Per Mansoor, J.;— 1. This Letters Patent Appeal is against the judgement and order dated 15.10.2009 passed by the Writ Court in OWP No. 703/2003 dated 15.10.2009, on the grounds taken in the memo of this appeal. 2. From perusal of the record, it is revealed that the writ petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court on 16.12.2003 for issuance of writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay an amount of Rs. 14,62,096/- along with interest @ 18% w.e.f. 18.05.1970. 3. The respondents resisted the writ petition by medium of counter affidavit on the averments taken in the counter itself. 4. On hearing learned counsel for the parties and after examining the case of the writ petitioner, respondent herein, the Writ Court dismissed the writ petition by judgment and order dated 29.10.2005, which became subject matter of Letters Patent Appeal (LPA No. 258/2005). The LPA was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 18.07.2006, setting aside the order of the Writ Court. Accordingly, writ petition was revived and was directed to be considered afresh by the Writ Court for disposal under law after hearing learned counsel for the parties. 5. The Writ Court examined the case of the petitioner and passed the judgement impugned herein. What emerges from the record is that writ petitioner has sought rentals from 18.05.1970 as arrears of rent as per the break up given in paragraph 7 of the writ petition for use of land and also compensation thereof, totaling to an amount of Rs. 14,62,096/-. 6. The respondents in the writ petition in their reply have specifically slated that the petitioner had not made any claim till 2003, though the claim is laid right from 1970 till 31.12.1999. The claim thus is delayed and is hit by limitation. Why the writ petitioner (respondent herein) had not sought the writ right from 1970 for the said period is not forthcoming from the record. Thus, on the sole ground of laches on the part of the writ petitioner respondent in filing the writ petition in time, this Letters Patent Appeal merits to be allowed. This view is fortified by the judgement of the apex Court in I. Chuba Jamir v. State of Nagaland, reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5162, paragraph 17 whereof is quoted hereunder: "On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made by Mr. This view is fortified by the judgement of the apex Court in I. Chuba Jamir v. State of Nagaland, reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5162, paragraph 17 whereof is quoted hereunder: "On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made by Mr. Goswami we are unable to accept the claims of the appellants-writ petitioners. In our view the inordinate delay of 7 or 8 years by the appellants-writ petitioners in approaching the High Court was a very valid and important consideration. This aspect of the matter was also brought to the notice of the single Judge but he proceeded with the matter without saying anything on that issue, one way or the other. It was, therefore, perfectly open to the Division Bench to take into consideration the conduct of the appellants-writ petitioners and the consequences, apart from the legality and validity, of the reliefs granted to them by the learned single Judge." 7. The same view was reiterated by the apex Court in Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Aggarwal, reported in 2011 AIR SCW 2835, wherein, in paragraph 15, it has been held as under: "In our view, even if the objection of delay and laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf of the BDA and the State Government, the High Court was duty-bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of 9 years between the issue of declaration under Section 6 (1) and filing of the writ petition and declined relief to respondent No. 1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches because the acquired land had been utilized for implementing the residential scheme and third party rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about six years between the passing of the award and filing of writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition." 8. In State of Orissa v. Mamta Mohanty, reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332, the apex Court was dealing with a case where a justification was supplied for the delay and laches that the petitioner approached the Court after relief in a similar matter was granted which had been filed with due diligence. In State of Orissa v. Mamta Mohanty, reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332, the apex Court was dealing with a case where a justification was supplied for the delay and laches that the petitioner approached the Court after relief in a similar matter was granted which had been filed with due diligence. In paragraph 34, the apex Court dispelled the justification in the following words: "This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgement in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court within a reasonable time..." 9. What emerges in the present case is that the case of the writ petitioner, respondent, was considered by the appellants, and an order was issued by the appellants on September 26, 1994. It is advantageous to reproduce the said order hereunder: "1. Shri Syed Iftikhar Hussain Jalali, owner 'Jalali Villa' Sonawar Srinagar had represented to me that we have been paying a rent of Rs. 1000/- per month only, from 1970 onwards, although the rent was assessed at higher rates, ail-along. Last assessment which was made was in 1985 when the cost of the land was assessed at Rs. 4663/- per month and cost of the building was assessed at Rs. 1520/- per month. The total of the two make it Rs. 6183/-per month. 2. Shri Jalali has been representing for the enhancement ail-along and also for payment of reasonable rent as assessed by the Rent Assessing Committee from time to time. For the reasons best known to my predecessors, he has not been given the assessed rent till now. 3. While it is not possible to reopen the previous issues, however, in order to give him relief and justice, it would be in the fitness of things if we pay Rs. 6200/-(rounded from 6183) per month w.e.f. 1st of October, 1994. This proposition is acceptable to Shri Jalali also. 4. It is, therefore, hereby ordered that from 01.10.1994, the rent of Jalali Villa shall be paid at the rate of Rs. 6200/- per month." 10. 6200/-(rounded from 6183) per month w.e.f. 1st of October, 1994. This proposition is acceptable to Shri Jalali also. 4. It is, therefore, hereby ordered that from 01.10.1994, the rent of Jalali Villa shall be paid at the rate of Rs. 6200/- per month." 10. The Respondents in the writ petition, i.e., the appellants herein, have specifically averred in paragraphs 'E to H' of their reply that the writ petitioner accepted the rent as assessed. Respondents have also specifically averred that the writ petitioner had represented before the competent authority in 1994 which was considered and, after negotiations held with the writ petitioner, the order dated September, 26 1994 was passed, was accepted by the writ petitioner and remained contented till 2003. The respondents have also stated that they have contested the writ petition and there is no outstanding against the Department, as the building of the writ petitioner was vacated on 31st of December, 1998 and rent was paid till 31st December, 1998. Thus, disputed questions of fact are also involved in the petition, which cannot be adjudicated in the writ petition or Letters Patent Appeal in absence of evidence. 11. From the aforementioned narration of facts, it becomes clear as crystal that the rent was received by the appellant and, thereafter, after a lapse of more than nine years, he approached the Writ Court by filing the writ petition. 12. Viewed thus, the Writ Court has fallen in error in passing the impugned judgement and directing the respondents to pay the rent of the building w.e.f. 1970 to 1994. The Writ Court has also fell in error in directing the respondents to constitute a Committee for examining the case of the writ petitioner for compensation for damages, as alleged by the writ petitioner, which, in our opinion, in itself constitutes a disputed question of fact and cannot be gone into by this Court in writ jurisdiction, nor any direction, as given by the learned Writ Court, can be given. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion and law laid down by the apex Court, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal deserves to be allowed. We do so accordingly. As a corollary, judgement of the learned Single Judge is set aside. Nonetheless, the respondent is at liberty to invoke the appropriate remedy, if he so chooses. 14. Disposed of along with CMP.