K. Kumaravel v. State of Tamilnadu Rep. By its Secretary Home (Police V) Department
2012-01-02
K.CHANDRU
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is an aspirant for the post of Sub Inspector of Police, for which selections were held during the year 2010. The petitioner was selected in the written test. Subsequently, his antecedents were verified. It was informed by the authorities that the petitioner was involved in a criminal case in Crime No.729 of 2005. The charges levelled against the petitioner relate to offences under Sections 147, 148, 294, 324 and 506(2) IPC and he was assigned as an accused NO.1 in the said case. Though the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Villupuram acquitted the petitioner under Section 248 (1) of Cr.P.C., it was opined the acquittal was not on merits but by giving the benefit of doubt. 2. On the receipt of report from the officer concerned, the petitioner was not selected. When the petitioner made a representation, he was replied with the impugned order dated 10.2.2011 by the Director General of Police, namely the 2nd respondent that not only the acquittal was not on merits but on the benefit of doubt, but also the petitioner in filling up the attestation form as against question Nos.13 (b) and 13(e), gave a reply stating that he was not involved in any criminal case and there are no criminal antecedents. It is not only the concern of this Court going into the effect of acquittal but also the petitioner suppressing the vital information, which would have weighed with them had he disclosed such information. 3. First of all whether even after a person is acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt, explanation to Rule 14 of the Special Rules applicable to the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules clearly says that an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt also amounts to having criminal background. When the Rule came to be challenged before this Court, the Rule was upheld by this Court in its judgment in V.Veeramani vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2007 (3) MLJ 676 . The issue was subsequently referred to the determination of a Full Bench. 4. The Full Bench held by A.P. Shah, Chief Justice (as he then was) vide its judgment in Manikandan and others vs. the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Uniformed Services Recruitment Board, Chennai and others reported in 2008 (2) CTC 97 upheld the validity of the Rule.
The issue was subsequently referred to the determination of a Full Bench. 4. The Full Bench held by A.P. Shah, Chief Justice (as he then was) vide its judgment in Manikandan and others vs. the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Uniformed Services Recruitment Board, Chennai and others reported in 2008 (2) CTC 97 upheld the validity of the Rule. In the same judgment, in paragraph No.35 the Full Bench referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.Radhakrishnan v. The Director General of Police and others reported in 2007 (12) SCALE 539 and observed as follows: “35. The issue is now set at rest by the Apex Court in R.Radhakrishnan v. The Director General of Police and others reported in 2007 (12) SCALE 539, which is the latest in this series of decisions. The Supreme Court has clarified the law on the point, as follows: "10. Indisputably, the appellant intended to obtain appointment in a uniformed service. The standard expected of a person intended to serve in such a service is different from the one of a person who intended to serve in other services. Application for appointment and the verification roll were both in Hindi as also in English. He, therefore, knew and understood the implication of his statement or omission to disclose a vital information. The fact that in the event such a disclosure had been made, the authority could have verified his character as also suitability of the appointment is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the persons who had not made such disclosures and were, thus, similarly situated had not been appointed." "11. The question came up for consideration before this Court in Delhi Admn. v. Sushil Kumar1 wherein it was categorically held: (SCC p. 606, para 3)" “3. ‘The Tribunal in the impugned order allowed the application on the ground that since the respondent had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 304 IPC, under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of appointment to the post under the State. The question is whether the view taken by the Tribunal is correct in law? It is seen that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State.
The question is whether the view taken by the Tribunal is correct in law? It is seen that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though he was found physically fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected, on account of his antecedent record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable to the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted.” "12. Mr Prabhakar has relied upon a decision of this Court in T.S. Vasudavan Nair v. Director of Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre2. The said decision has been rendered, as would be evident from the judgment itself, on special facts and circumstances of the said case and cannot be treated to be a binding precedent." "13. In the instant case, indisputably, the appellant had suppressed a material fact. In a case of this nature, we are of the opinion that question of exercising an equitable jurisdiction in his favour would not arise." Thus the above latest decision of the Apex Court has cleared the cloud of suspicion on the issue. Therefore, we hold that the failure of a person to disclose his involvement in a criminal case, at the earliest point of time, when the Application form is filled up, is fatal. His subsequent disclosure, whether before acquittal or after acquittal, will not cure the defect. In any case, the subsequent disclosure may not have any effect upon his selection, since his case will then fall under any one of the 2 Explanations under clause (iv) of Rule 14(b) and make him ineligible for the current selection or for all future selection depending on whether the acquittal is honorable or otherwise." 5. Apart from the fact that whether the criminal case ending in acquittal amounts to benefit of doubt or not, there is a grave charge against the petitioner, i.e., while filling up the attestation form, the petitioner did not disclose the pendency of the criminal proceedings. 6.
Apart from the fact that whether the criminal case ending in acquittal amounts to benefit of doubt or not, there is a grave charge against the petitioner, i.e., while filling up the attestation form, the petitioner did not disclose the pendency of the criminal proceedings. 6. However, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in V.Saravanan vs. the Government of Tamilnadu rep.by its Secretary to Government, Department of Home, Secretariat, Chennai and others in W.P.NO.9180 of 2009 dated 18.10.2011. In that case, this Court held that the candidate who appeared for selection for the police force and who was involved for trivial offence under Section 75 of the City Police Act, was denied employment. In that context, this Court referred to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police v. Sandeep Kumar reported in (2011) 4 SCC 644 . The Supreme Court made a general observation that persons are bound to commit indiscretion and such indiscretions can be condoned. It is not clear as to how the said judgment has any relevance to the case on hand. Whereas in this case the authorities found that in the attestation form, the petitioner also did not disclose the pendency of the criminal case and therefore the judgment in Radhakrishnan case delivered by the Supreme Court referred to above squarely applies to the present case. 7. Under the said circumstances, there is no case made out to interfere with the impugned order. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed. No costs.