JUDGMENT : RAJIV SHARMA, J. 1. Since common questions of law and facts are involved in both the petitions, the same were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by a common judgment. However, for clarity sake, facts of Cr.MMO No. 167/2009 have been taken into consideration. In these petitions, petitioners have challenged the order of taking cognizance by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No.3, Shimla for offence punishable u/s 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for brevity sake) in case RBT No. 244/3 of 07/04 titled Food Inspector versus Beli Ram and others summoning the petitioner as accused. 2. Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that respondent No.2, i.e. Food Inspector, inspected the premises known as Hotel Wood Park, Woodrina Estate, Dhalli, Shimla on 16.8.2003 at about 3.00 P.M. He found respondent No.3 carrying on the business of Deep Wood Restaurant at Hotel Wood Park. He was having 11x200 ml. bottles of Lehar Mountain Dew in a crate for sale to the general public. Respondent No.2 revealed his identity of his being Food Inspector and issued a notice declaring his intention to take the sample of Lehar Mountain Dew for the purpose of analysis. 3x200 ml bottles of Lehar Mountain Dew were purchased out of 11 sealed bottles on cash payment of ` 24/- as a sample for analysis. Purchased bottles were separately labelled and wrapped into a thick paper. A Paper slip bearing Sr. No. and code No. S-I/3597, issued and signed by the Local Health Authority, Shimla, was affixed with gum from bottom to top of each bottle. Signatures of the accused were taken in such a manner so as it appear on the slip and the wrapper. The bottles were fastened with strong thread and sealed with sealing wax. At least four seal impression were put on each packet and all the knots were covered with seal. One Ashwani Sood and Ashok Kumar were present throughout the whole process of sealing the sample. Spot memo was prepared which was signed by the accused, witnesses and respondent No.2. One part of the sample was sent to the Public Analyst, Kandaghat alongwith memo in form-VII through Ashok Kumar in a sealed packet. One Ashwani Sood and Ashok Kumar were present throughout the whole process of sealing the sample. Spot memo was prepared which was signed by the accused, witnesses and respondent No.2. One part of the sample was sent to the Public Analyst, Kandaghat alongwith memo in form-VII through Ashok Kumar in a sealed packet. A copy of memo form-VII alongwith impression of seal was also sent separately to the Public Analyst, Kandaghat in a sealed letter through Sh. Ashok Kumar on 18.8.2003. Remaining two parts of the sample alongwith two copies of form-VII were deposited with Local Health Authority, Shimla in a sealed packet for record. The Public Analyst found the sample misbranded vide his report dated 25.9.2003. The same was received by respondent No. 2 from the Local Health Authority, Shimla vide letter dated 7.10.2003 as the month and year of manufacture or packing was not legible and quantity of sugar added in the product was not mentioned on the label. Respondent No.2 sought sanction from the Chief Medical Officer, Shimla. The same was granted on 23.12.2003 and the prosecution was launched against respondents No.3 and 4. Copy of the complaint was supplied to the accused u/s 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Statements of the accused were recorded and placed on the file. Thereafter, on 7.11.2005, notice of accusation u/s 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Act was explained to the accused, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, vide order dated 7.11.2005. Statement of one of the PWs, namely, Sh. Naresh Kumar was recorded on 6.1.2006. Accused moved an application u/s 20-A of the Act on 8.3.2006 for impleadment of respondent No. 5. Reply was filed by respondent No.5 to the same. Thereafter, statements of 3 AWs, namely, Jasbir Singh, Rakesh Sood and Beli Ram were recorded on 25.7.2006. Application was allowed by the trial court on 28.8.2006 and respondent No.5 was also added as accused. Notice of accusation was put up to accused Gurmit Makin on 16.8.2007. She pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Thereafter, an application was moved by respondent No.5 to implead the present petitioner on 27.8.2007. Reply was filed to the same. Statement of AW-1 Gurmit Makin was recoded on 10.10.2007. Application was allowed by the trial court on 30.11.2007. Petitioner put up appearance for the first time before the trial court on 5.3.2010. 3. Thereafter, an application was moved by respondent No.5 to implead the present petitioner on 27.8.2007. Reply was filed to the same. Statement of AW-1 Gurmit Makin was recoded on 10.10.2007. Application was allowed by the trial court on 30.11.2007. Petitioner put up appearance for the first time before the trial court on 5.3.2010. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the pleadings. 4. In the instant case, sample was taken on 16.8.2003 by the Food Inspector. The report was received on 25.9.2003. It will be apt at this stage to refer few provisions of the Food Adulteration Act, 1954. According to section 2 (ix) (k), an article of feed shall be deemed to be "misbranded" if it is not labelled in accordance with the requirements of this Act or rules made thereunder. According to rule 32 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 every package of food shall carry label which will carry the month and year in which the commodity is manufactured or prepackaged. These provisions were applicable when the sample was taken on 16.8.2003. Thus, there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner(s) that month and year in which the commodity was manufactured or prepackaged was not necessary. Learned trial court has rightly taken the cognizance. 5. Now, the Court will advert to second limb of arguments whether there was requirement of mentioning the 'quantity of added sugar' on the label of the sample. In this case, the sample, as noticed above, was taken on 16.8.2003 and the provisions requiring the mentioning of quantity of added sugar on the label has come into force on 1.10.2003. 6. This question is no more res integra as far as this Court is concerned, since the Coordinate Bench in Cr.MMO No. 166/2009 has taken the same view. The Coordinate Bench has held as under: 6. In this case the prosecution of the accused persons including the petitioner is sought for infraction and a mandatory requirement is mentioned in the amended Rules. Although, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 were amended from time to time, the last amendment of the Rules was made vide Prevention of Food Adulteration (8th Amendment) Rules, 2002. The said amended rule came into force from 1st April, 2003. Although, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 were amended from time to time, the last amendment of the Rules was made vide Prevention of Food Adulteration (8th Amendment) Rules, 2002. The said amended rule came into force from 1st April, 2003. As is evident from sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of the amended Rules, 2002, sub-rules (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-rule (2) came into effect from later date that is from 1st October, 2003 as is evident from Rule 1 of amended Rules, 2002 quoted hereunder:- 1. (1) These rules may be called the Prevention of Food Adulteration (8th Amendment) Rules, 2002. (2) They shall come into force on the Ist April, 2003 except sub-rules (ii) (iii) and (iv) of rule 2 which shall come into force on the 1st October, 2003. 7. By sub-rule (iii) of rule (2) of Amended Rules, 2002 the original Rule 42 of 1995 was amended. The label of the bottle/ container, as was prescribed under sub-rule (zzz) (1) and (12) of Rule 42 was amended and substituted by Amended Rules, 2002 and for the first time, it was made mandatory to mention that 'quantity of added sugar' or 'no sugar added in product' which is clear from the amended Sub-rule (iii) of Rule (12) quoted hereunder:- (iii) in rule (42)- (a) in sub-rule (zzz) (1), for the existing label, the following label shall be substituted, namely:- (i) This.........(Name of food) contains..............(Name of artificial sweetener) (ii) Not recommended for children (iii) *(a) Quantity of sugar added.......gm/100gm. (b) No sugar added in the product. (iv) *Not for Phenylketoneurics (if aspartame is added) (*strike out whatever is not applicable) Xxx xxxx xxxx (b) for sub-rule (zzz) (2), the following shall be substituted, namely- (zzz) (2) Every package of Aspertame (Methyl ester) Accsulfame K and Saccharin Sodium marketed as Table Top Sweetener and every advertisement for such Table Top Sweetener shall carry the following label, namely:- (i) Contains............(name of artificial sweetener) (ii) Not recommended for children. Provided that the package of aspartame (Methyl ester) marketed as Table Top Sweetener and every advertisement for such Table Top Sweetener shall carry the following label, namely:- Not for Phenylketoneurics Xxx xxxx xxxx (c) in sub-rule (zzz) (12), for the existing lable, the following shall be substituted, namely:- (i) This....(Name of food) contains.............contains an admixture of Aspertame (MethylkEster and Acsulfame Potassium. (ii) Not recommended for children. (ii) Not recommended for children. (iii) *(a) quantity of sugar added........gm/100 gm. (b) No sugar added in the product. (iv) *Not for Phenylketoneurics ( if Aspertame is added). (*strike out whatever is not applicable) [Emphasis supplied]. 8. The item No.A.01.01 of the first proviso of the Appendix B to the sub rules, wherein it was prescribed that the quantity of added sugar shall be declared on the container/ bottle and if no sugar is added that also shall be declared on the container/ bottle as laid down in sub-clause (1) and (12) of sub-rule (zzz) of Rule 42. It was further provided that in case of returnable bottles, which are recycled or refilled the declaration of quantity of added sugar and no sugar added may be given on the crown and 'carbonated water (plain soda)' stood exempted from providing a declaration of 'no sugar added', as quoted hereunder:- "3.in Appendix B to the said rules (i) in item A.01.01 for the first proviso, the following provisos shall be substituted, namely:- Provided that the quantity of added sugar shall be declared on the container/ bottle and if no sugar is added that also shall be declared on the container/ bottle as laid down in sub-clause (1) and (12) of subrule (zzz) of rule 42. In case of returnable bottles, which are recycled and refilling the declaration of quantity of added sugar and no sugar added may be given on the crown. Provided also that the declaration of 'no sugar added' shall not be applicable for 'carbonated water (plain soda)'. The Amended Rules, 2002 thus makes it clear :- (i) The Amended Rules 2002 came into force on and w.e.f. Ist April, 2003, except sub rule (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-rule2 of the Amended Rules 2002; (ii) Sub-rule (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-rule 2 to the Amended Rules, 2002 whereby Rule 42 was amended and label prescribed under subrules (zzz) (1) and (12) came into force later date w.e.f. 1st October, 2003; (iii) Appendix 'B' to the said rule cannot be given effect independently till sub rule (zzz) of Rule 42 is given effect. Thus, the Appendix-B to the amended rule also came into effect from 1st October, 2003. 9. Thus, the Appendix-B to the amended rule also came into effect from 1st October, 2003. 9. From the above, it is now clear that in the instant case, said requirement was made mandatory w.e.f. 1st October, 2003 and it was not in existence on the date when the sample was taken. Therefore, no case against the accused persons including the petitioner is made out for the offence u/s 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. Thus, the petition, for the reasons aforesaid is allowed and the entire criminal proceedings including the order taking cognizance by the learned trial court of the aforesaid offence in Criminal complaint No.100-3 of 2009/2004, titled F. I. vs. Beli Ram and others, are hereby quashed and set-aside. Consequently, the complaint pending trial in the Court of Judicial Magistrate stands dismissed. 7. Thus, no case is made out against the accused persons as far as non-mentioning of quantity of added sugar on the label of commodity is concerned. 8. Learned Single Judge of the Jharkhand High Court has also taken the similar view in Pratha Sarathi Kumar and another versus State of Jharkhand and another, 2005 (2) FAC 113. Learned Single Judge has held as under: 3. According to counsel for the petitioners, on date, the samples of 7-UP, Pepsi and Mirinda Orange were seized by the opposite parties, i.e. 18th August, 2003, there was no law, such as Act or Rule laid down prescribing any condition to mention "quantity of added sugar" either on the cap or crown of the bottle. Such law having come into force from later date, i.e. 1st October, 2003, it cannot be alleged that the petitioners committed offence and for that the Court cannot take cognizance against the petitioners u/s 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Act. On the other hand, according to learned A.P.P., the relevant law prescribing condition to mention 'quantity of added sugar' on the cap/crown of the bottle having come into effect from 1st April, 2003, the Court below rightly took cognizance against the accused persons (petitioners), they having committed offence on 18th August, 2003, i.e. the bottles were seized. 10. On the other hand, according to learned A.P.P., the relevant law prescribing condition to mention 'quantity of added sugar' on the cap/crown of the bottle having come into effect from 1st April, 2003, the Court below rightly took cognizance against the accused persons (petitioners), they having committed offence on 18th August, 2003, i.e. the bottles were seized. 10. In these cases, the day, i.e. 18th August, 2003, the bottles of 7-UP 'Pepsi (sweetened carbonated water)' and 'Mirinda Orange' were seized and the day, the Public Analyst of MADA, Dhanbad submitted its report i.e. 11th September, 2003, the provisions of sub-rules (ii) (iii) and (iv) of Rule 2 and the Appendix-B of Amended Rules, 2002 having not come into effect and such amendment having come into effect from later date i.e. 1st October, 2003, the accused persons (petitioners) cannot be held to have violated the amended sub-rule (zzz) (1) and (12) of Rule 42 or the Appendix B to the Amended Rule, as quoted above. There being no provision, the accused persons (petitioners) were not required to declare 'quantity of added sugar' or 'no sugar added' on the cap/crown of the bottles and thereby, the question of misbranding of any one or other product aforesaid cannot be alleged. 9. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar Vs. State of M.P., have held, in a case where notification was issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh for the application of rule 44-A w.e.f. was 6.4.2000 and the samples were collected much prior to that date, i.e. 29.3.1988, that the same could not be applied to find accused guilty. Their Lordships have held as under: 9. We find that so far as State of M.P. is concerned, the notification No.F-3/62/98/M-2/17 was issued for application of Rule 44A with effect from 6th April, 2000. Admittedly the samples were collected much prior to that date i.e. 29.3.1988. Since Rule 44A was not applicable and was not in operation in the State of M.P. on the date of alleged collection of samples Rule 44A could not have been applied to find the accused guilty. Besides Section 2(i)(c) of the Act is relevant. Section 2(i) defines "adulterated". Section 2(i)(c) deals with substitution of an article by inferior or cheaper substance which affects injuriously the nature, substance or quality thereof. In the Public Analysts' report there was no reference to this aspect. Besides Section 2(i)(c) of the Act is relevant. Section 2(i) defines "adulterated". Section 2(i)(c) deals with substitution of an article by inferior or cheaper substance which affects injuriously the nature, substance or quality thereof. In the Public Analysts' report there was no reference to this aspect. What would happen if the Public Analysts' report in this regard even if Rule 44A was not in operation, does not, therefore, fall for consideration in this case. On that score alone the High Court's judgment is indefensible and is accordingly set aside. 10. Mr. Rajesh Batra, learned Senior Advocate in addition has also argued that impleadment of his client, i.e. Aradhana Soft Drink Company, is pre-mature and without jurisdiction. The accused persons were supplied with the copy of complaint on 15.10.2004. Notice of accusation was served upon them on 7.11.2005. Thereafter, statement of one of the PWs was recorded. An application was filed by the accused persons for impleadment of respondent No.5 on 8.3.2006. It was allowed by the trial court after recording statements of AWs on 25.7.2006. Application preferred u/s 20-A of the Act was allowed on 28.8.2006. Thereafter, notice of accusation was served upon the newly added respondent No.5 on 16.8.2007. Respondents No. 3 and 4 have not pleaded guilty on 7.11.2005 and claimed trial. Similarly, newly added respondent No.5 through Gurmit Makin was also served with a notice of accusation on 16.8.2007. She has also not pleaded guilty and claimed trial. Thereafter, on 27.8.2007, an application for impleadment of the petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 167/2009 was filed. Statement of AW-1 Gurmit Makin was recorded. According to her, Mountain Dew Soft Drink was purchased from the petitioner-company vide bill Ex. PX. She has also deposed that whatever items are received from the petitioner-company, the same are kept as such in the store and are sold as it is. According to her, till the bottles remain with them, these were not tempered. Though she has admitted, in her cross-examination, that bottles were sold in retail. These were sold on Malook & Sons bill. Then, subsequently, stated that the same were sold by putting the brand name on the bill. She also stated that whatever was purchased, it was sold further as such. It is only after the statement of AW-1 was recorded that petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 167/2009 was impleaded as accused u/s 20-A of the Act. 11. Then, subsequently, stated that the same were sold by putting the brand name on the bill. She also stated that whatever was purchased, it was sold further as such. It is only after the statement of AW-1 was recorded that petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 167/2009 was impleaded as accused u/s 20-A of the Act. 11. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander Vs. Delhi Administration, have held that a reason for insertion of section 20-A seems to be that the prosecution of a person impleaded as an accused u/s 20-A in the course of a trial does not require a separate sanction. Section 20-A itself lays down that where the Court trying the offence is itself satisfied that a "manufacturer, distributor, or dealer is also concerned with an offence", for which an accused is being tried, the necessary sanction to prosecute will be deemed to have been given. Their Lordships have held as under: 6. Although, we are not concerned in the appeals before us with the prosecution of the manufacturer, M/s. Gauri Shanker Prem Narain, yet, we find that one of the questions framed for consideration and decided by the Delhi High Court relates to the meaning and scope of Section 20A of the Act. We may mention that a statement has been made at the Bar that the manufacturer has also been acquitted. We do not know whether this acquittal was on the ground that the manufacturer cannot be impleaded u/s 20A of the Act after the trial is concluded by the acquittal of the two accused. It is clear that Section 20A contemplates action which can only be taken during the course of the trial. A separate trial would require a. written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or of a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority, unless it is a complaint by a purchaser, other than a Food Inspector, who could rely upon Section 12 of the Act. But, an addition of an accused u/s 20A of the Act constitutes an expressly laid down exception to the requirement of a sanction u/s 20(1) of the Act. 13. But, an addition of an accused u/s 20A of the Act constitutes an expressly laid down exception to the requirement of a sanction u/s 20(1) of the Act. 13. We are also unable to accept as correct a line of reasoning found in V. N. Chokra v. The State (supra) and Food Inspector, Palghat Municipality v. Setharam Rice & Oil Mills(1), and in P. B. Kurup v. Food Inspector, Malappuram Panchayat(2), that, in every case under the Act, there has to be initially a prosecution of a particular seller only,but those who may have passed on or sold the adulterated article of food to the vendor, who is being prosecuted, could only be brought in subsequently after a warranty set up u/s 19(2) has been pleaded and shown to be substantiated. Support was sought for such a view by referring to the special provisions of Section 20A and Section 19(2) and Section 20 of the Act. A reason for Sec. 20A seems to be that the prosecution of a person impleaded as an accused u/s 20A in the course of a trial does not require a separate sanction Section 20A itself lays down that, where the Court trying the offence is itself satisfied that a "manufacturer, distributor, or dealer is also concerned with an offence", for which an accused is being tried, the necessary sanction to prosecute will be deemed to have been given. Another reason seems to be that such a power enables speedy trial of the really guilty parties. We are in agreement with the view of the Delhi High Court, that these special provisions do not take away or derogate from the effect of the ordinary provisions of the law which enable separate as well as joint trials of accused persons in accordance with the provisions of the old Sections 233 to 239 of Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, there seems no logically sound reason why, if a distributor or a manufacturer can be subsequently impleaded, u/s 20A of the Act, he cannot be joined as a co-accused initially in a joint trial if the allegations made justify such a course. 15. We do not propose to attempt, in this case, the task of defining exhaustively what constitutes the same transaction within the meaning of Section 239 of Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 corresponding to Section 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. 15. We do not propose to attempt, in this case, the task of defining exhaustively what constitutes the same transaction within the meaning of Section 239 of Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 corresponding to Section 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. It is practically impossible as well as undesirable to attempt such a definition of a concept which has to be necessarily elastic. Moreover, this Court has, in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalpati Ganeshwara Rao and Anr. (supra), already expressed its views (at page 321.), which we respectfully quote and follow, on this question : What is meant by 'same transaction' is not defined anywhere in the Code. Indeed, it would always be difficult to define precisely what the expression means. Whether a transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case and it seems to us to be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that which the Legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have not come across a single decision of any Court which has embarked upon the difficult task of defining the expression. But, it is generally thought that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. It is, however, not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if several acts committed by a person show a unity of purpose or design that would be a strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction. 17. It is contended that it would be dangerous to leave the "unity of purpose and design", which may constitute a transaction, so vague as to bring in the manufacturer and every conceivable distributor as accused persons whenever any adulterated food, manufactured and scaled by one party and distributed by another, is finally sold by a vendor in the market. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that we must, therefore, restrict the concept of a "transaction", in a prosecution for sale of an adulterated article of food, to an alleged criminal participation in the adulteration of the actual article of food sold. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that we must, therefore, restrict the concept of a "transaction", in a prosecution for sale of an adulterated article of food, to an alleged criminal participation in the adulteration of the actual article of food sold. It was urged that some vague and general connection or concern of all the co-accused as manufacturers or distributors of the article sold will not do. It had, according to the contention on behalf of the appellant, to be specifically alleged that the accused was concerned with the adulteration or sale of the particular article of food sold. The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant seems to us to go so far as to suggest that an allegation was indispensable of a participation in some kind of conspiracy to sell the actual adulterated article of food which was sold in order to enable a trial in which the seller, the distributor, and, the manufacturer could be jointly tried for offences which could be looked upon as parts of a single transaction. To accept such an argument would be to import into such a case the need to establish a conspiracy between the accused manufacturer or distributor, as the case may be, and the actual vendor or the last seller to the consumer. We think that such a result would be obviously incorrect. 18. It was pointed out by this Court, in Sarjoo Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(1), that mens rea, in the sense of a guilty knowledge of adulteration of the food sold, is not necessary to prove for an offence u/s 7 of the Act. Indeed, Section 19(1) specifically rules out such a defence although S. 19(2) makes it available in the particular case of the accused who has taken the precaution of protecting himself from what seems otherwise to be an absolute liability without proof of guilty knowledge. Even if we were to widen (2) A.1-R 1974 SC 2154 the concept of "mens rea" here to embrace carelessness or indifference as the required states of mind in the manufacture or distribution or sale of an adulterated article of food, as an ingredient of a, legally punishable offence, the law obviously and expressly does not require parties to, an offence under the Act to have a particular guilty knowledge about the particular item of food found to be adulterated. We cannot introduce such a requirement into a case simply because several accused persons are being jointly tried. The law does require proof, for a successful defence, of a degree of care and caution revealed by the actions of the seller, distributor, or manufacturer, which will be enough to procure an exemption from criminal liability for a sale of adulterated article of food without knowledge of its actual adulteration. But, we cannot, for this reason, equate such. an offence with one in which the co-accused must necessarily have a common knowledge or design to sell an article actually known to them to be adulterated. In other words, a particular state of mind, which could be described as guilty or wrongful, could not, even if it could be there individually and separately in a) particular case, provide the connecting link between the co-accused in a trial for such an offence in order to constitute the same transaction. The link, if any, has to be found elsewhere. 24. The result is that we think that, in a suitable case, a vendor, a distributor, and a manufacturer could be tried together provided the, allegations made before the Court show that there are connecting links between their activities so as to constitute the same transaction. The connecting links, in a case such as the one before us, could be provided by: firstly, the fact that a sale at an anterior stage could be viewed as the cause of the subsequent sale; secondly, the allegation that each of the accused parted with the article of food when it was in an adulterated state; and, thirdly, by the common object of the manufacturer the distributor, and the vendor, that the article should reach the consumer to be used as food. The third and last mentioned link seems decisive and must tilt the balance in favour of legality of a joint trial of the parties concerned. But, we are also conscious of the fact that Courts cannot ignore broader requirements of justice. 12. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of M.P. and others, have held that Magistrate has power to proceed against the manufacturer, distributor or dealer if during the course of trial evidence adduced before the court discloses that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence. 12. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of M.P. and others, have held that Magistrate has power to proceed against the manufacturer, distributor or dealer if during the course of trial evidence adduced before the court discloses that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence. Their Lordships have held as under: 7. A reading of Section 20-A clearly indicates that during the course of the trial for any of the offence under the Act alleged to have been committed by any person, if the evidence adduced before the Court discloses that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then the Court has been empowered, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of s. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, 'the Code') to treat as if the manufacturer, distributor or the dealer is being proceeded against u/s 20 of the Act, as originally instituted thereunder. The concept of vendor and vendee is known to civil law and passing of the title in the goods is alien to the prosecution for an offence under the Act. It cannot, therefore, be introduced in a trial for the offence under the Act. The Act advisedly made a person who sells adulterated article of food liable to be prosecuted for the offence of adulteration of the article of food. During the trial when it comes to the notice of the Magistrate, from the evidence adduced, that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of that article of food, which is the subject matter of adulteration, is also concerned with the offence, then the court has been empowered to proceed against such manufacturer, distributor or dealer as if prosecution has initially been instituted against him u/s 20 of the Act. In fact, for general offences, Section 319 (1) of the Code empowers the court where during the course of enquiry or trial of an offence, if it appears from the evidence that any person not being accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, to proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. In view of the language of Section 20-A of the Act, whatever is contained in sub-section (3) of Section 319 of the Code, would not stand in the way of the Magistrate to proceed at a trial against any person, i.e., the original accused and against others mentioned in Section 20-A. In other words, joint trial for the same offence is permitted. The object appears to be that in a case where common evidence discloses that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence for which the prosecution was launched against a person from whom the article of food was purchased, to avoid multiplicity of prosecution and also keeping in view the doctrine of autrefois acquit the Legislature introduced s. 20A to have joint trial. 8. The further contention that Laxmi Narain being a dealer of the appellant, Section 20A has no application, as it speaks of trial of a person not being, inter alia, a dealer, has no merit, as the section has mentioned about trial of commission of the offence by any person; and, if that person be not the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, Section 20A permits trial of such manufacturer, distributor or dealer also, along with the person already before the court. So, the fact that the person being tried is a dealer would not make the section non-operational. 13. Mr. Rajesh Batra has also placed strong reliance on M/s. Omparkash Shivprakash Vs. K.I. Kuriakose and Others, . Ratio of this judgment would not be applicable in the case in hand since the trial had already commenced. Notice of accusation has also been served upon respondents No. 2 to 5 on 7.11.2005 and 16.8.2007. They have not pleaded guilty and claimed trial. Statement of one of the witnesses Sh. Naresh Kumar has been recorded. Statements of 3 AWs were recorded when the application was preferred by accused for impleadment of respondent No.5 on 25.7.2006. Statement of one AW Smt. Gurmeet Makin was also recorded at the time of considering the application preferred by respondent No.5 for impleading Aradhana Soft Drink Company. In M/s. Omparkash Shivprakash Vs. K.I. Kuriakose and Others, the Magistrate has not recorded the plea of any of the accused nor were they asked by the Magistrate to plead guilty or not and the Magistrate has ordered the impleadment of the appellant. In M/s. Omparkash Shivprakash Vs. K.I. Kuriakose and Others, the Magistrate has not recorded the plea of any of the accused nor were they asked by the Magistrate to plead guilty or not and the Magistrate has ordered the impleadment of the appellant. In the case in hand, once the Magistrate has asked the accused whether they plead guilty or not as per section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate was to hold the trial. Accused persons have taken the defence that they were not guilty as the soft drink has been supplied to them by the manufacturer. Thus, the requirement of law as stipulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case supra stood fully satisfied. In view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, it cannot be said that the impleadment of appellant was pre-mature or it was without jurisdiction. 14. Mr. Y.P. Sood and Mr. Balwant Kukreja have also argued that there was no warranty. This plea also merits rejection in view of section 14 of the Act. According to proviso to section 14, a bill or cash memo or invoice in respect of the sale of any article of food given by a manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in, such article to the vendor thereof shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such manufacturer, distributor or dealer. In the case in hand, the bill Ex.PX is also on record. Similar view has been taken by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Joginder Pal Mann versus State of Himachal Pradesh, Latest HLJ 2012 (HP) 698. The Coordinate Bench has held as under: 15. The petitioner has relied invoice No. 595 dated 9.4.2002 supplying Gold Riband Whisky to respondent No.2. Thus, there is no dispute that Gold Riband Whisky quarters in question were purchased by respondent No.2 from the petitioner. The Section 14 of the Act provides that no manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in any article of food shall sell such article to any vendor unless he also gives a warranty in writing in the prescribed form about the nature and quality of such article to the vendor. The Section 14 of the Act provides that no manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in any article of food shall sell such article to any vendor unless he also gives a warranty in writing in the prescribed form about the nature and quality of such article to the vendor. The proviso to Section 14 further provides that a bill, cash memorandum or invoice in respect of the sale of any article of food given by a manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in, such article to the vendor thereof shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such manufacturer, distributor or dealer under this Section. Accordingly, in view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, the petitions are partly allowed. The notice of accusation so far it pertains only to the extent of non-mentioning of 'quantity of added sugar' on the label, is concerned is quashed, however, rest of the part of notice of accusation will be tried by the Magistrate in accordance with law. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.