ORDER : S. Manikumar, J. Being aggrieved by the award made in I.D. No. 357 of 2004, dated 23.2.2010, the Chief Manager, Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd., Karur has filed the present writ petition. Record of proceedings shows that the litigation has started in the year 2004, and the award passed earlier by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Chennai, dated 22.8.2006, directing the bank to reinstate the petitioner with backwages has been set aside by this Court in W.P. (MD). No. 9076 of 2006 dated 15.2.2008 and that I.D. No. 357 of 2004 has been remanded back to the Presiding Officer of Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chennai, to allow the petitioner bank to adduce additional evidence, justifying the action of the bank, in not allowing the petitioner to rejoin the bank, afford sufficient opportunity to the workman and to pass orders on merits, and in accordance with law. Thus, it is the second round of litigation between the parties. 2. Facts deduced from the materials on record is that the second respondent was a clerk in Lakshmi Village Bank, at Kandhili Branch, Thiruppathru Taluk. His services were terminated with effect from 26.2.1994. Challenging the termination, he had raised an industrial dispute which has been referred to the first respondent. The first respondent which took up the Industrial dispute as I.D. No. 357 of 2004 and by award dated 22.8.2006 held that the termination of the workman herein, was not justified and that as the workman had not adduced any evidence regarding his gainful employment, the Tribunal has directed reinstatement of the second respondent/workman, in service, with continuity of service and all other attendant benefits with 50% of the backwages while ordering reinstatement. The first respondent Tribunal has also observed that there was no prohibition for initiating departmental action against the second respondent/workman. 3. Challenging the award, the petitioner has filed W.P. No. 9076 of 2006 and this Court, by an order dated 15.2.2008, set aside the award and remanded the matter back to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chennai, with a direction to allow the petitioner bank to adduce additional evidence justifying the action of the bank, afford sufficient opportunity to the workman and to pass orders on merits and in accordance with law. 4. 4. Thereafter, the Central Government Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chennai has framed the following points for consideration: (i) Whether the action of the respondent/management in terminating the services of the petitioner Sri. A. Selva Kumar with effect from 26.2.1994 without conducting any enquiry is justified? (ii) To what relief the concerned workman is entitled? 5. The second respondent/workman examined himself as W.W. 1. He has marked Exhibits W-1 to W-12. The writ petitioner bank has examined two witnesses. The bank has marked Exhibits M-1 to M-65. The Labour Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence let in by both parties, with reference to Clause 17 of the bipartite settlement, Exhibit W-13, and at paragraph 13 held as follows: 13. Instead of justifying why petitioner was not allowed to join duty respondent has only tried to justify why he has to be terminated. Once a notice has been sent requiring the petitioner to report for duty that he was not allowed to join duty is not at all justified. The first and foremost thing for the banks to have done is to permit him to join duty. The respondent/management acted arbitrarily and in violation of the principles of natural justice. The termination is one brought about without holding an enquiry. This is against justice, equity and good conscience and law as well as the broader principles of natural justice. Therefore, the petitioner is to be reinstated into service with continuity of service and all attendant benefit with 50% of back wages. It is made clear that thereafter the respondent/management will be at liberty in taking departmental action against him after conducting a domestic enquiry if it feels it must or may avoid it and keep him on watch to see whether he makes any appreciable progress in his conduct with regard to attendance in the bank for the performance of his duties in the futurity and also whether bank can repose confidence in him to continue in service. So Ordered. 6. Inviting the attention of this Court to Clause 17(a) of the Bipartite Settlement, dated 10.4.1989, Mr. K. Saravanan, learned counsel for the petitioner/management submitted that the second respondent/workman has absented for more than 90 days consecutively, without submitting any application for leave or extension and that as per the terms of the settlement, the workman ought to have reported for duty on or before 24.2.1994. K. Saravanan, learned counsel for the petitioner/management submitted that the second respondent/workman has absented for more than 90 days consecutively, without submitting any application for leave or extension and that as per the terms of the settlement, the workman ought to have reported for duty on or before 24.2.1994. According to him, the second respondent/workman did not report for duty within the time. Therefore, in terms of bipartite settlement, the bank has struck off the name of the second respondent/workman, from the rolls with effect from 26.2.1994. He further submitted even assuming without admitting for argument sake that the second respondent/workman had reported for duty on 24.2.1994 and 25.2.1994, it is incumbent on the second respondent/workman to submit a satisfactory explanation for his absence to the petitioner/bank that he had not taken another employment or vocation and that he had no intention of not joining duty. According to the learned counsel, the second respondent/workman did not submit any explanation, as per the above said settlement, and hence, his name was struck off from the rolls of the bank. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner management further submits that even assuming that the second respondent/workman had submitted an explanation and if such explanation is not satisfactory, even then, action can be taken under Clause 17(a) of the Bipartite Settlement dated 10.4.1989, and that the petitioner/bank can strike off the name of the workman from the rolls of the bank. 8. During the course of hearing, when the learned counsel for the petitioner/bank was posed with a question as to whether the petitioner/bank had received the letter dated 24.2.1994 stated to have been sent by the second respondent/workman, he submitted that the petitioner/bank had acknowledged the said letter. However, he submitted that the said letter dated 24.2.1994 cannot be treated as an explanation to the notice dated 28.1.1994. According to him, invocation of Clause 17 of the Bipartite Settlement, dated 10.4.1989 by the management, in terminating the services of the petitioner, by striking off the name of the petitioner, from the rolls of the bank, was proper and that the question of applying principles of natural justice, beyond the terms of the bipartite settlement does not arise. According to him, invocation of Clause 17 of the Bipartite Settlement, dated 10.4.1989 by the management, in terminating the services of the petitioner, by striking off the name of the petitioner, from the rolls of the bank, was proper and that the question of applying principles of natural justice, beyond the terms of the bipartite settlement does not arise. Making reference to the past conduct of the second respondent/workman, learned counsel for the petitioner/bank also made an attempt to justify the order dated 28.2.1994, whereby, the name of the petitioner has been struck off from the rolls of the bank. 9. Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Another Vs. S.C. Sharma, (2005) 2 SCC 363 learned counsel for the petitioner/bank submitted that the second respondent/workman had not placed sufficient materials before the Tribunal, to prove that he was not gainfully employed, after the order dated 28.2.1994 striking of his name from the rolls of the bank and that therefore, the Labour Court ought not to have directed, continuity of service and attendant benefits, with 50% back wages. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner/bank submitted that habitual absenteeism is a gross violation of duties and the responsibilities of the workman. In such circumstances, the punishment imposed on the second respondent/workman is commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and that for the reasons stated supra, submitted that the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chennai, ought not to have interfered with the matter. 11. Based on the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent/workman, Mr. S. Arunachalam, learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that the second respondent/workman was employed as clerk in various branches. He was suffering from illness and therefore, he had sent leave applications along with medical certificates. On 28.1.1994, the manager of the petitioner/bank sent a communication stating that the absence of the second respondent/workman from 27.10.1993 was unauthorized and called upon the second respondent/workman to report for duty, within 30 days from the date of notice based on Clause 17(d) of the Bipartite Settlement, dated 10.4.1989. 12. After receiving the said notice on 1.2.1994, the second respondent/workman reported for duty on 24.2.1994 in Kandhili Branch and handed over the joining report to the Branch Manager, but he refused to permit the workman to join duty. 13. 12. After receiving the said notice on 1.2.1994, the second respondent/workman reported for duty on 24.2.1994 in Kandhili Branch and handed over the joining report to the Branch Manager, but he refused to permit the workman to join duty. 13. Learned counsel for the workman further submitted that immediately, the second respondent/workman had intimated the matter to the Assistant General Manager, vide letter dated 24.2.1994, and thereafter, sent telegrams to the Divisional Officer and the Chairman. He also made representation to the Divisional Manager and met the Industrial Relation Manager of Personnel Department of the petitioner/bank. 14. Inviting the attention of this Court to a letter dated 28.2.1994 sent by the second respondent/workman to the Assistant General Manager Personnel Department Administrative, Karur District, learned counsel for the second respondent/workman submitted that in response to the letter dated 28.1.1994 stated supra, of the petitioner bank, the workman has submitted a reply, wherein he has stated that for the period between 27.10.1993-30.11.1993, 1.12.1993 to 21.12.1993, 22.12.1993 to 10.1.1994, 11.1.1994 to 5.2.1994 and 6.2.1994 to 23.2.1994, the workman had already intimated to the office, for availing leave and for the first three spells, leave had also been sanctioned by the competent authorities. He therefore, submitted that the contention of the petitioner/bank that the second respondent/workman had absented unauthorisedly for more than 90 days is not correct. According to the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, when the petitioner has submitted valid information vide letter dated 24.2.1994 and having acknowledged the same on 26.2.1994, the petitioner/bank ought to have considered his explanation and assigned valid reason, for rejecting the same. He further submitted that there is absolutely no reference to the explanation in the order, striking the petitioner's name from the rolls of the bank. 15. Inviting the attention of this Court to the order passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court in I.D. No. 357 of 2004, dated 22.8.2006, learned counsel for the second respondent/workman submitted that the Tribunal, upon analysis of the evidence let in by both the parties and upon perusal of Exhibits W-5 to W-7 has categorically found that, when the second respondent/workman was ready to join duty, the bank manager alone had refused to grant permission. He also submitted that even as per the notice dated 28.1.1994, the period, prescribing 30 days notice, expired only on 3.2.1994 and before the expiry of the said date, the second respondent/workman had taken all efforts to join duty, whereas, the management alone had prevented him from joining duty. In the above said circumstances, he submitted that the contention of the petitioner/bank, based on Clause 17 of the bipartite settlement, has been rightly rejected by the Tribunal in its award in I.D. No. 357 of 2004, dated 22.8.2006. 16. Referring to the order made in W.P. No. 9076 of 2006, dated 15.2.2008, in the earlier round of litigation, learned counsel for the second respondent/workman further submitted that when the award in I.D. No. 357 of 2004, dated 22.8.2006 was challenged by the writ petitioner/management, on the ground that for any reason, the Tribunal had come to a conclusion that the second respondent/workman had reported for duty and the petitioner/bank alone had refused to allow him to join duty and in terms of Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, and in such circumstances, following the decision made in The The Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. The Management and Others, (1973) 1 SCC 813 , this Court directed the petitioner bank to adduce additional evidence justifying its action for refusal. 17. He further submitted that even after the remand of I.D. No. 357 of 2004 to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court Chennai, the petitioner bank, has failed to adduce any acceptable legal evidence to justify, as to why the second respondent/workman was not allowed to join duty. 18. Inviting the attention of this Court to paragraph 13 of the award made in I.D. No. 357 of 2004, dated 12.5.2010, after the remand, learned counsel for the second respondent/workman further submitted that the finding of the Tribunal to the effect that, once a notice had been sent requiring the second respondent/workman to report for duty, the petitioner/bank ought to have allowed the workman to join duty and that the said finding arrived at on proper analysis of evidence, cannot be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further submitted that on both the occasions, the Tribunal has categorically held that refusal on the part of the petitioner/bank to permit the second respondent/bank to join duty within the specified period of 30 days, cannot be justified, and therefore, it is not open to the bank to reagitate the said finding. 19. Learned counsel for the second respondent/workman further submitted that past conduct cannot be raised, either before the Tribunal or this Court, for the reason that past conduct, was not one of the charges levelled against the second respondent/workman and that therefore, no reference to the same can be made, for inflicting a major penalty of termination, without considering the explanation submitted by the petitioner dated 24.2.2004, the telegrams on 24.2.2002 and the letter dated 25.2.2002 submitted to the concerned authorities within time. 20. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in A. Muthu Vs. Indian Overseas Bank learned counsel for the second respondent/workman submitted that by notice dated 28.1.2004, when the petitioner/bank called upon the second respondent/workman report for duty, the said notice was received on 1.2.2004, and as per the aforesaid judgment, the time for reporting or submitting the explanation ought to have been computed from the date of receipt of notice and in such circumstances, the petitioner had adequate time upto 2.3.2004 (28 days in February and 2 days in March) to report for duty, within 30 days from the date of receipt and striking off the name of the petitioner from the rolls of the bank by a one line order, by invoking paragraph 17(a) of the bipartite settlement even before the expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of notice amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. 21. Placing reliance on the decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. Vs. Shambhu Nath Mukherji and Others, (1977) 4 SCC 415 learned counsel for the second respondent/workman further submitted that striking off the name of the second respondent/workman from the rolls by the petitioner/bank amounts to termination of service without any enquiry, by invoking Clause 17(a) of the bipartite settlement and as observed by the Apex Court in the above reported judgment the said clause itself is an arbitrary clause similar to Henry Clause VIII. 22. Placing reliance on a decision in D.K. Yadav Vs. 22. Placing reliance on a decision in D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259 learned counsel for the 2nd respondent/workman further submitted that even assuming that by bipartite settlement, can be given a statutory effect, the same does not expressly exclude application of the principles of natural justice and in the case on hand, the Labour Court, after considering the evidence has clearly held that termination of the second respondent/workman, amounts to violation of principles of the natural justice. 23. On the contention regarding that the second respondent/workman ought not have been awarded back wages, even to the limited extent, i.e., half of the back wages and the reliance on the reported decision Kendriya Vidyala Sangathan and Another v. S.C. Sharma (supra), learned counsel for the second respondent/workman submitted that the abovesaid aspect has been taken note by the Tribunal and that the Tribunal has restricted the award only to 50% of the back wages. 24. According to the learned counsel for the second respondent/workman, when the first award in I.D. No. 357 of 2004, dated 3.4.2006 was tested in this Court in W.P. (MD) No. 9076 of 2006, the second respondent/workman filed an application u/s 17(B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and by observing that the 2nd respondent/workman was not gainfully employed, the last drawn wages was ordered. He therefore, submitted that no manifest illegality has been committed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Chennai, in ordering reinstatement with 50% of the back wages with continuity of service. For the above said reasons, he submitted that the award of the Labour Court does not require any intervention. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 25. For the above said reasons, he submitted that the award of the Labour Court does not require any intervention. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 25. The dispute centers around invocation of Clause 17(a) of the settlement dated 10.4.1989, which reads as follows: When an employee absents himself from work for a period of 90 or more consecutive days, without submitting any application for leave or for its extension or without any leave to his credit or beyond the period of leave sanctioned originally/subsequently or when there is a satisfactory evidence that he has taken up employment in India or when the management is reasonably satisfied that he has no intention of joining duties, the management may at any time thereafter give a notice to the employee at his last known address calling upon him to report for duty within 30 days of the date of the notice, stating inter alia the grounds for coming to the conclusion that the employee has no intention of joining duties and furnishing necessary evidence, where available. Unless the employee reports for duty within 30 days of the notice or given an explanation for his absence within the said period of 30 days satisfying the management that he has not taken up another employment or avocation and that he has no intention of not joining duties, the employee will be deemed to have voluntarily retired from the bank's service on the expiry of the said notice. In the event of the employee submitting a satisfactory reply, he shall be permitted to report for duty thereafter within 30 days from the date of the expiry of the aforesaid notice without prejudice to the bank's right to take any action under the law or rules of service. Thus, as per the agreed condition of service, if a person employed remained absent consecutively for a period of 90 days under the circumstances stated therein and has not reported for employment within 30 days of the date of notice along with satisfactory reply, it would be construed that he had voluntarily retired from the bank's service and accordingly the relationship of employer and workman would come to an end and stand terminated. 26. 26. According to the petitioner/bank, the second respondent/workman was absent from duty without sanction of leave, from 27.10.1993 and that therefore, the petitioner/bank was constrained to presume that the second respondent/workman had no interest in the employment and that he was also not willing to report for duty. In these circumstances, the petitioner/bank had decided to invoke Clause 17(a) settlement, dated 10.4.1989 and by notice dated 28.1.1994, called upon the second respondent/workman to report for duty within 30 days of the notice and to substantiate the reasons for his absence. In the said notice, the writ petitioner/bank has also stated that if there is any failure on the part of the second respondent/workman to comply with the requirement, he would be deemed to have been voluntarily retired from the bank service, on the expiry of 30 days, in terms of the bipartite settlement dated 10.4.1989. The notice also states that the name of the second respondent/workman would be deleted from the rolls of the bank, automatically, on the expiry of 30 days notice, without any further communication. 27. Perusal of the award made on 22.8.2006 and 23.2.2010 in I.D. No. 357 of 2004, both prior and after remand, respectively the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Chennai, has categorically found that by production of Exhibits W. 5 to 7, copies of telegrams, dated 24.2.1994 and 25.2.1994, the second respondent/workman had proved that when he was ready to join duty, the Branch Manager has refused to permit him from joining duty. Exhibit W-7, is the Xerox copy of the letter from the second respondent/workman sent to the writ petitioner/bank with an acknowledgement due. The said letter is reproduced hereunder: From Sri. A. Selvakumar, Clerk Staff No. 1440, The Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd., Kandili Branch. To Assistant General Manager, Personnel Department, The Lakshmi Vilas Bank ltd., Administrative Office, Salem Road, Kathaparai, Karur-639 006. through The Manager, Kandili Branch Sir, Sub: Sri. A. Selvakumar, Clerk Staff No. 1440, Leave application joining report-regarding. Ref: Your ref. No. /L/211 93-94, dated 28.1.1994. With reference to the letter cited, I report myself for duty this day forenoon. I am to state that I have applied for sick leave on Medical certificate since 27.10.1993. I furnish below the details for proof of absence called for in your letter cited. 28. The letter has been addressed to the Assistant General Manger Karur District, through the Branch Manager. I am to state that I have applied for sick leave on Medical certificate since 27.10.1993. I furnish below the details for proof of absence called for in your letter cited. 28. The letter has been addressed to the Assistant General Manger Karur District, through the Branch Manager. Copy of the said letter is also stated to have been sent to the Divisional Manager, Salem for information. Reading of the abovesaid letter, dated 24.2.1994 clearly shows that by referring to the notice dated 28.1.1994, issued by the writ petitioner/bank, to the second respondent/workman under Clause 17 of the bipartite settlement, dated 10.4.1989, the second respondent/workman has explained to the management that he was not unauthorized absent and when he had applied for leave, the Manager, Kandili Branch Karur has passed orders, sanctioning leave for different spells, as per the details stated in the foregoing paragraphs. Perusal of the impugned order indicates that the petitioner bank has not at all considered the explanation. Thus on the basis of the abovesaid Exhibit Ws-7 and 8 and 9, Xerox copies of the letter dated 22.4.1994 and 25.4.1994, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Chennai has arrived at a prima facie conclusion that it is only the Branch Manager of the petitioner/bank, who had refused to permit the second respondent/workman to join duty and in the above said circumstances, the writ petitioner/bank ought not to have invoked Clause-17 of the bipartite settlement and terminated the petitioner, by striking off his name from the rolls of the bank. 29. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the second respondent/workman, when the said finding was assailed in W.P. (MD) No. 9076 of 2006, this Court agreeing with the contentions of the petitioner/bank that an opportunity ought to have been given to adduce additional evidence, at paragraph 6, in the above writ petition, has ordered as follows: 6. In the case on hand, if it is true that the petitioner bank refused to permit the second respondent to join duty when he turned up for duty on 26.2.1994, then, the Bank is entitled for let in additional evidence as to why he was not allowed on the said date. In the case on hand, if it is true that the petitioner bank refused to permit the second respondent to join duty when he turned up for duty on 26.2.1994, then, the Bank is entitled for let in additional evidence as to why he was not allowed on the said date. The first respondent, having come to the conclusion that the second respondent turned up for duty on 26.2.1994 and it was only the petitioner Bank which did not allow him to join duty, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the first respondent ought to have called upon the petitioner Bank to cite additional evidence justifying its action. Obviously, the said established procedure has not been followed by the first respondent. Thus, the impugned order in my considered opinion is defective, which requires interference at the hands of this Court. 30. When the matter was remanded, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal has framed the following points for consideration: (i) Whether the action of the respondent/management in terminating the services of the petitioner Sri. A. Selva Kumar with effect from 26.2.1994 without conducting any enquiry is justified? (ii) To what relief the concerned workman is entitled?. 31. Though learned counsel for the petitioner/bank reiterated that the second respondent/workman had not reported duty before the expiry of the 30 days i.e., according to the bank, on or before 26.2.1994 and it was also contended that even for the period between 27.10.1993 and 24.2.1994, no leave was sanctioned and even assuming that for the period of absentism, leave had been granted it was only to set right the record and that granting leave, subsequently, by the management would not absolve the misconduct, considering the limited scope of remand, permitting the management to adduce additional evidence, to justify, as to why the 2nd respondent/workman was not allowed to join duty, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Chennai, has categorically observed that even after adducing additional evidence, the petitioner bank was not able to spell out any valid reasons, justifying as to why the second respondent/workman, was not allowed to join duty in response to the notice from the bank. 32. 32. In A. Muthu v. Indian Overseas Bank etc., and Another (supra), the Manager of Indian Overseas Bank alleged to have absented from duty, has been issued with a notice directing him to join duty, within 30 days from the date of that notice, failing which it would be construed that he has voluntarily retired from the bank service. Stating that the bank did not receive any communication from the manager, regarding his joining of duty and that he did not report for duty within the stipulated time, the Bank by referring to Clause 17 of the bipartite settlement, dispensed with the procedure of holding a regular domestic enquiry and terminated the services of the petitioner therein. One of the grounds raised by the charged official, assailing the order of termination was that the expression "30 days from the date of notice referred to in Clause 17 of the bipartite settlement, should be read as the date of receipt of notice, and if it is read in such a way, the clause could be saved from the attack of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or otherwise, it would offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India as well as the principles of natural justice. Though a series of objections were raised by the management therein, at paragraph 11, this Court has held as follows: 11. The above extract of Cl. 17-a clearly shows that a notice has to be served on the petitioner at his last known address calling upon him to report for duty within 30 days of the date of notice and if the employee reports for duty within 30 days of the notice or gives an explanation for his absence within the said period of 30 days satisfying the Managing that he has not taken another employment or avocation and that he has no intention of not joining duties, the employee will be deemed to have voluntarily retired from bank's service on the expiry of the said notice. In my view, the date of notice has to be read as the date of receipt of the notice, otherwise, Clause XVII-A will be liable to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In my view, the date of notice has to be read as the date of receipt of the notice, otherwise, Clause XVII-A will be liable to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Applying the principles in the rulings to validate the clause in the agreement and if the clause is read as within 30 days from the date of the receipt of notice, the petitioner cannot have any objection. It is well-settled that if a clause stipulated in an agreement is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, it can be struck down and this principle is laid down in AIR India Vs. Nergesh Meerza and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 335 That apart, the shifting now is to a broader notion of 'fairness' or 'fair procedure' in any administrative action as laid down by the Supreme Court. 33. In Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Others, (1991) 1 SCC 600 Supp which is reproduced hereunder: 13. This conclusion can be reached by applying the principle of 'reading down' or re-casting the clause, in a limited situation. The Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (supra) at page 180 has held as follows: It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of the principle that when two interpretations are possible one rendering it constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the Legislature to enact the statute or from its violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. The second situation which summons its aid is where the provisions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is possible to gather the intention is of the Legislature from the object of the statute, the context in which it is made. However, when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous language and its intention is clear, it is not permissible either to mend or bend it even if such recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to remake the statute. However, when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous language and its intention is clear, it is not permissible either to mend or bend it even if such recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to remake the statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to the Legislature if it so desires, to amend it. What is further, if the remaking of the statute by the Courts is to lead to its distortion that course is to be scrupulously avoided. One of the situations further where the doctrine can never be called into play is where the statute requires an extensive additions and deletions. Not only it is no part of the Court's duty to undertake such exercise, but it is beyond its jurisdiction to do so. 34. At paragraph 231, the Supreme Court reiterated that "The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood therefore cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premises and uncertain applications. That will be a mockery of them. 35. In the light of the above decision, this Court finds there is force in the contention of the learned counsel for the second respondent/workman that when there was no dispute over the date of receipt of the notice by the 2nd respondent i.e., on 1.2.1994, the period for submitting an explanation or for reporting duty, expired only on 2.3.1994 and in such circumstances, the petitioner/bank, ought not to have struck off the name of the second respondent/workman from the rolls of the petitioner/bank, by invoking Clause 17 of the bipartite settlement, even before the expiry of the notice period. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the second respondent/workman that when striking off the name of the workman from the rolls by the petitioner/bank, amounts to termination as held by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd., v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji and Others (supra) and in D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (supra), and when the Apex Court again, reiterated that, even Certified Standing Orders do not expressly exclude the application of the principles of natural justice and when the Industrial Disputes Act has made amendments to the principles of natural justice by necessary implication from the specific provisions in the Act, like Sections 25-F, 25-FF, and 25-FFF etc., the petitioner/bank on receipt of the telegrams and letters, Exhibits W-5 to W-9, ought to have considered the explanation offered by the second respondent/bank, taken note of the contents of the telegrams and if for any reason, the petitioner/bank was not satisfied with the explanation or the reasons for absence, the petitioner/bank ought to have ordered for a regular domestic enquiry, instead of dispensing with the procedure. 36. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner/bank that even assuming that the letter dated 24.2.1994, can be treated as an explanation to the charge of unauthorized absence, still the petitioner/bank can invoke Clause 17 of the bipartite settlement, dated 10.4.1989 and strike off the name of the petitioner from the rolls, if accepted, it would pave way for an arbitrary exercise of power and there is no meaning, in calling upon an employee to submit an explanation for the alleged absence. 37. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to extract the order dated 28.2.1994 passed by the Assistant General Manager, Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited Karur, in striking off the name of the petitioner from the rolls. Ref: 1st notice under XVII of the Bipartite Settlement dated 10.4.1989. Please refer to the above. As per our notice, you have not reported for duty till 26.2.2004. Hence your name stands deleted from the rolls of the Bank with effect from 26.2.2004 (closing off office hours) as per aforesaid notice. Yours faithfully, Assistant General Manager Personnel Department. 38. Ref: 1st notice under XVII of the Bipartite Settlement dated 10.4.1989. Please refer to the above. As per our notice, you have not reported for duty till 26.2.2004. Hence your name stands deleted from the rolls of the Bank with effect from 26.2.2004 (closing off office hours) as per aforesaid notice. Yours faithfully, Assistant General Manager Personnel Department. 38. When the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Chennai, has categorically found that it was the petitioner/bank which refused to permit to join duty on 24.2.2004 i.e., well within 30 days of notice, the contention to the contra, is legally unsustainable. 39. Reading of Clause 17 of the Bipartite settlement dated 10.4.1989 gives an option to the workman alleged to have absented himself for a period of 90 days and more consecutive days, either report for duty within 30 days, of notice or to give an explanation for his absence within the said period of 30 days satisfying the management that he had not taken up another employment or on a vacation and that he had no intention of not joining duty and only when the employee fails to report within the stipulated time, as explained in Muthu's case (cited supra), or fails to offer his explanation, the employee would be deemed to have automatically retired from the bank service, on the expiry of the said notice. 40. Clause 17 of the bipartite settlement cannot be read to mean that if the charged workman does not report for duty, within 30 days of notice, he cannot submit any explanation, within the stipulated time. All that is required under Clause 17 of the Bipartite Settlement is satisfactory explanation for the absence that he had not taken up another employment during the period of absence, or he was not on vacation or had no intention of joining duty. In a given case, if the charged workman is hospitalized or immobilized due to any illness, he cannot be terminated, by simply striking off his name from the rolls of the bank, when he offers a reasonable explanation, by furnishing necessary evidence, for his absence. In such cases, it cannot be contended that appearance in person is compulsory. By adopting a narrow construction to Clause 17(a) of the Settlement, the Management cannot make personal appearance as a mandatory condition, for considering a valid explanation, offered by a charged workman. In such cases, it cannot be contended that appearance in person is compulsory. By adopting a narrow construction to Clause 17(a) of the Settlement, the Management cannot make personal appearance as a mandatory condition, for considering a valid explanation, offered by a charged workman. When the charged workmen is given the option, either to submit an explanation or report for duty, within the stipulated time, on reporting, the charged official can even personally explain the reasons for his absence, with supporting documents and the reporting officer is bound to consider the explanation and the evidence, produced by the charged workman. If the reporting officer is not satisfied with the oral explanation, supported with evidence, he can reject the explanation or he can forward the same to the management for appropriate action. He has no authority to refuse, reporting for duty. There is nothing in Clause 17(a) of the bipartite settlement to restricting explanation submitted through post or that it should be given in writing in person. 41. It is the case of the 2nd respondent/Workmen that on 24.2.1994, he had reported for duty, but he was not permitted to join duty. In view of the discussion, the contention of the petitioner/bank that the second respondent/workman did not report for duty as per Clause 17 of the bipartite settlement dated 10.4.1989 cannot be countenanced. All that is required is that an explanation should be submitted within 30 days either by reporting in person or submitting an explanation. If the reply is satisfactory, the workman shall be permitted to report for duty, without prejudice to the bank's right, to take any action under law and rules of service. If the explanation is not satisfactory, the Management can order for a regular domestic enquiry. 42. Going through the materials available on record and Clause 17 of the bipartite settlement dated 10.4.1989, extracted supra, this Court is of the view that when the second respondent/workman had submitted reply dated 24.2.1994 and also sent telegrams to the authorities, stating that he was prevented from joining duty, the petitioner/bank ought to have considered the reply in proper perspective and if the explanation for absence was not satisfactory, the management ought to have taken recourse to conduct a regular domestic enquiry, without deleting the name of the second respondent/workman from the rolls of the bank. 43. 43. The last contention to be considered as to whether the order of the Tribunal directing 50% of the back wages with continuity of service and other attendant benefits should be interfered with. The Tribunal in the award dated 22.8.2006, by observing that since the petitioner had not adduced any evidence, that he was all along without any employment, issued a direction to the bank, to reinstate the petitioner in service with continuity of service, and all other attendant benefits and further held that the second respondent/workman would be entitled to half of the back wages. 44. Not satisfied with the award, petitioner/bank has filed W.P. (MD) No. 9076 of 2006. During the pendency of the above writ petition, satisfying with the averments made in the supporting affidavit, filed under 17(B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court has ordered the petitioner bank to pay the last drawn wages. In the second round, the Tribunal after holding that termination amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice, equity, conscience, has once again directed reinstatement in service with continuity with all attendant benefits with 50% of back wages. 45. Record of proceedings shows that when the second respondent/workman was terminated from service, he had preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour under the Shops and Establishments Act in T.S.E. No. 8/94, challenging the order of termination, the appeal was allowed on 13.3.1997. Thereafter, the petitioner/bank had filed a writ petition before this Court in W.P. No. 561 of 199. By an order dated 12.12.2003, this Court allowed the writ petition, preferred by the petitioner/bank on the ground that the authority under Shops and Establishments Act had no jurisdiction to decide the matter and thereafter, the second respondent/workman has preferred I.D. No. 357 of 2004. He had spent nearly, 10 years, between the date of termination and date of filing of the first Industrial Dispute which came to be decided on 22.8.2006. After the remand, made in W.P. No. 9076 of 2006, dated 15.2.2008, the second award has been passed on 23.2.2010. Thus it could be seen that from 1994, till the date of passing of the second award, 16 years have gone. The present writ petition has been pending for nearly 2 years. After the remand, made in W.P. No. 9076 of 2006, dated 15.2.2008, the second award has been passed on 23.2.2010. Thus it could be seen that from 1994, till the date of passing of the second award, 16 years have gone. The present writ petition has been pending for nearly 2 years. For 18 long years, the 2nd respondent/workman has been litigating before the Appellate Authority, under Shops and Establishments Act, Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, and this Court. The contention of the petitioner bank that the 2nd respondent/workman should not have been given even 50% of back wages reflects the oppressive attitude of the employer. How would the family of a terminated employee survive for all these years? Even assuming he was engaged in some jobs, he would not have been employed with the same salary and emoluments, but certainly would have earned some amount to provide the basic needs to his family. Considering the plight of the second respondent/workman, this Court is of the view that the principles of justice, equity and good conscience applied by the Tribunal, in awarding 50% of back wages with attendant benefits, and continuity of service, cannot be said to be illegal. If the management had doubted about the veracity of the claim, they could have very well adduced evidence, even before the Tribunal or this Court in the proceedings u/s 17(B) of the Act. 46. In view of the above, the objection regarding payment of wages is overruled, the impugned award made in I.D. No. 357 of 2004, dated 23.2.2010 is sustained in all respects. The petitioner/bank shall disburse the arrears of wages and other attendant benefits, as ordered by the Tribunal, to the second respondent/workman, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. This writ petition is dismissed accordingly. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.