Judgment :- This appeal is focussed by the plaintiff as against the judgement and decree dated 8.10.2007 passed by the III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, in O.S.No.4129 of 2000, which was filed for recovery of money. 2. The parties, for convenience sake, are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. The epitome and the long and short of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this appeal would run thus: A. The appellant herein, as plaintiff, filed the suit O.S.No.4129 of 2000, as against the respondent herein/defendant seeking the following reliefs: "...to pass a judgement and decree in favour of the plaintiff as against the defendant: i) directing the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.9,66,063.78. ii) directing the defendant to pay interest on the said sum of Rs.9,66,063.78 at 12% per annum from the date of the plaint to the date of decree. iii) directing the defendant to pay costs of the suit." (extracted as such) on the main ground that the defendant was doing business in hulling and as such, she was appointed as hulling agent by the plaintiff in Periyar Region and in Gobichettipalayam District for hulling paddy in her rice mill at Siruvalur Town under the name and style of Venkatesa Rice Mill. (ii) An agreement emerged between the plaintiff and the defendant on 17.1.1975 and the latter was appointed as the hulling agent. The terms and conditions are found set out therein. The stocks purchased and entrusted with the defendant by the plaintiff, was expected to be kept in safe custody by the defendant-the agent and the latter was solely responsible for the proper storage and safety of such items. (iii) The go-downs concerned were agreed to be under double lock system. One lock being operated by the defendant-the agent and the other by the official of the plaintiff-the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation of India. The agent could receive only such quantities of paddy that would be allotted by the plaintiff or its authorised representative and the defendant should hull it at the rates mentioned in Schedule-I of that agreement. One lock being operated by the defendant-the agent and the other by the official of the plaintiff-the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation of India. The agent could receive only such quantities of paddy that would be allotted by the plaintiff or its authorised representative and the defendant should hull it at the rates mentioned in Schedule-I of that agreement. (iv) While so, on various dates between 18th December 1975 and 1st December 1076 a total quantity of 1317.639.400 metric tonnes of paddy comprising Tanjavur Kuruvai 1975, Thanjavur Samba 1976, North Arcot Samba 1976, Chengalpattu Samba 1976 and D.P.C. (Direct purchase Centre) Samba 1976 was delivered to the defendant for hulling. (v) Out of the above paddy delivered to the defendant 37.031.000 metric tonnes of paddy were taken back from the (n.c) on the 10th January, 1977 in view of the consistent defaults on the part of the hulling agent. (vi) Out of the above paddy entrusted, 249.852.400 metric tonnes comprised of Thanjavur Kuruvai 1975, being the first, second and third sort, 164.224.400 metric tonnes of rice was due. The defendant failed to account for the same, but delivered only 146.601.200 metric tonnes of rice. Against 1386 gunny bags delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant with Thanjavur Kuruvai 1975 paddy, the defendant delivered only 1966 bags with rice; 900 bags were transferred to other hulling agents from the defendant because of defaults of the defendant. The defendant was allowed a concession in respect of Thanjavur Kuruvai 1975 paddy at 5% in respect of gunny bags issued and this accounted for 217 gunnies. Thus, the defendant had to account for 1303 gunnies out of the total lot of 4386 gunnies entrusted to her. There were also a shortage in terms of rice amounting to 17.623.200 metric tonnes. (vii) In respect of Thanjavur Samba 1976, the plaintiff had entrusted 9160 gunny bags with 525.736.000 metric tonnes of paddy comprising of the first, second and third sort. The defendant had to account for 356.385.400 metric tonnes of rice in respect of the above paddy. The defendant delivered 300.439.400 metric tonnes of rice and there was thus a shortage of 55.946.000 metric tonnes of rice. The defendant had to account for 356.385.400 metric tonnes of rice in respect of the above paddy. The defendant delivered 300.439.400 metric tonnes of rice and there was thus a shortage of 55.946.000 metric tonnes of rice. In respect of a total of 9160 gunny bags delivered with Thanjavur Samba 1976, 4006 gunny bags were returned with rice and 684 empty gunnies were returned making up a total of 4,692 gunny bags and there was thus a shortage of 4,468 gunny bags to be returned. (viii) The plaintiff had delivered to the defendant 354 gunny bags with (n.c.) metric tonnes of North Arcot Samba 1976 of the first sort in respect of which, first sort rice of 18.415.700 metric tonnes was due. The defendant delivered 17.321.800 metric tonnes of rice and 233 gunny bags and there was thus a shortage of 1,093.900 metric tonnes of rice. There was also shortage of 121 gunny bags. (ix) The plaintiff had further delivered to the defendant 260 bags of Chengalpattu Samba 1976 weighing 19.41.000 metric tonnes of paddy of the first sort and the defendant had accounted for 5.447.200 metric tonnes of rice. But the defendant had to account for 13.198.800 metric tonnes of rice of the first sort. There was thus a shortage in respect of this variety of 7.751.600 metric tonnes of rice. The defendant had delivered 74 gunny bags with rice and 186 empty gunnies making up a total o 260 gunnies and there was no shortage in respect of gunnies. (x) The plaintiff had been producing paddy from Direct Centres and out of the paddy procured by the plaintiff from Direct Purchase Centres, the plaintiff had delivered Samba 1976 paddy of 495.155.000 metric tonnes in 8350 gunny bags. Out of the aforesaid paddy a quantity of 37.031.000 metric tonnes were taken delivery of from the defendant and delivered to other hulling agents and the defendant had hence to account for the rice for the balance of paddy. Out of a total quantity of 308.381.200 metric tonnes of rice to be accounted for by the defendant, the defendant delivered only 220.406.600 metric tonnes of rice, and there was thus a shortage of 87.974.600 metric tonnes of rice. Out of a total quantity of 308.381.200 metric tonnes of rice to be accounted for by the defendant, the defendant delivered only 220.406.600 metric tonnes of rice, and there was thus a shortage of 87.974.600 metric tonnes of rice. Out of the total gunny bags of 8350 the defendant had returned 2,939 gunnies with rice and 684 empty gunnies making up a total of 3,623 gunnies and she failed to account for and deliver 4,727 gunny bags. (xi) On inspection it was found by the officials of the plaintiff Corporation that there was shortage, at the instance of the defendant, to a tune of 170.389.300 metric tonnes of rice. As per the terms of the agreement, the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.7,10,341.02. Despite demands, there was no response from the defendant. Hence the suit. The other details, for the purpose of disposal of this appeal, are not germane as of now. As such, the plaintiff claimed the said amount with 12% interest from 1.1.1977 to 30.4.1981. However, the interest is restricted for the period between 1.5.1978 and 30.4.1981 at the rate of 12% per annum, which was quantified at Rs.2,55,722.76. As such, the total suit amount was Rs.9,66,063.78. B. Whereas, the defendant challenging and impugning the averments/allegations in the plaint, filed the written statement which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: (i) The plaintiff has to strictly prove the averments in the plaint as those are fraught with falsities. (ii) There was no shortage at all at the instance of the defendant. There is no proof to show that at the instance of the defendant there was any misappropriation of the stock or that there was default on the part of the defendant. C. Whereupon the lower Court framed the issues. Up went the trial, wherein on the plaintiff's side one C.R.Veeraraghavan examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A54 were marked. The defendant examined herself as D.W.1 and marked Exs.B1 to B6 on her side. D. Ultimately, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgement and decree of the trial Court, this appeal has been focussed by the plaintiff on various grounds. 5. Heard both sides. 6. The defendant examined herself as D.W.1 and marked Exs.B1 to B6 on her side. D. Ultimately, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgement and decree of the trial Court, this appeal has been focussed by the plaintiff on various grounds. 5. Heard both sides. 6. The learned Senior counsel for the defendant would put forth and set forth his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus: (i) The appeal focussed by the plaintiff as against the dismissal of the suit is not tenable for the simple reason that the onus of proof, which was cast on the plaintiff, was not discharged, unless the plaintiff could prove specifically that certain amount of paddy was entrusted to the defendant for hulling and that the defendant committed default in giving the end product to the plaintiff, the question of mulcting the defendant with the liability would be a well neigh impossibility. (ii) Several documents were not marked before the trial Court, which also in the judgement clearly observed that while the case was transferred from the original side of the High Court to the trial Court which passed the judgement, certain documents were not sent; that there were criminal proceedings also and that some documents were sent to the Criminal Court. Wherefore, the question of mulcting the defendant with liability would be untenable. Ultimately the lower Court dismissed the suit, warranting no interference in appeal. 7. Consequent upon such representation and also on perusal of the records, this Court took steps to ascertain the true facts. 8. There were lot of correspondences emerged between the High Court registry and the criminal Court concerned as well as the trial Court and ultimately, the relevant particulars were fretted out and with the help of both sides, the lower Courts as well as the registry, what I could understand is that there are certain documents touching upon entrustment of the paddy by the plaintiff with the defendant, but those documents were not exhibited during trial. 9. No doubt it was the duty of the plaintiff, as keen as mustard to see that those documents were exhibited. But unfortunately that was not done so. 10. The core question arises as to whether one more opportunity could be given to the plaintiff to do it. 11. 9. No doubt it was the duty of the plaintiff, as keen as mustard to see that those documents were exhibited. But unfortunately that was not done so. 10. The core question arises as to whether one more opportunity could be given to the plaintiff to do it. 11. I recollect the legal adage that 'every trial is a voyage of discovery, in which truth is the quest, as found highlighted in the following precedents of the Hon'ble Apex Court: (i) 2012(1) MWN (Civil) 840 (S.C.) [Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and others vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (dead) through L.Rs.] Certain excerpts from it would run thus: "36. In Ritesh Tiwari and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2010(10) SCC 677 , this court reproduced often quoted quotation which reads as under: "Every trial is voyage of discovery in which truth is the quest". 37. This court observed that the power is to be exercised with an object to sub-serve the cause of justice and public interest and for getting the evidence in aid of a just decision and to uphold the truth. 38. Lord Denning, in the case of Jones v. National Coal Board, 1957 (2) QB 55 has observed that: "In the system of trial that we evolved in this country, the Judge sits to hear and determine the issues raised by the parties, not to conduct an investigation or examination on behalf of the society at large, as happens, we believe, in some foreign countries." 39. Certainly, the above, is not true of the Indian Judicial System. A judge in the Indian System has to be regarded as failing to exercise its jurisdiction and thereby discharging its judicial duty, if in the guise of remaining neutral, he opts to remain passive to the proceedings before him. He has to always keep in mind that "every trial is a voyage of discovery in which truth is the quest." In order to bring on record the relevant fact, he has to play an active role; no doubt within the bounds of the statutorily defined procedural law. 51. In the administration of justice, judges and lawyers play equal roles. Like Judges, lawyers also must ensure that truth triumphs in the administration of justice. 52. Truth is the foundation of justice. 51. In the administration of justice, judges and lawyers play equal roles. Like Judges, lawyers also must ensure that truth triumphs in the administration of justice. 52. Truth is the foundation of justice. It must be the endeavour of all the judicial officers and judges to ascertain truth in every matter and no stone should be left unturned in achieving this object. Courts must give greater emphasis on the veracity of pleadings and documents in order to ascertain the truth." (ii) 2010(10) SCC 677 [Ritesh Tiwari and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others]. Certain excerpts from it would run thus: "37. Section 165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 empowers the court to ask questions relevant, irrelevant, related or unrelated to the case to the party to ascertain the true facts. The party may not answer the question but it is not permitted to tell the court that the question put to him is irrelevant or the facts the court wants to ascertain are not in issue. Exercise of such a power is necessary for the reason that the judgment of the court is to be based on relevant facts which have been duly proved. A court in any case cannot admit illegal or inadmissible evidence for basing its decision. It is an extraordinary power conferred upon the court to elicit the truth and to act in the interest of justice. A wide discretion has been conferred on the court to act as the exigencies of justice require. Thus, in order to discover or obtain proper proof of the relevant facts, the court can ask the question to the parties concerned at any time and in any form. "Every trial is voyage of discovery in which truth is the quest". Therefore, power is to be exercised with an object to subserve the cause of justice and public interest, and for getting the evidence in aid of a just decision and to uphold the truth. The purpose being to secure justice by full discovery of truth and an accurate knowledge of facts, the court can put questions to the parties, except those which fall within exceptions contained in the said provision itself (vide Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra and Zahira Habibulla H.Sheikh vs. State of Gujarat]. 12. The purpose being to secure justice by full discovery of truth and an accurate knowledge of facts, the court can put questions to the parties, except those which fall within exceptions contained in the said provision itself (vide Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra and Zahira Habibulla H.Sheikh vs. State of Gujarat]. 12. A mere running of the eye over those decisions would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and shed light on the point that a Judge is not expected to simply decide the case based on materials placed before the Court. He should have the intention to delve deep into the matter and cull out the truth. 13. Here is the case between the public sector undertaking, namely, the plaintiff and an individual-a business person. The trial Court was totally wrong in simply throwing the baby along with bathe water. He cannot simply hold that the documents were not available and that he was dismissing the case. To say the least, the method and manner in which the lower Court washed its hands from its responsibility is far from satisfactory. No doubt, there were some laches on the staff of the Subordinate judiciary and also on the part of the advocate, who appeared for the plaintiff in pursuing the matter strictly in accordance with law. 14. Now then, it transpired that there are certain vital documents, which have to be exhibited. This is admittedly a case where double lock system was contemplated, which means that the godown should be under the lock and key of both the parties i.e. the officials of plaintiff as well as the defendant and it has to be found out as to how then the shortage occurred. Not to put too fine a point on it, the trial turned out to be an ill wind that blew no one any good. 15. In such a case opportunity should be given to the plaintiff to exhibit those documents, whereupon the defendant could cross-examine such witness with reference to those exhibits and also adduce rebuttal evidence in that regard. 16. On balance, I would like to set aside the judgement and decree of the trial Court and remit the matter back to the trial Court with the direction that the plaintiff shall be given opportunity to mark additional documents by recalling the witnesses or for summoning fresh witnesses. 16. On balance, I would like to set aside the judgement and decree of the trial Court and remit the matter back to the trial Court with the direction that the plaintiff shall be given opportunity to mark additional documents by recalling the witnesses or for summoning fresh witnesses. Whereupon the defendant shall have the opportunity of cross-examining those witnesses and also recall her own witnesses in addition to summoning fresh witnesses and adduce rebuttal evidence. 17. Accordingly the judgement and decree of the trial Court is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the trial Court to carry out the aforesaid mandates untrammelled and uninfluenced by any of the observations made by this Court. Both the parties shall appear before the trial Court on 15.11.2012. 18. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent/defendant would make an extempore submission, on hearing this judgement pronounced, that the police, in connection with the criminal case conducted search in the premises of the defendant and they took away the registers and documents available with the defendant and if those registers and documents are produced, certainly that would prove the innocence and the non-liability of the defendant so far this case is concerned. Hence, direction also is issued to the plaintiff as well as to the persons concerned that if any summons is issued by the trial Court, at the instance of the defendant, the same shall be responded to positively. 19. In the result, the appeal is disposed of accordingly. However, there is no order as to costs. The records shall be sent to the trial Court immediately.