ORDER A.S. Pachhapure J.—The petitioner instituted a suit in O.S. No. 1083/2003, seeking a relief of specific performance of contract of the Sale dated 29.12.1989 said to have been executed by the respondent herein. When, the petitioner was being examined as P.W.1, during the cross-examination on 27.08.2011, he admitted in the evidence that at the time of the Agreement of Sale, he was given a photocopy of the Lease-cum-Sale Agreement and a photocopy was shown to this witness and he admitted that a similar photocopy which was shown was given to him at the time of the Lease Agreement. At that time, the plaintiff's counsel objected to admit the document in evidence, it is thereafter, the witness went through the said photocopy and admitted that the photocopy of the document given to him was similar to the document shown. As marking of the document was objected, the said objections were over-ruled and it was marked as Ex. D2. It is this portion in the evidence, which has been challenged in the present writ petition as inadmissible evidence and the petitioner had sought for quashing the said portion. 2. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties. 3. As could be gathered from the facts, the respondent is holding a site allotted by the Bangalore Development Authority under a Lease-cum-Sale Agreement. The petitioner agreed to purchase the said site for a consideration of Rs. 98,000-00. He paid Rs. 90,000-00, took possession of the suit property and put up construction over the said site. At the time of execution of the Sale Agreement, the petitioner had received a photocopy of the Lease-cum-Sale Agreement So, while the petitioner was under cross-examination, one photocopy was shown to him and the petitioner admitted that it is similar to the photocopy, which was given to him at the time of execution of the Sale Agreement So, as the witness admitted receipt of the photocopy of the Lease-cum-Sale Agreement, the said document was marked. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision reported in Jupudi Kesava Rao Vs. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao and Others, AIR 1971 SC 1070 , the Apex Court held that the definition of "instrument" provided under the Stamp Act 1899 does not cover copy of the document for the purpose of Stamp Act. I do not think any relevance of the principle laid-down to the dispute in question. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao and Others, AIR 1971 SC 1070 , the Apex Court held that the definition of "instrument" provided under the Stamp Act 1899 does not cover copy of the document for the purpose of Stamp Act. I do not think any relevance of the principle laid-down to the dispute in question. He also placed reliance on the decision reported In ILR 2011 Kar 1 [Shalimar Chemical Works Limited Vs. Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (Refineries) and Others]. The Apex Court took into consideration of the provisions of Order XIII Rule 3 and 4 CPC., wherein a photocopy of the registration certificate was even marked in the evidence and it was objected to by the party, the Court provisionally admitted the photocopy subject to the question of admissibility The Apex Court held that the photocopy should have been rejected in the beginning itself. He also placed reliance on the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 2011 [NOC] 35 [chalasani Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. Chalasani Rama Koteswara Rao & Ors.] the High Court referred to the provisions of Section 65 of the Evidence Act held that no true copy or private copy of any public document is admissible as secondary evidence. Reliance was also placed on the decision reported in 1997 Rajasthan 211 [Harshvardhan Singh Vs. Ranveer Singhn and others] held that unstamped and unregistered document of Family Settlement creating right in the property, the original of which was not produced before the Court, allowing the copy of the alleged Family Settlement in evidence was held to be illegal. Finally, he placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court, reported in 2011 SC 1492, wherein the Apex Court taking into consideration the provisions of Section 65 of the Evidence Act held: In a case where original documents are not produced at any time, nor, any factual foundation has been led for giving secondary evidence, it is not permissible for the Court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. Thus, secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non-production of the original is accounted for, so as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in S. 65. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. Thus, secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non-production of the original is accounted for, so as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in S. 65. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved in accordance with law. The Court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. Where, the respondent had merely admitted his signature on the photocopy of the power of attorney and did not admit the contents thereof and the trial Court without examiainq whether contents thereof had probative value decreed the suit for spscific performance, the approach of trial Court was held to be improper. So, basing his claim on the decisions referred to supra, it is his submission that the photocopy which was shown to P.W. 1 in the cross-examination does not fall within the purview of secondary evidence and therefore when he objectedted the admissibility of the document in evidence, the trial Court committed an error in markinq the document and admitting it in evidence. per contra, the learned counsil for the respondent relied on the decision reported in Bipin Shantilal Panchal Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (2001) CriLJ 1254 ; wherein it is held as under: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such objection, and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case [or record the objected part of the oral evidence] subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment. If the Court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised is sustainable the Judge or Magistrate can keep such evidence excluded from consideration. There is no illegality in adopting such a course. The Court however made it clear that if the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the court has to decide the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections the procedure suggested above can be followed. There is no illegality in adopting such a course. The Court however made it clear that if the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the court has to decide the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections the procedure suggested above can be followed. Further, she also relied on the decision reported in ILR 2011 Kar. 594 [Smt. Vijayalakshmi Vs. Sri. Nagaraju*], judgment of this Court, wherein this Court considering the provisions of Order XIII Rule 4 and the provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act held that in case, if once the court admits a document, even wrongly, such admission becomes final and cannot be roopened and therefore there was a need for diligence, not only on the part of the opposite Counsel, but also on the part of the Court having regard to the statutory obligation under Section 33 of the Act. So far as this decision is concerned, it has no relevance as in the said case the question of admissibility of the document was with reference to Sections 33 and 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act. 5. Now, to consider the Order of the trial Court and the evidence recorded in the context of the decisions referred to supra, what could be inferred from the said material is that at the time when an Agreement of Sale was entered into between the parties, a photocopy of Lease-cum-sale Agreement, executed by the Banglore Development Authority in favour of the respondent was given to the petitioner and to clarify this position, the respondent's counsel showed a photocopy of the Lease-cum-Sale Agreement, which was seen by P.W. 1 petitioner and he admitted this document as similar photocopy, which was given to him at the time of the Sale Agreement. it is thereafter that document was marked as Ex. D2 It is well-established principle of law that mere marking of a document is not proof of its contents. As could be seen from the provisions of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, it deals with cases in which secondary evidence relating to the documents may be given. it is thereafter that document was marked as Ex. D2 It is well-established principle of law that mere marking of a document is not proof of its contents. As could be seen from the provisions of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, it deals with cases in which secondary evidence relating to the documents may be given. The relevant portion of the said provision is extracted hereunder: Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases:- (a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power- of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it; (b) When the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest; (c) When the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time; (d) When the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable; (e) When the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74; (f) When the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in [India] to be given in evidence; (g) When the originals consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection. X X X X X. So, under the aforesaid provision, the secondary evidence of the original document can be led only in the circumstances mentioned in the said provision. Therefore, in the absence of any of the circumstances aforesaid, the question of proving the document or admitting the document in evidence does not arise. So far as a photocopy is concerned, it is still worse. Therefore, in the absence of any of the circumstances aforesaid, the question of proving the document or admitting the document in evidence does not arise. So far as a photocopy is concerned, it is still worse. A photocopy even cannot be a secondary evidence and therefore, in this context if the relevant portion of the evidence of P.W. 1 in marking the document as Ex. D2 is looked into, what he stated was a photocopy of a Lease-cum-Sale Agreement was given to him at the time of the Sale Agreement and it is similar to the one which was shown to him in the cross-examination. So, this portion of the evidence does not relate to the proof of the original document. The photocopy of which was marked as Ex. D2 cannot be admitted in evidence to prove its contents. But, there is no bar under the provisions of Indian Evidence Act to show the document, whether a photocopy or otherwise and obtain the answers from the witness unless it is objected to. On this aspect of the matter, if the decision of the High Court of Gujarat reported in Ahmedabad New Textile Mills Vs. Rajubhai Dalchandbhai, AIR 1999 Guj 148 is looked into, wherein the Court took into consideration the provisions of Order XVIII Rule 4 CPC and held that a witness can be shown and questioned as regards xerox copy of document already on record and it will not amount to admission of the said document in evidence. Furthermore, in the decision reported in H. Siddiqui (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. A. Ramalingam, AIR 2011 SC 1492 referred to above, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, wherein a signature on the photocopy was admitted by the witness in the evidence and the contents were disputed. The Apex Court held that accepting the document as evidence is improper. But, in the case on hand, as could be seen from the evidence of P.W. 1 what he said was "the witness has gone through the document and admits that photocopy of the document is given to him is same as this document". So, to the extent that a photocopy of the document was given to him, at the time of Sale Agreement could be proved on the basis of the aforesaid evidence. But, it is not the proof of the contents of the original document. So, to the extent that a photocopy of the document was given to him, at the time of Sale Agreement could be proved on the basis of the aforesaid evidence. But, it is not the proof of the contents of the original document. So, even otherwise, it is necessary for the respondent to prove the Lease-cum-Sale Agreement by producing the original or by having recourse to provisions of Section 65 of the Indian, Evidence Act and prove the contents of the said document. It is relevant to note that; the learned counsel for the respondent had objected marking of the document in the evidence and therefore, the trial Court ought not to have even permitted the documents to be snown to the witness. But, anyhow, as the evidence has been recorded, I do not find any necessity to quash the contents of the deposition solely because the said evidence could be discarded by the trial court at the time of final hearing, to prove the original. With these observations, the petition is disposed of.