Judgment 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellants. The learned Counsel for the respondents remains absent. 2. The plaintiff before the Trial Court died during the pendency of the proceedings and is now represented by his legal representatives, who are the appellants. It was the case of the plaintiffs that the property as described is the plaint schedule measuring about 24 guntas in Survey No.377/4 was part of a larger extent of land measuring 4 acres purchased by Chikkamuniyappa, the father of the second and third defendants, from one Kariyamma, in the year 1939. It is claimed that since there was some doubt about the title of Kariyamma to the property that was sold, a sale deed was also obtained in respect of the very same property from one Patel Jalleel Saheb, in the name of Veerappa in the year 1945. It is claimed that Chikkamuniyappa and the second and third defendants were members of a joint family and the property purchased was in favour of the joint family though in the name of Veerappa. The land was said to be inam land. When the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Inams Abolition Act’ for brevity) came into force, Chikkamuniyappa had made an application to the Competent Authority for grant of occupancy rights and obtained a certificate to that effect in his name. In the year 1963, there was a partition in the family of Chikkamuniyappa. Of the 4 acres possessed by the family, 10 guntas were kharab, 25 guntas was left for grazing of cattle by all the members of the family, including the paternal uncle of the second and third defendants and the second defendant acquired about 2 acres and 5 guntas at the partition and the third defendant acquired about 1 acre. The third defendant is said to have sold the suit property to one Kempaiah under a registered sale deed dated 10-10-1963. Chikkamuniyappa and the second defendant are said to have endorsed the sale deed. The plaintiff had purchased the suit property from Kempaiah under a sale deed dated 27-6-1969 and that he had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property ever since its purchase. Chikkamuniyappa and the second defendant are said to have endorsed the sale deed. The plaintiff had purchased the suit property from Kempaiah under a sale deed dated 27-6-1969 and that he had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property ever since its purchase. The second defendant, who had got 2 acres and 5 guntas of land as his share at the partition, had sold 30 guntas to one Abdul Subhan and another 30 guntas to the plaintiff on 3-11-1966. He again sold yet another 25 guntas to one Ameer under a registered sale deed, dated 18-5-1966, who in turn, had sold the same to the plaintiff under a sale deed dated 22-8-1968. The plaintiff had again purchased 25 guntas of land, which was set aside for grazing of cattle, from the second and third defendants and their paternal uncle, under a registered sale deed dated 19-5-1966. Thus, the second defendant no longer had any interest in the joint family properties. The plaintiff and one Abdul Subhan, who purchased a total extent of about 2 acres and 30 guntas from the second defendant, jointly sold the same to the first defendant. Originally, all these lands were described as Survey No. 178. It was the plaintiffs’ case that after the Inam Commissioner’s order, the survey numbers of these lands changed to 171 and 173. Later, it was assigned a new Survey No. 377/4. The second defendant, who had lost interest in the suit property and who had endorsed the sale deed 10-10-1963 executed by his brother-the third defendant, is said to have sold the same to the first defendant under a registered sale deed dated 15-4-1975. Neither the first defendant nor the second defendant had any interest in the suit property, but he first defendant was trying to interfere with the same and therefore, the suit for declaration. It was further contended that the fourth defendant, in turn, who was relying on certain acquisition proceedings in laying claim to the suit property was also not entitled to do so since acquisition proceedings were quashed and that had attained finality. In any event, the sale of land by the first defendant to the fourth defendant is bad in law, as the fourth defendant was admittedly a non-agriculturist. 3. In any event, the sale of land by the first defendant to the fourth defendant is bad in law, as the fourth defendant was admittedly a non-agriculturist. 3. The first defendant had entered appearance and filed written statement, to contend that it was not correct to state that Chikkamuniyappa and defendants 2 and 3 constituted a joint family and that the suit property was joint family property. The property belonged to one Erappa, son of Chikkamuniyappa and it was not joint family property. It was jodi inam land and one Chikkamuniyappa had filed an application before the Additional Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition, Bangalore, seeking grant of occupancy rights in respect of 1 acre in Survey No. 173 and 1 acre in Survey No. 171 of Jodi Kempapura Village of Bangalore North Taluk. The Competent Authority considered the rival claims and granted occupancy rights in respect of the above in favour of Chikkamuniyappa. The claim in the plaint without reference to the land by its Survey Number is, therefore, vague and mischievous. The first defendant contends that he had no knowledge of any partition between Chikkamuniyappa and defendants 2 and 3 in respect of the joint family property nor the extent of land allotted to defendants 2 and 3 at the alleged partition. The said defendant had also denied the subsequent sale transactions. On the other hand, it was claimed that the said defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property till it was sold in favour of one Vyalikaval House Building Co-operative Society. The plaintiffs claimed that defendant 3 and got 1 acre of land at a partition and it is that which is the suit schedule property, is not substantiated by producing the partition deed. On the other hand, the suit property measures only 24 guntas and not 1 acre. Even assuming that Chikkamuniyappa was the father of defendants 2 and 3, Chikkamuniyappa had acquired title to the suit land only after he was granted occupancy rights as per an order of the year 1965. The plaint had not even disclosed the survey numbers of the alleged lands said to have been allotted to the share of defendant 2 and subsequently sold by him. The plaint had not even disclosed the survey numbers of the alleged lands said to have been allotted to the share of defendant 2 and subsequently sold by him. It was claimed that after the conduct of the general resurvey and settlement, old Survey No. 171 of Kempapura Agrahara was given Re-Survey No.377 and after pucca phodi, it was given sub-survey Nos. 377/2, 377/3, 377/4, 377/5 and 377/6. The first defendant, under a registered sale deed dated 15-4-1975, purchased 24 guntas of land in Re-survey No. 377/4 (Old No. 171) from its owner Erappa, son of Chikkamuniyappa and was in absolute possession and enjoyment till it was transferred in favour of the aforesaid society under a registered sale deed dated 26-5-1983 and since then, it was the Society which was in possession of the said land. Pursuant to an order issued by the Government of Karnataka under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1976 Act’ for brevity) since the defendant had transferred his ownership in favour of the society, he had no claim over the same and the question of interference with the land did not arise. It was contended that the plaintiffs had not produced any document to show that the land purchased was the suit schedule land. The land was granted in favour of Chikkamuniyappa and after Chikkamuniyappa, his son Erappa succeeded to the property and mutation entries in respect of the land were also made in the name of Erappa and after the purchase by the first defendant, her name had been entered and after it was sold in favour of the society, the same was notified for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended by Land Acquisition (Karnataka Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1894 Act’ for brevity) by the Bangalore Development Authority. A final notification under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act was also issued and an award had been passed. But, however, possession, of the land remained with the society. On the above contentions, the first defendant sought for dismissal of the suit. The fourth defendant also filed written statement to deny the plaint allegations. A final notification under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act was also issued and an award had been passed. But, however, possession, of the land remained with the society. On the above contentions, the first defendant sought for dismissal of the suit. The fourth defendant also filed written statement to deny the plaint allegations. The fourth defendant was the society, to whom land had been sold according to the first defendant and it reiterated the contentions put forward by the first defendant. 4. On the basis of the said pleadings, the Court below had framed the following issues.-- 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is the owner and in possession of suit property? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that defendant 1 is interfering with his possession? 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party? 4. Whether the defendant 1 proves that she has sold the suit property in favour of Vyalikaval House Building Co-operative Society Limited, and hence the said society is the owner and in possession of the suit land? 5. Whether the defendant 1 proves that the suit land is acquired by Bangalore Development Authority? 6. Whether the first defendant is not a necessary party to the suit? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration and permanent injunction? Additional Issue dated 30-6-1988: 1. Whether the fourth defendant proves that the suit is liable to be dismissed for the reasons stated in para 9(a) of its written statement?” The Court below has answered issues 1, 2, 6 and 7 in the negative and issues 4 and 5 is the affirmative. It is that which is under challenge in the present appeal. 5. The learned Counsel for the appellants has supported the Memorandum of Appeal with an elaborate synopsis and also written arguments. It is contended that it would have to be seen whether the finding of the Court as to the ownership of the plaintiff of the suit property vis-à-vis the ownership of the first defendant and the fourth defendant and the contention whether the land had been acquired, can be sustained. The learned Counsel would point out that these points are considered with reference to issue Nos.1, 4 and 5. The learned Counsel would submit that the findings of the Court below that there was no material produced to demonstrate that the land in Survey No. 178, was reassigned Survey No. 171. The learned Counsel would point out that these points are considered with reference to issue Nos.1, 4 and 5. The learned Counsel would submit that the findings of the Court below that there was no material produced to demonstrate that the land in Survey No. 178, was reassigned Survey No. 171. This is explained by the circumstance that in all the sale deeds produced by the plaintiff, the land is claimed to have been granted at the inams abolition proceedings, whereby the number of the proceedings is quoted along with the relevant date. This is not disputed by the defendants. The Deputy Commissioner, in those proceedings had in turn, held that the property was a portion of Survey No. 171. The subsequent transactions are all sufficient to establish that the properties originally purchased were held by Chikkamuniyappa and his family and the suit property was a portion of the same. The learned Counsel would draw attention to Exhibit P. 7, under which, the land was sold to one Kempaiah by his brother Appayyanna, which was prior to the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, wherein the land was assigned Survey No. 178 and attention is also drawn to Exhibit D. 3, under which, the first defendant has purchased the property, which has been identified as Survey No.377/6 and the measurement of the property is mentioned in terms of feet. Hence, the incorrect survey numbers indicated by scribes of those deeds would also affect the title of the first defendant, and he was in no better position that the plaintiff. Insofar as the finding of the Court below that the proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act referred to 1 acre of land whereas the suit land measured only 24 guntas, the learned Counsel seeks to address the same as follows:- That the land in Survey No. 171 actually measures more than what is indicated in the order of the Inams Deputy Commissioner. Secondly, it is contended that 1 acre mentioned in Exhibits P. 4 and P. 5 is ambiguous since Erappa and Appayyanna and other members of the family had sold 3 acres and 34 ½ guntas under various sale deeds, in land in Survey No. 171, which is now identified as land in Survey No. 377 by various sub-numbers. If all those sale deeds are taken into account, the case of the plaintiff ought to be accepted. If all those sale deeds are taken into account, the case of the plaintiff ought to be accepted. Insofar as the absence of the plaintiff’s name in the index of land, Ex. P. 17, is concerned, the learned Counsel would contend that the name of Chikkamuniyappa is shown and since mutation had not taken place by the time the index of land was prepared, his name had continued. Insofar as the acquisition of the lands by the Bangalore Development Authority is concerned, the same was not developed by the said authority over the years and hence the purpose for which the same was acquired was rendered redundant and consequently, the acquisition lapsed. The learned Counsel for the appellants would also seek to produce additional documents. The documents sought to be produced are said to be mentioned in Exhibit D. 3 and the copies of the documents were obtained. But, the learned Counsel, who represented the plaintiff before the Trial Court had opined that it did not have a direct bearing on the suit property and hence, they were not necessary to be filed. The said documents produced would clearly indicate the extent of land held by the family and it is also claimed that the suit property was assigned Survey No. 178 and after the abolition of the inams, the land was given Survey No.377/4 and the actual measurements were indicated only thereafter. In the opinion of this Court, these additional documents may only have the effect of further confounding a totally confusing state of affairs. The applicant seeing to produce the documents does not merit consideration. The elaborate written arguments submitted lacks cohesion and is difficult to comprehend. 6. The Court below, while answering issues 1, 4 and 5 has expressed that the plaintiff had not produced any evidence to substantiate that the land in Survey No. 178 was assigned a new Survey No. 171 and has also addressed the boundaries for land sold under Exhibit P. 7, which did not tally with the boundaries of the suit schedule property. Similarly, the evidence of the plaintiff that the suit property was sold by Appayyanna in favour of Kempaiah under Exhibit P. 7 and that Kempaiah in turn had sold the property to the father of the plaintiff under Exhibit P. 8 is also disbelieved, since on a perusal of Exhibit P. 8, it is found that the property in Survey No. 178, to an extent of 1 acre is sold by Kempaiah in favour of the father of the plaintiff and in the sale deed also, the extent sold was 1 acre and not 24 guntas, which is the extent of the suit schedule property. And again, the western boundary is shown as land belonging to Munithimmaiah, which is not in accordance with the description given by the plaintiff in the plaint and on the other hand, Exhibit P. 7 indicated that on the western side, Appayyanna had retained the property belonging to him. Therefore, the boundaries shown in Exhibits P. 7 and P. 8 did not tally with the suit property and there was no evidence placed before the Court to demonstrate that old Survey No. 178 was assigned new Survey No. 171. Apart from Exhibits P. 7 and P. 8, no other document was placed before the Court to prove his title. Exhibit P. 2 did not disclose survey numbers and the extent sold. Exhibit P. 3 also disclosed Survey No. 178 and in the absence of any material evidence to show that Survey No. 178 was given new No.171, it was difficult of acceptance. Exhibits P. 15 and P. 16 also were in respect of Survey No. 178 and would suffer from the same infirmity, when it could not be accepted that Survey No. 178 became 171 at a later point of time. Even insofar as land in Survey No.377/4 as per Exhibit P. 17 is concerned, it stood in the name of Chikkamuniyappa and not the plaintiff or his father. Similarly, Exhibit P. 18 did not disclose the name of the plaintiff or his father. On the other hand, Exhibit D. 1, produced by the defendant disclosed that Survey No. 171 was given new Survey No. 377 and Exhibit D 2 indicated that Survey No. 377 was sub-divided as Survey Nos. Similarly, Exhibit P. 18 did not disclose the name of the plaintiff or his father. On the other hand, Exhibit D. 1, produced by the defendant disclosed that Survey No. 171 was given new Survey No. 377 and Exhibit D 2 indicated that Survey No. 377 was sub-divided as Survey Nos. 377/1, 377/2, 377/3, 377/4, 377/5 and 377/6 and Exhibit D. 3, a copy of the sale deed was produced to show that the property was purchased by defendant 4 from defendant 1. Exhibit D. 5 was the permission to sell the land and Exhibit D. 6 was a notification under the 1976 Act, endorsing that the land in Survey No. 377/4 stood in the name of the first defendant. Ex. D. 8 disclosed that the property had been acquired and there was a clear admission that the land had been acquired measuring 24 guntas, standing in the name of Chikkamuniyappa. Insofar as the allegation that the Bangalore Development Authority had not substantially developed the land subsequent to acquisition etc., were not addressed by the Court below, in the absence of Bangalore Development Authority being made a party to the suit. 7. On those findings, the suit having been dismissed, the elaborate arguments canvassed by the learned Counsel for the appellants, with reference to the particulars, which may not be wholly relevant and since this Court fully agrees with the reasoning of the Court below, the involved and elaborate reasoning of the learned Counsel for the appellants does not appeal to this Court and therefore, the same is negated. The learned Counsel has placed reliance on several decisions of the Apex Court. The same are decisions rendered with reference to compulsory acquisition proceedings. Since the validity or otherwise of the acquisition proceedings in the case on hand was not really the subject-matter of the suit, the same may not be relevant and do not warrant any discussion. Accordingly, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.