Judgment :- P.JosephRajasekar doing business in the name of M/s.Rehoboth Garment Process, who figured as the defendant in O.S.No.240 of 2008 before the trial Court (Sub Court), Poonamallee, is the appellant in the second appeal. Radha Lakshmi, who filed the above said suit as plaintiff, is the respondent herein. The suit was filed for directing the appellant/defendant to quit and deliver vacant possession of the suit property, namely a shed bearing No.KR.9, Teleflo Mini Industrial Estate at No.3/88, Mount-Poonamallee Road, Ramapuram Village, Chennai – 89, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 5,000/- towards rent for the month of June 2008, for recovery of a sum of Rs.24,000/- towards damages for use and occupation for the months of July, August, September and October 2008 and for damages for future use and occupation from the month of November 2008 till the date of delivery at the rate of Rs.12,000/- per month and for costs. The suit was filed contending that the appellant/defendant became a tenant under the respondent/plaintiff and the lease was sought to be terminated by issuing a notice dated 09.06.2008 for which the appellant/defendant issued a reply notice dated 16.06.2008 denying the title of the respondent/plaintiff as his landlord and that thereby he lost his right to continue as a tenant in respect of the suit premises. The appellant/defendant resisted the suit by filing a written statement with a general denial of plaint averments, but with an admission that he became a tenant by entering into an agreement with the respondent/plaintiff on 17.07.2007 for a monthly rent of Rs.5000/- and by making a payment of Rs.60,000/- as deposit and that the lease was for business purpose, namely for carrying on the business of processing readymade garments. The appellant/defendant also did admit in the written statement that he received the notice dated 09.06.2008 terminating the tenancy and that the said notice was replied by a reply notice dated 16.06.2008. In addition to the said contention, the appellant/defendant also contended in his written statement that the suit property did not belong to the plaintiff as the major part of the property (4050 square meters) had been taken over by the Government under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978; that thus the land stood vested with the Government and that hence, the suit for eviction and recovery of possession and for other reliefs should be dismissed with costs. 2. Based on the above said averments, the learned trial Judge framed following three issues: 1) Whether there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled the relief of delivery of possession? and 3) To what relief? 3. In the trial, one witness was examined as PW1 and 13 documents were marked as Exs.A1 to A13 on the side of the plaintiff (respondent herein) and one witness was examined as DW1 and one document was marked as Ex.B1 on the side of the defendant (appellant herein). At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge answered issues 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff (respondent herein) and based on the said finding, the learned trial Judge, by its judgment and decree dated 05.07.2010, directed the appellant herein/defendant to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit property within a month from the date of the decree. So far as the relief of rent for the month of June 2008 is concerned, the same was granted as prayed for. So far the relief of damages for use and occupation is concerned, the learned trial Judge granted the same at the rate of Rs.8000/- uniformly from July 2008 till the date of delivery of possession. 4. As against the said judgment and decree, the appellant herein/defendant preferred an appeal on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Tiruvallur in A.S.No.45 of 2011. The learned first appellate Judge, after hearing both sides and on a re-appreciation of evidence, confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court in all respects and dismissed the appeal with cost by a judgment and decree dated 28.03.2012. Aggrieved by and challenging the same, the present second appeal has been filed. 5. Notice before admission was issued to the respondent and the respondent has entered appearance through counsel. The records of the lower Court have also been sent for and they are available for the perusal of the Court. 6. The appellant/defendant has formulated as many as 6 questions and incorporated the same as substantial questions of law, according to his perception, to be convassed in the second appeal. The records of the lower Court have also been sent for and they are available for the perusal of the Court. 6. The appellant/defendant has formulated as many as 6 questions and incorporated the same as substantial questions of law, according to his perception, to be convassed in the second appeal. They are as follows: a) Whether the lower appellate Court was right in its decision as per Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act and Subsection(g) is available for the plaintiff to file a suit in the trial Court and he proved the same? b) Whether, the lower appellate Court was correct in law in holding that, a suit can be filed under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act without existence of the lease? c) Whether the lower appellate Court was justify in rejecting the ratio's rendered in the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and as well as our Hon'ble High Court? d) Whether the lower appellate Court should have the bounden duty to accept the apex Court, and our Hon'ble High Court judgments and decided the issue as per law? e) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified to rejecting the appellant contention that the exception of the rule of estoppels under Section 116 of the Evidence Act written statement applicable to the appellants? f) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in shifting the burden of proof to the defendant without discharging the initial burden of proof of the plaintiff? 7. A consideration of the above said questions formulated by the appellant would show duplication of issues besides inappropriate framing of the questions. Upon hearing both sides and after considering the records, only the following questions can be accepted to be substantial questions of law involved in this second appeal: 1) Whether the Courts below have erred in holding that the tenancy right stood forfeited by the application of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act when the appellant/defendant had claimed that there was no existing contract of lease to be terminated or forfeited? 2) Whether the case falls under any one of the exceptions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act to rule out the application of rule of estoppel provided under Section 116 of the Evidence Act? 2) Whether the case falls under any one of the exceptions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act to rule out the application of rule of estoppel provided under Section 116 of the Evidence Act? In addition, one more substantial question of law was convassed at the time of arguments and this Court is also satisfied that such a substantial question of law has arisen in this case. The same is as follows: Substantial Question No.3: Whether the Courts below have awarded more amount than what was claimed in the plaint as damages and whether the Courts below are justified in awarding an amount which is more than the contractual rent as damages for use and occupation without there being any evidence to show that the rental value of the property is more than the contractual rent? 8. The learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent expressed their readiness to make their submissions regarding the above said substantial questions of law and made a request that the same might be decided simultaneously at the stage of admission and framing of the substantial questions of law, since the records of the lower Court had already been sent for and are available in this Court. Accordingly, the arguments advanced by Mr.D.S.Ramesh, learned counsel for the appellant and by Mr.A.Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent were heard. The materials available on record were also perused. 9. Admittedly the suit property was taken on lease by the appellant/defendant from the respondent/plaintiff on 17.07.2007 for a monthly rent of Rs.5,000/- and a sum of Rs.60,000/- was paid by the appellant/defendant as deposit. A written lease agreement was entered into fixing the period of lease as 11 months. The same has been produced before the trial Court as Ex.A1. Though the respondent/defendant might have referred to the notices sent by the Pollution Control Board and the local body in support of his claim for evicting the tenant and also the issuance of notice under Ex.A3 terminating the tenancy, the respondent/plaintiff mainly relied on the contention that the right of the appellant/defendant as tenant stood forfeited because of the denial of the title of the respondent/plaintiff by the appellant/defendant in his reply notice dated 16.06.2008. The said reply notice produced by the plaintiff was marked as Ex.A4. 10. The said reply notice produced by the plaintiff was marked as Ex.A4. 10. As pointed out supra, the appellant/defendant does not dispute the fact that he took the suit property on lease from the respondent/plaintiff under Ex.A1- Lease Deed dated 17.07.2007. Since it is an admitted fact that the appellant/defendant was inducted as a tenant in respect of the suit property by virtue of Ex.A1-Lease Deed, Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act stands attracted for the termination of the lease, as the subject matter of lease is an immovable property. Though the respondent/plaintiff initially chose to exercise the mode of termination of lease by issuance of notice asking the appellant/defendant to quit and deliver vacant possession, because of the reply notice sent by the appellant/defendant denying the title of the respondent/plaintiff, she has also relied on the forfeiture clause found in Sub-section (g)(2) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act in support of her contention that from the very moment the appellant/defendant denied the title of the respondent/plaintiff, his right as a lessee stood forfeited. 11. The appellant/defendant does not deny the fact that for the Ex.A1 notice to quit and deliver vacant possession sent by the respondent/plaintiff, a reply was sent by the appellant/defendant under Ex.A4 in which he had denied the very title of the respondent/plaintiff and also the relationship of landlord and tenant. Ex.A1 notice was issued terminating the tenancy by the end of June 2008. A clear 15 days notice came to be issued terminating the tenancy by the end of the tenancy month. In reply to the said notice, Ex.A4 was sent, in which the appellant/defendant chose to renounce the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the appellant. Hence, the respondent/plaintiff has chosen to seek recovery of possession on the basis of forfeiture of the leasehold right under Section 111(g)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not the case of the appellant/defendant that the condition precedent for seeking ejectment on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy rights had not been fulfilled. On the other hand, the appellant/defendant had taken a stand that he was justified in disputing the title of the respondent/plaintiff and hence, he incurred no forfeiture and Section 111 (g)(2) did not get attracted. On the other hand, the appellant/defendant had taken a stand that he was justified in disputing the title of the respondent/plaintiff and hence, he incurred no forfeiture and Section 111 (g)(2) did not get attracted. In this regard, both the Courts below, on careful consideration and re-appreciation of evidence respectively, came to the conclusion that the case of the appellant did not fall in any one of the exceptions provided in the forfeiture clause and hence, his right as a tenant stood forfeited. It was also the contention of the appellant/defendant before the trial Court that since the respondent/plaintiff was not the owner of the premises, the suit for ejectment was liable to be dismissed. 12. In this regard, the Courts below have considered the provisions found in Section 111 (g)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act and also Section 116 of the Evidence Act and arrived at the conclusion that the appellant/defendant incurred forfeiture because of the denial of title of the landlord and setting up the title in Government and that the appellant/defendant was also estopped from disputing the title of his landlord applying the rule of estoppel enshrined in Section 116 of the Evidence Act. Section 116 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: "116.Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession.- No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given." 13. Though the section does not recite exceptions to the rule, judicial pronouncements have recognized certain exceptions. Though the section does not recite exceptions to the rule, judicial pronouncements have recognized certain exceptions. They are as follows: The estoppel is restricted to the denial of the title of the landlord at the commencement of tenancy and it shall be open to the tenant to show that since the date of tenancy the title of the landlord came to an end or that he was evicted by a paramount title holder or that even though there was no actual eviction or dispossession from the property, under a threat of eviction he had attorned the tenancy to the paramount title holder. This was held so by the Supreme Court in D.SatyanarayanaVs. P.Jagadish reported in (1987) 4 Supreme Court Cases 424. Of course, it is true that the rule of estoppel is not attracted if the tenant contends that since (subsequent to) the date of commencement of tenancy the title of the landlord has come to an end. The appellant/defendant seems to rely on the said enunciation of principle providing an exception to the rule of estoppel found in Section 116 of the Evidence Act. But the appellant/defendant has not contend that the title of the respondent/plaintiff after the commencement of the tenancy had come to an end and that hence, he is entitled to deny and dispute the title of the landlord. On the other hand the appellant/defendant has contended that even before the inception of the tenancy, the Government took over the property under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978. 14. The above said contention seems to have been taken on a misconception and misconstruction of the above said exception provided to the rule of estoppel found in Section 116 of the Evidence Act. According to the exception, only the loss of title by the landlord subsequent to the inception of tenancy can be pleaded as an exception to the rule of estoppel. On the other hand, whatever be the defective title which the landlord would have held at the time of creation of tenancy, the tenant shall be estopped from pleading that defect as a ground for denying the relationship of landlord and tenant. On the other hand, whatever be the defective title which the landlord would have held at the time of creation of tenancy, the tenant shall be estopped from pleading that defect as a ground for denying the relationship of landlord and tenant. Similarly, eviction by the paramount title holder or a threat of eviction by the paramount title holder can also provide an exception to the rule of estoppel provided, on eviction or on the threat of eviction the tenant has attorned tenancy in favour of the paramount title holder. None of the above said exceptions stands attracted to the case of the appellant herein. On the other hand, it is the contention of the appellant that though the appellant/defendant took the property from the respondent/plaintiff on lease under Ex.A1, subsequently he came to know that the property did not belong to the respondent/plaintiff even as on the date of entering into the tenancy agreement and that the property itself had been taken by the Government under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978. The same will not fall under the exemption to the rule of estoppel provided under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. Such a contention is squarely hit by the rule of estoppel found in Section 116 of the evidence Act. 15. It is the case of the appellant/defendant based on Ex.B1 that the property was declared to be an excess holding and possession of the same was taken by the Government under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978. The appellant/defendant contends that possession was taken by the Government in 1983. It is true that proceedings were initiated under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978. Ex.B1 is the copy of the reply received by the defendant from the Public Information Officer/Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, Kundrathur Zone, Chennai – 88 under the Right to Information Act. It says that an extent of 4050 Sq.meters of land comprised in S.No.151/1B was acquired under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 and possession of the land was handed over to the Revenue Department on 05.08.1983 after completion of all procedures under the said Act. It says that an extent of 4050 Sq.meters of land comprised in S.No.151/1B was acquired under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 and possession of the land was handed over to the Revenue Department on 05.08.1983 after completion of all procedures under the said Act. The said letter also refers to payment of compensation and also allotment of the said vacant land in favour of Telace Plants and Equipments Private Limited by G.O.Ms.No.657, Revenue Department, dated 19.04.1990. But the above said Telace Plants and Equipments Private Limited was nothing but a company where the respondent/plaintiff was a major shareholder and she herself had moved for the transfer of the excess land to the said company. Though the Government had passed orders determining the excess land, according to the respondent / plaintiff, it did not take possession, which alone would vest the property with the Government. It has also been brought to the notice of the Court that during the pendency of the proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, the above said company, namely Telace Plant and Equipments Private Limited was closed and thereafter, the respondent/plaintiff put up about 47 industrial sheds in the said property. Though the appellant/defendant might have chosen to produce Ex.B1, no official connected to the said proceedings was examined to prove that the proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, had been completed before the same came to be repealed in 1999. It is the clear case of the respondent/plaintiff that despite the pendency of the proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, she continued to be in possession of the property and the industrial sheds were put up by her in 1998. After the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 was repealed, based on her possession and based on her contention that the acquisition under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 was not complete, since possession was not taken by the Government before the repeal of the Act, she had applied for transfer of the land. Since she could not get patta for the said land, she filed a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.28993 of 2007 for the issuance of a writ of declaration declaring that the respondent/plaintiff, who was the petitioner in the writ petitioner, was entitled to retain the lands measuring an extent of 4131.598 square meters comprised in S.No.151/1 part of Ramapuram Village. As against the said order of the singe Judge passed in the writ petition allowing the same, a writ appeal came to be filed in W.A.No.554 of 2011 and a Division Bench of this Court allowed the writ appeal by a judgment dated 15.11.2011. Producing a copy of the same, learned counsel for the appellant argued that since ultimately the respondent/plaintiff had failed in the writ proceedings, it must be taken that she had lost her title to the suit property under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978; that her attempt to regain the property proved to be a failure and that therefore, the same should be taken as loss of title of the landlord after the inception of the tenancy, which could be pleaded by the tenant as an exception to the rule of estoppel found in Section 116 of the Evidence Act. 16. This court is not in a position to accept the above said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. A perusal of the judgment of the Division Bench shows that the claim of the writ petitioner therein, who is the respondent herein/plaintiff, that she continued to be in possession of the property held to be in excess of the ceiling till the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 came to be repealed, was not rejected. On the other hand since she had prayed for an order under the said Act, the Court opined that any order that might have been passed after 16.06.1999, the date on which the Act was repealed by the authorities under the Act would be without jurisdiction. A close scrutiny of the said judgment of the Division Bench shows that the writ appeal was allowed on the premise that all proceedings pending under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 abated on the repeal of the Act and any order passed subsequent to the said date, namely 16.06.1999 would be without jurisdiction. A close scrutiny of the said judgment of the Division Bench shows that the writ appeal was allowed on the premise that all proceedings pending under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 abated on the repeal of the Act and any order passed subsequent to the said date, namely 16.06.1999 would be without jurisdiction. Therefore, the same cannot be cited as a ground for the loss of title by the landlord, namely the respondent/plaintiff, after the creation of tenancy under Ex.A1, which could be claimed as an exception for the rule of estoppel contemplated under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. 17. Even assuming that the judgment of the Division Bench in the writ appeal would mean that acquisition under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 had been completed prior to the date of repeal of the Act and hence, no order could be passed exempting the land subsequent to the date of repeal of the said Act, the same shall not be pleaded as a ground in support for the contention of the appellant/defendant that the respondent/plaintiff has lost her title to the suit property after the commencement of tenancy under Ex.A1. Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, which was brought into force in 1978 was repealed with effect from 16.06.1999. According to the appellant / defendant, the proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 was completed on 05.08.1983 and possession was taken on 05.08.1983, whereupon the property vested with the Government. As pointed out supra, except the reply received under the Right to Information Act, no other document has been produced and no officer concerning the proceedings was examined to show possession was actually taken. Even assuming that, as found noted in Ex.B1, possession was taken on 05.08.1983 and thus the property stood vested with the Government, whether the same will provide an exception to the rule of estoppel in this case is the question to be answered. 18. If possession was taken by the Government and the property stood vested with the Government in 1983 itself, it is not known as to how the respondent/plaintiff came to be in possession of the same in 2007 to lease it out to the appellant/defendant under Ex.A1. 18. If possession was taken by the Government and the property stood vested with the Government in 1983 itself, it is not known as to how the respondent/plaintiff came to be in possession of the same in 2007 to lease it out to the appellant/defendant under Ex.A1. Hence, it is crystal clear that what the appellant/defendant pleads is the absence of title or defect in title of the respondent/plaintiff (landlord) even as on the date of creation of the tenancy. Having entered into a tenancy agreement with the respondent/plaintiff acknowledging her right to give the property on lease to the appellant/defendant, he is not entitled to cite the defect in title, as on the date of creation of tenancy, for the renunciation of the tenancy agreement itself. It is not the case of the appellant/defendant that subsequent to the creation of tenancy under Ex.A1, the respondent/plaintiff lost whatever title or right she was having on the date of Ex.A1 and thus, his case comes under the exemption to the rule of estoppel. It is also not the case of the appellant/defendant that subsequent to Ex.A1, he was evicted by the Government or due to threat of eviction by the Government he had attorned the tenancy in favour of the Government. As such, the rule of estoppel contemplated under Section 116 of the Evidence Act squarely applies and the appellant/defendant is estopped from denying the title of the landlord, namely the respondent/plaintiff. As he has chosen to deny the tile of the landlord and thereby renounced his position as a tenant he has suffered forfeiture of his right and the respondent/plaintiff is justified in seeking ejectment on the ground of forfeiture. The Courts below have arrived at the correct conclusion in this regard. Hence, the first and second substantial questions of law framed above are answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent, holding that they were rightly decided by the Courts below and that there is no infirmity or defect in finding of the courts below in this regard. 19. The third substantial question of law does have substance in it. The respondent/plaintiff has chosen to seek a direction for payment of Rs.5000/- as rent for the month of June 2008, which the courts below have rightly allowed since the contractual rent is admittedly Rs.5000/-per month. 19. The third substantial question of law does have substance in it. The respondent/plaintiff has chosen to seek a direction for payment of Rs.5000/- as rent for the month of June 2008, which the courts below have rightly allowed since the contractual rent is admittedly Rs.5000/-per month. Regarding the claim of damages for use and occupation for the subsequent period, there is some confusion in the pleadings in paragraphs 12 and 15 of the plaint. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, the plaintiff has stated that he has filed the suit for recovery of damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs.12,000/- per month from July 2008. However, in paragraph 15, in the prayer part, only a sum of Rs.24,000/- was claimed as damages for use and occupation for four months, namely July, August, September and October 2008. The same works out to Rs.6,000/- per month. For the subsequent period, namely from the month of November 2008 till delivery of possession, the plaintiff has prayed for future damages at the rate of Rs.12,000/- per month. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court have chosen to allow damages uniformly at the rate of Rs.8000/-disregarding the fact that for the months of July, August, September and October 2008, only a sum of Rs.24,000/-at the rate of Rs.6,000/- per month, had been claimed. More amount than what was claimed by the plaintiff was awarded as damages. Even for the subsequent period also, though the respondent/plaintiff had claimed damages at the rate of Rs.12,000/-month, there is no evidence to prove the rental value of the property to justify the claim. In the absence of any evidence justifying the claim of damages for use and occupation, which is more than the contractual rent, the Courts shall not be justified in awarding the same. In such cases, the Court is bound to award only the contractual rent as damages for use and occupation. In this regard, both the courts below have committed an error and rendered a perverse finding not supported by evidence holding that the respondent/plaintiff was entitled to recover damages at the rate of Rs.8000/- per month from July 2008 till delivery of possession. 20. As pointed out supra, the same cannot be justified in the absence of any evidence showing that the rental value of the property is higher than the contractual rent. 20. As pointed out supra, the same cannot be justified in the absence of any evidence showing that the rental value of the property is higher than the contractual rent. In the absence of such evidence, only the contractual rent shall be awarded as damages for use and occupation. Hence, the third substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellant holding that the award of damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs.8000/- per month cannot be sustained and that the same has got to be reduced to Rs.5000/- per month. 21. For the reasons sated above, this Court comes to the conclusion that the second appeal is bound to be allowed in part and the decree of the trial court as confirmed by the appellate Court deserves interference and modification regarding damages for use and occupation from July 2008 till delivery of possession. In all other respects, the decree of the trial Court as confirmed by the appellate Court shall be kept intact and stand confirmed. Admittedly, a sum of Rs.60,000/-paid by the appellant as deposit is available with the respondent/plaintiff. It is also admitted that a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-was also paid by the appellant to the plaintiff. The said amounts shall be set-off against the rent for the month of June 2008 and damages for use and occupation from the month of July 2008 till delivery of possession. 22. In the result, the second appeal is allowed in part and the decree of the trial Court shall stand modified in respect of damages for use and occupation from the month of July 2008 till delivery of possession regarding quantum alone by reducing the same from Rs.8000/- to Rs.5000/- per month. The deposit amount of Rs.60,000/- and amount paid during the pendency of the case shall be adjusted towards the rent for the month of June 2008 and towards the damagesfor use and occupation from the month of July, August, September and October 2008 and after such adjustment the balance amount alone need be paid by the appellant/defendant to the respondent/plaintiff. In all other respects the decree of the trial court shall stand confirmed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.