A. K. Goel CJ, J.— The reliefs sought for in this petition are: "(i) To declare that Section 25 and 36(2)(j) of the Assam Excise Act, 1910 and Rule 244 of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945 are illegal, unconstitutional, ultra vires and void and consequently the Assam Excise (Amendment) Rules, 2010 (published in the Assam Gazette, Extra-ordinary dated 29.09.2010) vide Notification dated 29.09.2010 issued by the Respondent No.2 (Annexure-3) is unconstitutional and void; and/or (ii) To set aside and quash Sections 25 and 36(2)(j) of the Assam Excise Act, 1910 and Rule 244 of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945 as well as the Assam Excise (Amendment) Rules, 2010 (published in the Assam Gazette, Extra-ordinary dated 29.09.2010) vide Notification dated 29.09.2010 issued by the Respondent No.2 (Annexure-3) is unconstitutional and void; and/ or (iii) Alternatively, to declare and set aside the aforesaid impugned Amendment as arbitrary, unconstitutional, ultra vires and void; and/or (iv) Alternatively, to read down Sections 25 and 36(2)(j) of the Assam Excise Act, 1910 and Rule 244 of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945 to remove the arbitrariness by setting aside and quashing the Assam Excise (Amendment) Rules, 2010 (published in the Assam Gazette, Extraordinary dated 29.09.2010) vide Notification dated 29.09.2010 issued by the Respondent No.2 (Annexure-3) as unconstitutional and void; and/or (v) Issue a direction to the Respondents authorities not to levy annual fees for foreign liquor retail 'off licence upon the members of the Association as per impugned provisions, and/or (vi) Issue a direction to the Respondents authorities to recall, rescind and otherwise forebear from giving effect to the Assam Excise (Amendment) Rules, 2010 (published in the Assam Gazette, Extra-ordinary dated 29.09.2010) vide Notification dated 29.09.2010 issued by the Respondent No.2 (Annexure-3) as unconstitutional and void." 2. The petitioner is an association of licence holders of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) and is aggrieved by the enhancement of rate of annual fee of licence for retail sale of IMFL for consumption of IMFL 'OFF' by 100% under Rule 244 of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945 framed with reference to Sections 25 and 3 6 of the Assam Excise Act, 1910. 3. The provisions of the Act provide that no intoxicant can be sold except under the authority and in accordance with terms and conditions of licence (Section 15). 3. The provisions of the Act provide that no intoxicant can be sold except under the authority and in accordance with terms and conditions of licence (Section 15). Section 25 of the Act provides for the licence fee which may be prescribed under the Rules made under Section 36(2)(g) of the Act. Rule 244 lays down table of fee for various licences. The annual fee for foreign liquor retail 'off licence was amended from time to time. In the year 2002, the fee was Rs.50,000/-. It has been raised to Rs. 1 lakh vide Notification dated 01.04.2011. 4. Objection of the petitioners are two fold: (i) There is no guideline for laying down the scale of fee. Power conferred by Section 25 authorising levy of fee under the Rules without there being any guideline amounts to excessive delegation and is unconstitutional. (ii) Even if the said power can be held to be guided by the policy and purpose of the Act, the power cannot be exercised arbitrarily. Increase of fee has to be reasonable and allowed after taking into account relevant considerations. 100% increase without indicating any basis thereof was arbitrary and unreasonable. The increase was uniform without taking into account the location or scale of sales of the retailers in question, thus treating unequals as equals. 5. The petition has been contested by filing an affidavit by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department. According to the respondents, licence fee is not a fee within the meaning of Entry 66 of List II of Seventh Schedule but was covered by Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as price for consideration for which the Government parted with its privilege for dealing with liquor. It was neither regulatory nor compensatory fee. Licence fee was enhanced in the interest of the Government revenue, after due consideration of all relevant aspects, including the increased volume of business, large number of IMFL licences operating in the State and ever increasing applications for such liences. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners submitted that in absence of statutory guidance as to the rate at which the licence fee could be levied, Section 25 was liable to be declared unconstitutional. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners submitted that in absence of statutory guidance as to the rate at which the licence fee could be levied, Section 25 was liable to be declared unconstitutional. Alternatively, the notification in question is liable to be struck down as making enhancement of licence fee without taking into account all relevant aspects, particularly when uniform rate was fixed for all the licencees without having regard to the location and scale of business. The fee was not compensatory as no quid pro quo existed in which case it could be said to be regulatory. Such fee could not be excessive. 8. In support of the above submissions, reliance has been placed on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court: (i) (1986)4 SCC 566 , State of M.P. & Ors. Vs. NandlalJaiswal & Ors., to submit that even though there was no fundamental right to carry on trade in liquor, in case where such right was allowed, the State was under an obligation to act in accordance with law; and could not act arbitrarily. (ii) (1971)2 SCC 236 , Indian Mica and Micanite Industries Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. [para 11), (1997) 2 SCC 715 , Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (1999)2 SCC 274 , Secundrabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners 'Association & Ors. Vs. Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad & Anr., [para 9 and 12], (2000)8 SCC 167 , A.P. Paper Milk Ltd. Vs. Govt. of A.P. & Anr. [para 24] and (2007) 6 SCC 317 , Gupta Modern Breweries Vs. State ofJ&K& Ors. [para 10] to submit that regulatory fee could not be excessive. 9. Learned counsel for the State submitted that delegation of power to prescribe rate of fee which was in the nature of price for parting with the exclusive privilege to deal with potable liquor could not be held to be excessive delegation. Such fee need not have element of quid pro quo nor was akin to regulatory fee. The concept of fee under Section 25 of the Act and Rule 244 of the Rules was not at par with the concept of fee considered in the judgments relied upon in the context of levy other than tax. None of the decisions relied upon deals with levy of fee for licence for potable liquor. The concept of fee under Section 25 of the Act and Rule 244 of the Rules was not at par with the concept of fee considered in the judgments relied upon in the context of levy other than tax. None of the decisions relied upon deals with levy of fee for licence for potable liquor. In such a case neither quid pro quo was required to be established nor the same was required to be within any limit. The fee in question was price for parting with exclusive privilege of the State to deal with potable liquor and the same could not be held to be arbitrary. Reliance has been placed on (1975) 1 SCC 737 , Har Shankar & Ors. Vs. The Dy. Excise and Taxation Commr. & Ors. [para 55] and (1996) 10 SCC 304 , Khoday Distilleries Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. [para 26]. 10. We have given our due consideration to the rival submissions. 11. The question for consideration is whether provision of Section 25 can be declared to be unconstitutional on the ground of excessive delegation and whether the scale of fee laid down can be held to violative of Article 14 of the Constitution being arbitrary and excessive. 12. In our view the answers have to be against the petitioners. Section 25 reads as follows: "25. Form and conditions of licences etc.— Every license, permit or pass granted under this Act- (a) shall be granted - (i) on payment of such fees, if any, (ii) for such period, and (iii) subject to such restrictions and on such conditions, and (b) shall be in such form and contain such particulars, as the Board, subject to any rules made under section 36, sub-section (2), clause (g) may direct either generally or in any particular instance in this behalf: Provided that no fee shall be charged for any permit granted under section 17 for the possession of an 'intoxicant' for bonafide private consumption or use." 13. Section 36 reads as under: "36. Power of State Government to make rules.- (1) The State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to Excise revenue. (2) In particular and without prejudice to generality to the foregoing provision, the State Government may make rules - "244. Power of State Government to make rules.- (1) The State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to Excise revenue. (2) In particular and without prejudice to generality to the foregoing provision, the State Government may make rules - "244. Annual fees for foreign liquor retail 'Off and 'On' licences. (g) regulating the periods for which and the persons to whom licenses for the sale of any intoxicant may be granted and providing for selection of sites at which shop may be opened;" 14. Rule 244 is as follows: (1) License for the retail sale of foreign liquor to the public for consumption of 'Off the premises.... Rs. 1 lac." 15. It is well settled that though essential legislative functions have to be performed by the legislature, power of laying down details can be delegated to the Rule making authorm. Guidelines may be expressly spelt out or may be inferred from the object and purpose of the Act. It may not be possible for the legislature to for see all situations and to provide for all details in a statute. Reference may be made to settled law in this regard. 16. In Registrar of Coop. Societies I .v K. Kunjabmu, (1980) 1 SCC 340 , it was observed: "3. It is trite to say that the function of the State has long since ceased to confined to the preservation of the public peace, the exaction of taxes and the defence of its frontiers. It is now the function of the State to secure to its citizens "Social, economic and political justice", to preserve "liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship" and to ensure "equality of status and of opportunity" and "the dignity of the individual" and the 'unity of the nation'. That is what the preamble to our Constitution says and that is what is elaborated in the two vital chapters of the Constitution on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy. The desire to attain these objectives has necessarily resulted in intense legislative activity touching every aspect of the life of the citizen and the nation. Executive activity in the field of delegated or subordinate legislation has increased in direct, geometric progression. It has to be and it is as it should be. The desire to attain these objectives has necessarily resulted in intense legislative activity touching every aspect of the life of the citizen and the nation. Executive activity in the field of delegated or subordinate legislation has increased in direct, geometric progression. It has to be and it is as it should be. Parliament and the State Legislatures are not bodies of experts or specialists. They are skilled in the art of discovering the aspirations, the expectations and the needs, the limits to the patience and the acquiescence and the articulation of the views of the people whom they represent. They function best when they concern themselves with general principles, broad objectives and fundamental issues instead of technical and situational intricacies which are better left to better equipped full time expert executive bodies and specialist public servants. Parliament and the State Legislatures have neither the time nor the expertise to be involved in detail and circumstance. Nor can Parliament and the State Legislatures visualise and provide for new, strange, unforeseen and unpredictable situations arising from the complexity of modern life and the ingenuity of modern man. That is the raison d'etre for delegated legislation. That is what makes delegated legislation inevitable and indispensable. The Indian Parliament and the State Legislatures are endowed with plenary power to legislate upon any of the subjects entrusted to them by the Constitution, subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution itself. The power to legislate carries with it the power to delegate. But excessive delegation may amount to abdication. Delegation unlimited may invite despotism uninhibited. So the theory has been evolved that the legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function. Legislate it must by laying down policy and principle and delegate it may to fill in detail and carry out policy. The legislature may guide the delegate by speaking through the express provision empowering delegation or the other provisions of the statute, the preamble, the scheme or even the very subject-matter of the statute. If guidance there is, wherever it may be found, the delegation is valid. A good deal of latitude has been held to be permissible in the case of taxing statutes and on the same principle a generous degree of latitude must be permissible in the case of welfare legislation, particularly those statutes which are designed to further the Directive Principles of State Policy. 9. A good deal of latitude has been held to be permissible in the case of taxing statutes and on the same principle a generous degree of latitude must be permissible in the case of welfare legislation, particularly those statutes which are designed to further the Directive Principles of State Policy. 9. In Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602 , Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. made some useful observations which may be extracted here: "In regard to this matter we desire to make two observations. In the context of modern conditions and the variety and complexity of the situations which present themselves for solution, it is not possible for the Legislature to envisage in detail every possibility and make provisions for them. The Legislature, therefore, is forced to leave the authorities created by it an ample discretion limited, however, by the guidance afforded by the Act. This is the ratio of delegated legislation, and is a process which has come to stay, and which one may be permitted to observe is not without its advantages. So long therefore as the Legislature indicates, in the operative provisions of the statute with certainty, the policy and purpose of the enactment, the mere fact that the legislation is skeletal, or the fact that a discretion is left to those entrusted with administering the law, affords no basis either for the contention that there has been an excessive delegation of legislative power as to amount to an abdication of its functions, or that the discretion vested is uncanalised and unguided as to amount to a carte blanche to discriminate. The second is that if the power or discretion has been conferred in a manner which is legal and constitutional, the fact that Parliament could possibly have made more detailed provisions, could obviously not be a ground for invalidating the law." 17. In Consumer Action Group Vs. State of T.N., (2000) 7 SCC 425 , it was observed 17. In Registrar of Coop. Societies Vs. K. Kunjabmu, (1980)1 SCC 340 , this Court was considering Section 60 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932 which empowered the State Government to exempt the existing society from any of the provisions of the Act or to direct that such provisions shall apply to such society with specified modifications. In Registrar of Coop. Societies Vs. K. Kunjabmu, (1980)1 SCC 340 , this Court was considering Section 60 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932 which empowered the State Government to exempt the existing society from any of the provisions of the Act or to direct that such provisions shall apply to such society with specified modifications. This Court held: (SCC p. 343 & 346, paras 3 & 12) "The legislature may guide the delegate by speaking through the express provision empowering delegation or the other provisions of the statute, the Preamble, the scheme or even the very subject-matter of the statute. If guidance there is, wherever it may be found, the delegation is valid. ... Section 60 empowers the State Government to exempt a registered society from any of the provisions of the Act or to direct that such provision shall apply to such society with specified modifications. The power given to the Government under Section 60 of the Act is to be exercised so as to advance the policy and objects of the Act, according to the guidelines as may be gleaned from the Preamble and other provisions which we have already pointed out, are clear." 18. The catena of decisions referred to above concludes unwaveringly in spite of a very wide power being conferred on the delegatee that such a section would still not be ultra vires, if guidelines could be gathered from the Preamble, Objects and Reasons and other provisions of the Acts and Rules. In testing the validity of such provision, the courts have to discover, whether there is any legislative policy, purpose of the statute or indication of any clear will through its various provisions. If there be any, then this by itself would be a guiding factor to be exercised by the delegatee. In other words, then it cannot be held that such a power is unbridled or uncanalised. The exercise of power of such delegatee is controlled through such policy. The fast-changing scenario of economic, social order with scientific development spawns innumerable situations which the legislature possibly could not foresee, so the delegatee is entrusted with power to meet such exigencies within the inbuilt check or guidance and in the present case to be within the declared policy. The exercise of power of such delegatee is controlled through such policy. The fast-changing scenario of economic, social order with scientific development spawns innumerable situations which the legislature possibly could not foresee, so the delegatee is entrusted with power to meet such exigencies within the inbuilt check or guidance and in the present case to be within the declared policy. So the delegatee has to exercise its powers within this controlled path to subserve the policy and to achieve the objectives of the Act. A situation may arise, in some cases where strict adherence to any provision of the statute or rules may result in great hardship, in a given situation, where exercise of such power of exemption is to remove this hardship without materially affecting the policy of the Act, viz., development in the present case then such exercise of power would be covered under it. All situations cannot be culled out, which have to be judiciously judged and exercised, to meet any such great hardship of any individual or institution or conversely in the interest of the society at large. Such power is meant rarely to be used. So far as decisions relied on by the petitioner, where the provisions were held to be ultra vires, they are not cases in which the Court found that there was any policy laid down under the Act. In A.N. Parasuraman, AIR 1954 SC 465 , the Court held Section 22 to be ultra vires as the Act did not lay down any principle or policy. Similarly, in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair4, AIR 1958 SC 909 , Section 7 was held to be ultra vires as there was no principle or policy laid down. 19. In Johns Teachers Training Institute Vs. Regional Director, National Council for Teacher Education, (2003) 3 SCC 321 , it was observed: "12. The question whether any particular legislation suffers from excessive delegation has to be decided having regard to the subject-matter, the scheme, the provisions of the statute including its preamble and the facts and circumstances in the background of which the statute is enacted. (See Registrar of Coop. The question whether any particular legislation suffers from excessive delegation has to be decided having regard to the subject-matter, the scheme, the provisions of the statute including its preamble and the facts and circumstances in the background of which the statute is enacted. (See Registrar of Coop. Societies v. K. Kunjabmu, (1980)1 SCC 340 , and State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh, AIR 1967 SC 212 ) It is also well settled that in considering the vires of subordinate legislation one should start with the presumption that it is intra vires and if it is open to two constructions, one of which would make it valid and the other invalid, the courts must adopt that construction which makes it valid and the legislation can also be read down to avoid its being declared ultra vires." 20. In K. T. Plantation (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 , it was observed: "60. Law is settled that the court shall not invalidate a legislation on the ground of delegation of essential legislative functions or on the ground of conferring unguided, uncontrolled and vague powers upon the delegate without taking into account the Preamble of the Act as also other provisions of the statute in the event they provide good means of finding out the meaning of the offending statute. The question whether any particular legislation suffered from excessive delegation, has to be determined by the court having regard to the subject-matter, the scheme, the provisions of the statute including its Preamble and the facts and circumstances and the background on which the statute is enacted. See Bhatnagars & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 7 SCC 463 and Mohmedalli v. Union of India, (1996) 10 SCC 304 . 61. Further, if the legislative policy is formulated by the legislature, the function of supplying details may be delegated to the executive for giving effect to the policy. Sometimes, the legislature passes an Act and makes it applicable, in the first instance, to some areas and classes of persons, but empowers the Government to extend the provisions thereof to different territories, persons or commodities, etc. So also there are some statutes which empower the Government to exempt from their operation certain persons, commodities, etc. Some statutes authorise the Government to suspend or relax the provisions contained therein. So also there are some statutes which empower the Government to exempt from their operation certain persons, commodities, etc. Some statutes authorise the Government to suspend or relax the provisions contained therein. So also some statutes confer the power on the executive to adopt and apply statutes existing in other States without modifications to a new area." 21. Applying the above law, it cannot be held that Section 25 of the Act was unconstitutional. Liquor trade has been held to be res extra commercium and exclusive privilege of the State. Policy of the legislation has been laid down under the Act to regulate the trade by licences for which fee can be prescribed as per policy of the State, which is well recognized. Such fee in law is neither in the nature of tax nor in the nature of fee as a levy but in the nature of price for parting with the privilege to trade in liquor, which is not otherwise a right. The mechanism is time tested. No rigid guidance may be laid down by legislature for scale of such nature of fee and the matter may be covered by executive policy making in the light of experience and exigencies of situation. The matter in this regard is covered by law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to in subsequent part of this order. 22. As regards the notification enhancing the licence fee from Rs.50,00/- to Rs. 1,00,000/-, we are of the view that the decisions relied upon on behalf of the petitioners are not applicable. Therein the fee levied is either for the services rendered, to be justified on the principle of quid pro quo or is regulatory which cannot be excessive and has to be justified with reference to considerations which are to be kept in mind. Fee for the liquor licence of potable liquor is not covered by the said considerations. As held in Har Shankar, such fee is price for parting with the privilege of the State to deal with liquor. No doubt, scale of such fee can be graded, depending upon the location and scale of business but there is no legal bar to prescribe uniform rate. 23. In Har Shankar Vs. Dy. Excise & Taxation Commr, (1975) 1 SCC 737 , it was observed: "55. No doubt, scale of such fee can be graded, depending upon the location and scale of business but there is no legal bar to prescribe uniform rate. 23. In Har Shankar Vs. Dy. Excise & Taxation Commr, (1975) 1 SCC 737 , it was observed: "55. Since rights in regard to intoxicants belong to the State, it is open to the Government to part with those rights for a consideration. By Article 298 of the Constitution, the executive power of the State extends to the carrying on of any trade or business and to the making of contracts for any purpose. As observed in Harinarayan Jaiswal case, (1972) 2 SCC 36 , (SCC p. 44, para 13) "if the Government is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 becomes irrelevant. Citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to the Government, nor can there be any infringement of Article 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights." Section 27 of the Act recognises the right of the Government to grant a lease of its right to manufacture, supply or sell intoxicants. Section 34 of the Act read with Section 59(d) empowers the Financial Commissioner to direct that a licence, permit or pass be granted under the Act on payment of such fees and subject to such restrictions and on such conditions as he may prescribe. In such a scheme, it is not of the essence whether the amount charged to the licensees is pre-determined as in the appeals of Northern India Caterers and of Green Hotel or whether it is left to be determined by bids offered in auctions held for granting those rights to licensees. The power of the Government to charge a price for parting with its rights and not the mode of fixing that price is what constitutes the essence of the matter. Nor indeed does the label affixed to the price determine either the true nature of the charge levied by the Government or its right to levy the same. 56. The distinction which the Constitution makes for legislative purposes between a "tax" and a "fee" and the characteristics of these two as also of "excise duty" are well-known. Nor indeed does the label affixed to the price determine either the true nature of the charge levied by the Government or its right to levy the same. 56. The distinction which the Constitution makes for legislative purposes between a "tax" and a "fee" and the characteristics of these two as also of "excise duty" are well-known. "A tax is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not a payment for services rendered"(Per Latham C.J. in Mathews v. Chickory Marketing board, 60 CLR 263,276). A fee is a charge for special services rendered to individuals by some governmental agency and such a charge has an element in it of a quid pro quo. Excise duty is primarily a duty on the production or manufacture of goods produced or manufactured within the country. The amounts charged to the licensees in the instant case are, evidently, neither in the nature of a tax nor of excise duty. But then, the "licence fee" which the State Government charged to the licensees through the medium of auctions or the "fixed fee" which it charged to the vendors of foreign liquor holding licences in Forms L-3, L-4 and L-5 need bear no quid pro quo to the services rendered to the licensees. The word "fee" is not used in the Act or the Rules in the technical sense of the expression. By "licence fee" or "fixed fee" is meant the price or consideration which the Government charges to the licensees for parting with its privileges and granting them to the licensees. As the State can carry on a trade or business, such a charge is the normal incident of a trading or business transaction. 57. While on this question, we may with advantage cite a passage from American Jurisprudence (Vol. 30, pp. 642, 645) which is based on the decisions in Gundling v. Chicago, 44 L Ed 728, Phillips v. Mobile, 52 L Ed 578 and Richard v. Mobile, 52 L Ed 581, It says: "the familiar principle that the imposition of licence fees on useful and honourable occupations must not exceed the cost of issuing the licence, plus the expense of inspecting and regulating the business licensed... is not necessarily applicable to a liquor license. The liquor traffic is not something which is licensed for the purpose of promoting it. is not necessarily applicable to a liquor license. The liquor traffic is not something which is licensed for the purpose of promoting it. Indeed, licence fees may be exacted in amounts intended to discourage participation in the business. The courts have quite generally refused to hold that the licence fee imposed, merely because it is large, is a tax, where the object is to control, regulate, and restrict, and not to encourage the liquor traffic, the revenue being the result of the system and not the motive for its adoption .... The higher the fee imposed for a licence, it is sometimes said, the better the regulation, as the effect of a high fee is to keep out the business those who are undesirable, and to keep within reasonable limits the number of those who may engage in it." 58. In the view we have taken, the argument that the Government cannot by contract do what it cannot do under a statute must fail. No statute forbids the Government from trading in its own rights or privileges and the statute under consideration, far from doing so, expressly empowers it by Sections 27 and 34 to grant leases of its rights and to issue the requisite licences, permits or passes on payment of such fees as may be prescribed by the Financial Commissioner. 59. The argument that in Cooverjee case the impugned power having been exercised in respect of a centrally administered area, the power was not fettered by legislative lists loses its relevance in the view we are taking. It is true that in that case it was permissible to the Court to find, as in fact it did, that the fee imposed on the licensees was "more in the nature of a tax than a licence fee". As the authority which levied the fee had the power to exact a tax, the levy could be upheld as a tax even if it could not be justified as a "fee", in the constitutional sense of that term. But the "licence fee" or "fixed fee" in the instant case does not have to conform to the requirement that it must bear a reasonable relationship with the services rendered to the licensees. But the "licence fee" or "fixed fee" in the instant case does not have to conform to the requirement that it must bear a reasonable relationship with the services rendered to the licensees. The amount charged to the licensees is not a fee properly so-called nor indeed a tax but is in the nature of the price of a privilege, which the purchaser has to pay in any trading or business transactions." 24. The above observations fully cover the issue against the petitioners. In these circumstances, we are unable to hold that fixation of fee is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 25. For the above reasons we do not find any merit in this petition. Dismissed. _____________