Judgment :- 1. The petitioners pray for quashing of notices issued by the Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation dated 08.11.2011, calling upon the petitioners to show cause as to why their services be not dismissed for submitting bogus educational certificates. 2. The petitioners in two of the writ petitions, joined the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board in the year 1987. Whereas the petitioner in W.P.No.28135 of 2011 joined the Electricity Board in the year 1989 and services of the petitioners now stand transferred to the Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation on bifurcation of the Board. 3. The facts leading to filing of this writ petition, read that; i) The petitioners were initially appointed on contract basis. The decision was taken by the respondents to absorb the services of the employees, keeping in view length of their services in phased manner. The services of the petitioners were absorbed on regular basis in the year 2007. No education qualification has been prescribed for appointment to the post of Mazdoor. The person, who had not attended the school, was also absorbed, as with length of their service, they had gained experience and acquired technical skill. ii) The petitioners at the time of their absorption were directed to submit their school certificates for verification of their age. Whereas the persons who had not attended the school, were directed to get their age certificates from the Medical Officer, holding the rank of District Medical Officer. iii) The case of the petitioners is that the medical certificate was required only for verification of the age and not for the purposes of educational qualification. The case of the petitioners further is that no educational qualification was necessary and the persons, who did not have the school leaving certificates, were also absorbed. iv) The respondent no.2 issued the impugned notices to show cause as to why the petitioners be not dismissed for giving false school certificates. The reason for issuance of show cause notices, as shown in the petitions, is that the certificates produced were bogus certificates. v) It is pleaded by the petitioners that the persons similarly situated as that of the petitioners, who were issued similar show cause notices, had challenged the said show cause notices in W.P.No.38321 of 2006 and connected matters. The reason for issuance of show cause notices, as shown in the petitions, is that the certificates produced were bogus certificates. v) It is pleaded by the petitioners that the persons similarly situated as that of the petitioners, who were issued similar show cause notices, had challenged the said show cause notices in W.P.No.38321 of 2006 and connected matters. This Court quashed the show cause notices and orders passed by this Court have been implemented and the date of birth of those employees has been recorded as per the medical certificate. vi) The show cause notices are challenged on the ground that there is no requirement of any education qualification, as the age can be determined on the basis of medical certificates, thus, there is no ground available with the respondents to issue show cause notices of dismissal from service. vii) That the show cause notices have been issued on the basis of communication from the District Educational Officer collected at the back of the petitioners, thereby denying the opportunity of defending themselves. The show cause notices, therefore, are said to be violative of principles of natural justice. viii) That in the similar circumstances, the persons, who were dismissed, have been reinstated with punishment of reduction to the minimum time scale of pay in compliance with the direction issued by this Court. The notices are, therefore, said to be discriminatory, thus, violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. 4. Reliance is placed on Clause 110 of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations Act, which reads as under: "110. ACCEPTANCE OF DATE OF BIRTH:- i. The date of birth of a candidate entered in the Secondary School Leaving Certificate or Matriculation Register or the discharge Certificate issued by the Army or in the genuine certificates issued by recognised schools shall be taken as authentic for purpose of appointment in the service of the Board. ii. When the date of birth as entered in the records mentioned in clause (i) above is not available or its genuiness is in doubt, an extract from the birth register with evidence to indicate that the extract relates to the particular individual, issued by the Government or Local Authorities or by the Village Munsiffs attested by a Revenue Officer not lower in rank than a Tahsildar shall be accepted. iii. iii. In the absence of Certificate of date of Birth as in clause (i) or (ii) above the age certificate from a Medical Officer not lower in rank than a District Medical Officer or his equivalent shall be accepted. iv. In all doubtful cases of certificates of date of birth, the appointing authorities shall cause enquiries to be made. In respect of employees in the office of the Chief Engineer and subordinate offices, or for appointment to posts therein, the appointing authority concerned, other than the Board, shall after approval by the Chief Engineer, forward the case to an Executive Engineer / Operation and Maintenance having jurisdiction over the place of birth of the employee of the Board concerned, for enquiry and report. If the employee himself happens to be an Executive Engineer / Operation and Maintenance whose place of birth falls within his own jurisdiction, some other Executive Engineer nominated by Chief Engineer / Personnel shall be asked to conduct the enquiry. If the employee is a Superintending Engineer / Operation and Maintenance or Chief Engineer / Distribution having jurisdiction over his place of birth, some other Executive Engineer nominated by the Chief Engineer / Personnel shall be asked to conduct the enquiry. On receipt of the report of enquiry from the Executive Engineer, the case shall be submitted to the Board for decision. Such enquiry reports in respect of Superintending Engineers and above shall be submitted to the Board through the Chief Engineer (Personnel) with the specific remarks of the Chief Engineer (Personnel). The decision of the Board shall be final." 5. The writ petitions were contested by the learned counsel for the respondents, by challenging its maintainability, on the ground that the impugned show cause notices give opportunity to the petitioners to show cause against the proposed action, therefore, the writ petitions are premature. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the allegations against the petitioners are with regard to submission of forged certificates to seek employment, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to any compassion. 6. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the allegations against the petitioners are with regard to submission of forged certificates to seek employment, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to any compassion. 6. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that it is not open to the petitioners to challenge impugned show cause notices, on the ground that only minor punishment can be imposed, as for determining quantum of punishment, the role of Administrative Authorirty is primary and that of the Court is secondary, which is confined only to see that the discretion exercised by the Administrative Authority does not cause excessive infringement of right. 7. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Honble Division Bench of Delhi High Court, in the case of M/s.DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd. vs. O.P.Gupta & anr, 2006 (129) DLT 320 , laying down therein as under: "(12.) The misconduct proved against the workman was of a serious nature as he persistently refused to perform the duties assigned to him. An employee is expected and required to perform his duties in accordance with the lawful orders of his superior, and he cannot refuse to perform the duties merely on account of hardship in getting transportation etc. The Appellant was performing clerical duties which did not require much locomotion, and hence we cannot understand why he objected to do his duties. (13.) The Supreme Court in Om Kumar and Others v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 while considering the quantum of punishment / proportionality has observed that in determining the quantum, the role of the administrative authority is primary and that of the Court is secondary and confined to see if the discretion exercised by the administrative authority caused excessive infringement of rights. In the instand case, the authorities have not omitted any relevant materials nor any irrelavant fact taken into account nor any illegality committed by the authority nor the punishment awarded was shockingly disproportionate. The punishment was awarded in the instand case, after considering all the relevant materials and, therefore, in our view, the interference by the Labour Court was not called for. The punishment was awarded in the instand case, after considering all the relevant materials and, therefore, in our view, the interference by the Labour Court was not called for. (14.) The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in V.Ramana v. A.P.SRTC and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 338 (15.) The Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge as well as the award of the Labour Court are set aside and the order of termination dated 05.06.1991 is held valid." 8. Reliance is also placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the judgment of the Honble Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of V.C.VenkataRao vs. Government of A.P., 2001 (4) SCT 850, laying down as under: "(3.) The learned Tribunal having regard to the decision of the Apex Court in Surait Ghosh v. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others, 1995 (2) SCC 474 , as also the decision of this Court in G.Muralidhar v. Chairman and Managing Director, ECIL, 1996(1) ALD 897 , held that the order of punishment impugned before it was not valid. While doing so, it directed. "We feel that proper course for the respondents for the charges proved is that he should allow the applicant to retire from service on 30.11.1990 and take action under Section 9 of A.P. Pension Code and impose a reasonable cut in the pension and release the other pensionary benefits to the applicant. The above suggested exercise should be completed by the respondents within 3 months from the date of receipt of this order." (4.) Keeping in view the fact that the order of punishment was held to illegal, in our opinion, the learned Tribunal committed a serious error in issuing the aforementioned direction. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, had no jurisdiction to direct the respondents to take recourse to certain course of action which, according to it, would be a reasonable one, inasmuch as it is for the concerned authority to apply its own mind under the A.P. Pension Code as to whether action should be initiated or not as regards the fact situation of the case as also the order in which the misconduct was alleged. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly." 9. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly." 9. Reliance was finally placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of U.P.S.R.T.C. vs. Ram Kishan Arora, 2007 (3) SCT 195, laying down as under: "(7.) The High Court has not arrived at the conclusion that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was disproportionate to the gravity of his misconduct. Even in such a situation, the course which would have been ordinarily open to the High Court was to remit the matter to the employer for reconsideration of the question in regard to the quantum of punishment. The High Court without assigning any reason could not have substituted its opinion to that of the disciplinary authority." 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand vehemently, contended that the show cause notices are admittedly without jurisdiction, as it was not open to the respondents to issue show cause notices, proposing dismissal from service without holding enquiry on the alleged misconduct. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, was that, as the notices are without jurisdiction, the writ petitions would be competent. 11. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Chief of the Army Staff and others vs. Major Dharam Pal Kukrety, 1985 II LLJ 169, wherein the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down as under: "(5.) The same contentions, as were raised before the High Court, were taken before us at the hearing of this Appeal. We will first deal with the Appellants preliminary objection that the Respondents writ petition was not maintainable as being premature. It was the Respondents case that the Chief of the Army Staff had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause notice after he had been again found not guilty by the court-martial on revision. The said notice expressly stated that the Chief of the Army Staff was of the opinion that the Respondents misconduct as disclosed in the proceedings rendered his further retention in service undesirable and asked him to submit his explanation and defence, if any, to the charges made against him. The said notice expressly stated that the Chief of the Army Staff was of the opinion that the Respondents misconduct as disclosed in the proceedings rendered his further retention in service undesirable and asked him to submit his explanation and defence, if any, to the charges made against him. If the Respondents contention with respect to the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army Staff to issue the said notice were correct, the Respondent was certainly exposed to the jeopardy of having his explanation and defence rejected and he being removed or dismissed from services. Where the said notice issued without jurisdiction, the Respondent would have then suffered a grave, prejudicial injury by an act which was without jurisdiction. Where the threat of a prejudicial action is wholly without jurisdiction, a person cannot be asked to wait for the injury to be caused to him before seeking the Courts protection. If, on the other hand, the Chief of the Army Staff had the power in law to issue the said notice, it would not be open to the Respondent to approach the court under Article 226 of the Constitution at the stage of notice only and in such an event his writ petition could be said to be premature. This was, however, not a contention which could have been decided at the threshold until the court had come to a finding with respect to the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army Staff to issue the impugned notice. Having held that the impugned notice was issued without any jurisdiction, the High Court was right in further holding that the Respondents writ petition was not premature and was maintainable." 12. Reliance is also placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the decision of the Honble Division Bench of this Court in the case of G.MaragathaMeenakshi and others vs. District Collector, Madurai and others, 2010 (3) LLN 416, holding therein as under: "(9.) In so far as the chargememos are concerned, though they have been issued as charge memos, a perusal of the same would show the proposed punishment of dismissal to be imposed on each of the appellants has been indicated therein. In fact, the proceedings of the Block Development Office, dated 7 February 2005, also shows that it is more like a show-cause notice for imposing the penalty of dismissal from service, giving no room for teh appellants to make their explanation." 13. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of N.Sekarvs. Director of Medical Education, Chennai and others, 2009 (4) CTC 158 , wherein this Court was pleased to lay down as under: "(6.) In the light of the report of the District Elementary Educational Officer, Vellore and having regard to the undisputed fact that the petitioner got the certificate issued by the Headmaster of Panchayat Union Elementary School, Chitteri Village, Arakonam, the petitioner is qualified to be appointed as Barber in terms of Tamil Nadu Basic Service Rules viz. Rule 5(2). Hence, the dismissal order passed against the petitioner, even though he is qualified to be appointed as a Barber cannot be sustained. The petitioner though produced a certificate claiming that he passed 8th standard was found wrong and by producing the same he has not pursuaded the authority to ignore the claim of other candidate. Similar issue was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.38962 of 2002. By order dated 07.03.2005, the Division Bench has held as follows: "The question is whether production of such false document had in any way persuaded the Appointing Authority to give appointment to the first respondent or whether the production of such bogus certificate had excluded the claim of any meritorious candidate. As found by the Tribunal, the qualification for the post in which the first respondent was appointed is that one must know to read and writ Tamil. No other educational qualification is prescribed. Therefore, probably, out of anxiety, the first respondent would have produced the said certificate, which is wholly uncalled for. The avilability of such a certificate on file, assuming it had not been detected, would not give him any additional rights in the matter of promotion. Therefore, in the above noted circumstances, we do not find any illegality at all in the Tribunal setting aside the order of punishment of dismissal and remitting the case to the original authority to impose a lesser punishment, as he may deem fit. Therefore, in the above noted circumstances, we do not find any illegality at all in the Tribunal setting aside the order of punishment of dismissal and remitting the case to the original authority to impose a lesser punishment, as he may deem fit. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed." (9.) Applying the said decisions to the facts of this case, the impugned order is set aside. The second respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner as Barber with continuity of service without backwages within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is made clear that it is open to the second respondent to impose any other lesser punishment for the production of false certificate." 14. Finally reliance was placed on the judgment of the Honble Division Bench of this Court in the case of M.Venkatesanand others vs. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board in W.A.Nos. 1834 to 1838 of 2009, decided on 27.04.2010, wherein it was held as under: "(3.) Therefore, while setting aside the order of the learned single Judge, we direct the respondent Board to following the procedure as has been set out in the above referred to extracted paragraphs of the earlier order of this Court. That order has also become final. As the Board thought it fit to implement the directions, it is just and necessary that uniform procedure should be followed in respect of similarly placed employees. As the appellants were also appointed on a regular basis and as their probation has also been declared as referred to above, these writ appeals are allowed. The respondents are directed to follow the directions contained in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the order dated 20.02.2008 passed in W.P.Nos.38321 of 2006, etc. Batch as extracted above and pass orders. These writ appeals are allowed. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed." 15. On consideration, I find force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Though it is well settled law that for determining quantum of punishment, the role of Administrative Authority is primary and the Court has limited jurisdiction only to see as to whether the discretion exercised by the Administrative Authority has caused any infringement of right of an employee or whether punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate. 16. Though it is well settled law that for determining quantum of punishment, the role of Administrative Authority is primary and the Court has limited jurisdiction only to see as to whether the discretion exercised by the Administrative Authority has caused any infringement of right of an employee or whether punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate. 16. It is not for this Court to presuppose as to what punishment will be awarded, but at the same time, the question raised in these writ petitions is not to challenge the authority of the respondents to prosecute the petitioners for misconduct, but the challenge is on the ground that the respondents have already taken a decision to dismiss the petitioners and show cause notices issued are only against the proposed punishment. The show cause notice therefore is mere formality after the decision is taken. 17. The reading of show cause notices shows that it is prima facie without jurisdiction, as in the case of permanent employee, it is incumbent upon the employer to hold departmental enquiry to prove the allegations by giving opportunity to the employee to defend, and it is only on the basis of proved charge that tentative view can be formed with regard to the proposed punishment, and in case of punishment awarded is disproportionate, this Court can interfere. The reading of impugned show cause notices, issued to the petitioners, shows that finding of guilt already stands recorded and show cause notices are issued only against the proposed punishment. 18. The Honble Supreme Court, in the case of Oryx Fisheries Private Limited vs. Union of India and others, (2010) 13 SCC 427 , has been pleased to lay down as under: (para 24, 27 to 29, 31, 32 and 33 to 38) "(24.) This Court finds that there is a lot of substance in the aforesaid contention. It is well settled that a quasi-judicial authority, while acting in exercise of its statutory power must act fairly and must act with an open mind while initiating a show cause proceeding. A show cause proceeding is meant to give the person proceeded against a reasonable opportunity of making his objection against the proposed charges indicated in the notice. (27.) It is no doubt true that at the stage of show cause, the person proceeded against must be told the charges against him so that he can take his defence and prove his innocence. (27.) It is no doubt true that at the stage of show cause, the person proceeded against must be told the charges against him so that he can take his defence and prove his innocence. It is obvious that at that stage the authority issuing the charge-sheet, cannot, instead of telling him the charges, confront him with definite conclusions of his alleged guilt. If that is done, as has been done in this instant case, the entire proceeding initiated by the show cause notice gets vitiated by unfairness and bias and the subsequent proceeding become an idle ceremony. (28.) Justice is rooted in confidence and justice is the goal of a quasi-judicial proceeding also. If the functioning of a quasi-judicial authority has to inspire confidence in the minds of those subjected to its jurisdiction, such authority must act with utmost fairness. Its fairness is obviously to be manifested by the language in which charges are couched and conveyed to the person proceeded against. (29.) In the instant case from the underlined portion of the show cause notice it is clear that the third respondent has demonstrated a totally closed mind at the stage of show cause notice itself. Such a closed mind is inconsistent with the scheme of Rule 43 which is set out below. The aforesaid rule has been framed in exercise of the power conferred under Section 33 of The Marine Products Export Development Authority Act, 1972 and as such that Rule is statutory in nature. (31.) It is of course true that the show cause notice cannot be read hyper-technically and it is well settled that it is to be read reasonably. But one thing is clear that while reading a show-cause notice the person who is subject to it must get an impression that he will get an effective opportunity to rebut the allegations contained in the show cause notice and prove his innocence. If on a reasonable reading of a show-cause notice a person of ordinary prudence gets the feeling that his reply to the show cause notice will be an empty ceremony and he will merely knock his head against the impenetrable wall of prejudged opinion, such a show cause notice does not commence a fair procedure especially when it is issued in a quasi-judicial proceeding under a statutory regulation which promises to give the person proceeded against a reasonable opportunity of defence. (32.) Therefore, while issuing a show-cause notice, the authorities must take care to manifestly keep an open mind as they are to act fairly in adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person proceeded against and specially when he has the power to take a punitive step against the person after giving him a show cause notice. (33.) The principle that justice must not only be done but it must eminently appear to be done as well is equally applicable to quasi judicial proceeding if such a proceeding has to inspire confidence in the mind of those who are subject to it. (34.) A somewhat similar observation was made by this Court in the case of KumaonMandal Vikas Nigam Limited v. Girja Shankar PantIn that case, this court was dealing with a show cause notice cum charge-sheet issued to an employee. While dealing with the same, this Court in paragraph 25 (SCC p.198 of the report) by referring to the language in the show cause notice observed as follows: "(25.) Upon consideration of the language in the show-cause notice-cum-charge-sheet, it has been very strongly contended that it is clear that the Officer concerned has a mindset even at the stage of framing of charges and we also do find some justification in such a submission since the chain is otherwise complete." After para 25, this Court discussed in detail the emerging law of bias in different jurisdictions and ultimately held in para 35 (SCC p. 201 of the report), the true test of bias is: "(35.) The test, therefore, is as to whether a mere apprehension of bias or there being a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom --in the event however the conclusion is otherwise inescapable that there is existing a real danger of bias, the administrative action cannot be sustained:" (35.) Going by the aforesaid test any man of ordinary prudence would come to a conclusion that in the instant case the alleged guilt of the appellant has been prejudged at the stage of show cause notice itself. (36.) The appellant gave a reply to the show cause notice but in the order of the third respondent by which registration certificate of the appellant was cancelled, no reference was made to the reply of the appellant, except saying that it is not satisfactory. The cancellation order is totally a non-speaking one. The relevant portion of the cancellation order is set out:- "Sub: Registration as an Exporter of Marine Products under MPEDA Rules 1972. Please refer to the Show Cause Notice No.10/3/MS/2006/MS/3634 dated 23.01.2008 acknowledged by you on 28/01/2008 directing you to show cause why the certificate of registration as an exporter No.MAI/ME/119/06 dated 03/03/2006 granted to you as Merchant Exporter should not be cancelled for the following reasons:- (1.) It has been proved beyond doubt that you have sent sub-standard material to M/s. Cascade Marine Foods, L.L.C., Sharjah. (2.) You have dishonoured your written agreement with M/s. Cascade Marine Foods, L.L.C, Sharjah to settle the complaint made by the buyer as you had agreed to compensate to the extent of the value of the defective cargo sent by you and have now evaded from the responsibility. (3.) This irresponsible action has brought irreparable damage to Indias trade relation with UAE. Your reply dated 04/02/2008 to the Show Cause Notice is not satisfactory because the quality complaint raised by M/s. Cascade Marine Foods, L.L.C, Sharjah have not been resolved amicably. Therefore, in exercise of the power conferred on me vide Rule 43 of the MPEDA Rules, read with office order Part II No.1840/2005 dated 25/11/2006, I hereby cancel the Registration Certificate No.MAI/ME/119/06 dated 03/03/2006 issued to you. The original Certificate of Registration issued should be returned to this office for cancellation immediately. In case you are aggrieved by this order of cancellation, you may prefer an appeal to the Chairman within 30 days of the date of receipt of this order vide Rule 44 of the MPEDA Rules. (37.) Therefore, the bias of the third respondent which was latent in the show cause notice became patent in the order of cancellation of the registration certificate. The cancellation order quotes the show cause notice and is a non-speaking one and is virtually no order in the eye of law. Since the same order is an appealable one it is incumbent on the third respondent to give adequate reasons. The cancellation order quotes the show cause notice and is a non-speaking one and is virtually no order in the eye of law. Since the same order is an appealable one it is incumbent on the third respondent to give adequate reasons. (38.) On the question whether the entire proceeding for cancellation of registration 26 initiated by the show cause notice and culminating in the order of cancellation is vitiated by bias we can appropriately refer to the succinct formulation of the principle by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin and others (1964 A.C. 40). The Learned Law Lord, while dealing with several concepts, which are not susceptible of exact definition, held that by fair procedure one would mean that what a reasonable man would regard as fair in the particular circumstances (see page 65 of the Report). If we follow the aforesaid test, we are bound to hold that the procedure of cancellation registration in this case was not a fair one." 19. In view of the settled law by the Honble Supreme Court, the impugned show cause notices cannot be sustained in law. 20. Consequently, for the reasons stated herein-above, all the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned show cause notices are ordered to be quashed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.