JUDGMENT : N.V. Anjaria, J. By means of this Appeal, the appellant-original accused challenged judgment and order dated 10th January 1996 of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Valsad, Camp Valsad, in Sessions Case No.84/1994, whereby the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced to life imprisonment. 2. It was the case of the prosecution revealed from the complaint lodged by Leeluben Kantibhai, the wife of the deceased Kantibhai, which came to be recorded as First Information Report (Exh. 15), that as usual her husband was to go to sea in a boat to catch the fish on 27.08.1986. The accused was to accompany him as a sailor (Khalasi). On the night of 26.08.1986, the appellant went to the house of the deceased Kantibhai and asked for Rs. 200/-. Kantibhai offered Rs. 100/- and told him that he would give the remaining amount later. The accused did not accept the money and went back, came again after some time, took out a knife from his pocket and stabbed Kantibhai in the abdomen. The injured Kantibhai was taken to Valsad Civil Hospital for treatment in the car of one Harishbhai, a resident of the village. The complainant stated that while there were no other eye witnesses of the incident, she had seen herself the accused stabbing her husband. 2.1. The offence was registered initially under section 324 of I.P.C. Subsequently offence of murder was added as Kantibhai died during treatment at Surat Mahavir Hospital on 16.11.1986. The offence was investigated and a charge-sheet (Exh. 10) came to be filed in the court of Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Valsad. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions as the offence was exclusively triable by Sessions Court. Sessions Case No.84 of 1994 was registered. 2.2. The prosecution examined 8 witnesses and produced documentary evidence to prove its case. Upon conclusion of trial, trial court recorded statement of the accused under section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The trial culminated into the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence of the appellant-accused. 3. Learned advocate Ms. Sadhna Sagar appearing for the appellant submitted that there were no eye witnesses to the incident except complainant herself, who was the wife of the deceased. It was submitted that the trial court could not have based the conviction on the basis of her evidence. 3. Learned advocate Ms. Sadhna Sagar appearing for the appellant submitted that there were no eye witnesses to the incident except complainant herself, who was the wife of the deceased. It was submitted that the trial court could not have based the conviction on the basis of her evidence. According to learned advocate, she apart from being a sole eye witness. She could not have been treated as an independent witness because she was the wife of the deceased. According to learned advocate the trial court committed an error in convicting the accused on the basis of the testimony of that sole witness. It was submitted that her account of incident was not reliable as she stated in her evidence only that the deceased was wounded in the abdomen without specifying as to on which part of abdomen the knife was applied. It was further submitted that in the complaint her case was that the deceased died due to assault and injury inflicted by the appellant but when the injured was taken to the hospital, while giving history, she stated that her husband died because of injury caused for the reason that a piece of tin-sheet pierced through as he fell down while working on the vessel. 3.1. It was next submitted that the incident took place on 16.08.1986 whereas the deceased died after a span of three months on 16.11.1986. By relying on the evidence of Dr. Ramratan (PW 4), it was submitted that had the deceased received proper treatment, he could have been saved and therefore it could not be said that the cause of injury was knife-wound even if the case of the prosecution was to be believed. 3.2. As against that learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Mr. R.C. Kodekar, submitted that the medical evidence was clear on the cause of death. He submitted that the death had occurred due to knife injury and having regard to the description of the injuries available from the medical evidence, they were such as caused with a forceful blow of knife in the abdomen. It was submitted that the act of the accused in applying knife was a conscious act. It was predetermined and the offence was an offence of murder. Learned A.P.P. submitted that the evidence of complainant was natural and her testimony could not be treated untrustworthy only on the ground that she was related to the deceased. 4. It was submitted that the act of the accused in applying knife was a conscious act. It was predetermined and the offence was an offence of murder. Learned A.P.P. submitted that the evidence of complainant was natural and her testimony could not be treated untrustworthy only on the ground that she was related to the deceased. 4. We went through the evidence on record and in that context considered the rival submissions. 4.1. The incident was seen by the complainant Liluben (PW-3, Exh.26), wife of the deceased, who was a solitary eye-witness. Her evidence was that on the fateful night, the accused who was to go with her husband for catching fish in the next morning, came to their house and demanded money. When her husband stated that he could give Rs.100/- instead of Rs. 200/-, as he had only that much amount, the accused got angry and went away. Thereafter at around 11.00 a.m. when they both were sitting near the door of their house, the accused came back and assaulted her husband with a knife and injured him in the abdominal region. She stated that on that night some altercation took place between the accused and the deceased for money, but no fight or even a scuffle had resulted. The injured was taken to Valsad Hospital where he was treated for seventeen days, thereafter was shifted to a private hospital at Billimora and took 11 days treatment there. Thereafter, again treatment of another doctor was taken. According to her evidence, the accused used to go with her husband as a sailor in the boat along with other sailors and that both had friendly relations. In her evidence she admitted that she had given a wrong history to the doctor that her husband was injured by a tin sheet which was deliberately done so that the doctor accepts the case of her husband in medical treatment. Her deposition was consistent with the contents of the complaint she lodged. 4.2. It is true that P.W.-3 was the only eye witness who was present at the time of incident and saw the act of crime by the accused. She was wife of the deceased and her evidence was dependable. Her deposition was consistent with the contents of the complaint she lodged. 4.2. It is true that P.W.-3 was the only eye witness who was present at the time of incident and saw the act of crime by the accused. She was wife of the deceased and her evidence was dependable. It is not possible to countenance the argument by the appellant's advocate that P.W.-3 being a solitary witness and related to the accused, on the basis of her testimony, conviction could not have been recorded. In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 AIR SCW 1835, the Supreme Court observed that testimony of solitary witness can be the basis for conviction. It was observed that our legal system lays emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is therefore open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on the solitary witness and record conviction. It was observed that the bald contention that no conviction can be recorded in case of a solitary eye witness has no force and must be negatived. In Vadivelu Tevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 it was observed that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. Unless corroboration is insisted upon by the statute, the courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence that the corroboration should be insisted upon. 4.3. In Namdeo (supra) the Supreme Court also observed that merely because a witness was a relative of the deceased or victim of a crime cannot be characterised as an interested witness, though evidence of a relative witness would be required to be scrutinised carefully. Once his evidence is found reliable and probable, conviction can be based on sole testimony of such witness. The Supreme Court observed that on the contrary close relative of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. 4.4. As P.W.-3 was the sole eye witness, her evidence was closely considered. It was found that she deposed not only naturally but she was candid in giving the facts. The Supreme Court observed that on the contrary close relative of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. 4.4. As P.W.-3 was the sole eye witness, her evidence was closely considered. It was found that she deposed not only naturally but she was candid in giving the facts. She admitted that wrong information about cause of injury was given by her so that the doctor admitted her husband for treatment. Her evidence could neither be discarded nor could be discredited on a spacious ground that she was a related witness. P.W.-3's evidence as solitary eye witness was trustworthy and therefore was sufficient to convict the accused. When read together with the medical evidence on record discussed hereinafter, medical evidence was congruous that the death was the result of knife blow in the abdomen which was accounted by P.W.-3 in her evidence. It was sought to be argued that P.W.-3 did not mention in his deposition as to on which side of abdomen the knife was applied. P.W.-3 could not have been expected to notice as to on which particular part the knife was being applied while witnessing a sudden and ghastly attack on her husband. Non-mentioning by P.W.-3 about the exact part where knife blow was given, was not a major or material lacuna in her evidence. It was rather an insignificant and inconsequential aspect. 4.5. The postmortem of the deceased was performed by Dr. Rajankhan (PW-2) the Medical Officer at the Primary Health Centre. The postmortem report (Exh.20) described injuries as under: "(1) Huge old vertical wound on left side of umlicus, (2) round old wounds Bilaterally on udiac region, (3) Edges of the wound were Blackish, (4) The Peritonium, muscles & rectus sheeth were adherent to each other. Bad smelling blackish Rus like fluid were discharging from the wound." 4.6. The cause of death was mentioned as peripherol shock due to dehydration due to old homicidal injuries in the abdomen. The death certificate (Exh.19) mentioned cause of death as 'Cardio Respiratory arrest with dehydration with Hypoglycermia'. Postmortem was done on 17.11.1986. 4.7. The evidence of Dr. Ramratan (PW-4, Exh.7), who was working as Medical Officer at Valsad Municipal Hospital examined the injured after the incident. He mentioned two injuries. The death certificate (Exh.19) mentioned cause of death as 'Cardio Respiratory arrest with dehydration with Hypoglycermia'. Postmortem was done on 17.11.1986. 4.7. The evidence of Dr. Ramratan (PW-4, Exh.7), who was working as Medical Officer at Valsad Municipal Hospital examined the injured after the incident. He mentioned two injuries. First was a scratch of 6 x ½ x ½ cm long below the ribs on the right side of stomach. The second injury was a sharp wound extending deep down on the left side of navel. P.W.-4 further stated that the intestines of the deceased were in swollen condition. In the small intestine, water level was very high. During the operation, he found an opening of the wound which was on the left side and barely 2cm from navel, that rector's muscles were found cut. The lower peritoneum was also cut by 2cm size. The blood was clotted inside. A hole was seen in the big intestine. He stated that the wound was incised wound and was caused by a sharp edged weapon. He opined that the injury was sufficient in normal course to cause death. 4.8. P.W.-2 in his evidence (Exh.25) indicating the injuries stated that the external injuries were (1) a vertical old wound on the left of navel, (2) ball shaped injuries below the abdomen on the right side as well as on the left part and (3) the edges of injuries were blackened. A stinking black liquid was oozing out from the wound. He further stated that there was infection in the intestine could arise either because of carelessness on part of the patient or for want of timely and proper medical treatment. He stated that he had signed postmortem note (Exh.20) which was in his own handwriting and a separate certificate indicating cause of death (Exh.19) was also given by him. He opined that the dehydration was caused on account of old injury, because of which heart and lungs had stopped functioning leading to death of the patient. Thus, he explained that the cause of death mentioned in his certificate (Exh.19) was the result of old injury. Dr. Rajeshbhai Desai (PW1, Exh.24) who was full time surgeon at Surat Mahavir Hospital where the injured was admitted and died on 16.11.1986. Thus, he explained that the cause of death mentioned in his certificate (Exh.19) was the result of old injury. Dr. Rajeshbhai Desai (PW1, Exh.24) who was full time surgeon at Surat Mahavir Hospital where the injured was admitted and died on 16.11.1986. In his evidence, he referred to the death certificate (Exh.19) and further observed that when the patient was admitted, he had serious injuries; there were several holes in the intestine and further that the patient was very weak. He stated that the holes in the intestine could be either because of injury or due to infection. 5. A reading of medical evidence showed that the cause of death was the injuries in the abdomen which extended deep into the intestine. The cause of death was established. The death had therefore straight nexus with the injuries suffered by the deceased in the incident that took place on 26.08.1986 in the night of 26.08.1986. The injuries were serious and were on the vital part and they in their nature were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course. 6. The cumulative reading of the evidence on record discussed above duly establish that the evidence of murder was committed by the appellant-accused, who mercilessly wounded the deceased with knife. The knife was applied forcefully on the left side of abdomen of the deceased which was a vital part of the body. The accused mounted the attack without any cause, quarrel or instigation. An intention to kill could well be inferred. The medical evidence proved the serious nature of the injury and indicated that it was sufficient in nature to cause death in ordinary course. The incident of attack on the deceased by the accused was witnessed by P.W.-3 whose testimony was found fully reliable and trustworthy. Thus, the ingredients of offence of murder under section 300 I.P.C. were satisfied on evidence and the commission of offence punishable under section 302 was proved. 6.1. Lastly, the contention that the deceased lived for 17 days after the date of incident, and therefore, had he been given proper treatment, he would not have died, may be examined. On such basis, it was submitted that the offence of murder was not made out. The medical evidence was relied on in support of the contention. 6.1. Lastly, the contention that the deceased lived for 17 days after the date of incident, and therefore, had he been given proper treatment, he would not have died, may be examined. On such basis, it was submitted that the offence of murder was not made out. The medical evidence was relied on in support of the contention. That the deceased died after gap of 17 days was of no consequence, nor the argument that better treatment would have saved the deceased could be accepted when on evidence it was established that the death occurred because of the injuries inflicted by the accused and was the direct result of his act of assault. 6.2. Once it is proved on evidence as in the present case, that the injury was the outcome of a criminal act of the accused and in their nature they were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course, Explanation to section 299 would have its play, which reads as under: "299. Whoever causes death by doing an act with the such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. Explanation 1. xx xx xx Explanation 2. Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented. Explanation 3. xx xx xx" Explanation 2 excludes the consideration of nature of treatment in adjudging whether the act in question amounts to an offence of murder. In Sellappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 15 SCC 327 the Supreme Court observed as under: "Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons # being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons # being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid." 7. In view of the above discussion and reasons, the judgment and order of the trial court did not warrant interference. No error was committed by the trial court in convicting the accused for the offence of murder and sentencing him for that. The impugned judgment and order dated 10th January 1996 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Valsad, Camp Valsad, in Sessions Case No.84 of 1994 is accordingly confirmed. The present appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.