Judgment :- N.K. Balakrishnan, J. 1. The former is the petition filed by the 5th accused and the latter is the petition filed by the 8th accused in Crime No.1/12 of Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau, Kasaragod Unit. Both these petitions are filed to quash Annexure-A1, the FIR and the investigation initiated pursuant to the registration of FIR No.1/12 against the petitioners and other accused persons alleging commission of offences under Secs.420, 201 and 120-B of IPC and Sec.13(1)(d) r/w Sec.13(2) of PC Act, 1988. The petitioner in Crl.M.C.No.668/2012, (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) was a serving military personnel. In 1976, he applied for getting assignment of land as there was preference for serving military personnel. Pursuant to the said application he was assigned 3 Acres of land in Survey No.681/CD/Part of Enmakaje Village in Kasaragod Taluk as per the proceedings in L.A.No.15/1976. It was stated that the order of assignment was passed in his favour on 20.4.1977. Subsequently on 18.5.1977 one Sankaranaraya Bhatt and another filed a suit before the Munsiff's Court, Kasaragod as O.S.No.108/1977 contending that they have got 'kumki' right over the said property. In view of the pendency of the suit the petitioner was informed by the Special Tahasildar, Kasaragod on 16.2.1979 that the payment of the land value, tree value etc. need be made only after the disposal of the suit. Since the order of assignment was already passed in favour of the petitioner, as was stated in the written statement filed by the State, the plaint was returned for want of compliance of notice to the State under Sec.80 of CPC. It was stated that the plaint was not re-presented thereafter. 2. It was stated that the petitioner submitted an application dated 14.1.2006 for assignment of land appending necessary documents along with the same including a copy of the order in O.S.No.108/1977. The petitioner contends that he was then informed that the land covered by L.A.No.15/1976 was in the possession of some other persons and so that land cannot be given to him and hence he renewed his application for assignment and submitted the same in 2007 for getting another land for the earlier site, based on which he was granted assignment in 2009. But that order of assignment also did not take effect as it was not suitable and comparable to the land which had been assigned to the petitioner in 1977. But that order of assignment also did not take effect as it was not suitable and comparable to the land which had been assigned to the petitioner in 1977. Since his subsequent application for assignment in 2007 also bore no fruit he again renewed his application in 2009. He was granted assignment of 2.33 acres of land in Maire Village on 4.6.2010. It was subsequently cancelled by the Government as per order dated 7.6.2011. W.P.(C) No.19122/2011 was filed by the petitioner before this Court to quash the said order of cancellation passed by the Government. It was found that no notice was served on the petitioner before ordering cancellation and hence, it was observed by the court that the order of cancellation served on the petitioner can be treated as a notice before cancellation and thus the petitioner was directed to file his reply within four weeks. He submitted his reply. Again the Government passed an order of cancellation on 16.2.2012. The petitioner contends that he is challenging that order of cancellation also. 3. The prosecution contends that there was a criminal conspiracy among the accused persons in order to assign the government land to the petitioner who was ineligible to get assignment and that for the purpose of getting assignment, the petitioner made dishonest concealment of material facts and induced the authorities to believe that he was a landless poor and that his annual income was less than Rs.30,000/-. The allegation is that, the then Chief Minister (A1) exerted influence over the high ranking revenue officials including the Land Revenue Commissioner and by abusing the power, 2.33 Acres of land comprised in 111/2 and 111/5 of Maire Village in Kasaragod District which was reserved for assignment in favour of serving military personnel was assigned in favour of the petitioner. The allegation made in the FIR is that the petitioner is the brother of the first accused, the then Chief Minister. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that all the allegations mentioned in the FIR are absolutely false and that a preliminary report was stated to have been obtained, containing false and incorrect details without actually perusing the relevant file relating to L.A.15/1976. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that all the allegations mentioned in the FIR are absolutely false and that a preliminary report was stated to have been obtained, containing false and incorrect details without actually perusing the relevant file relating to L.A.15/1976. It is also pointed out that though the specific allegation made in the FIR was that the petitioner is the brother of A1, the respondents have now made a somersault stating that the petitioner is only a distant relative. The relationship of A1 and the petitioner herein made mention of now in the counter statement filed by the respondents does not make out anything, the petitioner contends. However, the fact that the petitioner is a distant relative of A1 is not disputed. But the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents have proceeded on a wrong premise thinking that petitioner was an ineligible person for getting assignment of the land. In the light of the specific admission contained in paragraph 4 of the written statement filed in O.S.No.108/77 [Annexure A2(b)] the respondent cannot contend that the petitioner was ineligible for getting assignment of the land in 1977. It was specifically admitted that the Special Tahsildar had already assigned a portion of the 'plaint schedule property' mentioned therein, measuring 3 Acres in favour of the petitioner herein and had applied for assignment as per rules. Therefore, it is pointed out by the learned counsel that when the written statement was filed in 1977, the specific contention raised by the respondents was that the application filed by the petitioner was proper and that he was entitled to get assignment and accordingly he was assigned land as per Kerala Land Assignment Rules. It was also mentioned in the very same paragraph that the assignment order passed in favour of the petitioner had become final. Therefore, if it is accepted that the petitioner was then eligible for assignment of the land can that right be denied because a 3rd party had filed a suit claiming right over the property pursuant to which the land value, tree value etc. were not received from the petitioner is the pertinent question posed by the petitioner's counsel. Therefore, if it is accepted that the petitioner was then eligible for assignment of the land can that right be denied because a 3rd party had filed a suit claiming right over the property pursuant to which the land value, tree value etc. were not received from the petitioner is the pertinent question posed by the petitioner's counsel. Annexure A2(c) dated 5.7.1977 has been referred to by the petitioner to contend that the petitioner had in fact sought clarification from the Tahsildar regarding the remittance of the amount due to the Government to which it was replied that the land assignment dues can be remitted only after the suit was disposed of. Annexure A2(d) the letter dated 16.2.1979 was a reply to the petitioner's letter dated 30.1.1979 addressed to the District Collector regarding payment to be effected. It was replied as per Annexure A2(d) that the suit O.S.No.108/77 was still pending and so further action would be taken only after the disposal of the suit. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was thereafter not informed of the date to pay the land value, tree value etc. payable to the Government. Since he was a military personnel, then serving in different parts of India, he could not contact the revenue authorities to pay the said amount. According to the petitioner, though he was entitled to get assignment of the land, only because of the pendency of the suit he could not get actual assignment of the land. The non-payment of the dues to the government was not because of any fault committed by him; he was always ready to pay the amount but only because of lack of communication the amount was not remitted by him. Later, he again submitted a renewal application for getting assignment of the very same land and then he was informed that the said land was subsequently assigned to other persons. Therefore, he again submitted an application in 2007 for getting assignment of an alternate site. Though a land was proposed to be assigned as an alternate site it was found to be a property which was prohibited from assignment and accordingly he did not get assignment of that land. Therefore, he again submitted another application which was also, according to him, only a renewal; in the sense; an application for getting an alternate site. Though a land was proposed to be assigned as an alternate site it was found to be a property which was prohibited from assignment and accordingly he did not get assignment of that land. Therefore, he again submitted another application which was also, according to him, only a renewal; in the sense; an application for getting an alternate site. The stand taken by the petitioner is that since the order of assignment was passed in L.A.15/1976 and at that point of time he was fully eligible to get assignment of the land and since that was the stand taken by the respondents at that point of time they cannot now turn round and contend that the petitioner was/is ineligible for getting assignment of the land. Had there been no suit pending at that time, there would have been no difficulty for the petitioner to remit the amount due to the government since readiness and willingness to pay the amount was well depicted in the two letters addressed by him to the revenue officials mentioned earlier. Therefore, the pertinent question posed by the petitioner's counsel is that, because he could not get actual assignment of the land which he was otherwise eligible to get, can he be denied assignment of the land for no fault of his. His fault if at all was only the delay in subsequently submitting the application for that purpose. Can delay alone be a reason to deny justice is the question which is again posed by the petitioner. The petitioner contends that if viewed in this angle his latest application is only to be treated as a request for assignment of an alternate site, instead of the land assigned under L.A.15/1976; if so, how can anybody find fault with his claim for getting assignment of that land. If a citizen, in such circumstances aspires that his claim for alternate site is legitimate and well with in his right, is it an offence; what is the mala fide act in it, the petitioner contends. Even if there was any procedural irregularities or illegalities can it be said that his act was tainted with dishonesty. Can such an attitude be taken by the State to a serving military personnel or ex-service man since even as per the rule a serving personnel’s and ex-service men were given priority in getting assignment of the land. Even if there was any procedural irregularities or illegalities can it be said that his act was tainted with dishonesty. Can such an attitude be taken by the State to a serving military personnel or ex-service man since even as per the rule a serving personnel’s and ex-service men were given priority in getting assignment of the land. The fact that long after the crucial date of getting assignment (in 1977) the petitioner or his family members happened to be in possession of some land (even if it is accepted to be so), can it be a reason to say that the petitioner should be denied justice since he was perfectly eligible and entitled to get assignment of the land in 1977 based on which actually an order of assignment was passed. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents could not produce any document to show that after the disposal of the suit, the petitioner was directed to remit the dues to the Government nor was any notice sent to the petitioner to show cause why the order of assignment should not be cancelled. That was expected of from the revenue authorities in view of the two letters sent to him from those offices as referred to earlier. The respondents on the other hand contend that non-remittance of the dues would entail in cancellation of the order of assignment as elucidated in Rule 9(6A) of Land Assignment Rules which says that notwithstanding the order of registry of any land and the communication of that order to the assignee, the title to that land shall not pass to the assignee until he remits that land value and tree value payable in respect of that land, the arrears of tax, if any due in respect of the land and other charges due from him. But the respondents cannot shut their eyes to the two letters, Annexures A2(c) and A2(d). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the peculiar fact situation of the case, the petitioner should have been informed, after the disposal of the suit as to the necessity of deposit of the amount due to the Government as per Rule 9(6A). But the respondents cannot shut their eyes to the two letters, Annexures A2(c) and A2(d). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the peculiar fact situation of the case, the petitioner should have been informed, after the disposal of the suit as to the necessity of deposit of the amount due to the Government as per Rule 9(6A). It is contended that so far as the petitioner is concerned, he was legitimate in aspiring/expecting assignment of an alternate site equivalent to the area covered by the assignment in L.A.15/1976, because it was due to no fault of his that the amount was not remitted or that the final order of assignment happened to be stalled. The only other contention that can be advanced by the respondents is the delay that occurred in submitting his application. According to the respondents, it was possible for the petitioner to request for extension of time. It is pointed out as per the 3rd proviso to Rule 9(7), the delay in payment of the land value, tree value etc. can be condoned upto a period of 5 years by the District Collector and if there is a delay of more than five years, sanction of the government shall be obtained for condoning the delay. Therefore, the learned State Prosecutor submits that there was no difficulty for the petitioner to approach the government for condonation of the delay in payment of the land value, tree value etc. This argument is totally untenable. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that this is contrary to the stand taken by the respondents that the order of assignment made in L.A.15/1976 was cancelled by the government. Not only that the reply to the earlier application submitted by the petitioner would show and is not disputed by the respondents also, that the land covered by the earlier assignment in L.A.15/1976 was assigned to various other persons. Therefore, the condonation of delay was totally out of question. In such circumstances, can the petitioner be blamed for requesting allotment of an alternate site when there appears gross injustice having been done to the petitioner, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits. The contention raised by the respondents that the petitioner could have sought condonation of delay in payment of the amount is unacceptable. In such circumstances, can the petitioner be blamed for requesting allotment of an alternate site when there appears gross injustice having been done to the petitioner, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits. The contention raised by the respondents that the petitioner could have sought condonation of delay in payment of the amount is unacceptable. Had it been done then that would have been projected by the respondents as a more serious offence, the petitioner contends. 6. The main plank of the contention raised by the respondents is that in the latest application submitted by the petitioner he has furnished absolutely false details with a view to get an order of assignment in his favour. Annexure R1(b) is the copy of the application submitted by the petitioner. It is contended by the respondents that the form requires the applicant to furnish the details of land sought to be assigned. That form further requires the applicant to furnish the details of land if any already under occupation by the applicant. The land sought for assignment was stated to be comprised in Survey No.324 part of Kattukukke Village and the area sought for assignment was shown as 3 Acres which was shown as a dry land. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that in the column where the details of the land sought to be assigned were to be mentioned, it was specifically mentioned by the petitioner/applicant that the land assigned in L.A.15/1976 of Enmakaje Village R.S.No.681/1 was encroached upon and assigned to other persons and so the alternate site is requested to be assigned. In Column 10 also, it was stated that the request was for assignment of an alternate site. It is contended by the respondents that as per the prescribed form the petitioner/applicant was to furnish details of the patta land held by the applicant, showing in particular extent of the land, survey No., Village etc. Against that column it was shown 'do'. It is contended by the respondents that as per the prescribed form the petitioner/applicant was to furnish details of the patta land held by the applicant, showing in particular extent of the land, survey No., Village etc. Against that column it was shown 'do'. The petitioner contends that it only means, the request was for assignment of a site, alternate or as a substitute for the extent of the land assigned under L.A.15/1976 and hence, the petitioner did not furnish the details of the other land held by him since according to the petitioner, his position has to be reverted back to the position in 1976 when he was assigned the land as per the proceedings then issued by the District Collector. In the next column where the annual income of the family was mentioned, the petitioner showed his annual income as Rs.25,000/-. 7. The respondents contend that the annual income of the petitioner is more than Rs.86,000/-, as he is a pensioner getting that much amount as pension and as such the petitioner is ineligible to get assignment of land because his annual income exceeds Rs.30,000/-, which is the limit prescribed as per the Rules. According to the petitioner if Annexure R1(b) is treated as a request for assignment of alternate site, the fact that the petitioner did not furnish in Annexure R1(b) the particulars of the land held by him and his family, cannot be treated as concealment of facts. The petitioner further contends that if his application is treated as a request for assignment of an alternate site, his application has to be treated as the one filed in the year 1976 and if he is treated as a serving personnel the income limit was not then applicable for getting assignment and therefore, he cannot be held ineligible for getting assignment of land, even if, now his income by way of pension is more than Rs.30,000/-. 8. The main thrust of the argument advanced by the respondents/V.A.C.B. is that since the application was submitted in the prescribed form, the petitioner was bound to disclose the total extent of land held by him and his family members. He did not disclose the same. That, according to the respondent, is the dishonest concealment of facts as explained in section 415 of IPC. He did not disclose the same. That, according to the respondent, is the dishonest concealment of facts as explained in section 415 of IPC. Again, according to the respondent, there was dishonest concealment of fact in regard to the total annual income of the petitioner since the annual income he is getting by way of pension is Rs.86,400/-, he was ineligible to get assignment because his annual income was exceeding Rs.30,000/-. Furnishing false details in the relevant column should also be treated as an act of deception practiced by the petitioner, the respondents contend. 9. But the learned counsel for the petitioner resisted this contention projecting the fact that it was specifically mentioned in the application submitted by him that the request was only for assignment of alternative site. Further, the factum of earlier assignment as per L.A. No:15/76 and the subsequent encroachment etc into that land were specifically mentioned in his application. Authorities were actually informed of the fact that there was an earlier assignment of land in L.A. 15/76. Since, it was specifically noted that the request was for alternate site it cannot be said that there was any sort of concealment of fact or furnishing of false details as alleged by the respondents, the petitioner contends. 10. But the respondents would contend that such a request for assignment made by the petitioner more than two and a half decades after the disposal of the suit would only show that he was making use of the opportunity that A1, who is his distant relative, became the Chief Minister of Kerala and he somehow or other wanted to get assignment of the land. The villages Maire, Kattukukke, Enmakaje and Pedre of Kasargod Taluk are all falling in the category of Hill Tract Villages. It was pointed out by the petitioner that vast dry lands were available in those villages and some of the parcels of such land were separately earmarked for assignment to military personnel’s/ex service men. 11. The contention that only when A1 became Chief Minister the petitioner filed an application for assignment is factually incorrect since even in 2006, when the present Chief Minister was in office, application was filed by the petitioner for getting assignment of the land. Exhibit R1(f) dated 14.01.2006 has been referred to for that purpose. 11. The contention that only when A1 became Chief Minister the petitioner filed an application for assignment is factually incorrect since even in 2006, when the present Chief Minister was in office, application was filed by the petitioner for getting assignment of the land. Exhibit R1(f) dated 14.01.2006 has been referred to for that purpose. The petitioner contends that in that application also all the details of the earlier assignment and subsequent events which took place in the matter were detailed. All the copies of the earlier petitions and documents were also submitted along with Exhibit R1(f). But it is contended by the respondents that the petitioner was then informed that the land covered by earlier assignment was already allotted to other persons. According to the petitioner, when he was so informed he again moved an application for getting assignment of an alternate land equivalent to the area that was assigned to him in L.A. 15/76. If so, can he be found fault with, the petitioner contends. 12. It was vehemently contended by the respondents that the petitioner had approached A1, the Chief Minister and then A1 had directly contacted the then District Collector, Kasargode and thereafter the petitioner approached the District Collector and submitted Exhibit R1(g) application dated 09.03.2007. Here also, the petitioner contends that if a Minister realises that injustice has been done to a citizen and if he acts zealously and swiftly and for that purpose, instead of forwarding papers to the subordinate officers only to get it delayed in red tapes, if he directly contacts the District Collector to act promptly and properly to redress the grievance of the applicant can the Minister be found fault with and in such cases can it be assumed that there was a criminal conspiracy? In such circumstances if the petitioner had mentioned in his application to the District Collector that the request was made pursuant to the submission made by him to the Chief Minister, can it be said that the statement so fairly made in his application be termed as an act done in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy. In Exhibit R1(g) he had submitted the copies of all the earlier communications, applications and order of assignment in L.A. 15/76 etc, and also the latest application dated 14.01.2006, submitted by him to the then Thahsildar, Kasargode. In Exhibit R1(g) he had submitted the copies of all the earlier communications, applications and order of assignment in L.A. 15/76 etc, and also the latest application dated 14.01.2006, submitted by him to the then Thahsildar, Kasargode. These aspects have been highlighted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner to fortify his submission that, here is a case where the petitioner who was entitled to get assignment of land was unjustly denied the same and when he voiced his grievance to the Chief Minister, the Chief Minister happened to act so swiftly to see that the grievance is redressed and in such circumstance how could it be said that there was any element of cheating the State or an act of criminal conspiracy. In any such executive actions there would be an element of arbitrariness. There would be slight procedural lapses, irregularities or short comings, but if it was done bona fide or in good faith how could it be termed as criminal misconduct to attract an offence under section 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act, the learned senior counsel submits. 13. The respondent relies on Exhibit R1(k), the letter issued from the District Collector, Alappuzha, which shows that the annual income of the petitioner from his pension is Rs.86,400/- and that he is also getting income from the business conducted by him. It was stated that his wife was also getting Rs.36,000/-as annual income. But in the application the annual income was shown as Rs.25,000/-only. Exhibit R1(k) has also been relied upon by the respondent to contend that the petitioner and his family members were holding five items of properties and so in the light of those facts the petitioner should have disclosed in his application, Exhibit R1(b), that he was holding such and such land. It is also contended by the respondents that the Revenue Officials treated Exhibit R1(b) as a fresh application and that was why it was assigned the number L.A. 23/07- Kattukukke Village and thereafter, assigned a new number as L.A. 51/08-Maire. It appears that as per the application submitted by the petitioner in 2007 another land was proposed to be assigned but later on, it was found out that the said land was not suitable and as such it was not acceptable to the petitioner. It appears that as per the application submitted by the petitioner in 2007 another land was proposed to be assigned but later on, it was found out that the said land was not suitable and as such it was not acceptable to the petitioner. Therefore, if A1, the Chief Minister had directed to assign some other alternate site, the said act of A1 cannot be faulted with, submits the learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. The respondents contend that it was only because of the undue influence of A1 the land measuring 2.33 acres in Maire Village happened to be assigned in L.A. 51/08 on 4.6.2010. The provisional patta was issued to the petitioner and it was received by him. It is pointed out by the respondent that as per the conditions mentioned in the assignment, the assigned land shall not be alienated for a period of 25 years from the date of registry. But to get over that difficulty, the petitioner again moved the Government for relaxation of the said Rules. The request made by the petitioner was to order relaxation of that Rule. Exhibit R1(t) is the application dated 30.8.2010 submitted by the petitioner. Reports were obtained from the District Collector and also from the Land Revenue Commissioner. It is pointed out that notes were put up by the Officers to the effect that allowing sale of land within a year of assignment would imply that the intention of assignment is being violated and this would set a bad precedent and would be legally unjustifiable. It was mentioned in Annexure R1(x) that 25 years' non-alienability was brought to effect by an amendment and hence any change or relaxation in it can be made only by another amendment and as such no exemption can be brought to effect through an executive order. It was also mentioned that exemption can be granted only in respect of cases of assignment prior to 24.1.2009, whereas the date of registry in this case was 4.6.2010 and hence the petitioner is not entitled to get the exemption as claimed by him. It was submitted that A1 had called the Land Revenue Commissioner and asked him to examine and find a way out. It was submitted that A1 had called the Land Revenue Commissioner and asked him to examine and find a way out. This, according to the respondent, is another act which would throw light on the conspiracy alleged by the respondent/V.A.C.B. The petitioner contends that exemption was claimed by him as it was an assignment of a land as a substitute for the land covered by L.A. 15/76 and so the restriction on alienability is not applicable to his case. It was on such a premise the restriction on alienability was relaxed by the Land Revenue Commissioner, the petitioner contends. But the fact that objection raised by the Revenue Officials including the District Collector was ignored in granting the relaxation is a factor to be taken into, the respondents contend. 15. It was stated that subsequently the exemption granted in that regard was cancelled. According to the petitioner immediately on coming to know of the legal hurdles in granting exemption it was cancelled and so it cannot be said that the earlier request or direction for exemption can be made use of as a circumstance to hold that there was criminal conspiracy in the matter. 16. The learned State Prosecutor would submit that the file notes would speak for itself as to the undue interest shown in the matter in granting assignment of land when the petitioner was ineligible to get assignment of any land. It is also submitted that even if the petitioner was otherwise eligible, he was entitled to get assignment of only one acre of land whereas he was assigned 2.33 acres of land in Maire Village. But the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was assigned 3 acres of land as per L.A. 15/76 and since the present assignment is less than 3 acres it cannot be said that the land assigned was in excess of the land which the petitioner was entitled to get in 1976. 17. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is on the premise that if the request is treated as an assignment of an alternate site (as the petitioner could not get the actual assignment of the land mentioned in L.A. 15/76) his request for assignment and all other acts should be treated as if it is a claim or a renewal or revival of the claim made in L.A. 15/76. It was so processed to see that his grievance is redressed, for, it was not because of his fault he could not get assignment of the land, but only because of some supervening events which took place; namely, the filing of the suit by Mr.Shankara Narayana Bhat etc. But this contention is stoutly resisted by the prosecution stating that the present request was made more than two decades after the disposal of the suit. 18. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the fact that there was a subsequent amendment to the Land Assignment Rules restricting or limiting the extent of land or enlarging the blocking period restricting alienation of the assigned land cannot be made use of against the petitioner, since, if the request is treated only as a revival so as to give an alternate site, then the law as it stood in 1976-77 alone can be made applicable. 19. Relying on the decision of A.A.Calton Vs. Director of Education and Another (1983) 3 SCC 33, it was argued by the learned counsel that no retrospective effect should be given to any statutory provision so as to impair or take away an existing right, unless the statute either expressly or by necessary implication directs that it should have such retrospective effect. But the prosecution contends that the aforesaid decision has no bearing on the facts of the present case since the assignment application made by the petitioner in 2007 is only a fresh application for assignment of an altogether different land and that provisional order of assignment made in L.A. 15/76 stood automatically cancelled for non compliance of the conditions mentioned as per the Rules. Anyway, at this stage it is not necessary to probe into all those aspects. 20. The learned State Prosecutor has referred to certain file notes made by the Thahsildar and District Collector and other Officers to point out that despite remarks against assignment of land to ineligible persons, the then District Collector directed assignment of an alternate land which according to the prosecution was only because of a conspiracy or understanding between the then District Collector and the 1st accused. Those contentions have been refuted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 21. Those contentions have been refuted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 21. According to the prosecution even after the assignment of land the petitioner wanted to get rid of the restrictions on alienation of the property and for that purpose he again met the 1st accused and it was pursuant to that meeting of mind, A1 directed the Land Revenue Commissioner to avoid or relax the restriction on alienation. It is contended that report was called for from the District Collector, Mr. Satheesh who has reported that the request made by the petitioner cannot be allowed since that would be against the objectives of the Assignment Rules and that if such a request is allowed, other persons would also come with similar requests and ultimately all the assignees would later become landless persons; but in spite of that objection, the condition relating to restriction on alienation was at first deleted, but subsequently, after there was some protest it was cancelled. 22. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner relies upon the decision in State of West Bengal Vs. Swapan Kumar Guha (1982) 1 SCC 561 in support of his submission that it is not within the province of the police to investigate into a report which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of enquiring into such cases. It is further submitted that the Police has no unfettered discretion to commence investigation unless the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses commission of such offence. If the F.I.R. does not disclose commission of an offence then the investigation must be stopped, argues the learned counsel. 23. The learned State Prosecutor would submit that staggering revelations which came to light from the note files and circumstances mentioned earlier would show that there are strong prima facie materials to hold that there was a criminal conspiracy and that there was wrongful loss to the State and corresponding to wrongful gain to the petitioner since the assignment of 2.33 acres of land was against the Land Assignment Rules prevailing at the time of passing the impugned order of assignment. Whether the assignment was only as a substitute or only as an alternate site for the land covered by L.A. 15/76 or whether the impugned assignment was a result of subsequent deliberation or conspiracy, are not matters to be now gone into. 24. Whether the assignment was only as a substitute or only as an alternate site for the land covered by L.A. 15/76 or whether the impugned assignment was a result of subsequent deliberation or conspiracy, are not matters to be now gone into. 24. The learned State Prosecutor has relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Union of India and Others Vs. B.R. Bajaj and Others 1994 SCC (Cri) 477, State of Bihar Vs. Rajendra Agrawalla 1996 CRI.L.J. 1372, K. Karunakaran Vs. State of Kerala and another 2000 CRI.L.J. 2278 and Mahavir Prashad Gupta and Another Vs. State of National Capital Territory of Delhi and Others (2000) 8 SCC 115 in support of his submission that the power of quashing criminal proceedings must be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases and that the court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint as to whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. 25. The contention which was vehemently advanced by the petitioners is that the police was acting at the behest of the political executives to appease them and that the F.I.R. was registered with undue haste without conducting a proper preliminary enquiry. Since the V.A.C.B. is under the direct control of a Ministry, the officers conducting the investigation would be prompted and actuated by malice to tarnish accused no.1, who has been fighting against corruption by filing petitions before this Court and before the apex Court and that all such forces have now joined together to wreck vengeance and so it cannot be said that there would be unbiased and impartial investigation, the petitioner further contends. 26. It would be too early for this court to make any observations regarding the same. The learned State Prosecutor would submit that the decision in State of U.P. Vs. R.K. Srivastava and Another (1989) 4 SCC 59 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of this case since in that case the allegations made in F.I.R. did not constitute any offence of cheating or forgery and thus the apex Court found that it would be abuse of process of court. R.K. Srivastava and Another (1989) 4 SCC 59 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of this case since in that case the allegations made in F.I.R. did not constitute any offence of cheating or forgery and thus the apex Court found that it would be abuse of process of court. But according to the learned State Prosecutor the dishonest concealment of facts regarding the properties held by the petitioner and his family members and the further fact that his total annual income was far above the ceiling limit prescribed under the Rules would prima facie show that there are materials to proceed with the investigation of the case. Whether the investigation was conducted fairly or with malicious design or with oblique motives can be seen only after the final report is filed, the learned State Prosecutor submits. 27. The learned counsel appearing for the 8th accused, who is the petitioner in W.P.(C) No:4903/2012, has also advanced arguments that the petitioner therein, has been arrayed as an accused only because of the vengeance against the 1st accused. As a Personal Assistant to the then Chief Minister, he (A8) may have to follow or obey the directions and as a result of the same he might have contacted ever so many officers including Secretaries to the Government and Land Revenue Commissioner. It may not be possible for a Chief Minister to directly contact those officers and to have their presence before the Chief Minister to discuss important issues; and therefore, simply because the petitioner (A8) who was the Personal Assistant happened to contact such officers and requested them to meet the Chief Minister for discussion cannot be construed to hold that he was a party to the conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution. Considering the importance of the issue and the urgency to carryout certain orders or directions of the Chief Minister, being the Personal Assistant he might have contacted so many such officers, but how could the petitioner be found fault with or be roped in as an accused, is the question posed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It was submitted by the learned State Prosecutor that the phone call register would show that he had made so many calls to the Land Revenue Commissioner. It was submitted by the learned State Prosecutor that the phone call register would show that he had made so many calls to the Land Revenue Commissioner. It was also pointed out that the statement given by the Land Revenue Commissioner would show that he was contacted by A8 to meet the Chief Minister. It is further argued that so many other aspects have also come to light from the revelations made by the Land Revenue Commissioner and in any event at this stage the court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the acceptability or reliability of those statements, the learned State Prosecutor argues. 28. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner (A5) submits that the allegations in the F.I.R. are nothing but a conglomeration of calumny and distorted versions prepared by over zealous officers of the respondent and if investigation is proceeded in that line it is likely to pervert or subvert the Law. It is also argued that the registration of F.I.R. and investigation will do incalculable damage and harm to the integrity and reputation of the accused persons and so the Court would be justified in invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court to quash the F.I.R. This submission is resisted by the learned State Prosecutor. It was held by the apex Court in the decision in Mrs.Rupan Deol Bajaj Vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995) 7 JT (SC) 299 thus: "It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an exceptional one. Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinise the FIR/charge- sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that FIR is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence. After the investigation is concluded and the charge-sheet is laid the prosecution produces the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code in support of the charge-sheet. At that stage it is not the function of the Court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict compliance of the provisions which are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. At that stage it is not the function of the Court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict compliance of the provisions which are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. It would be done after the trial is concluded." Relying on the aforesaid decision the learned State Prosecutor submits that at this stage it is not proper to examine the truth or falsity of each of the instances in snippet form and thereafter string them together and express any opinion either way lest it should cripple the investigation. 29. There may be so many aspects which can be urged by the petitioner to justify his application for assignment of land putting forth a plea that his request was only for assignment of an alternate site, as he did not get the actual possession of the land as per the proceedings in L.A. 15/76 and so his position should be reckoned as it stood in 1976-77. Similarly, the prosecution may also be able to state so many aspects in support of the case projected by them in the F.I.R. At this stage it is not just or proper for this court to enquire into all those aspects to arrive at a conclusion or to express any opinion regarding the same. The points which have been raised by the petitioners can certainly be advanced by them at the appropriate stage. I find it not just or proper to interfere with the investigation at this stage. In the result both these petitions are dismissed without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to urge all the contentions raised in these petitions at the appropriate stage.