JUDGMENT S.K. MISHRA, J. : In this writ petition the Management of M/s. Hotel Hans Coco Palms has assailed the award dated 9th July, 2010 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar, (hereinafter referred to as the “Tribunal” for brevity) in Industrial Dispute Case No.144 of 2008 answering the reference in favour of the workman-opposite party. The industrial dispute was referred by the Government of Odisha to answer the following :- “Whether the termination of services of Sri Milan Das, House Keeper, w.e.f. 27.5.1993 by the Management of M/s. Hotel Hans Coco Palm, Puri is legal and/or justified ? If not, to what relief he is entitled to ? 2.The admitted facts of the case is that the workman was working as a Receptionist in Hotel Prachi, Puri, since 22.4.1983. The said Hotel was under the management of M/s. Sun and Beach Hotel (P) Ltd. On 1.8.1992 M/s. Sun and Beach Hotel (P) Ltd. under a deed of licence handed over the management of the Hotel to M/s. Hotel Hans (P) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “M/s. Hotel Hans” for brevity). The workman continued to work in the said Hotel. It also transpires that Hotel Prachi was renamed as M/s. Hotel Hans Coco Palms. Till April, 1993 the workman was getting salary of Rs.1250/- per month. In April, 1993 he was promoted as House Keeper and his salary was enhanced to Rs.1601/-. On 26.5.1993 he was transferred to work in Hans Plaza, New Delhi. He made a representation to recall the order of transfer, but it was turned down. 3.The disputed questions relate to the pleadings that under the terms of the Licence, the management of the Hotel was being controlled by M/s. Hotel Hans, but the transfer order was issued by the management of M/s. Sun and Beach, which was devoid of any authority. That apart, the workman could not have been transferred by M/s. Sun and Beach to work in Hans Plaza, New Delhi, which is not a sister concerned of the former. He further pleads that after the transfer order was served on him, he had gone to the Hotel to meet the Manager, but he was denied to enter into the Hotel Premises. He further pleads that after the transfer order was served on him, he had gone to the Hotel to meet the Manager, but he was denied to enter into the Hotel Premises. With such denial of entry w.e.f. 27.5.1993 he was denied employment which amounts to retrenchment, but it is not in accordance with the provisions laid down under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for brevity). The further case of the workman is that since he and some other workmen made a demand for better service conditions, the order of transfer was issued and it amounts to unfair labour practice. The Management, however, pleads that the workman at the relevant time was in a supervisory/managerial post getting salary of Rs.1601/- per month and, therefore, he is not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act. Further plea is that since he had already been transferred to Delhi he was no longer on the roll of M/s. Hotel Hans. On the other hand, he was on the roll of Hotel Hans, New Delhi. Therefore, the workman cannot raise the industrial dispute in Odisha for want of territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Further, the management pleads that the workman did not obey the order of the management and waited till 13.12.1993 affording the workman opportunity to report the duty at Delhi and at last vide letter dated 13.12.1993 terminated his services paying all legal dues in the shape of bank draft. 4.At the first instance, the Tribunal answered the question in favour of the workman. The said order was assailed in W.P.(C) Nos.4832 and 12357 of 2009, which were disposed of by this Court giving a direction to the Tribunal to cast an additional issue to decide whether the second party is a workman as defined under the Act. Accordingly, after remand, the case was taken up and the impugned order has been passed. The Tribunal after taking into consideration the materials placed before it, has come to the conclusion that the workman was not working in a managerial or supervisory capacity while he was discharging the duty as House Keeper and answered the issue framed against the management. The Tribunal further came to the conclusion that it has territorial jurisdiction over the matter and refusal of the employment to the workman on and from 27.5.1993 took place in Odisha. The Tribunal further came to the conclusion that it has territorial jurisdiction over the matter and refusal of the employment to the workman on and from 27.5.1993 took place in Odisha. Therefore, the Tribunal held that there has been violation of conditions enshrined in Section 25-F of the Act and the workman is entitled to be reinstated with full back wages and other benefits. Such findings are assailed in this writ petition. 5.In assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner urged three contentions. Firstly, it was contended that the Tribunal has erroneously placed the onus of proving that the second party was a workman within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Act, and therefore, there has been a miscarriage of justice. Secondly, it is contended that the materials available on record show that the workman has admitted that he had received a sum of Rs.1601/- per month as salary and as he was discharging duties in a supervisory capacity being the House Keeper is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. Thirdly, it is contended that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the case as the termination order was passed at Delhi on the refusal of the workman to join his duty on transfer. 6.The workman appeared himself and filed his written arguments. Though this Court has ordered that Mr. D.P. Nanda to act as an amicus curiae on the behalf of the workman, he refused to take assistance of the amicus curiae and, accordingly, he submitted his argument himself. In the written argument he has submitted that the contention of the management that the Tribunal has placed the onus on the management to prove that the workman was discharging duties of a supervisory post is erroneous and this point has already been decided by the Tribunal and, therefore, the issue is hit by the principles of res judicata. As far as jurisdictional issue is concerned, the workman submitted that the Tribunal has correctly decided the issue in his favour holding that the Tribunal at Odisha has jurisdiction over the matter. 7.The first issue involved in this case is whether the opposite party is a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act. As far as jurisdictional issue is concerned, the workman submitted that the Tribunal has correctly decided the issue in his favour holding that the Tribunal at Odisha has jurisdiction over the matter. 7.The first issue involved in this case is whether the opposite party is a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act. Section 2(s) of the Act reads as follows :- “Section 2(s) - Workman means any person (including apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hiere or reward whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - (i)who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950, or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957), or (ii)who is employed in the police service or as officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii)who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or (iv)who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, function mainly of a managerial nature)” Taking into consideration this provision, the Tribunal has held that such question is required to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case and the materials on record. It is further held that if the main works is of manual, clerical or technical nature, the mere fact that some supervisory or other work is also done by the employee incidentally or as a small fraction of his work, it will not take him out of the purview of the definition of a workman. There is no dispute regarding the fact that the opposite party was working as a House Keeper at the relevant time and he was receiving salary in excess of Rs.1600/- per month. There is no dispute regarding the fact that the opposite party was working as a House Keeper at the relevant time and he was receiving salary in excess of Rs.1600/- per month. While dealing with the materials available on record, the Tribunal has disbelieved the case of the management on the ground that the only witnesses were examined to prove that the workman was working as a House Keeper having supervisory authority over the house boys/maids, who were working under his direction and control. It is further noted that neither the letter of appointment nor any Service Rule indicating the nature of duties to the performed by a House Keeper has been exhibited on behalf of the management. At page-7 of the impugned judgment in the third unnumbered paragraph, the Tribunal has categorically held that “The onus is on the management to prove that the work of a House Keeper is of supervisory character”. Thus, it is apparent that the Tribunal has placed the onus of proving that the workman was discharging the function of a supervisor. It is hotly contested that such placing of onus on the management is contrary to law. 8.The workman has relied upon the reported case of Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia (dead) through L.Rs.; AIR 1975 SUPREME COURT 1898, wherein it has been taken note by the Supreme Court that there was no paper produced to show any entrustment of managerial or administrative duty to the respondent while he was working as a mere Accountant. The workman further relied upon the case of S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra and another, AIR 1984 SUPREME COURT 1462, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the definition of workman included a Development Officer in the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The Supreme Court further held that the words ‘any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work’ are not intended to limit or narrow the amplutude of the definition of ‘workman’ on the other hand they indicate and emphasize the broad sweep of the definition which is designed to cover all manner of persons employed in an industry, irrespective of whether they are engaged in skilled work or unskilled work, manual work, supervisory work, technical work or clerical work. The Supreme Court further held that the broad intention is to take in the entire ‘labour force’ and exclude ‘the managerial force.’ 9.On the contrary the petitioner has also relied upon the case of the case of ELECTRONICS CORPN. OF INDIA LTD. Vs. ELECTRONICS CORPN. OF INDIA SERVICE ENGINEERS UNION; (2006) 7 Supreme Court Cases 330 wherein at paragraph-10 of the judgment the Supreme Court has held that the High Court accepted that the onus was on the persons claiming to be workmen to prove that they are workmen as defined in the Act. It came to a peculiar conclusion that since the preliminary issue was raised by the employer the onus shifts to it. 10.Having considered the aforesaid cases, this Court is of the opinion that once the relationship of employer and employee is admitted by the employer and the employer submits that the employee was working in a supervisory capacity and is excluded from the definition of workman as provided under Section 2(s) of the Act, then the onus is on the management to prove that the employee was in fact not discharging the manual duty. This is more so when it is brought to the notice of the Court that originally the workman was working as a Receptionist and he was given promotion to work as a House Keeper, then it was the duty of the employer to produce the letter of promotion and the terms and conditions on which the workman was working. A mere oral assertion to that effect will not be sufficient as has been held by the Tribunal. 11.A subtle difference has to be kept in mind, the management denies the very assertions that the person concerned was an employee of the management, then the onus is on the workman to prove the same. But once it is admitted that a person was an employee and was working in the capacity as a workman, but he was given promotion and as such he became a part of the management, then the onus shifts to the management to prove that the employee was not a workman within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Act. Accordingly, this Court comes to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the Tribunal does not suffer from any illegality requiring interference in exercise of judicial review power of the High Court on this issue. Accordingly, this Court comes to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the Tribunal does not suffer from any illegality requiring interference in exercise of judicial review power of the High Court on this issue. 12.The next question is regarding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. In answering this issue, the Tribunal has taken into consideration that the reference of the alleged termination of service of the workman was w.e.f. 27.5.1993. However, according to the management the services of the workman was terminated on 13.12.1993. However, the Tribunal has taken into consideration that 27.5.1993 is the relevant date as mentioned in the reference and on which date he was refused to entry into the Hotel premises, i.e. his work place. The management, on the other hand, submitted that on 27.5.1993 the workman was allowed to enter inside the Hotel to meet the Manager, who advised him to proceed to New Delhi to join in his duties in Hotel Hans Plaza. The Tribunal has held that the order of transfer is found to be malafide and/or legally not binding on the workman. As the order of transfer could not have been passed by M/s. Sun and Beach, he could not have directed to work in Hans Plaza, New Delhi. According to the workman when the management of the Hotel along with the services of the existing workmen was taken over by M/s. Hotel Hans w.e.f. August, 1992 under an agreement of License, the management of M/s. Sun and Beach had not power and authority to transfer the workman by passing an order of transfer in the month of May, 1993. M/s. Sun and Beach and M/s. Hotel Hans are two different entities and during the subsistence of the Licence Agreement, the Manager of M/s. Sun and Beach could not have passed the order of transfer and that too with a direction to join in Hotel Hans Plaza, New Delhi, which is not shown to be a sister concern of M/s. Sun and Beach. Further, it is apparent from the record that the workman received salary for the month of April, 1993 on 20.5.1993, which is just six days prior to the order of transfer. Further, it is apparent from the record that the workman received salary for the month of April, 1993 on 20.5.1993, which is just six days prior to the order of transfer. Holding that the action of the management to be unfair labour practice, the Tribunal has held that the order passed by the management is contrary to law and, therefore, the termination pursuant to such order of transfer is also illegal. 13.In this case, it is apparent from the record that the order of transfer was issued by M/s. Sun and Beach, which was not the management and has no control over the employees as the hotel was being managed by M/s. Hotel Hans. As such the order of transfer is illegal and any action taken thereto or arising out of such transfer order is also illegal. In pursuance of the order passed by M/s. Sun and Beach, the workman was denied work at Puri and he was directed to work at New Delhi, this amounts to retrenchment as the workman was denied to work at Puri. In that view of the matter the cause of action or at least a part of the same arose within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal at Odisha and hence the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the matter in question. 14.Since both the issues are decided against the management, there is no plausible ground to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal and, accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Petition dismissed.