaintiffs have come forward with this application praying the Court to receive additional evidence. 14. In the affidavit, it is alleged that the third defendant by name C.Balakrishnan claimed that Lakshmi Devi was his second wife and after her life time, he inherited the property, by stating that on 05.09.1979 Lakshmi Devi died, as evident from Ex.B2-Death Certificate issued by the Corporation of Madras and that an entry is available in this certificate to the effect that Lakshmi Devi died on 05.09.1979. Since the dates of death as regards death of Lakshmi Devi was under much deliberations, this Court directed the authorities of Chennai Corporation to produce relevant Death Register. 15. As per plaintiffs, Lakshmi Devi died on 19.10.1973 as evident from Ex.A4-Death Certificate issued by the Chennai Corporation. Ex.A4 is xerox copy of the certified copy of the death register issued by the Corporation of Madras on 26.10.1973. Now the certified copy of the death register is sought to be received as additional evidence. 16. 15. As per plaintiffs, Lakshmi Devi died on 19.10.1973 as evident from Ex.A4-Death Certificate issued by the Chennai Corporation. Ex.A4 is xerox copy of the certified copy of the death register issued by the Corporation of Madras on 26.10.1973. Now the certified copy of the death register is sought to be received as additional evidence. 16. In order to show that Lakshmi Devi was guardian for the third plaintiff, his S.S.L.C. book is sought to be received as additional evidence which shows that Lakshmi Devi has signed as guardian. In order to establish ages of both second and third plaintiffs, the above said S.S.L.C. books as well as S.S.L.C. book of second defendant are produced. On 25.10.1966 Lakshmi Devi purchased the property from Tamil Nadu Housing Board under Ex.A3 sale deed in which the second plaintiff has attested. In the evidence P.W.1 says that his age was 26 at the time of death of Lakshmi Devi. If so, in 1966, when second plaintiff attested Ex.A3, his age would have been 9 years but it is stated that it was slip of tongue and his date of birth was 01.06.1947 as evident from his S.S.L.C. book. If so, he would have been above 19 years at the time of attesting Ex.A3-Sale deed. 17. The cheque book issued to Lakshmi Devi from Andhra Bank, Mylapore Branch is also sought to be received as additional evidence. The affidavit is silent about the purpose for production of this cheque book. Further, property tax receipts issued to Lakshmi Devi for the house at Vijayawada are also produced as additional documents. But it is not disputed that she is not the owner of the house property in Vijayawada. 18. As far as the certified copy of death extract of Lakshmi Devi issued by the Chennai Corporation is concerned, already its xerox copy was marked and the entries, imports and genuineness were already discussed and in the view of the Court, the available materials are enough to come to the conclusion as regards Ex.A4. If the additional document is received, no purpose will be served. As regards S.S.L.C. book of second and third plaintiffs, they are not of much importance since it is admitted by all the parties that Lakshmi Devi was the owner who became entitled to the suit property by virtue of Ex.A3 Sale deed and attestation of second plaintiff therein assumes less importance. As regards S.S.L.C. book of second and third plaintiffs, they are not of much importance since it is admitted by all the parties that Lakshmi Devi was the owner who became entitled to the suit property by virtue of Ex.A3 Sale deed and attestation of second plaintiff therein assumes less importance. With respect to cheque book containing the remaining cheque leaves belonging to the deceased Lakshmi Devi, as already stated, it is not indicated as to in what way they would be helpful to the contentions of the plaintiffs. Insofar as the property tax receipts standing in the name of Lakshmi Devi are concerned, there is no pleading nor evidence with respect to the house belonging to Lakshmi Devi which is situate in Vijayawada. The receipts are in Telugu. 19. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the additional evidence sought to be received in appeal are not necessary for adjudicating the rights of the parties. Further, the affidavit is bereft of particulars as to for what reason they could not be produced at the time of trial of the suit and it is also not stated that in what way they are advantageous for rendering a complete judgment in these appeals. In such view of this matter, there is no ground for allowing C.M.P.No.588 of 2012 which suffers dismissal. This point is answered in the negative. Point No.2: 20. One Periyammal filed an application in C.M.P.No.322 of 2010 for impleading as party defendant and the same was allowed by this Court on 20.04.2010. She has filed an application in M.P.No.712 of 2010 to grant ad interim injunction restraining the respondents, their men, agents and subordinates from interfering with the peaceful possession of the petitioner. She claims to have purchased the properties from the legal representatives of C.Balakrishnan after his life time. They are appellants in A.S.No.981 of 2004. In the affidavit, she has alleged that without knowledge of contents of the cases she purchased the property. On 09.06.2006 she had taken possession of the property. She secured necessary permission from the competent authority and had got the electricity supply and assessment in her name. She is fourth respondent in W.P.No.8322 of 2008 filed by the power of attorney of the respondents. None of the plaintiffs who are legatees under the Will had been examined in the suit. She secured necessary permission from the competent authority and had got the electricity supply and assessment in her name. She is fourth respondent in W.P.No.8322 of 2008 filed by the power of attorney of the respondents. None of the plaintiffs who are legatees under the Will had been examined in the suit. The Will produced by them is a fabricated one. The letters of administration issued by this Court in favour of the first plaintiff has to be revoked under numerous grounds. 20(a). she executed a mortgage deed in favour of one Mr.Veda Arun Nagarajan for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- in 2007. He was threatened and a complaint was lodged against the second respondent and others on 05.02.2007. A proceeding was initiated under Section 145 Cr.P.C. by the Tahsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate, Mambalam, Guindy. In this proceeding, she was not made as a party. The plaintiffs have filed Crl.R.C.No.867 of 2007 before this Court. By means of an order, this Court on 23.07.2009 set aside the order of the Tahsildar-Cum-Executive Magistrate and also observed that the encroachment was made by Mr.Veda Arun Nagarajan or any other third party in the subject premises shall be removed by the Commissioner of Police Greater Chennai within two weeks. 20(b). The purchaser filed a civil suit in C.S.No.699 of 2009 before this Court praying interim injunction against the respondents 2 to 4. On 14.08.2009, in O.A.No.784 of 2009 in C.S.No.699 of 2009 was dismissed. Against that order, she preferred an appeal before this Court in O.S.A.No.278 of 2009 and it was also dismissed by this Court. She preferred an SLP before the Supreme Court but it was dismissed as withdrawn on account of the observation made in the application directing her to agitate her rights in the pending appeals. The order of the Court reads thus: "14.The learned senior counsel for the applicant would also implore and entreat that this court may recognize the right of the applicant to approach this court which is seized of the appeal. It is always open for the purchaser of a property pendente lite to approach the court concerned which is seized of the matter for getting oneself impleaded and it is for the court seized of the appeal to consider on merits as to whether the purchaser during the pendency of the suit should be added or not as one of the parties. Suffice to say that it is open for the applicant to work out his remedy in the way known to law." 21. She is paying property tax to the Corporation of Chennai. She is in possession of the property. She learnt that another person by name V.M.Natarajan who sought for right over the property by means of a sale deed Ex.A-3 executed by Lakshmi Devi in favour of V.M.Natarajan on 22.01.1994 and who in turn sold it to the 7th and 8th defendants on 22.12.1995. They are appellants in A.S.NO.772 of 2006. There is no legal embargo in adjudicating all the claims together. The said Lakshmi Devi is said to have died thrice viz., once in 1973, then in 1979 and later on in 1995. If all contested proposed parties are examined, it can be seen that she is necessary party to the suit. 22. The petitioner had independently probed through her advisers and found that the plaintiffs had not approached this Court with clean hands. It is learnt by the petitioner that the power of attorney of plaintiffs executed a sale deed in favour of his wife K.Raja Rani in 2008. Hence, the power agent can no longer continue the suit. The plaintiffs have lost their right to the property. These facts have not been disclosed by power agent either before this Court or before the Supreme Court. But the power agent has now no locus standi to represent for and on behalf of the plaintiffs. In view of the above said circumstances, the petitioner prays the Court to implead herself as party defendant to the suit. 23. In the counter filed by the power of attorney of the plaintiffs it is stated that furnishing of Ex.A4-Death Certificate was confirmed by the Assistant Health Officer of Chennai Corporation. This Court found Ex.B2 to be a forged one in the order in A.Nos. 320 and 321 of 2001 in O.P.No.752 of 1993 on 07.03.2001. C.Balakrishnan filed a petition for revoking letters of administration. The petition was dismissed by this Court directing the Registrar of High Court to prosecute the third defendant C.Balakrishnan for the offence of forgery in the suo motu contempt proceedings. The allegations that it has been relevant to verify the correctness and state of affairs with regard to the death certificate of Lakshmi Devi as produced and marked as Ex.A.4 does not arise at all. The allegations that it has been relevant to verify the correctness and state of affairs with regard to the death certificate of Lakshmi Devi as produced and marked as Ex.A.4 does not arise at all. But Ex.B2-Death Certificate of Lakshmi Devi produced by C.Balakrishnan has been found to be forged before this Court. There is no harm or bar in examining the power of attorney of the plaintiffs. The petition may be dismissed with costs. 24. It is true to state that this Court has found the death certificate produced by C.Balakrishnan as a forged one. A contempt application No.172 of 1995 was filed before this Court by the plaintiffs arraying the third defendant to fifth defendant as respondents, this Court disposed of the application on 04.07.1997 by observing that since the plaintiffs were put in actual physical possession of the property nothing further survives in the contempt application. C.Balakrishnan filed A.Nos.320 and 321 of 2001 in O.P.No.752 of 1993 praying this Court for revoking the letters of administration granted to the first plaintiff. This Court has observed in the order dated 7.03.2001 that the death certificate produced by C.Balakrishnan is not true and it appears to be a fabricated one and the act of the applicant amounts to contempt of Court. The order was carried in appeal in O.S.A.No.396 of 2002 and the Division Bench of this Court has passed an order on 20.11.2002 dismissing the O.S.A. 25. Taking advantage of the above said orders of this Court, the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs would submit that C.Balakrishnan was not having any right in the property and the petitioner has purchased the property from the legal heirs of C.Balakrishnan. But it is the case of the petitioner that without the knowledge of the cases, she purchased the property. Even though this Court on an earlier occasion has found that the death certificate of Lakshmi Devi produced by the third defendant is fabricated one, there has been no final decision in any order of this Court as to whether Lakshmi Devi was wife of C.Balakrishnan. In the cross examination of P.W.1, it is suggested that the marriage of third defendant with Lakshmi Devi was in 1972 in a temple near Walajapath in Kancheepuram District and that they were living as man and wife and from 1972 the properties of Lakshmi Devi were looked after by the third defendant. In the cross examination of P.W.1, it is suggested that the marriage of third defendant with Lakshmi Devi was in 1972 in a temple near Walajapath in Kancheepuram District and that they were living as man and wife and from 1972 the properties of Lakshmi Devi were looked after by the third defendant. These were denied by P.W.1. In the revenue proceedings, the third defendant had asserted that Lakshmi Devi was his second wife. He also got a legal heir certificate after the death of Lakshmi Devi from Tahsildar, Guindy-Mambalam that she was his wife. 26. Ex.B3 is the proceedings of the District Collector of Chennai in which it is stated that C.Balakrishnan produced a copy of legal heirship certificate dated 21.05.1990 issued by the Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy. It is also stated therein that the Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy reported that he is in possession of the property. However, he has not produced any documents and that the claim of C.Balakrishnan deserves no consideration. By means of this proceeding, the patta standing in the name of the first plaintiff was cancelled. Ex.B5 letter was issued by the Government dated 15.03.1994 stating that the patta standing in the names of plaintiffs was cancelled by Chennai District Collector. Ex.B4 is the proceeding of the Urban Land Tax Commissioner, dated 27.11.1990 wherein it is ordered that for the said property urban land tax will be assessed in the name of C.Balakrishnan. Hence, in that proceedings also, it is stated that C.Balakrishnan as asserted that Lakshmi Devi was his wife. 27. From the above the following inferences could be drawn: (1) The petitioner claims that she is a bona fide purchaser without notice of the suit property. (2) It has not been so far decided whether Lakshmi Devi was wife of C.Balakrishnan. (3) C.Balakrishnan had asserted before the revenue authorities that Lakshmi Devi was his wife and urban land tax for the suit property was directed to be assessed in his name. (4) C.Balakrishnan got legal heirship certificate from the competent authority stating that Lakshmi Devi was his wife which has not been cancelled so far by the competent authority. 27(b). The Court has to answer this point, in the light of events contained in para 20(b) of this judgment. The SLP was dismissed as withdrawn with observation of the Supreme Court. (4) C.Balakrishnan got legal heirship certificate from the competent authority stating that Lakshmi Devi was his wife which has not been cancelled so far by the competent authority. 27(b). The Court has to answer this point, in the light of events contained in para 20(b) of this judgment. The SLP was dismissed as withdrawn with observation of the Supreme Court. Such observation as extracted in the affidavit of Periyammal as culled out in para 20(b) of this judgment is as follows: "14.The learned senior counsel for the applicant would also implore and entreat that this court may recognize the right of the applicant to approach this court which is seized of the appeal. It is always open for the purchaser of a property pendente lite to approach the court concerned which is seized of the matter for getting oneself impleaded and it is for the court seized of the appeal to consider on merits as to whether the purchaser during the pendency of the suit should be added or not as one of the parties. Suffice to say that it is open for the applicant to work out his remedy in the way known to law." 28. Even though the death certificate of Lakshmi Devi produced by him was found to be fabricated and contempt proceedings were initiated against C.Balakrishnan, still the above said circumstances would indicate that further probe has to be made in the contentions of third defendant so as to find out the legal enforceability of the sale deed obtained by this petitioner. C.M.P.No.322 of 2010 filed by Periyammal was allowed by this Court on 20.04.2010 and consequently she was impleaded as 13th respondent in A.S.No.981 of 2004. She has been impleaded only in the appeal and in order to see whether she has got right to get any injunction order, the records on her side have to be scrutinised and then only the grant of relief in C.M.P.No.712 of 2010 could be ascertained. Such exercise could not be taken in this appeal. As observed above, it is open for her to work out her remedy known to law. In these circumstances, C.M.P.No.712 of 2010 is closed. This point is answered accordingly. Point No.3: 29. The application in A.No.4576 of 2007 has been filed by one Saurabh Rathi son of M.D.Rathi since deceased, 8th defendant in the suit. As observed above, it is open for her to work out her remedy known to law. In these circumstances, C.M.P.No.712 of 2010 is closed. This point is answered accordingly. Point No.3: 29. The application in A.No.4576 of 2007 has been filed by one Saurabh Rathi son of M.D.Rathi since deceased, 8th defendant in the suit. In the affidavit filed by him along with the petition under Order XIV, Rule 8 of Original Side Rules of High Court and Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, it is alleged that his father along with his mother and other close relatives purchased the suit property from one V.M.Natarajan who is the 5th defendant in the suit by means of four registered sale deeds. The said V.M.Natarajan, purchased the property from testatrix on 22.01.1994. There are four purchasers from V.M.Natarajan by four different sale deeds dated 22.12.1995 and each was for 1/4th undivided share. Ever since the date of purchase his father was in possession and enjoyment of the property. The suit was contested by his father. The above said sale deeds are valid. In view of the conflicting claims over the properties, the petitioner made enquiry with regard to the testatrix and he came to know that she was living near Thanjavur during his last days. He also came to know that she had executed a deed of cancellation of the Will dated 15.10.1993 on 30.11.1993 which was registered as Doc. No.82 of 1993 on the file of the Sub Registrar, Maharnombuchavadi and the same was intimated to the Sub Registrar, Mylapore, where the Will was executed. The Will said to have been executed by her was duly recalled by testatrix during her lifetime and no rights can flow under the said cancelled Will. Without bringing the fact before this Court, the plaintiffs got probate. The testatrix died at her native village on 25.01.1995 for which a death certificate has also been issued. The probate granted in respect of a cancelled Will cannot be allowed to stand especially, when it is causing untold hardship and agony to the valid titleholders i.e., the petitioner and his family members. In view of the above, the grant of probate in favour of the plaintiffs has to be revoked. 30. Even though the petitioner has spoken about a deed of cancellation of Will dated 30.11.1993, the said document has not seen the light of the day. In view of the above, the grant of probate in favour of the plaintiffs has to be revoked. 30. Even though the petitioner has spoken about a deed of cancellation of Will dated 30.11.1993, the said document has not seen the light of the day. Further, the death certificate as alleged by the petitioner to show the death of Lakshmi Devi was 25.01.1995 has also not been produced. 31. However, all the defendants would contend about the conduct of the plaintiffs in obtaining the probate from this Court on various other grounds which have to be considered: 31(a). The learned Counsel Mr.P.B.Ramanujam, appearing for the petitioner, would contend that the decision of the probate Court is a judgment in rem and if it is brought to the notice of the Court that if any persons who are interested in the property were left be added in the petition for grant of probate and if any person who has got caveatable interest in the property in the probate petition as per Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act was omitted, the Court may revoke the probate. 31(b). Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Counsel appearing for the 13th respondent in A.S.No.981 of 2004 would contend that inasmuch as the application for probate was miserably barred by time, it has to be necessarily revoked, that for the Will allegedly executed in the year 1973, only in 1993 the probate proceedings have been initiated by the plaintiffs and there is no explanation for the long delay in bringing the Will to the Court, that the plaintiffs have materially suppressed the essential fact of date of death of testator Lakshmi Devi and the death certificate produced by the plaintiffs has not been proved to be genuine, that the plaintiffs very well knew earlier to the filing of the probate application that the third defendant was also agitating his rights in their presence claiming as legal heir to deceased Lakshmi Devi before the revenue authorities, but the plaintiffs knowing full well that he was interested in the suit property and had caveatable interest, but he was significantly omitted to be impleaded in the proceedings, that the Will has not been proved before the Court as per law as regards due execution and attestation and that no explanation on the part of the plaintiffs for their failure to appear before the Court as propounder. 32. 32. Repelling the contentions, the learned Counsel Mr.A.Prabhakara Reddy, appearing for the plaintiffs would contend that Order 137 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the probate proceedings; that no question of bar of limitation would arise in this case; that the execution and attestation of the Will have been duly proved; that since the validity and the genuineness of the Will have been already decided, the issue cannot be reopened, that Ex.A4 death certificate produced by the plaintiffs has been established to be a true one, but on the contrary, the death certificate produced by third defendant has been held by this Court as a forged one and that there is no valid ground made out to revoke the Will under any of the grounds enlisted under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act. Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act reads thus: "263. Revocation or annulment for just cause.-The grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for just cause. Explanation.- Just cause shall be deemed to exist where - (a) the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; or (b) the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion, or by concealing from the Court something material to the case; or (c) the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently; or (d) the grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances; or (e) the person to whom the grant was made has wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or account in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of this Part, or has exhibited under that Chapter an inventory or account which is untrue in a material respect. Illustrations (i) The court by which the grant was made had no jurisdiction. (ii) The grant was made without citing parties who ought to have been cited. (iii)The will of which probate was obtained was forged or revoked. (iv) A obtained letters of administration to the estate of B, as his widow, but it has since transpired that she was never married to him. (v) A has taken administration to the estate of B, as if he had died intestate, but a will has since been discovered. (iii)The will of which probate was obtained was forged or revoked. (iv) A obtained letters of administration to the estate of B, as his widow, but it has since transpired that she was never married to him. (v) A has taken administration to the estate of B, as if he had died intestate, but a will has since been discovered. (vi) Since probate was granted, a later will has been discovered. (vii) Since probate was granted, a codicil has been discovered which revokes or adds to the appointment of executors under the will. (viii) The person to whom probate was, or letters of administration were, granted has subsequently become of unsound mind." 33. Adverting to the circumstances as regards revocation of probate, the learned Counsel have cited various authorities which are supporting their contentions. Mr.P.B.Ramanujam, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in A.No.4576 of 2007 would contend that a person who has a real interest in the estate who is or is likely to be prejudicially affected or adversely affected by the Will can oppose the grant of probate or letters of administration and that it is not necessary for the objector to show that he had an interest in the estate at the time of the testator's death as held by a Division Bench of Calcutta, reported in A.I.R. 1932 Calcutta 234 (Nabin Chandra Guha v. Nibaran Chandra Biswas and others). 34. Mr.A.Prabhakara Reddy, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs cited a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court reported in Manu/DE/7106/2007 (Dinesh Chand v. State and another) in which it is held that when validity or genuineness of Will already stood decided between the same parties by the Apex Court then the same issue cannot be reopened in probate Court under Indian Succession Act. But in the case on hand, no earlier decision is available by any Court. 35. But in the case on hand, no earlier decision is available by any Court. 35. In 2001 3 CTC 283, (Corra Vedachalam Chetty v. G.Janakiraman) cited by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, a Division Bench of this Court has held that the fact that the Will was not produced immediately after the demise of the testator for the purpose of probate, does not by itself render the Will fraudulent or untrue and that the Court should be cautious while reading evidence placed before them in relation to the execution and attestation of the Will as also the disposing state of mind of the testator and this need for caution, cannot be exploited by unscrupulous caveators who choose to cull out imaginary suspicions with a view to prevent the legatees under the Will from claiming the benefit thereunder and to render the last Will of the deceased wholly ineffective. He also placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1990 1 LW 337 (Testamentary & Intestate Jurisdiction Smt.Jayalakshmi Ammal (Deceased)-S.Krishnaswami) wherein the learned Judges have held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act will not apply to proceedings filed for grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the Will annexed. It is also observed therein that delay in taking steps gives rise to suspicion and the longer the delay the stronger the suspicion. But, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on this point, the law is settled that to make Article 137 of the Limitation Act applicable to grant of probate or letters of administration certain limitations have to be observed. In the decisions, 2008 (8) SCC 463 (Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur v. Kirandeep Kaur and others) and 2009 11 SCC 537 (Krishna Kumar Sharma v. Rajesh Kumar Sharma), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as regards the applicability of Article 137 to the proceedings in grant of letters of administration. The following are the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in both the decisions: "16. Similarly reference was made to a decision of the Bombay High Court's case in case Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. MANU/MH/0222/1983 Sajni Prem Lalwani : AIR 1983 Bom 268 . Para 16 reads as follows: 16. The following are the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in both the decisions: "16. Similarly reference was made to a decision of the Bombay High Court's case in case Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. MANU/MH/0222/1983 Sajni Prem Lalwani : AIR 1983 Bom 268 . Para 16 reads as follows: 16. Rejecting Mr.Dalapatrai's contention, I summarise my conclusions thus: (a) under the Limitation Act no period is advisedly prescribed within which an application for probate, letters of administration or succession certificate must be made; (b) the assumption that under Article 137 the right to apply necessarily accrues on the date of the death of the deceased, is unwarranted; (c) such an application is for the Court's permission to perform a legal duty created by a Will or for recognition as a testamentary trustee and is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed; (d) the right to apply would accrue when it becomes necessary to apply which may not necessarily be within 3 years from the date of the deceased's death; (e) delay beyond 3 years after the deceased's death would arouse suspicion and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion; (f) such delay must be explained, but cannot be equated with the absolute bar of limitation; and (g) once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates. 17. The conclusion 'b' is not correct while the conclusion 'c' is the correct position of law." 36. The Hon'ble Supreme Court prescribed certain limitations for the applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act. In the case on hand, after 20 years, the Will was brought out and probate proceedings were initiated. As already stated, no explanation is forthcoming for the long delay. In the above said decisions clause (g) is "once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion and delay no longer operates." When we probe the events on record with resect to the execution and attestation, the Court can reach the conclusion that the execution and attestation have not been proved as required by law. It has become inevitable in this context, to wade through the evidence and its implications, touching the execution and attestation of the Will. 37. It has become inevitable in this context, to wade through the evidence and its implications, touching the execution and attestation of the Will. 37. P.W.2 is one among the attestors to the Will. He says that the Advocate Chalapathy Rao prepared the Will and he (P.W.2) typed the Will. But it is not referred to in the Will that it was prepared by Chalapathy Rao and typed by P.W.2. 38. P.W.2's chief examination is as brief as possible. He did not say about the execution and attestation of the Will as required by law in his chief Examination. He says that while Lakshmi Devi signed the Will, she was in a sound disposing state of mind and P.W.2 and Chalapathy Rao attested the Will, which was read over to testatrix who signed after expressing her consent and that Chalapathy Rao is no more. In his cross examination, suggestion was put that he is not the person who has attested the Will as attestor. But he denied the suggestion. It is required by law that both the attestors should see the testators signing and that testators should witness the attestors signing the Will. But the evidence of P.W.2 is not on these lines. In this context, the learned Counsel for 13th respondent would place reliance upon a decision of this Court reported in 1997 (1) CTC 222 (Kannammal v. Chinnaponnammal) wherein S.S.Subramaniam, J, has held as follows: "13. The legal requirement of attestation is not proved by D.Ws.2 and 3. The omission of the witnesses to speak about the due attestation cannot be cured on the basis of assumptions. Even if the witnesses do not speak in terms of the Section, atleast from probabilities, the Court must be in a position to infer that there has been due attestation. Even those circumstances have not been made out in this case. When there is no evidence of D.Ws.2 and 3 that they subscribed their signature in the presence of the testator or received his acknowledgement, it cannot be said that Ex.B-2 Will be properly proved. That finding of the lower appellate Court is, therefore, correct." 39. He has also cited a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kashibai v. Parvatibai, (1995) 6 SCC 213 ,. That finding of the lower appellate Court is, therefore, correct." 39. He has also cited a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kashibai v. Parvatibai, (1995) 6 SCC 213 ,. Reference to this decision and the extraction of the same are as follows: "One of the legal requirements is, that each of the witnesses shall sign in the presence of the testator. Even if he testator signed in their presence, the attestation is not complete unless and until the attestors also sign in the presence of the testator and the testator has seen the attestors signing the document. This aspect of the matter is not spoken to by D.Ws.2 and 3. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Kashibai v. Parvatibai, their Lordships said that 'Section 68 of the Evidence Act, shows that 'attestation' and 'execution' are two different acts one following the other. There can be no valid execution of a document which under the law is required to be attested without the proof of its due attestation and if due attestation is also not proved, the fact of execution is of no avail. Section 63 of the Succession Act also lays down certain rules with regard to the execution of unprivileged wills. The word 'attested' has been defined in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act.' In paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said decision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held thus:- "This brings us to the question of the will alleged to have been executed by deceased Lachiram in favour of his grandson Purshottam, Defendant 3. Section 68 of Evidence Act relates to the proof of execution of document required by law to be attested. Admittedly, a deed of Will is one of such documents which necessarily require by law to be attested. Section 68 of the Evidence Act contemplates that if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. A reading of Section 68 will show that 'attestation' and 'execution' are two different acts one following the other. A reading of Section 68 will show that 'attestation' and 'execution' are two different acts one following the other. There can be no valid execution of a document which under the law is required to be attested without the proof of its due attestation and if due attestation is also not proved, the fact of execution is of no avail. Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 also lays down certain rules with regard to the execution of unprivileged Wills. Clause (c) of Section 63 provides that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each one of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to be Will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark or the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses should sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary. Here we may also take note of the definition of the expression 'attested' as contained in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act which reads as under: - "3. Here we may also take note of the definition of the expression 'attested' as contained in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act which reads as under: - "3. 'attested', in relation to an instrument means and shall be deemed always to have meant attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the execution sign or affix his Mark to the instrument, or has seen some other person sign the instrument in the presence and by the direction of the executant, or has received from the executant, a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person and each of whom has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant; but it shall not be necessary that more than one of such witnesses shall have been present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary." Having regard to the aforementioned definition an attesting witnesses is a person who is the presence of an executant of a document puts his signature or mark after he has either seen the executant himself or some one on direction of the executant has put his signature or affixed his mark on the document so required to be attested or after he has received from the executant a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark or the signature or mark of such other person..." 40. This Court has no occasion to see the evidence on record with regard to the execution and attestation of the Will in the probate proceedings. No party to suit has produced certified copy of the evidence of testators to the Will adduced in the probate proceedings. Hence, this Court has to appreciate the available evidence on record for deciding whether the Will was duly executed and attested. P.W.2 has miserably failed to adduce evidence to the effect that when the testatrix signed, both the attestors saw and when the attestors put their signatures the testatrix had seen. In this regard it has to be necessarily held following the above said decisions, that the execution and attestation of the Will have not been proved as per law. In MANU/SC/0366/2009 : 2009 4 SCC 780 , (Yumnam Ongbi Tampha and Ibemma Devi v. Yumnam Joykumar Singh and others) the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "6. In MANU/SC/0366/2009 : 2009 4 SCC 780 , (Yumnam Ongbi Tampha and Ibemma Devi v. Yumnam Joykumar Singh and others) the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "6. As per provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act, for the due execution of a will: (1) the testator should sign or affix his mark to the will; (2) the signature or the mark of the testator should be so placed that it should appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will; (3) the will should be attested by two or more witnesses, and (4) each of the said witnesses must have seen the testator signing or affixing his mark to the will and each of them should sign the will in the presence of the testator. 7. The attestation of the will in the manner stated above is not an empty formality. It means signing a document for the purpose of testifying of the signatures of the executant. The attested (sic attesting) witness should put his signature on the will animo attestandi. It is not necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time and no particular form of attestation is necessary. Since a will is required by law to be attested, its execution has to be proved in the manner laid down in the section and the Evidence Act which requires that at least one attesting witness has to be examined for the purpose of proving the execution of such a document. Therefore, having regard to the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63 of the Succession Act, a will to be valid should be attested by two or more witnesses in the manner provided therein and the propounder thereof should examine one attesting witness to prove the will. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signature or affixing his mark to the will but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator." 41. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signature or affixing his mark to the will but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator." 41. Mr.A.Prabhakara Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs would cite a Division Bench decision of this Court in 2005 (1) CTC 11 , (Janaki Devi v. R.Vasanthi and others), wherein it is observed that each witness must have seen testator sign or affix his mark in Will and each witness should have signed Will in presence of testator. The learned Judges have also dealt with the import of the Order 25, Rule 9 of the Madras High Court Original Side Rules with regard to its compliance etc. The following is the extraction of the Rule and the decision on the point of furnishing explanation by the propounder who applies for probate which is as follows: "27. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Order 25, Rule 9 of Madras High Court Original Side Rules, is not complied with in this case, and the non-explanation of the delay, with materials should be construed as one of the unavoidable circumstances, to cast shadow upon the Will, to eclipse the same. Order 25, Rule 9 of the Madras High Court Original Side Rules says: "In any case where probate or letters of administration is for first time applied for after the lapse of three years from the death of the deceased, the reason for the delay shall be explained in the petition." In the case on hand, it cannot be said, that this requirement is not complied with, since paragraph-7 of the petition gives some explanation, for the delay. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, that during the relevant period viz., from September 1984 to June 1989, the plaintiff/first respondent could not have been in bed rest, since she was attending the Court in the connected proceedings, fails to inspire us, to reject the explanation offered, considering the fact that the petitioner had proclaimed and propounded the Will, as and when occasion had arisen for her to do so. Admittedly, this petition or plaint has been filed, after three years from the date of death of the testator, since she died on 22.6.1981. Admittedly, this petition or plaint has been filed, after three years from the date of death of the testator, since she died on 22.6.1981. If the plaintiff had been silent, not even whispering about the Will, when occasion had arisen, then the inaction on the part of the plaintiff for more than three years in not taking the steps, to probate the Will, could be viewed with suspicion." "As held by the Division bench of this Court, in Ammu Balachandran v. O.T.Joseph, AIR 1996 Mad. 442 , if the execution of the Will is proved, the delay in taking steps to probate the Will, will not loom large, since Order 25, Rule 9 of Madras High Court Original Side Rules has not prescribed any period of limitation and probably, it aims to give explanation alone." 42. In view of the above position, the initiation of proceedings for probate shall come to the Court within three years from the date of death of the deceased and if the execution of the Will is proved, the delay in taking steps to probate the Will, will not loom large. But in the case on hand, as already stated, there is no explanation for a long spell of two decades and the silence on the part of the plaintiffs would make the Court to lay suspicion over genuineness of the Will. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs also placed reliance upon the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to support his contention. 43. In (1995) 5 SCC 215 (Vrindavanibai Sambhaji Mane v. Ramchandra Vithal Ganeshkar and others), it is held that non-disclosure of the Will immediately after death of the testatrix, is not a suspicious circumstance when the Will was produced in Court by the propounder immediately after filing written statement pursuant to suit filed by the predecessor of respondents. 44. In 2002 (1) CTC 244, (Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Sedage), the Apex Court has held that challenge to Will by person who is stranger and who is trespasser on property on the grounds of suspicion is not well founded. The same view has been observed in a decision of I.David Christian, J, reported in 2001 (1) CTC 708 (Valliammal v. S.Arumugha Gounder and another) wherein it is observed that a stranger to family cannot urge suspicious circumstances regarding execution of Will. The same view has been observed in a decision of I.David Christian, J, reported in 2001 (1) CTC 708 (Valliammal v. S.Arumugha Gounder and another) wherein it is observed that a stranger to family cannot urge suspicious circumstances regarding execution of Will. In 2004 (5) CTC 790 , (Daulat Ram and others v. Sodha and others), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the propounder of the Will has to prove that testator signed the Will in the presence of two attestors in his presence and in the presence of each other, and once these elements are established the onus which rests on propounder regarding validity of the Will is discharged. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs also cited a decision of mine reported in 2009 5 CTC 844 (G.Panneerselvam v. Ayyannan and 3 others) wherein it is observed that burden of proving due execution of Will is discharged if propounder leads evidence to show that Will bears signature or mark of testator and that it is duly attested. He also brought to the notice of the Court a judgment of this Court in A.No.1945 of 2006 and A.No.4687 of 2006 in O.P.No.436 of 2004 dated 16.09.2009 which go to the effect that insofar as the impleadment of a third party, who is a subsequent purchaser after the Will and Testament is concerned, it is not necessary to add such parties and even during the pendency of the O.P. proceedings, no such third party purchaser could have come on record. The Supreme Court in Sunil Gupta Vs. Kiran Girhotra and others reported in (2007) 8 SCC 506 has observed in para 13 that a transferee of a property during the pendency of a proceeding is not a necessary party and citations are necessary to be made to only those who, inter alia, claim through or under the Will or deny or dispute the execution thereof. But it is pertinent to note that the respondents 1 to 9 namely the appellants and plaintiffs in the suit had no objection for impleading 13th respondent in the appeal in A.S.No.981 of 2004 and C.M.P.No.322 of 2010 was allowed. But it is pertinent to note that the respondents 1 to 9 namely the appellants and plaintiffs in the suit had no objection for impleading 13th respondent in the appeal in A.S.No.981 of 2004 and C.M.P.No.322 of 2010 was allowed. In AIR 1996 Madras 318, (In re: P.D.Rajan and others) it is observed that to invoke Section 263 there should be some relationship between person claiming revocation of probate and property of testator and where the party who is neither beneficiary nor one having any right over the estate of deceased, his objection for grant of letters of administration is not entertainable. 45. In view of the above decisions, this Court has reached a conclusion as mandated by the Supreme Court, in the matter of limitation, as under: In this case, the delay occurred beyond three years after the deceased's death, has paved way to lay suspicion over the genuineness and validity of the Will. Since the delay is greater, suspicion is also greater and as provided by the decision, since the plaintiffs have failed to prove due execution and attestation as required by law, the suspicion of delay operates upon the Will under dispute. 46. Another circumstance which would invalidate the probate as per Section 263 is that the parties who have got caveatable interest at the time of filing of probate O.P. were ignored. It is argued that rightly or wrongly the third defendant had claimed right on the property in the capacity of husband of the deceased Lakshmi Devi and he should have been impleaded as respondent. It is also stated that the plaintiffs very well knew about the said assertion of third defendant long before the institution of probate proceedings. 47. Another limb of argument of the defendants, upon the plaintiffs' claim is that they played fraud upon the Court by production of Ex.A4 Death Certificate of Lakshmi Devi reportedly issued by Corporation of Madras. To ascertain the genuineness of Ex.A4, the extract from Death Register kept by the Registrar of births and deaths in Corporation of Madras, concerned Register maintained by Madras Corporation which should have contained the original entries of Ex.A4. The register was directed to be produced and the same has also been produced by the officials of City Health Officer in the Corporation of Chennai. The register was directed to be produced and the same has also been produced by the officials of City Health Officer in the Corporation of Chennai. While producing the death register an affidavit of City Health Officer in the Corporation of Chennai has also been submitted, in which, he has affirmed that it is found that the paper containing the death entry regarding death of Lakshmi Devi with Annual No.166 and Monthly No.15 in page No. 202 and also death entry with Annual No.167, Monthly No.16 in page No.203 were found missing and the photocopy of the death certificate of Lakshmi Devi was pasted; that the applicant applied for the death certificate of Lakshmi Devi and the death register was verified and found that relevant page is missing, then he produced the death certificate of Lakshmi Devi issued on 20.06.1973 and the same was compared with other entries in the register and the signature, hand writing, etc., were found to be similar and serial number was found to be in continuation from previous entry and therefore, it was concluded that the certified copy produced by the applicant is genuine and issued by the Corporation of Chennai. But the above said events do not show on what point of time the xerox copy of Ex.A4 was pasted. The affidavit also contains general instructions from Deputy Registrar, General of Births and Deaths for reconstruction of destroyed or mutilated records. But there is no material to show only by observance of due procedure the xerox copy of Ex.A4 was pasted to the register. 48. The volume of Death register maintained for the year 1973 was produced in which page number 202, Annual No.166 and Monthly No.15 should pertain to death of Lakshmi Devi. It is significant to note that the sheet in the register containing Annual No.166 and on the reverse 167 is found missing in the register. In that place, a xerox copy of Ex.A4 has been pasted. There is no reference nor particulars with regard to Annual No.167. The missing of the page for Annual No.166 creates serious doubt upon the date of death of Lakshmi Devi. There is no proof that page No.202 is related to the death of Lakshmi Devi. It may be stated that the plaintiffs are not responsible for the missing of particular sheet in the death register. The missing of the page for Annual No.166 creates serious doubt upon the date of death of Lakshmi Devi. There is no proof that page No.202 is related to the death of Lakshmi Devi. It may be stated that the plaintiffs are not responsible for the missing of particular sheet in the death register. But it is expected to be maintained by the Health Department, Corporation of Madras. When this Court is at loss to find out the correct date of death of Lakshmi Devi from the unassailable original record of the authority, there is no option except to lay suspicion over the issue. There is no reference in the relevant page as to who authorised the official to paste the xerox copy of Ex.A4. The Court expects normal official functions to be transacted every day and in case if a particular page is missing, then and there, it should have been intimated to the Head of the Department and only with his approval relevant page should have been reconstructed or substituted. But, in this case, it is not so. There could be no second opinion except to record a finding that the xerox copy in Ex.A4 for page No.202, Annual No.166 is unauthorised, unlawful and unauthenticated, by means of which Ex.A4 could not be compared and in this context, the plaintiffs should have taken proper steps to prove the genuineness of Ex.A4 alternatively. In this case, such steps have not been taken. In view of the above, it has to be necessarily held that Ex.A4 has not been proved to be connected to the death of deceased Lakshmi Devi. By no stretch of imagination, it could be stated that Ex.A4 reflects page No.202. Consequently, it ought to be observed that necessary ingredient i.e. date of death, which should have been the cause of action for filing the probate petition is not inexistence and in this regard the probate proceedings are vitiated. 49. This Court has gone through the oral evidence and exhibits with utmost care and in the light of the authoritative judicial pronouncements, it reaches a conclusion that sufficient and valid grounds are very much available to revoke the grant of probate issued in favour of the plaintiffs and it is hereby revoked and this point is answered in the affirmative. Points Nos.4 and 5: 50. Points Nos.4 and 5: 50. Under Point No.3, this Court has taken up extensive discussion on deep scrutiny of all the materials and circumstances and has reached a conclusion that the probate is liable to be revoked and it has been revoked. Consequent upon this, the Will of deceased Lakshmi Devi remains without probate, by means of which, no right would flow to the plaintiffs. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the death certificate produced by third defendant is also a forged one and from the letter of the Assistant Health Officer, Corporation of Chennai in Ex.A9, it is evident that on thorough checking of the volume for the year 1979 the death of Lakshmi Devi is not registered. Whatever may be the contention of the defendants, the plaintiffs have to establish their right, title and possession in the suit property so as to pray for reliefs of declaration and injunction. It is well settled that the plaintiffs have to succeed or fall by their own case and they cannot take advantage of the loophole in the defence raised by the defendants. Since the plaintiffs have not proved their alleged source of title namely the Will, they have to be non-suited for the reliefs claimed. In such view of this matter, the judgment and decree of the trial Court have to be interfered with, which are liable to be set aside and they are accordingly set aside and A.S.No.981 of 2004 is allowed. 51. The 13th respondent has been newly impleaded in this Court in A.S.No.981 of 2004 consequent to the allowing of her impleading application in C.M.P.No.322 of 2010 on 20.04.2010. A.S.No.981 of 2004 was filed by the legal representatives viz., his wife, daughters and son of third defendant who are continuing A.S.No.981 of 2004, from whom the 13th respondent has purchased the property. As per the observations of this Court in Para No.27 of this judgment, certain points have to be answered with regard to the right vested in third defendant. 52. The 7th and 8th defendant have filed appeal in A.S.No.772 of 2006. Pending hearing of the appeal in A.S.No.772 of 2006, the second appellant by name M.D.Rathi died and his legal representatives were added as 3rd and 4th appellants. The rights of the 13th respondent in A.S.No.981 of 2004 was discussed under point No.2. 52. The 7th and 8th defendant have filed appeal in A.S.No.772 of 2006. Pending hearing of the appeal in A.S.No.772 of 2006, the second appellant by name M.D.Rathi died and his legal representatives were added as 3rd and 4th appellants. The rights of the 13th respondent in A.S.No.981 of 2004 was discussed under point No.2. Insofar as the rights of the appellants in A.S.No.772 of 2006 are concerned, even though they were parties to the suit, excepting the copies of sale deeds, they have not produced any evidence in the trial of the suit to show that they are in absolute possession of the suit property. Even the four sale deeds executed by 5th defendant are with respect to undivided 1/4 share each in the scheduled property. Though they plead that Lakshmi Devi died in 1995, they have not produced any document to show the alleged date of her death. The sale deeds in favour of the appellants by V.M.Natarajan, who is the fifth defendant in the suit were reportedly executed on 22.01.1994. There is nothing on record to call for a finding to the effect that the appellants in A.S.No.772 of 2006 have got right in the suit property. Existing circumstances would explicitly indicate that they have no semblance of right in the suit property and hence, there could be no finding in their favour by this Court with regard to the suit property. The relief of setting aside the judgment and decree in the suit is already granted in A.S.No.981 of 2004. Hence, A.S.No.772 of 2006 has to be dismissed with regard to claiming of rights by appellants in the suit property. With cost of repetition, as already stated, though the death certificate produced by C.Balakrishnan was found to be forged one, the point whether Lakshmi Devi was his wife is yet to be decided. Coupled with the above said circumstances, in view of the answer rendered with regard to the disposal of the original suit thereby A.S.No.981 of 2004 deserves to be allowed. As answered in point No.3, A.No.4576 of 2007 in O.P.No.752 of 1993 is to be allowed. These points are answered as indicated above. 53. In fine, A.S.No.981 of 2004 is allowed setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Second Additional City Civil Court, Chennai in O.S.No.4681 of 1997. A.S.No.772 of 2006 is dismissed. C.M.P.No.588 of 2012 is dismissed. As answered in point No.3, A.No.4576 of 2007 in O.P.No.752 of 1993 is to be allowed. These points are answered as indicated above. 53. In fine, A.S.No.981 of 2004 is allowed setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Second Additional City Civil Court, Chennai in O.S.No.4681 of 1997. A.S.No.772 of 2006 is dismissed. C.M.P.No.588 of 2012 is dismissed. C.M.P.No.712 of 2010 is closed. A.No.4576 of 2007 in O.P.No.752 of 1993 is allowed. No costs.