JUDGMENT 1. The second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff, which is a religious mutt, represented by the power agent, challenging the reversal of the decreeing of the suit in A.S.No.16 of 1999. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit for the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession. The suit property consists of two items. Both the items are located within the municipal limits of Mannargudi Haridranathi North Bank, Ward No.1, Block No.37, and under the following Town Survey Numbers with corresponding extents:- (i) T.S.No.2160/2 – 14551 sq.ft., and (ii) T.S.No.2162 – 57000 sq.ft., 3. According to the plaintiff, T.S.No.2160 was subjected to land acquisition proceedings and during that occasion, it got sub-divided into T.S.Nos.2160/1 and 2160/2 and later, the Government acquired the property comprised in T.S.No.2160/1 for which compensation was paid to the plaintiff. The remaining item i.e., in T.S.No.2160/2 is the first item of the suit property. 3.1 The property covered in T.S.No.2162, with patta No.232, consists of two tiled houses. Out of the total extent of two acres 42,654 sq.ft., only portion of the property, namely, 57,000 sq.ft., belongs to the plaintiff. Even though joint patta has been issued in the name of the plaintiff as well as Shri.V.Ratnam, Retd., Judge of the Madras High Court, in patta No.2322, covering the entire extent in T.S.No.2162, the plaintiff restricted the claim only to the extent of 57,000 sq.ft., while admitting that the rest belonged to Justice V.Ratnam, the former Judge of the Madras High Court. 3.2 According to the plaintiff, one Raja of Thanjavur, dedicated those properties to the plaintiff's mutt by way of title deed No.579. The settlement register bears the name of the plaintiff's mutt; even though the ownership is shown to be joint, but actually the enjoyment is separate; Justice V.Ratnam is enjoying the western portion and the Mutt is enjoying the eastern portion; eastern portion alone is shown as one of the suit item; the tax assessment stands in the name of the plaintiff's mutt. 3.3 During 1940, the first defendant came to the suit property for the purpose of running Vedapadasalai. Thus the defendant is in permissive occupation of the suit property. After the first defendant occupying the property, the idol of “Sri Lakshmi Narasimha Perumal Swamy” was shifted to a place nearby Ahobilaswamy Mutt. 3.3 During 1940, the first defendant came to the suit property for the purpose of running Vedapadasalai. Thus the defendant is in permissive occupation of the suit property. After the first defendant occupying the property, the idol of “Sri Lakshmi Narasimha Perumal Swamy” was shifted to a place nearby Ahobilaswamy Mutt. As the two buildings in the second item of the property are classified as Chathiram, there is no tax assessment. 3.4. As the enjoyment of the property by the plaintiff was sought to be prevented by the second defendant, the suit came to be filed. 4. The first defendant denied knowledge about the grant of patta in favour of the plaintiff under the proceedings of the Inam Commissioner. The specific case of the first defendant is that first defendant never occupied the property with the lease and license of the plaintiff. The Inam title deed relied on by the plaintiff will not confer any title to the plaintiff. By virtue of the provisions contained in the Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963, all pre-existing rights of any party relating to the minor Inam get extinguished and therefore, the title could be claimed only by virtue of the patta granted under the Act. But as against the grant of patta, the first defendant has filed the appeal, which is still said to be pending. The plaintiff cannot claim any title based on that patta also. 4.1. The two buildings existing in T.S.No.2162 bearing Door Nos.34 and 33 are known as 'Sethupatha Chathiram' and as such, as they are chowtries, they are exempted from the property tax by the Municipality. However, in the Municipal Tax Assessment Register, the name of the first defendant alone is shown as the owner of the property. 4.2. The second defendant is the auditor in the HR & CE Department. The property has been leased out to the third parties through him. Therefore the plaintiff's case must be dismissed. 5. The trial court relied upon the grant of patta by the Thanjavur Settlement Tahsildar in favour of the plaintiff, while pointing out the omission on the part of the first defendant to file the copy of the alleged appeal petition and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration of title. The trial court also observed that the defendants have not filed any document of title. The trial court also observed that the defendants have not filed any document of title. The pertinent observation is that the first defendant did not explain as to how he entered into the possession of the property. 6. As against the grant of decree, the first defendant has filed an appeal in A.S.No.16 of 1999. It is pointed out by the first appellate court that the property covered under Ex.A-2-title deed, dated 26.10.1864, cannot be given much importance as it did not contain the survey number and the extent of property. The first appellate court was not inclined to rely upon Ex.A-4 dated 07.10.1996 on the reasoning that it has been obtained subsequent to the filing of the suit i.e., on 23.01.1995. Relying upon AIR 1932 Calcutta 39 (Bengal Coal Company Ltd. Vs. Prosanna Kumar Bhattacharjee and others) wherein, it has been held that "the onus is upon the plaintiff to prove the specific case set up by them and they cannot fall back on the partial admission made by the defendants and contend that the onus is shifted from them to the defendants". It was held that the plaintiff has not proved his case and plaintiff is not entitled to rely upon the case of the defendant. 6.1. Another decision relied upon by the first appellate court was the one reported in AIR 1979 Calcutta 500, wherein it has been held, thus:- “the plaintiff cannot be allowed to shrink his duty from the statutory responsibility of discharging the burden of proof independently as to his title in the suit property .....”. Mainly finding that Ex.A-2 document is not proved to be relating to the suit property, the first appeal was allowed. 7. Against which, the present second appeal has been filed raising the following substantial questions of law:- “(1) Whether the lower appellate court is right in non-suiting the plaintiff when the plaintiff has filed the suit to declare its title based on grant of patta in its favour? (2) Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court is in accordance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C.?” Arguments were advanced only with reference to issue No.1. 8. Learned counsel for the first respondent raised an objection that there is no substantial question of law involved and therefore the appeal itself is not maintainable. 8.1. (2) Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court is in accordance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C.?” Arguments were advanced only with reference to issue No.1. 8. Learned counsel for the first respondent raised an objection that there is no substantial question of law involved and therefore the appeal itself is not maintainable. 8.1. To answer this objection, it is relevant to quote the decision of this Court reported in Ramalingamv. Government of Tamil Nadu, through Collector, Thanjavur & another, in Second Appeal No.1597 of 1995, dated 16.04.2012, wherein it has been held as follows:- "13.) In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise. The substantial question of law that arises for consideration in this appeal is: "Whether the courts below had failed to consider vital pieces of evidence and whether the courts relied upon inadmissible evidence while arriving at the conclusion that the mortgage was sham and that there was no relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant as mortgagor and mortgagee but the real relationship was as landlord and tenant? Point 1 is decided accordingly..... The finding is also not based on evidence adduced for which there is no foundation in the pleadings. The finding of the lower court appellate court is essentially erroneous approach. For the above reasons it must be held that it is a fit case where interference is called for under Sec. 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. 14.) He also cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mehrunnisa and others V. Visham Kumari and another, (1998) 2 SCC 295 at page 299, in paragraph 13, it is held as follows: 13.) In the case on hand unfortunately the lower appellate court before reversing the finding of the trial court on the issue of bona-fide requirement of the landlady for starting a cloth business failed to read the entire evidence and take into consideration all the documents placed before the trial court. Therefore, it was rightly contended by Dr. Ghosh, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, that the High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of the first appellate court. Therefore, it was rightly contended by Dr. Ghosh, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, that the High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of the first appellate court. A reading of the judgment of the lower appellate court leaves no doubt that it has looked into the contents of the first notice whereunder the landlady has stated that she required the premises for her husband's office and ignored the notice issued just before the filing of the suit. The lower appellate court has also failed to give due importance to the fact that the landlady has not taken any steps to file suit for eviction pursuant to the notice issued on two earlier occasion and the ground stated in the notice preceding the suit are relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue. 15.) The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/ Plaintiff seeks in aid of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Santhosh Hazari V. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs., 2001-3-L.W. 308, (2001) 3 SCC 179 at page 181 wherein it is observed hereunder:- The phrase substantial question of law, as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying question of law, means -of having substance, essential, real, of sound, worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with -technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the Legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109of the Code or Article 133(1)(a)of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance." Therefore, as per the decision quoted above, the substantial question of law in a second appeal need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance, but it can arise when there is a, (a) perverse finding (b) recording of a finding without any relevant evidence on record and (c) judgment, taking into account irrelevant or inadmissible evidence etc. 9. Therefore this Court has to find out whether the finding has been arrived at by the first appellate court without reference to evidence relating to it. 9. Therefore this Court has to find out whether the finding has been arrived at by the first appellate court without reference to evidence relating to it. In other words, when the findings are perverse, the High Court can interfere in the findings of fact. 10. So far as the contention regarding lack of evidence connecting the suit property with the suit document Ex.A-2 is concerned, it is the crucial issue to be considered. The document, dated 26.10.1864, with the seal of Inam Commissioner, Madras, standing in the name of Ahobilaswamy Mutt has been filed as Ex.A-2. Even though Ex.A-2 document did not have any reference to survey number, the plaintiff want to establish that Ex.A-2 was issued with reference to the suit property by filing Ex.A-4 document which mentions about the location of the property, survey number, title, etc., The location of the property is shown as Mannargudi Haridranathi North Bank, and the number of patta / inam title deed is shown as 232. Adangal, i.e., name of the person in possession, is shown to be in the name of the then Nambakar. Ex.A-2 even though did not have any reference as to the survey number, speaks about the detailed location of the property. Since it is the document of the year 1864, it is not known whether the practice of assigning survey number was in vogue at that time. Correlation can be made only with available parameters. However, considering holistically the evidence of P.W.1, Ex.A4 and Ex.A2, the conclusion is that Ex.A2 deed correspond to Ex.A-4. Moreover, when the defendant claims that as against the grant of patta in respect of the suit property, he has filed appeal, then necessarily the patta relates to the suit property over which the defendant claims title. The comparison of Ex.A-2 with Ex.A-4 would show that Ex.A-2 property is the same as the Ex.A-4 property, which is the suit property. The first appellate court has chosen to reject Ex.A-4 document on the ground that it is the document which came into existence after the filing of the suit. This finding is not reasonable as Ex.A-4 document is not a private document. It is the document issued by Commissioner of Municipality. The Commissioner has issued it, while exercising the statutory powers granted under District Municipalities Act. This finding is not reasonable as Ex.A-4 document is not a private document. It is the document issued by Commissioner of Municipality. The Commissioner has issued it, while exercising the statutory powers granted under District Municipalities Act. Under Ex.A-4 document, the location of the property, ward number, block number, old survey number, sub-division number etc., are given. As it is the document issued by a statutory authority, prima facie the document cannot be rejected, unless it is proved to be incorrect or false. The defendant has not proved the document to be incorrect. The chitta and adangal are also in the name of the plaintiff. The tax assessment also stands in the name of the plaintiff. There is clear admission in the written statement of the first defendant that the suit property constituted a minor inam governed by the provisions of T.N. Act, 30 of 63 and that patta has been issued in favour of the plaintiff and one Sri.V.Ratnam, Retd. Judge, High Court. Therefore, the defendant is estopped from contending otherwise. Even though, the defendant has stated that he did not come to occupy the buildings with the leave and license of the plaintiff, he did not state how the defendants came into possession of the property. Therefore, the contention of the defendants with regard to title and possession cannot be accepted. 11. The main contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent is that the plaintiff should stand or fall on his own strength and he cannot seek support from the case of the defendant, as per the settled legal position. On principle, there is no dispute, but whether this principle would be applicable to the facts of this case is the issue. 11.1. The issue is whether the case of the plaintiff stands upon its own strength or the case of the plaintiff leans in favour of the defendant's case seeking to establish support. It is not a case where the plaintiff without proving the title to the suit property seek to establish the case by relying upon the oral or documentary evidence adduced on the part of the defendants. After establishing title to the suit property by producing Ex.A-2 and Ex.A-4 the plaintiff has pointed out the weakness in the case of the defendants just to show that the demand made by the first defendant is not legal / justifiable / sustainable. After establishing title to the suit property by producing Ex.A-2 and Ex.A-4 the plaintiff has pointed out the weakness in the case of the defendants just to show that the demand made by the first defendant is not legal / justifiable / sustainable. While relying upon Exs.A-2 and A-4, the plaintiff has pointed out the admission made with regard to the patta issued in favour of the plaintiff. 12. It is relevant to point out the defendants did not disclose the complete defence. The defence taken by the defendants is open to many 'ifs and buts', which remain in dotted lines. 12.1. Under Order 8 Rule 4 CPC, when a defendant denies an allegation of fact in a plaint, he must not do so evasively but answer the point of substance. By “point of substance” is meant the real gist and significance of the allegation traversed as distinguished from comparatively immaterial details. Under Order 8 Rule 5 CPC, “every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically, or by necessary implication, are stated to be not admitted in the pleadings of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted”. Therefore, if the defendant does not chose unequivocal language for denying the fact which he intends to deny and when the defendant does not make it clear that he does not admit it, then he runs the risk of being understood to have impliedly admitted the allegations. 12.2. The following two rules must be followed by the defendants when traversing the opponents allegations:- (i) that the denial must be specific; and that the denial must not be evasive. (ii) The denial should be bold and clear and that there should not be half-hearted denial, nor is any explanation needed for the denial. 12.3. At this juncture, the admission made by the defendant and the evidentiary value of the admission need to be high lighted. In any civil proceeding, an admission, adverse to the party to the proceeding, whether made by the third party or by any other person may be given as evidence against that party, for the purpose of proving any fact stated in the pleadings. In any civil proceeding, an admission, adverse to the party to the proceeding, whether made by the third party or by any other person may be given as evidence against that party, for the purpose of proving any fact stated in the pleadings. An admission, if unequivocally made is the best evidence against the party making it and though not conclusive, shift the onus on to the maker on the principle that "what a party himself admitted to be true, may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption is rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established. (AIR 1977 S.C. 1274, Thiru.John.V.Subram Bamanyan Vs. Returning Officer). Therefore, the defendant is estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiff unless he is able to establish a better title than the title of the plaintiff. In order to escape from the admission made, the defendant cannot contend that the plaintiff is not entitled to lean upon the case of the defendant. 13. So far as this case is concerned, the first defendant has chosen to state that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property and that his name is shown as the owner in the tax assessment register maintained by the Municipality. If so, it is his duty to continue to state how his name found place as owner in the tax assessment register of the Municipality as the owner? What is the source of his title? No such details are furnished. The first defendant claims that he is in possession of the suit property. If so, from whom he derived possession, under what terms and conditions and the nature and character of the possession so delivered to him, etc., No such details are furnished by the first defendant. Therefore, it is clear that the defence of the first defendant is neither specific nor complete. When the first defendant himself is shirking his responsibility of not disclosing his defence clearly and completely, it is not open to him to contend that the plaintiff has not discharged his responsibility of establishing the title and that the plaintiff is leaning in favour of the first defendant for the support of the plaintiff's case. When the case of the first defendant himself is basically weak, there is no strong place for the plaintiff to lean on the first defendant. When the case of the first defendant himself is basically weak, there is no strong place for the plaintiff to lean on the first defendant. Therefore, the second appeal filed by the plaintiff has to be allowed and it is allowed accordingly. 14. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed, reversing the judgment and decree made in A.S.No.16 of 1999, dated 24.09.1999, on the file of the Additional District Court, Nagapattinam, and confirming the judgment and decree rendered in O.S.No.130 of 1995, dated 24.11.1997 in decreeing the suit. No costs.