JUDGMENT :- On 9th September, 2011, this Court issued a notice for final disposal. 2. The respondent has put in appearance and submitted written Notes of Submissions. 3. The matter is taken up for final disposal. Hence Rule. However, no fresh service is required in view of earlier notice for final disposal. 4. This application proceeds on following background:- [a] The respondent had filed the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. [b] The case proceeded for recording of evidence by affidavit. [c] Complainant's evidence by affidavit was tendered on 20th June, 2002 and he had offered himself for cross-examination. [d] After Written Notes of Submissions were tendered, the complainant filed application [Exh.39], and prayed for permission to adduce further evidence to prove that the notice of dishonour of chqeue was issued. [e] The date when cross-examination was conducted is not stated by the complainant in the application [Exh. 39]. [f] The Complainant has averred that it has revealed at the time of cross-examination that the suggestion relating to notice of dishonour of cheque was denied. Therefore, it was necessary to prove the notice by again stepping in the witness box. [g] The averments in this regard need to be referred by quotation for its proper understanding, which read as follows:- 1. That in the instant complaint on 24/06/2009 the complainant has given his Chief Examination. That due to the over sight of complainant in his chief examination the complainant has not mentioned that on 21-02-2008 the accused through his advocate D.D. Lanjewar, Pulgaon replied the notice of the complainant dt.25-1-2008 sent through Advocate M.G. Sukhija, Pulgaon. 2. That, said fact came to the knowledge of the complainant when at the time of the cross-examination surprisingly the counsel of the accused denied that the complainant has not sent any notice to the accused on 25-1-2008 through Advocate Sukhija. In fact the accused received the notice dt. 25-1-2008 of the complainant and replied the said notice through his advocate D.D. Lanjewar. The said fact is pleaded in the complaint. 3. The said notice dated 21/02/2008 is the reply of the accused and it is not manipulated document therefore no prejudice wil1 be caused to the accused if the complainant has permitted to adduce additional evidence." [Quoted from page no. 14 of the application paper-book ]. [h] After hearing the parties, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pulgaon, rejected the application. 3. The said notice dated 21/02/2008 is the reply of the accused and it is not manipulated document therefore no prejudice wil1 be caused to the accused if the complainant has permitted to adduce additional evidence." [Quoted from page no. 14 of the application paper-book ]. [h] After hearing the parties, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pulgaon, rejected the application. [i] The complainant carried Revision Application, being Criminal Revision Application No. 102 of 2010, and challenged the said order passed below Exh.39. [j] The learned Sessions Judge heard and decided Criminal Revision Application No. 102 of 2010 by allowing the same. 5. The said order dated 3rd May, 2011 passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 102 of 2010 is challenged in the present petition. 6. The grounds, which are put forward, are:- [a] The story of discovery of requirement of further evidence couched in the application [Exh.39] was afterthought and a sheer lie. The matter could have at the best be taken quickly in the reexamination-in-chief, or otherwise. [b] The attempt to lead further evidence amounts to curing the lacunae and Exh. 39 could never have been allowed. [c] The order under challenge in Criminal Revision Application was interlocutory, inasmuch that by no means, a favourable decision on the application itself, the case before Trial Court could have led to finality. [d] That, a Revision Application is barred by virtue of the restriction created by Section 397 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the order passed by the Magistrate allowing further Examination in-Chief is interlocutory. 7. Learned Adv., for the petitioner has placed reliance on the reported judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of M/s. Bhaskar Industries Ltd. Vs. M/s. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd., & others [2001 Cri. L.J. 4250] : [2001 ALL MR (Cri) 1961 (S.C.)], to urge the point as regards maintainability of Revision Application before Sessions Court. 8. Perused the judgment. The ratio deci dendi is as to the meaning:- of connotation "interlocutory order" as understood by Section 397 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code. In the judgment relied upon, the reliance is placed therein on the case of Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1978 SC 47 ] : [2007 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 191]. Relevant portion defining the term "interlocutory order" in Madhu Limaye's case, [2007 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 191] [cited supra] is quoted below for ready reference:- "10. ............................................. In the judgment relied upon, the reliance is placed therein on the case of Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1978 SC 47 ] : [2007 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 191]. Relevant portion defining the term "interlocutory order" in Madhu Limaye's case, [2007 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 191] [cited supra] is quoted below for ready reference:- "10. ............................................. "It is well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397 (2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam. The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in S. 397 (2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objections raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court, the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable." [Quoted from page no. 4252 of 2001 Cri. L.J. in M/s. Bhaskar Industries Ltd.'s case, [2001 ALL MR (Cri) 1961 (S.C.)) (supra)]. 9. It is, thus, far above any debate that the order below Exh.39 was interlocutory. In the present case, the trial of case before Trial Court could never have ended with a favourable decision on Exh.39. 10. Thus, seen from any angle, the order passed below Exh.39 being an interlocutory order, the Revision Application before Sessions Court was not maintainable. 11. This Court cannot part with this Judgment without commenting on complainant's claim for recall of witness. Now, therefore, this Court has to consider other grounds as to the propriety of further Examination-in- Chief by recalling witness, and right of the party for this purpose. 12. It seems that the version contained in paragraph no.2 of the application [Exh.39] is consciously, rather deliberately, kept blissfully vague. The complainant did not go to the Court with application purportedly under Section 311, Criminal Procedure Code, with clean hands. 13. Complainant wants that Court should believe that omission to prove the notice, which was a jurisdictional fact, was a slip of pen or lawyer's mistake. The complainant did not go to the Court with application purportedly under Section 311, Criminal Procedure Code, with clean hands. 13. Complainant wants that Court should believe that omission to prove the notice, which was a jurisdictional fact, was a slip of pen or lawyer's mistake. The complainant wants to transgress his failure or omission in proving a jurisdictional fact with help of Section 311 of Criminal Procedure Code or an analogous effort. 14. Sole ground when such an effort can succeed is on those provided in Section 311 of Criminal Procedure Code. 15. Failure of a party to prove a jurisdictional fact cannot be repaired or cured by pleading a shelter of inadvertence or somebody's negligence. 16. Incapacity of a party to secure the evidence on record is to be demonstrated to the satisfaction of Court. Failure to prove a fact within own control is totally distinct from failure of a party to produce evidence despite having an opportunity. 17. Section 311 of Criminal Procedure Code cannot be brought in aid to cure the failure of a patty to "prove" a fact which refers to party - witness's knowledge and memory, that too when it is a crucial jurisdictional fact. 18. Whether it is a case of negligence of a lawyer or a genuine act of failure or omission of client to refer to and prove the notice of dishonour of cheque or failure being a fact of matter beyond control of a party could not have been preempted by the learned Sessions Judge, observing that it was a mistake of the lawyer and the client should not have to suffer, that too in absence of pleadings to that effect in the application seeking to call back the witness. 19. Therefore, the factual aspect even otherwise does not favour the complainant. 20. This Court is, therefore, satisfied that the application [Exh.39] ought not to have been allowed and the rejection thereof could never have been a matter of revisional jurisdiction or on facts capable of interference even in inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 21. In the result, petition succeeds. The Judgment and order dated 3rd May, 2011 [Annex. VI] passed by the Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision Application No.102 of 2010 is quashed and set aside. 22. Rule is made absolute in terms of Prayer Clause (2). Petition allowed.