Judgment :- Prasenjit Mandal, J. This application is at the instance of the defendant/respondent and is directed against the Order dated May 26, 2008 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Alipore in Misc. Appeal No.152 of 2008 thereby setting aside the Order dated April 2, 2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, 3rd Court, Alipore in Title Suit No.38 of 2007 thereby rejecting an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code (in short ‘C.P.C.’) on contests. The plaintiffs/appellants/opposite parties herein instituted a suit being Title Suit No.38 of 2007 against the petitioner for declaration that the agreement dated September 19, 2005 is still in operation, permanent injunction restraining the defendant for rescinding or cancelling the agreement dated September 19, 2005 and other consequential reliefs. They filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. praying for temporary injunction. The petitioner filed his objection to the said application. By the Order dated April 2, 2008, the learned Trial Judge rejected the application for injunction on contests. Thereafter the appeal being Misc. Appeal No.152 of 2008 was field by the plaintiffs against the order of the learned Trial Judge before the learned District Judge, South 24-Parganas at Alipore. The plaintiffs/opposite parties moved an application praying for an ad interim order of injunction. But, no order of ad interim injunction was passed. The record was transferred to the Court of the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Alipore for disposal. Since, no order of ad interim injunction was granted by the Appellate Court, a revisional application was filed by the plaintiffs before this Hon’ble Court and by the order dated May 16, 2008, this Hon’ble Court directed the Appellate Court to dispose of the appeal as well as the application interim injunction on the next date, that is, on May 22, 2008. Thereafter, the said misc. appeal was allowed on contests by the impugned order. Being aggrieved, this application has been preferred. Now, the question is whether the impugned judgment and order should be sustained. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on going through the materials-on-record, I find that there is no dispute that the parties entered an agreement dated September 19, 2005 in respect of the suit property as described in the schedule of the plaint. Now, the question is whether the impugned judgment and order should be sustained. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on going through the materials-on-record, I find that there is no dispute that the parties entered an agreement dated September 19, 2005 in respect of the suit property as described in the schedule of the plaint. That agreement was executed by the defendant/petitioner herein and there is no dispute that he has 1/7th Share in the suit property situated at 37/1 Diamond Harbour Road at a consideration of Rs.6 lakh out of which the petitioner accepted Rs.3 lakh as earnest money. It may be pointed out here that one Chaman Project Pvt. Ltd. filed a suit before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 8th Court, Alipore being Title Suit No.101 of 2000 under specific performance of agreement for development dated April 5, 2000 and the said agreement was also executed by the defendant/petitioner herein agreeing to develop the suit property at 37/1 Diamond Harbour Road, Kolkata-700027. It is contended by Chaman Project Pvt. Ltd. that the other co-owners of the said premises have also given their consent by executing similar type of development agreements in its favour and on the basis of an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. filed by Chaman Project Pvt. Ltd. in the said suit, the learned Trial Judge, by the order dated February 21, 2002, directed the parties to maintain status quo over the suit property till the disposal of the application for temporary injunction. The said order of status quo is still in force. Under the circumstances, it is contended by the defendant that unless the order of status quo is vacated, the respondent/petitioner herein cannot be compelled to sell and transfer the property at the agreed consideration money. Therefore, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the agreement is not a concluded contract but is nothing but a contingent contract. Mr. Moloy Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that according to the decision of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal reported in AIR 1962 SC 527 particularly the paragraph No.43 when there is an express provision for granting injunction, the application under Section 151 of the CPC is not maintainable. Mr. Moloy Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that according to the decision of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal reported in AIR 1962 SC 527 particularly the paragraph No.43 when there is an express provision for granting injunction, the application under Section 151 of the CPC is not maintainable. He has also contended that according to the decision of M.V. Shankar Bhat & anr. v. Claude Pinto (since deceased) by LRS. & ors. reported in (2003) 4 SCC 86 particularly paragraph Nos. 31 and 32 when an agreement is entered into subject to ratification by others, a concluded contract is not arrived at. Whenever ratification by some other persons, who are not parties to the agreement is required, such a clause must be held to be a condition precedent for coming into force of a concluded contract. The said agreement for sale is not enforceable in a Court of law. Mr. Ghosh has also contended that according to the decisions of Shamali Das v. Swadesh Ghosh & ors. reported in 2009 (4) CHN 15 particularly paragraph Nos. 16, 17 and 18 and Amulya Gopal Majumdar v. United Industrial Bank Ltd. & ors. reported in AIR 1981 Cal 404 that an agreement for sale does not create any interest. So, the impugned order should be set aside. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties refers to Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act and thus, he submits that in view of the decision of Bai Dosabai v. Mathurdas Govinddas & ors. reported in AIR 1980 SC 1334 particularly paragraph No.6, the penultimate paragraph of Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act makes it clear that such a contract creates an obligation annexed to the ownership of immovable property, not amounting to an interest in the property, but which obligation may be enforced against a transferee with notice of the contract or a gratuitous transferee of the property. Thus, he submits that the obligation may even be enforced against a transferee with notice or a gratuitous transferee. Thus, he submits that the obligation may even be enforced against a transferee with notice or a gratuitous transferee. He has also referred to the decision of Maqsood Ali v. Zahid Ali Sabzposh reported in AIR 1954 Allahabad 385 particularly the paragraph No.23 and thus, he submits that if the situation demands, the relief sought for in the plaint may be moulded but for the purpose of disposal of the injunction matter, the obligation of the intended transferor is to be looked into. Thus, he supports the impugned judgment and order. Having considered the submissions for the learned Advocates of both the sides, the above facts and situations and the decisions referred to, I am of the view that the defendant/petitioner herein has an obligation to execute the Deed of Sale in respect of the suit property as modified by the impugned judgment and order of the Lower Appellate Court. The decision of Bai Dosabai (supra) relating to obligation will be applicable in the instant case particularly with reference to Sections 40 and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The decision of M.V. Shankar Bhat and anr. (supra) refers to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and not to Section 40 of the said Act. So this decision will not be applicable in the instant case. The Lower Appellate Court is, therefore, justified in granting the order of injunction with regard to undivided 1/7th share of the petitioner in the suit property at 37/1 Diamond Harbour Road, Calcutta 27 till the disposal of the suit. The learned Lower Appellate Court has observed that the impugned order is necessary to prevent the breach of an obligation. It is also observed that as per Sections 31 and 39 of the Indian Contracts Act, the existing agreement which is enforceable by law should be treated as contingent contract and according to the provision of Section 39 of the Indian Contract Act, the necessary relief should be given to the plaintiffs in relation to alleged 1/7th share of the petitioner in the suit property. Thus, I find that the learned Lower Appellate Court has found prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants/opposite parties herein, the balance of convenience in granting injunction is in favour of the plaintiffs and that they would suffer irreparable loss or injury if the injunction is not granted. Thus, I find that the learned Lower Appellate Court has found prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants/opposite parties herein, the balance of convenience in granting injunction is in favour of the plaintiffs and that they would suffer irreparable loss or injury if the injunction is not granted. The Lower Appellate Court has rightly held that unless injunction is granted, there may be multiplicity of suits / proceedings. Therefore, so far as injunction matter is concerned in the impugned order, I am of the view that there is no scope of interference. The learned Appellate Court has passed orders within the bounds of its authority and there is no perversity in the impugned judgment and order. Accordingly, so far as the injunction matter is concerned in the impugned order, there is no scope of interference by exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The revisional application is devoid of merits and is dismissed accordingly. Considering the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. In view of the above order, the C.A.N. No.7744 of 2008 for recall of the interim order of stay dated August 25, 2008 passed earlier in the application, has now become infructuous and as such, the said C.A.N. application stands rejected being infructuous. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the learned Advocates for the parties on their usual undertaking.