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2012 DIGILAW 418 (GAU)

Kirba Lomi v. State of A. P.

2012-03-30

A.C.UPADHYAY, I.A.ANSARI

body2012
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. (i) Do the rules for transaction of business, framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India, need to be followed and/if not followed, whether a decision would be illegal? (ii) Whether the Rules of Executive Business, framed under Article 166(3), in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, permit any change in the conditions of service, or in the method of recruitment to a service or post, to which the appointment is made by the Governor, and if such change or alteration is in violation of the Rules of Executive Business, whether such change or alteration is sustainable in law? Broadly speaking, these are the two important questions of paramount importance, which the present writ petition has raised. The material facts, giving rise to the present writ petition, may, in brief, be set out as under: (i) The petitioner No. 1 herein was initially appointed, on 14.11.1984, as Upper Division Clerk (in short, 'UDC') in the Civil Secretariat, Arunachal Pradesh. Similarly, petitioner No. 2 was also initially appointed, on 21.08.1990, as UDC in the said Secretariat. The petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 2 were promoted to the post of Assistants in the year 1992 and 1996 respectively While working as Assistants, the petitioners, on being detailed by the Department concerned, underwent Basic Management Service (in short, 'BMS') course for a period of three months at the Institute of Training and Management, New Delhi, and successfully completed the same. On completion of the training, the petitioners resumed their duties as Assistants. This was followed by promotion of the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 to the posts of Senior Research Assistant, on 04.01.2000 and 05.01.2000, respectively, in the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Training, Government of Arunachal Pradesh. (ii) By a notification, dated 20.07.2000, the post of Senior Research Assistant was re-designated as Junior Analyst, in the Department of Administrative Reforms, and this was followed by another notification, dated 05.02.2001, whereby recruitment rules for Junior Analyst, namely, "The Recruitment Rules for the post(s) of Junior Analyst, 2001 (in short, the 2001 Recruitment Rules') were notified by the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Training, Government of Arunachal Pradesh. As far as the Senior Analysts were concerned, the recruitment rules for Senior Analyst, namely, "The Arunachal Pradesh Senior Analyst (Group 'A') Recruitment Rules, 1990 (in short, the 1990 Recruitment Rules')", were published by the Department of Administrative Reforms, on 16.02.1990, under the seal and signature of the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh. By relaxing the conditions for recruitment to the post of Senior Analyst in the 1990 Recruitment Rules, petitioner No. 1 was promoted to the post of Senior Analyst in the said Department. By yet another notification, dated 23.06.2006, the "the Post of Senior Analyst, General Arunachal Service Group 'A' (Gazetted) Non Ministerial Recruitment (2nd Amendment) Rules, 2006 (in short, 'the 2nd Amendment Rules') were published, whereby the post of Senior Analyst was re-designated as Senior Analyst-cum-Under Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh. (iii) A proposal was initiated, in the year 2006 itself, for creation of the post of Deputy Secretary and Personal Assistant in the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Training, in order to strengthen the department. The proposal for creation of the post of Deputy Secretary, in the said department, was cleared by the State Cabinet, on 15.07.2007, and, thus, a post of post of Deputy Secretary, in the Department Administrative Reforms and Training, came into existence on the basis of the order, dated 22.08.2007, issued, by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh. As far as the recruitment rules for Deputy Secretary, Administrative Reforms Department were concerned, the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh published another set of rules, namely, "the Recruitment to the Post(s) of Deputy Secretary (Group-A), Rules, 2007 (in short, 'the 2007 Recruitment Rules')" providing for promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary in the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Training, the qualification required for appointment to the post of Deputy Secretary being that the incumbent (a) must have undergone BMS training course from ISTM, (b) ought to have served as Senior Analyst-cum-Under Secretary to the Government for the last 5 years, or (c) by deputation from the Central/State Govt./Autonomous or Statutory Bodies/Public Sector Undertaking holding analogous posts. Thereafter, the petitioner No. 1 was promoted, on 03.09.2008, to the post of Deputy Secretary and the petitioner No. 2 was promoted to the post of Senior Analyst-cum-Under Secretary, on 11.09.2007, in the Department of Administrative Reforms Government of Arunachal Pradesh. The promotions of the petitioner Nos. Thereafter, the petitioner No. 1 was promoted, on 03.09.2008, to the post of Deputy Secretary and the petitioner No. 2 was promoted to the post of Senior Analyst-cum-Under Secretary, on 11.09.2007, in the Department of Administrative Reforms Government of Arunachal Pradesh. The promotions of the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 to the post of Deputy Secretary and Senior Analyst-cum-Under Secretary, respectively, were on officiating basis. (iv) The fast track promotions of the petitioners led to serious resentment in the staff of the Secretariat and the Arunachal Secretariat Employees' Association made representation objecting to the framing of separate rules, namely, the 2007 Recruitment Rules, and also pointing out that the present petitioners were given promotions by amending the rules, which were tailored for them. On receiving the representation from the staff of the Secretariat, a Committee was constituted, by an order, dated 18.07.2008, issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh, to consider review/cancellation of the Notification, dated 22.08.2007, whereby the 2007 Recruitment Rules were published and the petitioners were promoted, though on officiating basis, to the post of Deputy Secretary and Senior Analyst-cum-Under Secretary as indicated above. This Committee, headed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, found that a common recruitment rule for recruitment to the post of Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary was already in place and, therefore, there ought not to have been a separate recruitment rule to accommodate the present petitioners. The Committee accordingly submitted its report on 06.08.2008. In this report, recommendations were made for cancellation of the 2007 Recruitment Rules and also cancellation of re-designation of the post of Senior Analyst as Senior Analyst-cum-Under Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh. (v) Following the recommendations of the said Committee, an order was issued, on 05.11.2012, stating to the effect, inter alia, that the sole authority for creation of Group-A posts of various departments rests in the Department of Personnel, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, and that there cannot be a separate recruitment rule for Deputy Secretary (Secretariat Service) to accommodate two individuals and, therefore, the Govt. Notification No. OM-49/88, dated 23.08.2007, has to be cancelled and, consequently, the officiating promotions of the petitioners should also be cancelled. Notification No. OM-49/88, dated 23.08.2007, has to be cancelled and, consequently, the officiating promotions of the petitioners should also be cancelled. (vi) On 05.11.2008, the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, issued a notification publishing the "Recruitment to the post(s) of Deputy Secretary (Group-A), Repeal Rules, 2008 (in short, the 2008 Recruitment Rules')", repealing thereby the 2007 Recruitment Rules and cancelling the order, dated 23.06.2006, whereby the post of Senior Analyst was re-designated as Senior Analyst-cum-Under Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh. 2. Aggrieved by the repeal of the 2007 Recruitment rules, by virtue of the 2008 Recruitment Rules, and cancellation of their promotions, which were officiating in nature, and reversion of the petitioners to the post of Senior Analyst and Junior Analyst, respectively, the petitioners have put to challenge the said action of the Government and have sought for, with the help of this writ petition, made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, setting aside and quashing said the Committee's report, dated 06.08.2008, whereby cancellation of their officiating promotions to the post of Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary, respectively, were recommended. By the present writ petition, the petitioners have also sought for setting aside and quashing the order, dated 05.11.2008, whereby the 2007 Recruitment Rules were repealed and the petitioners were reverted to the posts of Senior Analyst and Junior Analyst, respectively, the petitioners' case being that the 2008 Recruitment Rules, whereby the 2007 Recruitment Rules were repealed, and also the cancellation of their officiating promotions are ultra vires and unconstitutional. 3. We have heard Mr. K. Jini, learned counsel for the appellants, and Dr. A.K. Saraf, learned Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, appearing on behalf of the State respondents. 4. Presenting the case on behalf of the appellants, Mr. Jini, learned counsel, submits that the repeal of the 2007 Rules is ultra vires inasmuch as having framed the 2007 Rules and given promotions, though on officiating basis, to the appellants under the 2007 Rules, the 2007 Rules could not have been amended and repealed by the subsequent Rules, i.e, the 2008 Rules. This apart according to Mr. Jini, the cancellation of the appellants' promotion, though officiating, and their reversion to the posts of Senior Analyst and Junior Analyst are nothing but arbitrary and cannot, therefore, be sustained. 5. With regard to the above, Mr. This apart according to Mr. Jini, the cancellation of the appellants' promotion, though officiating, and their reversion to the posts of Senior Analyst and Junior Analyst are nothing but arbitrary and cannot, therefore, be sustained. 5. With regard to the above, Mr. Jini also contends that under the Business of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh (Allocation) Rules, 1998, it is the. Department of Administrative Reforms, which is vested with the power to make rules with regard to promotion, conditions of promotion, etc., and that even the Arunachal Pradesh Rules of Executive Business, 1987 (in short, the 'Rules of Executive Business') confer power on the Administrative Reforms Department to frame recruitment rules and, hence, in the case at hand, the power, under Article 309, in framing the 2007 Rules, having been exercised by the Government in terms of the provisions of the Rules of Executive Business, the 2007 Rules could not have been repealed, particularly, on the basis of the recommendations made by the Committee, which was constituted by the Government, on 18.07.2008, as indicated above. 6. Appearing on behalf of the State, Dr. Saraf, learned Advocate General, submits that a Government servant's conditions of service can be changed unilaterally and the consent of the Government servant concerned, in such a change, is not essential. It is also submitted by the learned Advocate General that if the pleadings and the materials on record are closely examined, it would clearly appear that the two appellants were preparing notes and making, for each other, recommendations for creation of posts and promotions and that the appellants, being in the position to influence the decision of some of the Government officials, managed to get the 2007 Rules framed, though the said Rules had not been framed in accordance with law inasmuch as exercise of power under the proviso to Article 309 ought to be in terms of the Rules of Executive Business, because the Rules, which the Governor frames under Article 309, flow, essentially, out of the decision of the State Government and not of a particular Department of the State Government and, in the present case, the Arunachal Pradesh Rules of Executive Business, 1987, clearly indicate that it is the Department of Personnel, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, which has the authority to frame rules as regards recruitment and conditions of service. 7. 7. A close examination of the 2007 Rules, contends the learned Advocate General, would show that though the 2007 Rules were said to have been framed in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article 309, the fact remains that this power was not exercised in tune with the scheme of the Constitution inasmuch as the Arunachal Rules of Executive Business, 1987, had not been followed, while making the 2007 Rules, because the 2007 Rules were not framed by the Department of Personnel, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, and, hence, the 2007 Rules were not sustainable and it was, therefore, incumbent for the State Government to repeal the same, when the infirmity in the 2007 Rules and the devastating consequences, flowing therefrom, were brought to the notice of the State Government by the representation made to the State Government by the Arunachal Secretariat Employees' Association. Various departments of the State Government, points out learned Advocate General, have to act in tandem with each other and not in isolation of, or in collision course with, each other, or else, the entire concept of the parliamentary democracy, enshrined in the Constitution, and the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers would be rendered otios. 8. Learned Advocate General has also submitted that no regular promotion had been given to the appellants, they were only given officiating promotions and once the Government realized that the 2007 Rules were ultra vires to the Constitution and unfair to its employees' welfare, it owed a duty to the Constitution to undo the wrong and it discharged, therefore, the duty of repealing the 2007 Rules. In such circumstances, the consequential reversion of the appellants to their original posts, which the appellants have had to bear, would not make the State's action or the 2008 Rules invalid, particularly, when the appellants were not regularly promoted to the posts, which they were holding before the impugned order was passed reverting them to the posts,, which they were holding immediately preceding their officiating promotions. The learned Advocate General adds that the Government acted wholly in the interest of fair administration and in terms of the requirements of the Constitution and the laws made in this regard and, hence, the Government's actions were neither ultra vires nor mala fide and this would become manifest if the report of the Committee, which had been constituted by the Government by Notification, dated 18.07.2008, is looked into and examined by the Court. The writ petition may, therefore, submits the learned Additional Advocate General, be dismissed. 9. In support of his submissions, learned Additional Advocate General relies upon the cases of T. Narasimhulu and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 545 , State of Maharastra and another v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and others, reported in (1981) 4 SCC 130 , V.K. Sood v. Secretary, Civil Aviation and others, reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 9, State of Bombay (Now Moharashtra) v. FA. Abraham, AIR 1962 SC 794 , Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 . 10. In order to appreciate the correctness of the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties concerned, it needs to be pointed out that the issues, at hand, are precise and clear. The issues are: whether the 2007 Rules can be said to be in conformity with the proviso to Article 309, for, the 2007 Rules, if not in tune with the proviso to Article 309, cannot be sustained and any advantage, which might have flown to the appellants from the 2007 Rules, can also not be restored. The second issue, which is equally important and closely inter-linked with the first issue, is: whether the 2008 Rules are in conformity with the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution? In other words, if the 2007 Rules are held to be ultra vires and the 2008 Rules are found sustainable, then, the reversion of the appellants to the post of Senior Analyst and Junior Analyst, by cancellation of their respective officiating promotions, to the posts of Deputy Secretary (Administrative Reforms) and Senior Analyst-cum-Under Secretary, have to be upheld. 11. Before entering into the merit of the various submissions, made on behalf of the parties, it is appropriate to ascertain the legal aspects of the law, which govern the case of the parties concerned. 11. Before entering into the merit of the various submissions, made on behalf of the parties, it is appropriate to ascertain the legal aspects of the law, which govern the case of the parties concerned. While considering this aspect of the matter, it is necessary to bear in mind that though the employment of a Government employee and the employment of a person in a private sector is, originally, contractual in nature, what distinguishes a Government employee from others is that a Government employee acquires, on his appointment to a Government office, a status. As a result of this status, which he acquires, his service conditions are determined on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the statute. In consequence thereof, a Government servant's rights and obligations can be determined by the statutory or the constitutional authority concerned and for such exercise of powers, the authority concerned does not, unlike the case of a private employee, require consent from the Government employee concerned. In other words, Government can alter terms and conditions of its employees unilaterally, though, in practice, such alteration may face protest from the employees concerned. This does not, however, mean, I must hasten to add, that the consent of the Government employee is a condition precedent for changing the terms and conditions of his service by the statutory or constitutional authority in terms of the provisions of the relevant statutes and/or the Constitution. A reference may be made, in this regard, to the case of Advocate General of the State of J & K v. T.N. Khosa, AIR 1974 SC 1 , wherein the Supreme Court has held thus: it is well settled that though employment under the Government like that under any other master may have a contractual origin, the Government servant acquires a 'status' on appointment; to his office. As a result, his rights and obligations are liable to be determined under statutory or constitutional authority which, for its exercise, requires no reciprocal consent. The government can alter the terms and conditions of its employees unilaterally and though in modem times consensus in matters relating to public services is often attempted to be achieved consent is not a, pre-condition of the validity of rules of service, the contractual origin of the service notwithstanding. (Emphasis supplied) 12. The government can alter the terms and conditions of its employees unilaterally and though in modem times consensus in matters relating to public services is often attempted to be achieved consent is not a, pre-condition of the validity of rules of service, the contractual origin of the service notwithstanding. (Emphasis supplied) 12. What follows from the above is that the service conditions of a Government employee can be changed by making changes in the relevant statutes or rules by the statutory or constitutional authority concerned in terms of the statute and/or the Constitution. This power to alter conditions of service, undoubtedly, includes the power to alter the conditions of service with retrospective effect. Such a broadly stated position of law governing the status of a Government employee is, however, subject to the condition that the benefits acquired with regard to the conditions of service, by virtue of the relevant existing statutory or constitutional provisions, cannot, with retrospective effect, be taken away, abridged or withdrawn by amending the statute concerned and/or the Constitution nor can such amendments be allowed if such amendment is arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable or Violative of Article 14 and 16 inasmuch as by acquiring such benefit, the employee is vested with a right and such a right cannot be taken away by a mere change in the statute or the rules with retrospective effect. While considering this aspect of the matter, the observations of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, reported in (1994) 5 SCC 450 , may be borne in mind, which run as follows: 12. In T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana three petitioners T.R. Kapur, Mahinder Singh and V.D. Grover, who were Diploma holders, were working as Sub Divisional Officers on regular basis under the unamended Rule 6(b) of the Punjab Service of Engineers Class-I, Public works Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964. They were eligible for promotion, as Executive Engineer in Class-I service despite the fact that they did not possess a degree in Engineering. By the Notification dated 22/6/1984, Rule 6(b) was amended and it was provided that a degree in Engineering was an essential qualification for promotion of Assistant Engineers (Irrigation Branch) to class-1 service and thereby the petitioners were rendered ineligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer in class-I service. By the Notification dated 22/6/1984, Rule 6(b) was amended and it was provided that a degree in Engineering was an essential qualification for promotion of Assistant Engineers (Irrigation Branch) to class-1 service and thereby the petitioners were rendered ineligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer in class-I service. The amendment was challenged in this Court by way of a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. This Court came to the conclusion that the retrospective effect given to the amendment was violative of Article- 14 and 16 of Constitution of India on the following reasoning: (SCCP. 595, Para-16). It is well settled that the power to frame Rules to regulate the conditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution carries with it the power to amend or altered the rules with a retrospective effect: B.S. Vaderao, Union of India, Raj Kumar v. Union of India, K. Nagaraj v. State of A.P. and State of J and K. v. Tribki Nath Khosa. It is equally well settled that any Rule which affects the right of a person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service although mere chances of promotion may not be. It may further be stated that an authority competent to lay down qualification for promotion, is also competent to change the qualifications. The Rules defining qualifications and suitability for promotion are conditions of service and they can be changed retrospectively. This Rule is however subject to a well recognised principle that the benefit acquired under the existing Rules can not be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect, that is to say, there is no power to make such a Rule under the Proviso to Article- 309 which affects or impairs vested rights. 13. Finally this Court considered the effect of retrospective legislation on the vested rights of the affected person in P.O. Agarwal v. State of UP. Under the U.P. service of Engineer (Buildings and Roads branch) class-II Rules, 1936, the Assistant Engineers substantively appointed against temporary vacancies became members of the service and were entitled to seniority on the basis of continuous length of service. Under the U.P. service of Engineer (Buildings and Roads branch) class-II Rules, 1936, the Assistant Engineers substantively appointed against temporary vacancies became members of the service and were entitled to seniority on the basis of continuous length of service. The Rules were amended in the years 1969 and 1971 wherein it was provided that the assistant Engineers would only become members when they are selected and appointed against the quota meant for them and their seniority would be determined only for the date of order of appointment in substantive vacancies. These amendments were made with retrospective effect thereby taking away the vested rights of the Assistant Engineers appointed against temporary posts. The High Court held that the retrospective amendment of the Rules to be arbitrary and unconstitutional. This Court upheld the judgment of the High Court on the following reasoning: (SCC p. 637, Para 16; P. 638, para 18 p. 639, Para 18, it has been urged that Government has the power to amend Rules retrospectively and such rules are quite valid. Several decisions have been cited of this Court at the bar. Undoubtedly, the Government has got the power under proviso to Article- 309 of the Constitution to make Rules and amend the Rules giving retrospective effect. Nevertheless, such retrospective amendments can not take away the vested rights and the amendments must be reasonable, not arbitrary or discriminatory violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) 13. From a close reading of the law laid down in Tushar Ranjan Mohanty (supra), it becomes evident that the power to frame rules to regulate conditions of service under the provisions of Article 309 carries with it the power to amend or alter the rule with retrospective effect. This rule is, however, subject to well recognized principle that the benefit, acquired under the existing rule or a right vested in a government employee under the existing rules, cannot be taken away by amending the rules with retrospective effect, for, there is no power under the proviso to Article 309 enabling the government to make rule in a manner so as to take away or impair an accrued or vested right. 14. That the conditions of service can be amended even with the retrospective effect is too well settled to be doubted. In the case of K. Nagraj & Ors. 14. That the conditions of service can be amended even with the retrospective effect is too well settled to be doubted. In the case of K. Nagraj & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 551 , the Supreme Court has made it clear that such a power flows to the Government under the proviso to Article 309 read with Article 313 of the Constitution and the power, so conferred on the Government is legislative in character and is to be distinguished from an ordinary rule-making power. I may, for the sake of brevity, refer to some observations made, in this regard, in K. Nagraj (supra), which read thus: ...it is well settled that the service rules can be as much amended, as they can be made, under the proviso to Article 309 and that the power to amend these rules carried with it the power to amend them retrospectively. The power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 is of a legislative character and is to be distinguished from an ordinary rule making power. The power to legislate is of a plenary nature within the field demarcated by the Constitution and it includes the power to legislate retrospectively. Therefore, the amendment made to the Fundamental rules in the exercise of power conferred by article 309, by which the proviso to rule 2 was deleted retrospectively, was a valid exercise of legislative power. The rules and averments made under the proviso to Article 309 can be altered or repealed by the Legislature but until that is done, the exercise of the power can not be challenged as lacking in authority. (See B.S. Vedera v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 575 , 582-585 : AIR 1969 SC 118 123-124); Raj kumar v. Union of India, (1975) 3 SCR 963 , 965: AIR 1975 SC 1116 1118). (Emphasis supplied) 15. What logically follows from the above discussion is that unlike an employee in a private sector, a Government employee's terms and conditions of service are governed by the relevant statutes, rules and provisions of the Constitution. Such conditions of service can be changed by the constitutional or statutory authority concerned unilaterally. (Emphasis supplied) 15. What logically follows from the above discussion is that unlike an employee in a private sector, a Government employee's terms and conditions of service are governed by the relevant statutes, rules and provisions of the Constitution. Such conditions of service can be changed by the constitutional or statutory authority concerned unilaterally. Such a change can even be made with retrospective effect; but benefits acquired or a right, which has accrued or comes to be vested in a Government employee by virtue of the existing rules, cannot be impaired, far less, taken away by amending the conditions of service with retrospective effect. Whether an amendment, with retrospective effect, has taken away an accrued or vested right is, however, essentially a mixed question of fact and law and can be determined on the basis of the facts of a given case. 16. In the backdrop of the position of law, as indicated above, that the Government has the power to change the conditions of service of its employees unilaterally, let us, now, determine the scope and ambit of the proviso to the Article 309. While considering Article 309, it needs to be noted that Article 309 cannot be read wholly independent of, and divorced from, Article 162 read with Article 166, for, in terms of the provisions of Article 154 the executive power of the State shall be vested in the Governor and shall be exercised by the Governor either directly or through officers, subordinate to him, in accordance with the Constitution. This power of the Governor is same as the power of the President in respect of the Union as provided in Article 53. 17. In short, thus, the executive power of the State shall be vested in the Governor and shall be exercised by him, directly or through officers subordinate to him, according to the Constitution. 18. Coupled with the above, Article 162, which relates to the scope of the executive power of the State, lays down that the executive power of a State shall, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws. 18. Coupled with the above, Article 162, which relates to the scope of the executive power of the State, lays down that the executive power of a State shall, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws. However, the proviso to Article 162 makes it clear that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof. 19. The provisions, embodied in Article 162, show that the executive power of the State is co-extensive with its legislative power subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. Since the executive power of the State is co-extensive with the State's legislative power, it clearly follows that without prior legislative authority, the State's executive may make rules on a matter, which is within the legislative competence of the State legislature. 20. What is, now, of immense importance to note is that Article 163 makes it clear that there shall be Council of Ministers, with the Chief Minister at the head, to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is, by or under this Constitution, required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. The Governor, therefore, does not exercise executive power, vested in a State, on his own, he has to exercise his executive powers with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, headed by the Chief Minister, except where the Constitution gives the Governor the discretion to act independent of the advice of the Council of Ministers. 21. How to conduct the executive actions of the Government of a State is embodied in Article 166, which lays down as under: 166. Conduct of business of the Government of a State.- (1) All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be token in the name of the Governor. 21. How to conduct the executive actions of the Government of a State is embodied in Article 166, which lays down as under: 166. Conduct of business of the Government of a State.- (1) All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be token in the name of the Governor. (2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor. (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion. 22. Thus, the State is required to frame rules for convenience of the transaction of the businesses of the Government of the State except when the Governor is, under the Constitution, required to act on his own discretion. 23. In the background of what have been indicated above, when one reverts to Article 309, it will be noticed that Article 309 empowers the appropriate legislature to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. In the present case, we are concerned with the recruitment and conditions of service to posts in connection with the affairs of the State. The proviso to Article 309 makes it clear that in the event a legislature has not made any law regulating the recruitment and conditions of service and/or posts in connection with the affairs of the State, the Governor may make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of the persons aforementioned. This position of law is clearly discernible from a bare reading of Article 309, which is reproduced below: 309. This position of law is clearly discernible from a bare reading of Article 309, which is reproduced below: 309. Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State.--Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State: Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such, person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act. 24. While referring to the case of K. Nagraj (supra), we have already indicated above, that the power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 is, essentially, legislative in character and has to be distinguished from an ordinarily rule-making power. 25. In fact, long before the decision, in K. Nagraj (supra), the Constitution Bench, in B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1980 Supp SCC 524, had, in no uncertain words, pointed out that the Governor possesses legislative power, too, under our Constitution and it is, therefore, nothing unique about the Governor's power under the proviso to Article 309, which is in the nature of legislative power. In this regard, the Constitution Bench has also pointed out, in B.S. Yadav (supra), that by virtue of Article 168, the Governor of a State is a part of the legislature of the State and the most obvious exercise of legislative power of the Governor is the power, given to him by Article 213, to promulgate ordinances, when the legislature is not in session inasmuch as the Governor exercises, under Article 213, a power of the same kind, which the legislature, normally, exercises and that the power of the Governor, under the proviso to Article 309, to make appropriate rules is also of the same kind as the power, under Article 213, meaning thereby that the power of the Governor, under the proviso to Article 309, is legislative in nature inasmuch as the Governor exercises the power to promulgate ordinances under Article 213, when the legislature is in recess, and, similarly, the Governor exercises the power to make rules, under the proviso to Article 309, regulating recruitment and conditions of service, because the appropriate legislature has not yet exercised its power to pass necessary law on the subject. 26. The Constitution Bench, in B.S. Yadav (supra), has clarified that the power to make law, as regards recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts, in connection with the affairs of the State, stands vested, by Article 309, in the legislature of the State and until the legislature exercises the power, it is the Governor, who has, under the proviso to Article 309, the scope to exercise the power. The relevant observations, made by the Supreme Court, in B.S. Yadav (supra), read as under: 45. That the Governor possesses legislative power under our Constitution is incontrovertible and, therefore, there is nothing unique about the Governor's power under the proviso to Article 309 being in the nature of a legislative power. By Article 168, the Governor of a State is a part of the legislature of the State. And the most obvious exercise of legislative power by the Governor is the power given to him by Article 213 to promulgate ordinances when the legislature is not in session. Under that Article, he exercises a power of the same hind which the legislature normally exercises the power to make laws. And the most obvious exercise of legislative power by the Governor is the power given to him by Article 213 to promulgate ordinances when the legislature is not in session. Under that Article, he exercises a power of the same hind which the legislature normally exercises the power to make laws. The heading of Chapter IV of Part VI of the Constitution, in which Article 213 occurs, is significant: Legislative Power of the Governor". The power of the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 to make appropriate rules is of the same kind. It is legislative power. Under Article 213, he substitutes for the legislature because the legislature is in recess. Under the proviso to Article 309, he substitutes for the legislature because the legislature has not yet exercised its power to pass an appropriate law on the subject. (Emphasis supplied) 27. The question, therefore, is as to how the Governor would exercise, under Article 309, the power of making rules? Does this power belong to the Governor alone, or he has to act, while exercising this power, on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister? In other words, (Sic) is: Whether the Governor (Sic) the power of making rules, under the proviso to Article 309, on his own in terms of, and in accord with, the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister? It needs to be noted, in this regard, that a seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, has clearly pointed out that, ordinarily, the Governor exercises his powers with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, headed by the Chief Minister, unless he is required to act, under the Constitution or in a given situation, in his own discretion. The Constitution Bench, in Samsher Singh (supra), noted, at paragraph 154 of its decision, thus: ...We do not examine in detail the constitutional proprieties in these predicaments except to utter the caution that even here the action must be compelled by the peril to democracy and the appeal to the House or to the country must become blatantly obligatory, We have no doubt that de Smith; statement (Constitutional and Administrative Law by S.A. de Smith Penguin; Books on Foundations of Law) regarding royal assent holds good for the; President and Governor of India: Refusal of the royal assent on the ground that the Monarch strongly disapproved of a Bill or that it was intensely controversial Y would nevertheless be unconstitutional. The only circumstances in which the withholding of the royal assent might be justifiable would be if the Government itself were to advise such a course a highly improbable contingency of possibly if it was notorious that a Bill had been passed in disregard to mandatory procedural requirements; but since the Government in the latter situation would be of the opinion that the deviation would not affect the validity of the measure once it had been assented to, prudence would suggest the giving of assent. 28. Following the decision, in Shamsher Singh (supra), it has been held by the Constitution Bench, in M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of MP., and others, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 788 , that the normal rule is that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and not independent of, or contrary to, the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except where the Governor is, under the Constitution or in a given situation, required to act on his own discretion. 29. While making the rules, In exercise of power under Article 309, there is nothing to show that the Governor has to act in a manner other than the manner in which he has to, ordinarily, act, namely, that he must exercise his power with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. 30. The question, which, now, arises for consideration is: When the Governor is required to act with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, what is the constitutional mechanism or mandate for a Governor to act in this regard? 30. The question, which, now, arises for consideration is: When the Governor is required to act with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, what is the constitutional mechanism or mandate for a Governor to act in this regard? In a comparatively recent decision, in MRF Limited v. Manohar Parrikar, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 574, the Supreme Court has held that whenever executive action is to be taken by way of an order or instrument, it shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor in whom the executive power of the State is vested. Further-more, the orders and instruments, made and executed in the name of the Governor, shall be authenticated in the manner specified in the rules. 31. Taking note of the fact as to how, in Samsher Singh (supra), a Seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had explained the scope of Article 166, as a whole, and clause (3) thereof, in particular, the Supreme Court, in MRF Limited (supra), has indicated thus: Under clause (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution, the Governor is authorized to make rules for the more convenient transaction of business of the Government of the State and for the allocation among its Ministers of the business of the Government. All matters excepting those in which the governor is required to act in his discretion have to be allocated to one or the other of the Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister. Apart from allocating business amongst Ministers, the Governor can also make rules on the ad-. vice of the Council of Ministers for more convenient transaction of business. 32. From what have been observed, in MRF Limited (supra), it becomes clear, as, indeed, the language, employed in 166(3), otherwise also makes it clear, that the Governor has the obligation to make rules for more convenient transaction of the businesses of the Government of the State except in respect of such cases, where the Governor is, by or under the Constitution, required to act on his own discretion. 33. Having elaborately taken note of the manner in which the power under Article 166 has to be exercised, the Supreme Court has pointed out, in MRF Limited (supra), as under: 72. The High. 33. Having elaborately taken note of the manner in which the power under Article 166 has to be exercised, the Supreme Court has pointed out, in MRF Limited (supra), as under: 72. The High. Court has observed, that the Rules of Business are framed in such a manner that the mandate of the provisions of Articles 154, 163 and 166 of the Constitution are fulfilled. Therefore, if it is held that the non-compliance with these Rules does not vitiate the decisions taken by an individual Minister concerned alone, the result would be disastrous. In a democratic set-up the decision of the State Government must reflect the collective wisdom of the Council of Ministers or at least that of the Chief Minister who heads the Council. The fact that the decisions taken by the Minister alone were acted upon by issuance of notification will not render them decisions of the State Government even if the State Government chose to remain silent for a sufficient period of time or the Secretary concerned to the State Government did not take any action under Rule 46 of the Business Rules. If every decision of an individual Minister taken in breach of the Rules are treated to be those of the State Government within the meaning of Article 154 of the Constitution, the result would be chaotic. The Chief Minister would remain a mere figure head and every Minister will be free to act on his own by keeping the Business Rules at bay. Further, it would make it impossible to discharge the constitutional responsibility of the Chief Minister of advising the Governor under' Article 163. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the contentions of the appellants that the Business Rules are directory. 73. We also subscribe to and uphold the view of the High. Court that Business Rules 3, 6, 7 and 9 are mandatory and not directory and any decision taken by any individual Minister in violation of them cannot be termed as the decision of the State Government. We are fortified in our view by several decisions of this Court. 74. In K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.R. the facts were that the State of M.P. had allotted certain land under the Jabalpur Development Authority (JDA) to a person at concessional rates to set up a newspaper printing press, though the land was earmarked for commercial use. We are fortified in our view by several decisions of this Court. 74. In K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.R. the facts were that the State of M.P. had allotted certain land under the Jabalpur Development Authority (JDA) to a person at concessional rates to set up a newspaper printing press, though the land was earmarked for commercial use. The Court held: (SCC p. 597, para 64) 64. The purported policy decision adopted by the State as regards allotment of land to the newspaper industries or other societies was not a decision taken by the appropriate Ministry. If a direction was to be issued by the State to JDA, it was necessary to be done on proper application of mind by the Cabinet, the Minister concerned or by an authority who is empowered in that behalf in terms of the Rules of the Executive Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. Such a direction could not have been issued at the instance of the Chief Minister or at the instance of any other officer alone unless it is shown that they had such authority in terms of the Rules of the Executive Business of the State. We have not been shown that the Chief Minister was the appropriate authority to take a decision in this behalf. (Emphasis supplied) 75. In State, of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi, this Court held that the power of the State Government was confined to issuing directions to the State Agricultural Produce Market Board on the question of policy and observed: (SCC p. 683, paras 41 & 45) 41. Such a decision on the part of the State Government must be taken in terms of the constitutional scheme i.e. upon compliance with the requirement of Article 162 read with Article 166 of the Constitution of India, In the instant case, the directions were purported to have been issued by an officer of the State. Such directions were not shown to have been issued pursuant to any decision taken by a competent authority in terms of the Rules of Executive Business of the State framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. (Emphasis supplied) 34. Such directions were not shown to have been issued pursuant to any decision taken by a competent authority in terms of the Rules of Executive Business of the State framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. (Emphasis supplied) 34. From what have been pointed out by the Supreme Court, in MRF Limited (supra), one can have no escape from the conclusion that in a democratic set up, the decisions of the Government must reflect the collective wisdom of the Council of Ministers and, a decision, taken by a Minister alone, will not, ordinarily, render the decision a decision taken in violation of the Rules of Executive Business of the Government even if the Government chooses to remain silent over the matter for sufficiently long period of time, for, if every decision, which is taken by an individual Minister in breach of the Rules of Executive Business, is treated to be a decision of the State Government within the meaning of Article 154, then, the result would be chaotic and, hence, one cannot accept the fact that Article 166(3) is merely 'directory' in character. The Supreme Court derived support for the conclusion, so reached by it, in MRF Limited (supra), from its earlier decisions in K.K. Bhalla v; State of M.R. reported in (2006) 3 SCC 581 , State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 667 . 35. Explaining the decision, in R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1823 , wherein the Supreme Court had held that Article 166 of the Constitution is only 'directory' and not 'mandatory' in character, the Supreme Court, in MRF Limited (supra), has explained that its decision, in R. Chitralekha (supra), had been misinterpreted, because, in R. Chitralekha (supra), the Supreme Court was considering a controversy with regard to an order, which had not been expressed in the name of the Governor in terms of Article 166(1) and 166(2) and it was in that context only that the Supreme Court had observed, in R. Chitralekha (supra), that the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution is only directory and not mandatory in character. The relevant observations, appearing in this regard, in MRF Limited (supra), read as under: 77. The decision of the Constitution Bench in R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1823 , has been misinterpreted. The relevant observations, appearing in this regard, in MRF Limited (supra), read as under: 77. The decision of the Constitution Bench in R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1823 , has been misinterpreted. In that case this Court was considering a controversy in regard to an order which was not expressed in the name of the Governor in terms of Articles 166(1) and (2). In that context, this Court observed that it is a settled law that the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory in character. The context clearly shows that the observation that the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory, referred only to clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 and did not refer to clause (3), which was not under consideration at all. Chitralekha, therefore, cannot be relied upon to support the contention that the Business Rules made under clause (3) of Article 166 are directory. (Emphasis supplied) 36. Laying down the law in the light of its earlier decisions on the scope of Article 166, the Supreme Court has, eventually, rejected, in MRF Limited (supra), the contention that the Rules of Business, made under Article 166(3), are only 'directory' and 'not mandatory'. Points out the Supreme Court, at paragraph 89, in MRF Limited (supra), that the Rules of Business, framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution, are for convenient transaction of the business of the Government and for allocation of the business among the Ministers and Article 166(2) of the Constitution requires the decision of the State Government to be authenticated as per the Rules framed thereunder and, therefore, the decision of the State Government must meet the requirements of these Rules also. The relevant observations made, in this regard, by the Supreme Court, in MRF Limited (supra), run as under: 89. At this stage, we find it necessary to refer to some of the constitutional provisions to deal with the issue raised by the appellants. Under Article 154 of the Constitution of India, the Governor is vested with the executive power of the State and he shall exercise them either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Under Article 154 of the Constitution of India, the Governor is vested with the executive power of the State and he shall exercise them either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The Governor is advised by the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at its Head in exercise of his functions except those specifically stated in discharge of his functions as the Head of the State. The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State. The Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution are for the convenient transaction of the business of the Government and for allocation of the business among the Ministers. Article 166(2) of the Constitution requires the decision of the State Government to be authenticated as per the Rules framed thereunder. Any decision taken by the State Government, therefore, reflects the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers and their participation in such decision making process. The Chief Minister as the Head of the Council of Ministers is answerable not only to the legislature but also to the Governor of the State. The Governor of the State as the Head of the State acts with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. The Rules framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution are in aid to fulfill the constitutional mandate embodied in Chapter II of Part VI of the Constitution. Therefore, the decision of the State Government must meet the requirement of these Rules also. (Emphasis supplied) 37. The Rules framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution are in aid to fulfill the constitutional mandate embodied in Chapter II of Part VI of the Constitution. Therefore, the decision of the State Government must meet the requirement of these Rules also. (Emphasis supplied) 37. From the above observations, made in MRF Limited (supra), one has no escape from the conclusion that as far as the rules, framed under Article 166(3), are concerned, these rules are mandatory in nature and any action or decision, taken in deviation thereof, would not be sustainable in law, because, the Governor exercises the powers under Article 154 either directly or through the officers subordinate to him in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, which warrant the Governor to act, except where he was to act in his own discretion, on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at its head and the decision, taken by the State Government in a matter covered by Article 166(3), must reflect the collective decision of the State Government and this is feasible in law, when the Rules, framed under Article 166(3), are mandatorily followed, because these Rules advance the constitutional mandates embodied in Chapter II of Part VI. 38. Approving the reasoning, assigned by the High Court as sound and in accordance with the Constitutional mandate the Supreme Court has, in unequivocal terms, laid down, in MRF Limited (supra), that the decisions of the State Government have to be in conformity with the mandate of Articles 154 and 166 of the Constitution and also the rules framed thereunder. The Supreme Court has gone to the extent of saying, in MRF Limited (supra), that if the constitutional mandate, laid down by Articles 154 and 166 and the Rules, framed thereunder, are not adhered to, then, a decision would not have the form of a government decision and will be a 'nullity'. Finally, the Supreme Court has taken the view, at paragraph 92, in MRF Limited (supra), that the Business Rules, framed under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution, are 'mandatory' and must be strictly adhered to. The observation of the Supreme Court, as appearing in paragraph 92, in MRF Limited (supra), read as under: 92. Finally, the Supreme Court has taken the view, at paragraph 92, in MRF Limited (supra), that the Business Rules, framed under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution, are 'mandatory' and must be strictly adhered to. The observation of the Supreme Court, as appearing in paragraph 92, in MRF Limited (supra), read as under: 92. As observed by us earlier, these observations apply equally to the case on hand and in light of this view, we have no difficulty in holding that the Business Rules framed under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution are mandatory and must be strictly adhered to. Any decision by the Government in breach of these Rules will be a nullity in the eye of the law. It is in this legal background that the issues raised before us have to be dealt with. (Emphasis supplied) 39. From what have been laid down, as a whole, in MRF Limited (supra), the inescapable conclusion is that the Rules, under Article 166(3), are framed for convenient transaction of the businesses of the Government and the Rules, so framed under Article 166(3), are 'mandatory' in character and that any decision, which is in breach of such Rules, has to be treated as 'nullity'. 40. Bearing in mind what have been indicated above, let me, now, turn to the Arunachal Pradesh Rules of Executive Business, 1987 (in short, the 'Business Rules'). Rule 7 of the Business Rules lays down that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible for all executive orders issued in the name of the Governor in accordance with these rules whether such orders are authorized by an individual Minister on a matter pertaining to his portfolio as the result of discussion at a meeting of the Councilor of the Cabinet or otherwise. 41. Rule 8 of the Rules puts beyond any pale of doubt that subject to the orders of the Chief Minister under Rule 14, all cases, referred to in the Schedule to these rules shall be brought before the Cabinet in accordance with the provisions of the rules contained in Part-II. 42. 41. Rule 8 of the Rules puts beyond any pale of doubt that subject to the orders of the Chief Minister under Rule 14, all cases, referred to in the Schedule to these rules shall be brought before the Cabinet in accordance with the provisions of the rules contained in Part-II. 42. What is, now extremely important to note is that Item 19 of the Schedule to the Business Rules reads, "Proposals involving any important alteration in the conditions of service of the Members of any All India Service or the State Service or in the method of recruitment to the service or post to which appointment is made by the Governor." 43. From what Item 19 of the Schedule to the Business Rules maintains, it becomes clear that any proposal, involving any important alteration in the conditions of service of the Members of the State Service, or in the method of recruitment to the service or post, to which appointment is made by the Governor, shall be, subject to the order of the Chief Minister under Rule 14 be brought before the Cabinet in accordance with the provisions of the rules contained in Part II of the Rules. 44. Rule 14 of the Business Rules makes the position a little more clearer by laying down that all cases, referred to in the Schedule, shall, after consideration by the Minister, be sent to the Secretary with a view to obtaining orders of the Chief Minister for circulation of the case under Rule 16 or for bringing it for consideration at a meeting of the Cabinet. 45. Closely following Rule 14, Rule 16 of the Business Rules lays down that the Chief Minister may direct that any case, referred to in the Schedule, may, instead of being brought up for discussion at a meeting of the Cabinet, be circulated to the Ministers for opinion and if all the Ministers are unanimous and the Chief Minister thinks that a discussion, at a meeting of the Cabinet, is unnecessary, the case shall be decided without such discussion. However, if the Ministers are not unanimous or if the Chief Minister thinks that a discussion, at a meeting' of the Cabinet is necessary, the case shall be discussed at a meeting of the Cabinet and if it is decided to circulate for opinion any case to the Ministers, copies of all papers relating to such a case which are circulated among the Ministers, shall simultaneously be sent to the Governor. 46. When Rules 7, 8, 14 and 16 of the Rules are considered in the light of the Schedule to the Business Rules, what becomes abundantly clear is that unless the Chief Minister orders for circulation of a proposal of a Minister in respect of a matter covered by the Schedule to the Business Rules, the matter has to be placed before the Cabinet for its decision; otherwise also, the Business Rules, under the proviso to Article 309, are the rules, which have to have the application of the collective wisdom of the Ministers and must be the decision of the Cabinet, as a whole, and not of a Government department unless the Rules of Business so provide. 47. In the present case, the Rules of Business, admittedly, provides, as reflected by item 19 to the Schedule to the Rules, that any important alteration in the conditions of service of the Members of the State Service, or in the method of recruitment to the service, shall be made by the decision of the State Cabinet. 48. Considering the fact that the 2007 Recruitment Rules did not have the support of the Cabinet decision, as mandated by the Rules framed under Article 166(3), the 2007 Recruitment Rules were illegal inasmuch as the 2007 Recruitment Rules were making important alterations in the conditions of service. The respondents have rightly done away with the 2007 Recruitment Rules by repealing the 2007 Recruitment Rules and framing the 2008 Rules in terms of the Constitutional scheme. This Court is, therefore, of the firm view that the 2008 Rules, which form the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petition, cannot be held ultra vires, infirm and unsustainable in law. 49. In consequence of what have been indicated above, the officiating promotions, which were being enjoyed by the present petitioners, were wholly illegal and could not have been allowed to stand good on record. 49. In consequence of what have been indicated above, the officiating promotions, which were being enjoyed by the present petitioners, were wholly illegal and could not have been allowed to stand good on record. The State respondents, therefore, committed no error of law in taking corrective steps, in the manner as they have done, and in cancelling the officiating promotion's, which the petitioners had been enjoying. The decision of the Government to repeal the 2007 Rules, the framing of the 2008 Rules and the consequential decision of setting right the things by taking away the illegal promotions, though officiating in nature, earlier accorded to the petitioners, are not, in any way, illegal and do not, therefore, suffer from any infirmity, legal or factual. 50. Though the petitioners have claimed that the repealing of the 2007 Rules and the consequential cancellation of their officiating promotions and their reversion to their original posts are illegal, we are, in the light of the discussions held above, of the firm view that there was no vested right in any of the petitioners so far as their officiating promotions are concerned inasmuch as their promotions, though officiating in nature, were the result of the 2007 Rules, which have been held to be illegal. The petitioners cannot, therefore, be held to have any vested right, because their rights, if any, flowed from the 2007 Rules, which were not sustainable. As the wrong has been undone by making the 2008 Rules, the petitioners cannot challenge either the 2008 Rules as ultra vires or cancellation of their officiating promotions as illegal or beyond the powers of the Government. 51. This writ petition, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.