Per Mansoor, J.;— 1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgement and order dated 12th of August, 2005 passed by the learned Writ Court in SWP No. 375/1998. 2. The writ petitioner, respondent herein, was serving as a Constable in the Police Department. He came to be dismissed from service vide Order No. 93 of 1998 dated 24.02.1998 issued by the Senior Superintendent of Police, purportedly in exercise of powers under Section 126 (b) of the State Constitution. 3. The writ petitioner questioned the dismissal order in a writ petition, SWP No. 375/1998, which was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court vide judgement dated 12.08.2005 and the order of dismissal was quashed with liberty to the respondents in the writ petition, i.e., the appellants herein, to conduct an enquiry into the allegations against the writ petitioner in terms of the relevant rules. 4. It is the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge which is challenged by the respondents in the writ petition in this appeal. 5. The short facts that emerge are that the writ petitioner, respondent herein, was posted at Police Station Safakadal. He proceeded on two days' casual leave vide DD report No. 15. After expiry of the said period, he did not resume his duties and remained absent. His absence was marked vide DD report No. 07 dated 01.07.1997. It is revealed that, thereafter, he came to be dismissed from service on the allegations that he had harboured a militant, namely, Sameer Khan, in his house situated at Gutlibagh, Ganderbal, Srinagar, who was killed in an encounter on 04.07.1997. 6. Writ respondents, appellants herein, in paragraph (2) of the preliminary objections have stated that inquiry was not possible on the ground of non-availability of witnesses and troubled situation in the valley. 7. Mr. Magray, learned counsel, appearing for the appellants, was asked to produce the original record. He has produced the same. We have gone through the record; perusal thereof reveals that the writ respondents have not recorded any reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. What transpires from the record is that Inspector General of Police, Kashmir, had asked the SSP concerned to issue the order of dismissal and detain the Constable, Respondent herein, in terms of the provisions of the J&K Public Safety Act. What transpires from the record is that Inspector General of Police, Kashmir, had asked the SSP concerned to issue the order of dismissal and detain the Constable, Respondent herein, in terms of the provisions of the J&K Public Safety Act. Report was sought from the Criminal Investigation Department, J&K, and it is recorded in paragraph (4) in note 1 that IG, CID, Headquarter, vide No. 7637 dated 09.09.1997, has reported that militant Sameer Khan entered in the house of Constable Asger Khan while trying to escape the cordon of troops and the Constable was not involved in any subversive activities. The SSP has submitted the report to the IGP, Kashmir, who again directed dismissal of the Constable, Asger Khan and his detention under the provisions of the J&K Public Safety Act. Vide report No. 9, the SSP again submitted the file, but, despite of that, he was asked to dismiss the Constable. Alongside, the SSP concerned asked the Chief Prosecuting Officer, Srinagar, to submit his opinion. In paragraphs 18 and 19 he has reported that there was no adverse report against the Constable, Asger Khan; therefore, the report of CID can be a ground for challenging his dismissal order. 8. From all what is corning forth from the records and the respective pleadings, the material sought to be relied upon for, purposes of dispensing with the requirement of holding an enquiry into the allegations in question does not seem to be such as could lead a prudent mind to a satisfaction required in terms of the Constitutional provision. The order clearly has been based on the allegation that the respondent had harboured a militant. On the other hand, the Criminal Investigation Department of the Police have clearly reported that the militant in question had entered into the house of the respondent while trying to flee from the cordon. There is nothing on record to overweigh the aforesaid report of the CID or to belie the same. At the top of it, it is nowhere recorded by the SSP concerned that it was not possible to conduct an inquiry as mandated by law in this behalf, not to speak of recording of reasons, much less cogent ones, to arrive at a just conclusion in the matter. 9. At the top of it, it is nowhere recorded by the SSP concerned that it was not possible to conduct an inquiry as mandated by law in this behalf, not to speak of recording of reasons, much less cogent ones, to arrive at a just conclusion in the matter. 9. It is settled that before dispensing with the requirement of inquiry, reasons are to be recorded in writing on the basis of which the satisfaction is arrived at that it is not possible to conduct the inquiry, which is wanting in the case on hand. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in one of its latest judgments on the subject, namely Union of India v. M. M. Sharma, 2011 AIR SCW 2687, has held as under: "...Therefore, under the Indian Constitution dismissal of civil servants must comply with the procedure laid down in Article 311, and Article 310(1) cannot be invoked independently with the object of justifying a contravention of Article 311(2). There is an exception provided by way of incorporation of Article 311(2) with sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). No such inquiry is required to be conducted for the purposes of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons when the same relates to dismissal on the ground of conviction or where it is not practicable to hold an inquiry for the reasons to be recorded in writing by the authority empowered to dismiss or remove person or reduce him in rank or where it is not possible to hold an enquiry in the interest of the security of the State. These three exceptions are recognized for dispensing with an inquiry, which is required to be conducted under Article 311 of the Constitution of India when the authority takes a decision for dismissal or removal or reduction in rank in writing. In other words, although there is a pleasure doctrine, however, the same cannot be said to be absolute and the same is subject to the conditions that when a government servant is to be dismissed or removed from service or he is reduced in rank a departmental inquiry is required to be conducted to enquire into his misconduct and only after holding such an inquiry and in the course of such inquiry if he is found guilty then only a person can be removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank. However, such constitutional provision as set out under Article 311 of the Constitution of India could also be dispensed with under the exceptions provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution where clause (a) relates to a case where upon a conviction of a person by a criminal court on certain charges he could be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank without holding an inquiry. Similarly, under clause (c) an inquiry to be held against the government employee could be dispensed with if it is not possible to hold such an inquiry in the interest of the security of the State. Sub-clause (b) on the other hand provides that such an inquiry could be dispensed with by the concerned authority, after recording reasons, for which it is not practicable to hold an inquiry. The aforesaid power is an absolute power of the disciplinary authority who after following the procedure laid down therein could resort to such extraordinary power; provided it follows the pre-conditions laid down therein meaningfully and effectively. It should also be pointed out at this stage that clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India mandates that in case the disciplinary authority feels and decides that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry against the delinquent officer, the reasons for such satisfaction must be recorded in writing before an action is taken." 11. It may be apt to mention here that the provision of Article 311(2)(b) is akin to Section 126(b) of the Constitution of the State under which the SSP concerned has proceeded to take action in the instant matter against the respondent, as is reflected in the order impugned by the petitioner, respondent herein, in his writ petition. It is reiterated here that no reasons have been recorded on the basis of which the disciplinary authority has assumed the satisfaction that it was not practicable to hold an inquiry into the allegations against the petitioner. 12. In the aforementioned backdrop, we, therefore, find that the appeal in hand lacks merit and the impugned order does not warrant any interference. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Record produced by Mr. Magray, learned Sr. AAG, is returned to him in the open Court.