JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order dated 02.04.1997 (Annex.-1) passed by the Superintendent of Police, Jaipur City, Jaipur, whereby, the petitioner was removed from service, so also, the orders passed by the appellate authority and reviewing authority whereby the appeal and review application filed by the petitioner were dismissed. 2. As per the facts of the case, the petitioner was working on the post of Constable, he was served with memorandum of charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (to be called hereinafter 'the CCA Rules') on 14.02.1996. The said charge-sheet was given to the petitioner because he remained absent wilfully for 240 days. The grievance of the petitioner is that although the charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner, but, thereafter, no reasonable opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner and at his back the inquiry was conducted ex parte and final order of removal dated 02.04.1997 was passed. 3. The grievance of the petitioner is that order impugned is against principles of natural justice because proper opportunity of defending his case in the inquiry was not granted by the authority who has passed order for removal. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that upon perusal of the order of removal it will reveal that on the one hand the Superintendent of Police, Jaipur City, Jaipur passed an order of removal from service against the petitioner and on the other hand, he has sanctioned extraordinary leave for the period in respect of which he was charge-sheeted with the allegation of willful absence from duty. The said period is with effect from 13.08.1984 to 17.04.1985; meaning thereby, on the one hand, the Disciplinary Authority punished the petitioner for misconduct and, on the other hand, he himself has passed order for regularising the leave (alleged absence) period by way of passing order of sanctioning 248 days extraordinary leave, therefore, in view of the judgment reported in AIR 1999 SC 2626 : [1998 (5) SLR 625 (SC)], State of Punjab & Others v. Bakshish Singh, the order impugned is not sustainable in law because the Disciplinary Authority himself has regularised the leave period. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that once the leave period is condoned, then, automatically, the charge of absence did not survive, therefore, only on this ground this writ petition deserves to be allowed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention towards judgment of the co-ordinate Bench of this Court, reported in RLW 2002 (1) Raj. 205, in which, the aforesaid judgment of Bakshish Singh's case rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court, was followed and order of termination was quashed. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the petitioner was removed from service due to willful absence from duty for 240 days after holding departmental inquiry under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules therefore, it cannot be said that the order of removal is against the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that admittedly charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner, thereafter, he did not file reply, therefore, the inquiry officer proceeded to complete the inquiry and after completion of inquiry copy of the inquiry report was served upon the petitioner but, again, he did not file any reply, therefore, the inquiry report was submitted in which the inquiry officer held that charge is proved against the petitioner. 6. It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that after receiving the inquiry report and providing an opportunity of hearing, the Superintendent of Police, Jaipur City, Jaipur passed the order for removal against the petitioner while granting extraordinary leave for 248 days, during which period, the petitioner remained absent, in which, there is no illegality because the period of absence is required to be decided by the competent authority, therefore, in which, there is no illegality. 7. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the respondents that not only the Disciplinary Authority but the appellate authority also considered the grounds raised by the petitioner, therefore, no illegality has been committed by the Disciplinary Authority while passing the order of removal. 8. 7. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the respondents that not only the Disciplinary Authority but the appellate authority also considered the grounds raised by the petitioner, therefore, no illegality has been committed by the Disciplinary Authority while passing the order of removal. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the case of State of Punjab & Others v. Bakshish Singh (supra) was further considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maan Singh v. Union of India & Others, reported in JT 2003 (2) SC 514 : 2003(2) SLR 607 (SC), and Hon'ble Supreme Court held that decision rendered by this Court in Bakshish Singh's case is not an authority for the proposition that order of termination cannot be sustained where in the latter part of the same order the disciplinary authority also regularised the unauthorized absence from duty by granting an employee leave without pay. Therefore, in this case, the adjudication made in the case of Bakshish Singh's case will not apply. 9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the entire record of the case. 10. It is worthwhile to observe that in the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority it is observed that although an opportunity that although an opportunity was given to the delinquent for producing oral and documentary evidence but no evidence has been produced by him; but, the Disciplinary authority observed in the order that the delinquent at the time of joining after availing leave filed medical certificates but those certificates were not accepted for the reason that those certificates were not issued by the medical board. It is, however, nowhere observed the said certificates produced by the petitioner with regard to his ailment were false or forged. Non-acceptance is expressed certificates were not issued by the medical board; and, at the time of passing order the Disciplinary Authority sanctioned extraordinary leave of 248 days to the petitioner. 11. It is, however, nowhere observed the said certificates produced by the petitioner with regard to his ailment were false or forged. Non-acceptance is expressed certificates were not issued by the medical board; and, at the time of passing order the Disciplinary Authority sanctioned extraordinary leave of 248 days to the petitioner. 11. It is also worthwhile to observe that the extraordinary leave was granted without observing that the petitioner will not be entitled for salary; meaning thereby, it was in the mind of the Disciplinary Authority that although no other documentary evidence was produced in the inquiry but, at the time of joining after availing the leave the petitioner submitted 3 medical certificates issued by Doctors and not by the medical board, therefore, the documentary evidence was on the record to prove the fact that the petitioner was not medically fit to discharge duties. In this view of the matter, the respondents were under obligation to bestow proper consideration to the fact that petitioner was medically unfit to discharge duties because while accepting those certificates the petitioner was allowed to join duties. 12. Further, it is important aspect of the matter that the order of termination has been passed on 02.04.1997 whereas the petitioner joined duties on 17.04.1987 after 248 days while submitting the medical certificates. If the Disciplinary Authority was of the opinion that these documents are not genuine or the petitioner's plea of ailment is wrong, then, the proper course was to direct the petitioner to appear before the medical board to prove the fact of ailment; but, without exercising that jurisdiction to get report from the petitioner knowing it well that he submitted 3 medical certificates issued by Doctors to prove the medical ailment during the period, in which, he remained absent for 248 days. 13. Therefore, even though the plea of the respondents counsel is accepted that the ratio of Bakshish Singh's case will not apply, then too. upon facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that there is no material on record to prove the ailment of the petitioner for alleged absence from duty for 248 days. It is abundantly clear that while taking into consideration those documents extraordinary leave of 248 days was granted to the petitioner. upon facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that there is no material on record to prove the ailment of the petitioner for alleged absence from duty for 248 days. It is abundantly clear that while taking into consideration those documents extraordinary leave of 248 days was granted to the petitioner. It might be possible that while taking into consideration those medical certificates issued by the Doctors the extraordinary leave was granted by the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner. 14. As per basic principles of law, the Disciplinary Authority is required to first apply its mind to the facts before initiating the departmental proceedings. When the employee is submitting medical certificates to join duties, then, it is duty of the authority to ascertain the correct facts and before that he ought not to proceed for initiation of the departmental inquiry. Here, in this case, although it is observed in the order of termination that medical certificates were filed before joining duties and extraordinary leave was sanctioned in favour of the petitioner for 248 days, the Disciplinary Authority gave the finding that those certificates were not issued by the medical board and, therefore, the same cannot be accepted. In my opinion, such finding given by the Disciplinary Authority is highly technical, therefore, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is not sustainable in law. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by either the appellate authority or the reviewing authority. In this view of the matter, order impugned dated 02.04.1997, so also, orders issued by the appellate authority and reviewing authority deserve to be quashed. 15. Consequently, this writ petition is allowed. Order impugned dated 02.04.1997 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, so also, orders passed by the appellate authority and reviewing authority are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits except back-wages because the petitioner has not worked during this period. However, the petitioner will be entitled to get monetary benefits from the date of passing this order.Petition allowed. *******